The study of plant signaling and behaviour, whose aim is to address the physiological basis for adaptive behaviour in plants, is a growing and thought-provoking field of research. In this review we discuss relevant studies that try to interpret in a neurocognitive fashion cases in which plants seem to behave similarly to animals. By comparing observations and experiments about plants and animals, we propose a framework composed of three axes in which interactions of living organisms with the world can be (...) represented. The first axis refers to adaptiveness, the second to sensitivity, and the third to sentience. This model allows us to interpret the behaviours of living organisms along a continuum capable of giving a smooth transition from simple to complex responses. In light of this, plants show an excellent adaptiveness, a variable level of sensitivity, and a good degree of sentience (restricted to the immediate perception that something is happening to themselves). Only the organisms with a high degree of sentience can have the basis for developing consciousness. However, even though it is necessary for consciousness, sentience is not sufficient, as it must be associated with a complex functional organization of structures that can support a recursive and synchronized processing of information. So far, plants have been found to completely lack this type of organization. Plants appear to be, therefore, sentient but not conscious. (shrink)

Riassunto: L’esperienza cosciente sembra essere un soggetto di studio elusivo per la ricerca neuroscientifica. Tuttavia, da un punto di vista operazionale e neurocognitivo, l’esperienza cosciente può essere vista come una collezione di eventi inseriti in una cornice bidimensionale. Una dimensione è relativa al livello di vigilanza o grado di veglia, l’altra dimensione è relativa ai contenuti esperienziali, gli oggetti della nostra consapevolezza fenomenica. A dispetto della variabilità di queste due dimensioni, il senso di unità cosciente sembra essere di norma profondo, (...) reale e immediato. Nondimeno, alcune condizioni neurologiche avvalorano l’ipotesi che quest’unità sia il risultato di una costruzione operata da delicati e complessi meccanismi cerebrali. Si esamineranno pertanto, in una prospettiva neurocognitiva, i dati provenienti da alcune ricerche empiriche su pazienti affetti da epilessia, i risultati degli esperimenti condotti su persone split-brain e di minima coscienza, che dimostrano come l’esperienza cosciente si basi su un’organizzazione modulare del cervello. Parole chiave: Coscienza; Modularità; Livello; Contenuto; Epilessia; Split-brain; Stato di minima coscienza Modularity and Conscious Experience in a Neurocognitive Perspective: Conscious experience seems to be an elusive matter of study for neuroscientific research. From an operational and neurocognitive point of view, however, conscious experience can be considered as a collection of events within a bidimensional framework. One dimension relates to wakefulness or the level of arousal, the other dimension relates to experiential contents, the objects of our phenomenal awareness. The variability of these two dimensions notwithstanding, the sense of conscious unity generally appears to be deep, real and immediate. Still, certain neurological conditions provide evidence for the hypothesis that this unity may be the result of a construction achieved by subtle and complex brain mechanisms. Taking the neurocognitive perspective, I will examine data coming from empirical research on patients with epilepsy and present some results from experiments conducted on split-brain patients and individuals in a minimally conscious state, which show how conscious experience may be rooted in the modular organisation of the brain. Keywords: Consciousness; Modularity; Level; Content; Epilepsy; Split-brains; Minimally Conscious State. (shrink)

This study reviews research about the recognition of one’s own face and discusses scientific techniques to investigate differences in brain activation when looking at familiar faces compared to unfamiliar ones. Our analysis highlights how people do not possess a perception of their own face that corresponds precisely to reality, and how the awareness of one’s face can also be modulated by means of the enfacement illusion. This illusion allows one to maintain a sense of self at the expense of a (...) precise discrimination of self-face. The internal dynamics of different brain processes, associated with the construction of bodily identity and the sense of self and capable of integrating signals from different sensory channels, particularly visual and tactile, create a mirror-mask effect. According to this effect, the self-face reflected by a mirror becomes a mask for the self, which has the features of the subject’s face, but nonetheless does not correspond perfectly to its characteristics. This poses interesting questions about the nature and construction of one’s self, as self-face reflections allow the mind to mediate between analogue and virtual reality, between past and future events, between memories and plans of action and, most importantly, between beliefs about our identities. (shrink)