Early Buddhism has been described as a “gnostic soteriology” in that itsees the chief cause of life’s unsatisfactoriness to be ignorance of certain metaphysical truths, and that once this ignorance is eliminated through awareness of the true nature of reality, the suffering that is rooted in ignorance goes away with it. In what follows, I will describe a significant problem that early Buddhism faces, as does any gnostic soteriology, and propose a solution to the problem. This is a (...) quasi-analytic study of early Buddhist epistemology in that it applies some of the standard ideas about knowledge that have guided analytic epistemology for some time to a specific problem that confronts the early Buddhist attempt to claim that knowing some truths about reality will transform us in some significant way. When speaking of “early Buddhism” in what follows, I intend those teachings contained in thePali canon, which the Theravada tradition has sought to preserve. Historically Buddhism quickly moves away from the Theravada focus on nirvana and into the various schools of the “Great Vehicle” of the Mahayana Tradition. My characterization of Buddhism as a gnostic soteriology refers only to a form of Buddhism that may be limited to the earliest part of the movement and the conservative wing that has sought to preserve its earliest form ever since. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt at opening parallel but contrastive avenues into the respective Christian and Buddhist outlooks with respect to the metaphysical notion of relativity in contradistinction with the concept of the Absolute. The main thesis is that Christianity and Buddhism present us, in their respective normative intellectual economies, with analogous, yet profoundly different ways of envisioning metaphysics from the vantage point of their sui generis soteriology. In other terms, our argument is that Christian and Buddhist (...) metaphysics are essentially informed by the tenets of their spiritual way, whether redemptive or emancipative. Furthermore, these forms of “soteriological metaphysics” could be encapsulated in the twin nutshells of an “absolutization of the relative” on the one hand, and a “relativization of the absolute” on the other hand. The first formula refers, more specifically, to Christian Trinitarian theology, and the second to the Buddhist ontology of emptiness. These two formulas provide a theoretical framework that suggests both the internal coherence of each tradition and the ways in which this coherence is variously understood within the tradition itself. In the soteriological emphasis of these two traditions lies a possible—but not exclusive—way to open a wider space for a hermeneutics of aspects and vantage points, as well as for warding off any overly rigid conceptual crystallizations through a deeper recognition of the interplay between principled intellectual unity and the manifold of human existence. This essay is the second section of the article, and focuses on the Buddhist tradition. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt at opening parallel but contrastive avenues into the respective Christian and Buddhist outlooks with respect to the metaphysical notion of relativity in contradistinction with the concept of the Absolute. The main thesis is that Christianity and Buddhism present us, in their respective normative intellectual economies, with analogous, yet profoundly different ways of envisioning metaphysics from the vantage point of their sui generis soteriology. In other terms, our argument is that Christian and Buddhist (...) metaphysics are essentially informed by the tenets of their spiritual way, whether redemptive or emancipative. Furthermore, these forms of “soteriological metaphysics” could be encapsulated in the twin nutshells of an “absolutization of the relative” on the one hand, and a “relativization of the absolute” on the other hand. The first formula refers, more specifically, to Christian Trinitarian theology, and the second to the Buddhist ontology of emptiness. These two formulas provide a theoretical framework that suggests both the internal coherence of each tradition and the ways in which this coherence is variously understood within the tradition itself. In the soteriological emphasis of these two traditions lies a possible—but not exclusive—way to open a wider space for a hermeneutics of aspects and vantage points, as well as for warding off any overly rigid conceptual crystallizations through a deeper recognition of the interplay between principled intellectual unity and the manifold of human existence. This essay is the first section of the submission, which is focusing on the Christian tradition. (shrink)

Bradley S. Clough’s Early Indian and Theravāda Buddhism seeks to retrieve the soteriological diversity of early Buddhism that has been masked by the systematizing efforts of the Theravāda commentarial tradition. Deliberately breaking from the custom of reading the Pali Canon through the systematizing lens of the great fifth-century CE commentator Buddhaghosa, his monumental Visuddhimagga in particular, Clough points to evidence in the canonical texts for a variety of paths to liberation that resist efforts at harmonization and integration. Chapter 1 examines (...) evidence in the Canon for two paths in particular: the path of concentration and the path of wisdom or insight . These two paths correspond to two forms of meditative practice, namely, the cultivation of tranquility and the cultivation of insight . In the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa will integrate these into a single path, specifically a three-stage sequence—morality, concentrati .. (shrink)

This paper makes a number of observations on soteriology, asceticism and the female body in two Indian Buddhist narrative. The first story examined is about the enlightenment of the Buddhist saint Yasas from a collection of verses know as the Anavatapta-gatha, or Songs of Lake Anavatapta. This narrative graphically describes a rotting female corpse and associates this physical corruption with the female body in general. The second story is about a mythical girl from the ancient past found (...) in the Mahayana scripture, the Gandavyuha-sutra. The female protagonist is described as exceedingly beautiful and her beauty functions as a sign of her spiritual superiority and as a means to aid beings. After a summary of these two tales, their soteriological presuppositions are discussed. Next,the effect of Buddhist soteriology upon the construction of gendered bodies in Indian Buddhism is considered. The author argues that the first story represents an ascetic soteriology that sees the female body as corrupt, while the second story displays an alternative devotional soteriology that extols female beauty as linked to virtue and as efficacious for religious development. The paper concludes with the suggestion that the narratives employing the image of the corrupt female body were meant for a male monastic audience; while the Gandavyuha with its devotional soteriology may have been composed with a royal female audience in mind. Thus target audience should be considered when studying Indian Buddhist narratives. (shrink)

Extant discussions of Buddhist mereology give minimal attention to the soteriological significance of denying the reality of wholes. This is unfortunate, because the connection between mereology and soteriological is both significant and problematic. The connection is significant, because it supports an argument for the unreality of composite wholes that does not depend upon any claim about the nature of wholes. The connection is also problematic, because some Buddhists endorse the soteriological relevance of mereology despite admitting that composite wholes are (...) real. I address these issues by reviewing early Pāli Buddhist attitudes toward the soteriological significance of mereology, developing an argument for the unreality of wholes from the work of Buddhaghosa, and explicating an alternative approach from the Chinese tradition of Huayan 華嚴 Buddhism that calls into question some common assumptions about parts and wholes. (shrink)

The ideas of a “Buddha” or of his “enlightenment” suggest a certain unity and coherence. In accord with the positivist and metaphysical realist attitudes of our times, many assume that a Buddha is defined by his awakening, which is conceived of as a definitive, clear-cut event with specific characteristics. Enlightenment is a “thing,” a recognizable state of mind or change of consciousness, or perhaps a similar kind of process, which may be beyond the grasp of words, but is nevertheless confidently (...) identifiable and ascertainable. Although this state of mind is generally portrayed as a negation—non-duality, non-attachment, the uprooting of ignorance, the realization of... (shrink)

The functions of new metaphors in early tantric Buddhism are analysed in the paper. Two models of religious practice are concerned. According to both of them, the goal of tantric practice is permanent modification of the practitioner’s cognitive activity. That modification can be understood as willingness to implement particular metaphors spontaneously into the process of perceptive data interpretation. Those metaphorical concepts are closely related to the conception of Buddha nature. Religious practice of Vajrayâna can be seen as striving for experiential (...) substantiation for the main of those metaphors (mind is mandala). Special act of visualization in ritual context is expected to be such substantiation. Six types of metaphors important in the soteriology of the early Vajrayâna can be distinguished. All of them are discussed in the paper. (shrink)

: This is an attempt to clarify a vital ontological aspect of Tiantai teaching created by the sixth-century Chinese Buddhist monk Zhiyi. To do this Tiantai must first be distanced from Mou Zongsan's interpretation of its central pattern of nonduality, a reconstructive theory that refers to both Chinese Buddhism and Confucianism and sees a "two-level ontology" in Chinese philosophical traditions, grounded in both the Chinese Buddhist patterns of "nonduality between the sacred and the profane" and the Kantian distinction (...) between "noumena and phenomena." Part 1 of this article is a critical analysis and evaluation of Mou's theory, concluding that the Buddhist patterns of nonduality and the Kantian distinction are not mutually convertible. Part 2 focuses on Tiantai ontology in the specific context of its soteriological relevance, demonstrating that the ideal of "universally saving all sentient beings" in Tiantai soteriology must presuppose the conception of "nonduality of/between the sacred and the profane," and that the ambiguous ontological status of existing things corresponds to this soteriological doctrine in a manner that can only be expressed by a "paradoxical articulation." The ontological meaning of Tiantai teaching is then specified with regard to Zhiyi's discussion of reality and the diversity of existing things. The three constitutive elements of Tiantai Buddhism—the soteriological doctrine of nonduality, ontological indeterminacy, and paradoxical articulation—are all based on an ideal of universal salvation that excludes a level of "being" transcending the realm of sentient beings. This conclusion directly controverts Mou's metaphysical notion of a "two-level ontology.". (shrink)

The ‘mind-made body’ is seen as a subtle body attained by a Buddhist adept during meditative practice. Previous research has elucidated this concept as having important doctrinal significance in the Buddhist cosmological system. The P?li canonical evidence shows that the manomaya-k?ya is not merely a spiritual byproduct of meditative training, but also a specific existential mode of being in the system of the three realms. Studies of the manomaya-k?ya to date, however, have focused mostly on early P?li materials, (...) and thus do not encompass theoretical development and soteriological significance of this notion in later tradition. As a beginning step to fill this gap, this article explores the meanings of the manomaya-k?ya represented in the?r?m?l?dev? S?tra and the two treatises of the Ratnagotravibh?ga??stra and the Foxing lun, which are doctrinally based on the?r?m?l?dev? S?tra in their discussion of the manomaya-k?ya. Through the observation of the manomaya-k?ya in these Mah?y?na texts, this article seeks to demonstrate how the concept is used in the broader cosmological and soteriological system of Mah?y?na tradition. For this purpose, I first review the meanings of the manomaya-k?ya in early Buddhist texts and then observe the cosmological and soteriological meaning of the notion by analyzing the theoretical connection between the three Mah?y?na texts. (shrink)

Most Buddhists would admit that every Buddhist practice and theoretical construct can be traced to or at least subsumed under one or more among the four nobles’ truths. It is hardly surprising, then, that listening to these truths and pondering upon them were considered the cornerstones of the Buddhist soteric endeavour. Learning them from a competent teacher and subjecting them to rational analysis are generally regarded as taking place at the very beginning of the religious career or, to (...) put it otherwise, still as an ordinary person along the preparatory path. At this stage, the discursive nature of the four nobles’ truths fits well the didactic and intellectual requirements of early religious practice. But how about the subsequent, more distinctively intuitive/non-conceptual stages of a mystic’s career? How to interpret, for instance, our sources’ strong emphasis on the four nobles’ truths as forming the content of the first pivotal event on the path, the so-called path of vision? And how to understand a philosopher’s claim that the yogic path exhausts itself in one’s learning, rationally analyzing and mentally cultivating the four nobles’ truths? In order to understand this, one has to turn to Abhidharmic interpretations of the four truths as embodying the ultimately true aspects of reality itself. Here, the truths are not regarded as a didactic device encapsulating the entire Buddhist law, but as the basic sixteenfold structure of the real. It is, of course, these ultimately true aspects that the path of cultivation is supposed to make directly perceptible to the yogin, thus enabling him to get rid of ignorance. (shrink)

영지주의는 우주와 세계의 근원이자 발현자로서의 순수의식이며 모든 존재의 원천이 자 존재 그 자체의 동일자로서 시간과 공간을 넘어선다. 모든 생명 존재의 내면에 빛나는 존재이기 때문에 근원적이고 궁극적인 일자(一者)이면서 다시 모든 생명체에 내재된 보 편적 신성(神性)”1)을 추구하는 종교사상이다. ‘영지’란 ‘영혼의 지혜’를 의미하며 그리스 어 그노시스(Gnosis)의 번역어이다. 지식을 의미하는 Gnosis는 외부세계에 대한 인식과 배움을 통한 지식을 의미하지 않는다. 본질직관이나 내적 영감(靈鑑)과 같이 개인의 독립 적이고 주체적인 ‘신비체험’에 의해서 체득하여 깨닫는 지식을 의미한다. 그러므로 그노 시스는 인간의 영혼과 우주 만물에 내재하는 신이나 근원적 일자를 체험을 (...) 통하여 통찰 하는 것이다. 근원적 일자(一者)를 ‘영혼’과 ‘지성’을 통해 깨달아 궁극적 절대성으로 회귀하는 영지 주의 구원론이 성립하기 위해서는, 먼저 인간은 이 ‘영혼’과 ‘지성’을 자기의 본질로 삼아 야 한다. 또한 그 ‘영혼’은 순선(純善)하거나 조리(條理)적 완전성을 가진 성선(性善)이어 야 한다. 그리고 그 ‘지성’은 궁극적 일자(一者)의 본체성을 경험과 학습을 통해 후천적으 로 인식하는 것이 아닌, 선험적이고 본래적인 생득성을 가져야 한다. 동아시아의 종교 사상은 이와 같은 영지주의적 성격을 명확하게 나타내고 있다. 대승불 교의 불성론은 인간존재의 본질이 깨달음을 통한 해탈에 이를 수 있음을 보여주고 있고, 유교사상에서도 맹자의 성선론을 기초로 내면의 근원적 순수의식을 통찰하는 수양론을 가 지고 있다. 성리학의 미발(未發)공부론과 양명학의 치양지(致良知) 공부론 등은 동아시아의 영지주의 수행론과 수양론의 성격을 명확하게 나타내고 있는 것이다. (shrink)

Identity and Experience: The Constitution of the Human Being According to Early Buddhism. Sue Hamilton. Luzac Oriental, London 1996. xxxi, 218 pp. £30.00. ISBN 0 898942 10 2. The Five Aggregates: Understanding Theravada Psychology and Soteriology. Mathieu Boisvert. (Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religious Writings, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ontario, 1995. xii, 168 pp. $24.95. ISBN 0-88920-257-5.

The doctrine of emptiness (śūnyavāda) is of significant soteriological importance for the Madhyamaka Buddhism. Therefore it is a reasonable prima facie demand that interpretations of emptiness must accord with this fact. This hermeneutic consideration has been taken to present particular problems for Mark Siderits' semantic interpretation of śūnyavāda. This paper examines Siderits' attempted reconciliation of his semantic interpretation of śūnyavāda with its purported soteriological aspects. I question whether Siderits can successfully respond to these problems in order to adequately incorporate the (...) hermeneutic requirement. I argue that the semantic view is not immune to the problems that it was formulated to avoid. It too can be asserted. What is more, the semantic view can generate its own particular forms of attachment which can obscure soteriological goals. These conclusions lead me to question the general project of trying to develop a soteriologically efficacious interpretation of śūnyavāda in the first place. (shrink)

Early Buddhism was not interested in questions about existence and the nature of God, considering these unimportant in relation to the question of the release from earthly suffering which is at the heart of Buddhist soteriology. Later Buddhist thought considered theism incompatible with Buddhist doctrine, but at the same time Buddhism developed a dimension of devotion that resembled theistic faith. Conscious of their different religious heritage, Buddhist thinkers in more recent times have nevertheless embraced dialogue (...) with monotheistic religions, emphasizing their common ethical preoccupations, while retaining the non-theistic viewpoint of traditional Buddhism. (shrink)

In this article I would like to reflect on Buddhist soteriology in light of debates in cognitive science and philosophy of mind on the nature of folk psychology. My point of departure is the argument of Paul and Patricia Churchland that our commonsense understanding of mind and behavior can, and indeed should, be transformed on the basis of scientific knowledge of the brain and its functioning. Like many theorists in the 1980s and 1990s, the Churchlands regarded folk psychology—our (...) natural and spontaneous interpretation of human behavior in terms of mental states, preeminently beliefs and desires—as a theory akin to those folk theories used to explain natural phenomena in default of the modern scientific theories... (shrink)

This highly original work explores the concept of self-awareness or self-consciousness in Buddhist thought. Its central thesis is that the Buddhist theory of self-cognition originated in a soteriological discussion of omniscience among the Mahasamghikas, and then evolved into a topic of epistemological inquiry among the Yogacarins. To illustrate this central theme, this book explores a large body of primary sources in Chinese, Pali, Sanskrit and Tibetan, most of which are presented to an English readership for the first time. (...) It makes available important resources for the study of the Buddhist philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Epistemology – the study of the nature and scope of knowledge – has been an integral topic in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist scholastic communities for the past 1500 years. This article provides an overview of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, emphasizing the central role that the concept of pramana plays in Indian theories of knowledge. After elucidating the two pramanas accepted by the Buddhist epistemological tradition, the article concludes by discussing the relationship between Buddhist epistemology and (...) class='Hi'>Buddhist soteriology. (shrink)

This chapter sheds new light on the interaction between Chinese Buddhism and Confucianism by exploring and comparing the thoughts of the ninth century Huayan-Chan Buddhist Zongmi 宗密 and the twentieth century Neo-Confucian Mou Zongsan 牟宗三. It reveals the structural parallel between their opposing theories: both hold a doctrine of true mind as the central component, and both are influenced by the tathāgatagarbha 如來藏 doctrine of The Awakening of Faith. The former uses them to synthesize Huayan and Chan Buddhist (...) soteriology; the latter assimilates them into his framework of Neo-Confucian moral metaphysics. Seen as a response to Zongmi’s criticism of Confucian metaphysics in general, and the shortcomings of the mandate of heaven and the lack of causal theory in particular, Mou stresses the universality of the Confucian Dao, which is supported by the Song Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi’s unified ontological principle. Rather than appealing to the mandate of heaven, Mou makes clear in following Wang Yangming that the Confucian Dao can be manifested by the sage through his infinite intellectual mind, which is immanent in every human being, so as to solve the problem of the highest good without postulating a transcendent god nor appealing to the karmic causality. Mou’s response, supplemented by other Neo-Confucian theories such as Xiong Shili’s and Tang Junyi’s, is a prominent example of how Confucian tradition meets the challenge of Chinese Buddhism while absorbing Buddhist influence. However, the author also points out that Mou’s Neo-Confucian philosophy provides a possibility of defending Chinese Buddhism in face of the critique raised by Critical Buddhism. (shrink)

The purpose of the research is to explicate the Buddhist principles of ethical analysis of premeditated murder as an immoral act. The author solves this problem through the method of case study of exegetical treatises of outstanding Buddhist thinkers Vasubandhu (4th-5th centuries) and Yašomitra (8th century). It is shown that the ethical analysis of premeditated murder is based on a religious anthropological concept (the Buddhist doctrine of human action producing karmic retribution). Sinful intent is interpreted as an (...) immoral mental urge that generated a verbal intention to take the life of a certain person or a certain animal. According to the canonical point of view, there are three mental roots of immoral acts - greed, hatred, ignorance. The ethnical analysis of sinful intent is aimed at determining the connection of intent with any of these three mental phenomena. In accordance with this principle, Buddhist thinkers have identified three types of premeditated murder. All of them produce a “black” (unfavorable) karmic fruit, i.e. an unfortunate form of rebirth, exacerbating physical suffering. Great attention is paid by the author to the problem of the karmic responsibility of individuals ordering murders and the executors of such orders. In the considered sources, the verbal order to kill and its physical execution are interpreted as equally immoral actions that produce collective karmic responsibility. The author of the research examines in detail a special class of premeditated murder, fraught with inevitable infernal retribution. This class includes murders of benefactors (mother, father, arhat) and Buddhist ascetics practicing asceticism. These malicious sins were interpreted as an insurmountable obstacle to achieving a soteriological goal, even in the distant transcendental future. It is shown that Buddhist exegetes have developed principles for diagnosing these sins and characterized the immoral personal characteristics of sinners (disrespect towards parents, Buddhist preachers and religious ascetics, heretical denial of spiritual values, shamelessness, arrogance, ignorant self-will, misanthropy). (shrink)

I examine the consistency between contemporary environmentalist ideals and Buddhist philosophy, focusing, first, on the problem of value in nature. I argue that the teachings found in the Pāli canon cannot easily be reconciled with a belief in the intrinsic value of life, whether human or otherwise. This is because all existence is regarded as inherently unsatisfactory, and all beings are seen as impermanent and insubstantial, while the ultimate spiritual goal is often viewed, in early Buddhism, as involving a (...) deep renunciation of the world. Therefore, the discussion focuses mostly on the Mahāyāna vehicle, which, I suggest has better resources for environmentalism because enlightenment and the ordinary world are not conceived as antithetical. Still, many contemporary green ideas do not sit well with classical Mahāyāna doctrines. Mahāyāna philosophers coincide in equating ultimate reality with ‘emptiness,’ and propose knowledge of this reality as a final soteriological purpose. Emptiness is generally said to be ineffable, and to involve the negation of all views. An important question is how to reconcile environmentalism with the relinquishing of views. I consider several prevalent themes in environmentalism, including the philosophy of ‘Oneness,’ and other systems that are often compared with Buddhism, like process thought. Many of these turn out to have more in common with an extreme view that Buddhism seeks to avoid, namely, eternalism. I attempt to outline an environmental position that, like the doctrine of emptiness, traverses a Middle Path between eternalism and nihilism. I conclude by proposing that emptiness could be regarded as the source of value in nature, if it is seen in its more positive aspect, as ‘pliancy.’ This would imply that what Buddhist environmentalists should seek to protect is not any being in its current form, nor any static natural system, but the possibility of adaptation and further evolution. (shrink)

The research examines the features of the Mahayana world of Chinese Buddhism in the system of worlds of Mahayana Buddhism. A definition is given of the concept of “worlds of Mahayana Buddhism” as divergent constructs formed in the areas of distribution of Buddhism, as well as the world of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism. The specific features of Mahayana Buddhism in China, formed as a result of its assimilation on traditional religious and sociocultural grounds, are shown. The factors that prevented the entry (...) of Buddhism into the civilizational space of China and determined its formation there over the course of several centuries are indicated. The role of the Prajnaparamita texts, the Lotus Sutra, the Nirvana Sutra and the Avatamsaka Sutra in the formation of schools of Chinese Buddhism is revealed. The role of the Mahaparinirvana Sutra in the formation of the idea of an instant path to salvation in China is especially emphasized. The importance of the idea of an instant way of salvation for the formation of Chinese schools itself is shown. An analysis is given of the formation of the philosophical and soteriological direction in China, which took a different direction than in India, where the development of Madhyamaka ideas led to an emphasis on the epistemological aspects of the doctrine of emptiness, while in China attention was focused on its ontological aspects. The significance of the problem of truly existing is indicated as one of the main problems of philosophical research of the Tiantai, Chan, Huayan schools of Chinese Buddhism, as well as the idea of instantly achieving Buddhahood, which became the main soteriological guideline of these schools. It is indicated that in Tibet the development of philosophical and soteriological directions was developed in line with Indian Buddhism. The reasons for the Tibetans' choice of the soteriological path of the gradual movement of nirvana, which determined the development of Buddhism in their country, are considered. The role of Atisha in choosing the gradual path to nirvana is revealed. The difference between the worlds of Mahayana Buddhism, formed in China and Tibet, is shown. (shrink)

The conceptions of three kinds of knowledge in Buddhism and in Spinoza are compared. There are both similarities and differences in the two conceptions, both of which provide interesting insights into both traditions. The similarities are that the three kinds of knowledge represent a hierarchical structure, starting from the first kind, characterized by sense perception. The second kind for Spinoza is characterized by rational knowledge, which is comparable to the Buddhist second kind, which is about thinking through what one (...) has heard. These two kinds lead to the third kind of knowledge, which in Spinoza is intuitive knowledge, and in Buddhism is knowledge by mental cultivation. In both traditions, these three kinds of knowledge lead to soteriological aims. Among the differences is that Spinoza presents his three kinds of knowledge through a series of axioms and proofs, whereas in Buddhism they form a guideline for the practitioner. (shrink)

Comparative philosophy of religions -- Disciplinary challenges -- A grammar for comparison -- Comparative philosophy of religions -- Content, structure, and arguments -- Epistemology -- Religious epistemology in classical India: in defense of a Hindu god -- Interpreting Nyāya epistemology -- The Nyāya argument for the existence of Īśvara -- Defending the Nyāya argument -- Shifting the burden of proof -- Against Īśvara: Ratnakīrti's Buddhist critique -- The section on pervasion: the trouble with natural relations -- Two arguments -- (...) The section on the reason property -- The section on the target property -- Is Īśvara the maker of the world? -- Language, mind, and ontology -- The theory of exclusion, conceptual content, and Buddhist -- Epistemology -- The theory of exclusion -- What exclusion is not -- Semantic value -- Ratnakīrti's inferential argument -- Jñānaśrīmitra's three questions -- Ratnakīrti's world: toward a Buddhist philosophy of everything -- An inventory of mental objects/images -- The contents of perception -- The contents of inferential/verbal awareness -- Nonexistence, existence, and ultimate existence -- The Īśvara-inference, revisited -- Who created the world? -- The values of Buddhist epistemology -- Foundational figures and foundational texts -- The soteriological significance of epistemology -- Jñānaśrīmitra on epistemology as pedagogy -- Ratnakīrti's framework of value -- Religious reasoning as religious practice. (shrink)

. This paper presents Buddhism as a path theory in which the adherent practices mindfulness in order to see the world as‐it‐is. The world as presented in a human situation is an interdependently originating process to which one can bring meaning but in which meaning is not inherent. The conceptualizing process by which one concretizes reality is the foundation on which human frustrations and disease arise. However, it is by this conceptualizing process that one establishes a cosmological view of the (...) universe. The soteriological consideration in Buddhism is to realize that reality created by the mind is like an illusion, a concretization of an interdependently originating process into a substantive reality. Through this realization one can remove the delusion created by mind and see reality as‐it‐is. (shrink)

Buddhist teachings and practices can be viewed as a journey of soteriological transformation, where language, as a tool for the analysis of views, occupies a place of special significance and importance. This article examines how the concept of non-duality, from the Madhyamaka perspective, has served as a powerful rhetorical device with the explicit aim of fostering soteriological transformation. Among the various expressions representative of the Madhyamaka perspective, two are particularly explored in this article for their facilitation of soteriological transformation: (...) the expression of ‘neither a dharma nor a not-dharma’ and the teaching that ‘one should let go even of dharmas, still more so not-dharmas’ . I argue that the Madhyamaka expression of ‘neither A nor not-A’ is hardly ever just about conforming to any linguistic conventions. It is about gaining liberation from linguistic conventions and unexamined remarks. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Whose Buddhism? Whose Identity? Presenting and/or Misrepresenting Shin Buddhism for a Christian AudienceAAR Panel on Multiple Religious Belonging and Buddhist Identity November, 2013Kristin Johnston Largenmultiple religious belongingThe concept of multiple religious belonging has become much more popular in the past ten years, both in academic discourse and in public practice, particularly in the United States. One of the most common “pairings” in this regard is Buddhism and Christianity. (...) Perhaps this is not surprising: Since at least the 1900s Christians have been fascinated with “oriental” religions in general and Buddhism in particular.1 And yet, here at the close of 2013, we can conclude that this fascination has not been unproblematic.It is fair to say that from their first introduction, Christians have regarded Buddhism more as a humanistic philosophy than as a religion (as that term typically is understood in a Western context) and consequently as not putting forth any exclusive truth claims.2 This idea has led to the assumption that Buddhism can be easily mined for self-improvement techniques and attitudes that can be smoothly integrated into a Christian framework.So, for example, Christian congregations and individuals alike pursue with alacrity meditation, mindfulness, and mantra recitation without much, if any, awareness of what they mean and how they function within a particular Buddhist context.3This has had negative ramifications for Christians and Buddhists alike, and even though Shin Buddhism has not been a frequent dialogue partner with Christianity, it is particular vulnerable to these kind of distortions, given the apparent resemblances between them. Dennis Hirota notes that [End Page 29]similarities with Christian teachings have often led to fundamental difficulties in expressing and understanding Shin thought in the context of dialogue with other religions. Because Shin Buddhist statements about reality and human engagement with it have seemed so similar in certain respects to some Christian doctrines, it has been assumed that the conceptions of truth are the same, and therefore such problems as the nature of religious engagement or the ontological status of a supreme being are the same.4In the same vein, Gregory Gibbs writes that “We cannot escape the tendency that many scholars will have to elaborate Shinshū against the backdrop of Christian thought. Alfred Bloom and Unno Taitetsu have each expressed reservations about ‘the recourse to traditions other than Shin to explain its basic teachings.’”5So, we find ourselves in a situation in which well-meaning Christian practitioners and academics, with the best of intentions, often seek to interpret Shin Buddhism through a Christian lens, such that it can be better understood, approached, and experienced by Christians. However, the linguistic and conceptual bridges that are built in this way unfortunately can distort the very ground on which they stand, facilitating a fabricated sense of multiple religious belonging by asserting false parallels. In my view, these bridges function more effectively when they are designed to facilitate a going out and a returning home [rather than travel to a new destination entirely], with the goal of what I might call a “Buddhist-infused” Christianity, which may well be both more authentic and more constructive than any “multiple” permutation of either.In light of all this, then, my paper proceeds as follows. I first examine the portrayal of Amida, both as described by Shinran himself, and also as depicted in the three Pure Land sutras.6 I then explore how Amida has been characterized for a Christian audience, demonstrating how descriptions of Amida often are couched in Christian theistic language, resulting in the fact that Amida looks uncannily similar to “God,” particularly when the understanding of Amida’s relationship to those who invoke his name is defined using a christological and soteriological model.7 I then turn to the important concept of shinjin, arguing that the popular translation of shinjin as “faith” only furthers the assumption that Christianity and Shin Buddhism make the same basic claims about human existence.who is amida buddha?Beginning with Shinran and Shin Buddhism, the first thing that must be emphasized is that, according to The Larger Sutra on Amitāyus, Amida Buddha is not a “god,” as Christians understand the term, but originally, at... (shrink)

This Book Is An In-Depth Study Of Buddhist Philosophy In India And Tibet. The Concentration Is On Ontology/Epistemology And, To A Somewhat Lesser Extent, Soteriology. It Is Based On The Writings Of The Buddhist Philosophers Themselves, From The Unknown Authors Of The Pali `Abhidhamma' Books Down To The Present Dalai Lama Of Tibet. It Takes Into Consideration The Work Of Many Twentieth Century Scholars Of Buddhism In Order To Bring Our Knowledge Of Buddhist Philosophy Up-To-Date. An (...) Exhaustive Index (And Glossary) Has Been Prepared In Order To Help The Reader With The Technical Terms Of Buddhist Philosophy.;;The Two Parts And Fourteen Chapters Of The Book Are As Follows: Part I (India): Ch.I: The Theravada. Ch.Ii: The Sarvastivada. Ch.Iii: The Madhyamaka (1) The Prasangikas Nagarjuna And Candrakirti. Ch.Iv: The Madhyamaka (2) The Prasangikas Aryadeva And Santideva. Ch.V: The Madhyamaka (3) The Svatantrikas. Ch.Vi: The Yogacara (1) Two Yogacara Sutras And Asanga And Vasubandhu. Ch.Vii: The Yogacara (2) Dignaga And Dharmakirti. Ch.Viii: The Yogacara (3) Santarakshita And Kamalasila. Ch.Ix: The `Tathagata-Garbha'. Part Ii (Tibet): Ch.X: The Vajrayana, General Features. Ch.Xi: The Nyingmapa. Ch.Xii: The Sakyapa. Ch.Xiii: The Kagyupa. Ch.Xiv: The Gelugpa. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhism and Deconstruction: Toward a Comparative SemioticsYouru WangBuddhism and Deconstruction: Toward a Comparative Semiotics. By Youxuan Wang. London: Curzon Press, 2001. Pp. xiv + 242. Hardcover $65.00.Youxuan Wang's Buddhism and Deconstruction: Toward a Comparative Semiotics is a full-length study comparing Derridean and Buddhist discourse, especially their deconstruction of the notion of sign. Since Robert Magliola's 1984 publication Derrida on the Mend, which involved his pioneering comparison of (...) Derrida and Nāgārjuna, many articles or book chapters have contributed to the growing body of comparative studies on Derridean and various (Indian, Chinese, or Japanese) Buddhist thought. However, a more systematic study of Buddhist deconstruction had not been achieved until the publication of Wang's book. In my view, as long as the investigation of deconstructive strategies in important Buddhist texts has not been completed, the comparison of Derridean and Buddhist deconstruction will never be sufficient. Wang's book provides substantial development of this topic. The understanding of sign and the conception of the Same are the major threads running [End Page 486] through his detailed investigation of Derridean texts and the Chinese texts of Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Buddhism.Wang denies that the objects of his study are "representatives of Buddhist philosophy" but rather believes they are "specimens of Buddhist literary production" (p. 11). This attitude enables him to be open to different Buddhist texts, to discover different strategies and styles, without being fettered by the problem of the self-identity of each text and its authorship. Consequently, the author's selection of a particular set of Buddhist texts has proven distinctive and philosophically significant. The texts he investigates are written neither by famous Indian Mādhyamika philosophers such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti nor by great indigenous Chinese thinkers such as Sengzhao, Jizang, and the Chan Buddhists. Such texts, with their greater names, are popular among contemporary scholars for their study of Buddhist deconstruction. What Wang examines, however, is a set of peripheral texts, including the Dazhidu Iun (translated and edited by Kumārajīva but attributed to Nāgārjuna) and the Treatise on the Eighteen Points about Emptiness (translated and edited by Paramārtha but also attributed to Nāgārjuna). Because of their problems of alleged authorship, these have largely been neglected by modern scholarship. Wang's study in fact subverts this kind of judgment of central/marginal texts by revealing their significance to the historical development of the understanding of Mahāyāna teaching in Chinese Buddhism and their critical usefulness in the postmodern discourse of sign.The subversiveness of Wang's study lies not only in his use of marginal Mādhyamika texts, but also in his bold approach to a couple of Yogācāra texts. To my limited knowledge, no serious discussion of Buddhist deconstruction has specifically referred to any Yogācāra text. Most discussions have hitherto referred to Nāgārjuna, Prāsangika, or Chan/Zen texts. It has been a common impression that Yogācāra Buddhism somehow smuggles a form of substantialization into Mahāyāna teaching through the back door. But this is not the case with the texts Wang studies. Although these texts may also be considered marginal compared to some others, Wang convincingly demonstrates in them a Yogācāra deconstruction of substantialization through the three categories of absence-of-being (san wu xing) and other strategies, with regard to a Yogācāra understanding of the Same or True Suchness.The first two chapters concentrate on a survey of the Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika metaphysical-semiotic themes in the list of seventy-five existential factors and how they are undone by Kumārajīva and Paramārtha's commentaries on the Mahāyāna list of eighteen points about emptiness. Wang's analysis reveals the deconstructive power of these commentaries while doing justice to the Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika refutation of naive realism. The central semiotic theme as involved in the soteriology of Mahāyāna Buddhism, according to these commentaries and Wang's interpretation, is the "true character of all dharmas"—the emptiness of all existential factors (pp. 76... (shrink)

The doctrine of the two truths - a conventional truth and an ultimate truth - is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools; it is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. One theory is articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd ct CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another and yet (...) distinct. One of the most influential interpretations of Nagarjuna's difficult doctrine derives from the commentary of Candrakirti (6th ct CE). In view of its special soteriological role, much attention has been devoted to explaining the nature of the ultimate truth; less, however, has been paid to understanding the nature of conventional truth, which is often described as "deceptive," "illusion," or "truth for fools." But because of the close relation between the two truths in Madhyamaka, conventional truth also demands analysis. Moonshadows, the product of years of collaboration by ten cowherds engaged in Philosophy and Buddhist Studies, provides this analysis. The book asks, "what is true about conventional truth?" and "what are the implications of an understanding of conventional truth for our lives?" Moonshadows begins with a philosophical exploration of classical Indian and Tibetan texts articulating Candrakati's view, and uses this textual exploration as a basis for a more systematic philosophical consideration of the issues raised by his account. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration by Jay L. GarfieldYilun Zhai (bio)Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration. By Jay L. Garfield. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xiv + 248. Paperback $24.95, ISBN 978-0-19-090764-8.Jay L. Garfield's Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration offers a comprehensive presentation of Buddhist ethics as well as one of the most ingenious metaethical developments in the field. With Western philosophers as (...) its potential readers, the tone and the choice of examples of this book contain a typical philosophical flavor. Most interestingly, it is not only an objective interpretation of the existing Buddhist ethical theories, but also an innovative work that expands the current theoretical boundary. Buddhist Ethics is divided into three parts: in the first part ("Structure") Garfield argues that Buddhist ethics is best characterized by "moral phenomenology," a metaethical theory that emphasizes how we experience over what we do. The second part ("Doctrine") elaborates on how both the Theravāda and Mahāyāna paths are ethical in nature and compatible with a phenomenological interpretation. The third part ("Contemporary Issues") introduces Engaged Buddhism, and claims that Buddhist ethics can function naturalistically without supernatural concepts such as rebirth and the six realms of transmigration.The first part of Buddhist Ethics maps a structural framework of moral phenomenology. Over the past decades, philosophers have endeavored to place Buddhist ethics under the existing Western metaethical categories, for Buddhist ethical thought bears a striking resemblance to all of the major traditions of Western ethics--consequentialism, virtue ethics, and deontology. But Garfield rejects any simple generalization and proposes a particularist reading of Buddhist ethics, which he calls "moral phenomenology." For Garfield, Buddhist ethics cannot be captured by any universal, overarching moral principle; not because Buddhists neglected ethics or failed to create metaethical theory, he argues, but that no universal moral principle is sufficiently sophisticated as a guidance for real life (p. 23). The complexity of dependent origination and the unique goal-oriented paths make the Buddhist definitions of action, agent, free will, pleasure, and pain utterly distinct from their Western counterparts. In particular, while Western philosophers often rely on our natural perceptual capacities and the conceptual mind as sources of information (such as the Cartesian "clear and distinct ideas"), according to Garfield, Buddhist ethicists regard ordinary perception as [End Page 1] fundamentally flawed and the source of all suffering. Thus, they "aim to correct a 'natural' way of experiencing ourselves," characterized by moral phenomenology (p. 22).Although moral phenomenology is the nucleus of Garfield's entire project, a comprehensive, formal definition of the term is lacking throughout the book. To help the reader understand this sophisticated term and its ethical stance, I will briefly summarize it here. Buddhist moral phenomenology centers on the transformation of our mental experiences, which Garfield calls an "input ethics," in contrast to the Western "output ethics" that emphasize explicit rules, external actions and their consequences, and cultivation of virtues (p. 29). The process of ethical cultivation--completed through prescriptive paths--replaces our natural egocentric experiences with a liberated perspective stemming from the interdependence of all things. Such a perceptual transformation in turn replaces one's instinctive reactions with a spontaneous and responsive mode of comportment toward the world (p. 27). The final goal of moral phenomenology is the elimination of suffering for all sentient beings, with the buddhas and bodhisattvas as exemplary models of its perfection. In this sense, it is a combination of an ethical path and a soteriological path.To the best of my knowledge, Garfield is the first person to explicitly identify a moral phenomenological reading of Buddhist ethics: His 2010 article "What Is It Like to Be a Bodhisattva" and 2015 book Engaging Buddhism include pioneering research on this theory. The current book (Buddhist Ethics) further develops the theory, offering a more mature metaethical structure and in-depth explorations of canonical texts from the Indo-Tibetan traditions. By endorsing a moderate form of ethical particularism, Buddhist phenomenology refrains from committing to a single Western metaethical category, and gains notable advantage in synthesizing a myriad of Buddhist moral discourses into a united whole. This theory is undoubtedly Garfield's paramount contribution in the... (shrink)

As an atheistic religious tradition, Buddhism conventionally stands in opposition to Christianity, and any bridge between them is considered to be riddled with contradictory beliefs on God the creator, salvific power and the afterlife. But what if a Buddhist could also be a Classical Theist? Showing how the various contradictions are not as fundamental as commonly thought, Tyler Dalton McNabb and Erik Baldwin challenge existing assumptions and argue that Classical Theism is, in fact, compatible with Buddhism. They draw parallels (...) between the metaphysical doctrines of both traditions, synthesize their ethical and soteriological commitments and demonstrate that the Theist can interpret the Buddhist's religious experiences, specifically those of emptiness, as veridical, without denying any core doctrine of Classical Theism. By establishing that a synthesis of the two traditions is plausible, this book provides a bold, fresh perspective on the philosophy of religion and reinvigorates philosophical debates between Buddhism and Christianity. (shrink)

The ideas, topics, and parameters of Indian Mahāyana Buddhist philosophy are immense and diverse. The soteriological goal of achieving the liberative state of nirvāna provides the basic aim and orientation of all Buddhist philosophy, including the Indian Mahāyana. The Yogācāra school (also known as Cittamātra) of Mahāyana philosophy makes use of the technical term “emptiness” in its descriptions of the essenceless way in which things are said to exist, yet the details of the way this is explained are (...) strikingly different from those of their Madhyamaka counterparts. The chapter presents a basic outline of the structure of Mahāyana path system with the caveat that, for individual thinkers, the devil, so to speak, is in the details. (shrink)

This article (1) offers a relatively comprehensive survey of criticisms of Buddhism made by the influential Chinese philosopher Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) with translations of key passages, and (2) proposes that these criticisms are best understood as targeting the implicit presuppositions and practical implications of Buddhist teachings, not so much the explicit doctrines of the Buddhists. The article examines three sets of criticisms. The first has to do with Buddhist soteriology, the fundamental priority of Buddhist salvation, (...) which Zhu takes to be egoistic and a corruption of the more relationship-oriented nature of ethics itself. The second set of criticisms concerns Buddhist over-reliance on meditation as a form of mental discipline, which in Zhu’s view leaves Buddhists ill-equipped to take independent standards of right and wrong into account. He proposes instead that Confucian “reverential attention” (jing 敬) is the better means by which to reshape one’s intentions and emotions in light of objective standards. The final criticisms are of the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. Here Zhu seems to be an uncharitable critic, suggesting that Buddhists treat all things as illusory and without a certain ethically significant relationship to the larger world. But a closer examination of the evidence shows that he was both aware of more defensible notions of Buddhist emptiness and, at the end of the day, unconvinced that Buddhist practices were conducive to realizing them. (shrink)

The difference between the concepts of saṃsāra e nirvāṇaset forth by the historical Buddha in his first sermon seem to be disputed by the equalization of the two terms effected by Nāgārjuna in a topical passage of his MK. This article, firstly, supports the thesis that the contradiction is just a seeming one and that the relation of difference or identity between the two dimensions depends on the philosophical register, respectively epistemological and ontological, being used - in both cases for (...) soteriological purposes - by the Buddha and Nāgārjuna. Secondly, we wish to prove that, in any case, Nāgārjuna's ontology, far from being a philosophical novelty or an evolution of the thought of the founder of Buddhism, is, on the contrary, one of the possible applications of the "non-self" doctrine - probably the most important and original contribution of Buddhist thought to the history of world philosophy - expounded by the Buddha in his second sermon.La differenza tra i concetti di saṃsāra e nirvāṇastabilita dal Buddha nel suo primo sermone sembra essere messa in discussione dall'equiparazione dei due termini effettuata da Nāgārjuna in un passaggio-chiave delle sue MK. Questo articolo, in primo luogo, difende la tesi che la contraddizione sia soltanto apparente e che la relazione, di differenza o di identità, tra le due dimensioni dipende dal registro filosofico, rispettivamente epistemologico e ontologico, usato - in entrambi i casi per finalità soteriologiche - dal Buddha e da Nāgārjuna. In secondo luogo, cercheremo di provare che, in ogni caso, l'ontologia di Nāgārjuna, lungi dall'essere una novità filosofica o un'evoluzione rispetto al pensiero del fondatore del buddhismo è, al contrario, una delle possibili applicazioni della dottrina del non-sé - probabilmente il contributo più importante e originale del pensiero buddhista alla storia della filosofia universale - esposta dal Buddha nel suo secondo sermone. (shrink)

This article examines the Buddhist idea of anātman, ‘no- self ’ and pudgala, ‘the person’ in relation to the notion of ‘self ’ emerging from contemporary cognitive science. The Buddhist no-self doctrine is enriched by the cognitive scientist’s understanding of the multiple facets of selfhood, or structures of experience, and the causative action of a functional self in the world. A proper understanding of the Buddhist concepts of anātman and pudgala proves critical to mindfulness-based therapeutic interventions: this (...) is as the ‘person’, as constituted by various structures of selfhood, including—the ecological, interpersonal, extended, private, narrative, relational and conceptual selves—which may be disrupted by traumatic events which disorder one’s experience of time, defence, relationality, memory, resource and agency. In the absence of this understanding, the no-self doctrine might encourage a sort of bypass, in which traumatic facets of selfhood are overlooked in the quest for spiritual liberation. With a proper understanding of the function served by the Buddhist concepts of no-self and ‘person’, psychotherapeutic work may be situated as a necessary ‘preliminary practice’ for meditative exploration of deeper transpersonal domains and soteriological goals. (shrink)

This paper advocates learned in the religious context of liberation, the "theology," a concept can be reasonably applied to religious traditions other than Christianity. According to that "beyond the world community and how the phenomenon of contact" as a general theological issues, and Consciousness-only school of Buddhism, one of the major literature of the "photo Mahayana theory of" how to respond to this issue. In the "photo Mahayana theory" in this issue of "inaction of the Dharma Realm to save sentient (...) beings in the phenomenal world and promising" in the form of presentation. This stands for "photo Mahayana theory" to this problem, but through three Buddha body of theory. In short, the body of law to the Buddha Dharma and sentient beings as a contact intermediary. On the one hand, body of law as a Buddha in the phenomenal world to attend the results, which do not transcend the phenomenal world; other hand, the body of law were no wisdom to properly recognize the judicial system, and therefore associated with the Dharma Realm. Further, the body of law can not smell, good enough for practical enlightenment through the body of living beings must engage with the changes in the body, while the body of law and the relationship between the other two, is equivalent to no difference between the intellect and wisdom after that relationship. Finally, the "photo Mahayana theory" liberation school structure and Christianity's "Christology" of relief to make a simple comparison study architecture, and as a conclusion. This paper begins with arguing that within the larger context of soteriology, the notion of "theology" can be legitimately applied to other religious traditions than Christianity. Following this, I propose that the issue of how the realm of transcendence could relate to the realm of phenomenon can serve as an example of a general theological issue across religious boundaries. I then investigate how this issue is discussed in the Mahāyānasamgraha as a seminal text in the Buddhist Yogācāra tradition. In the Mahāyānasamgraha, the above issue is formulated as the question of how unconditioned Dharma-realm could save the sentient beings in the conditioned world. I argue that the asnwer provided in the Mahāyānasamgraha hinges on its theory of three bodies of the Buddha. In short, the Dharma-body bridges between the Dharma-realm and sentient beings. On the one hand, the Dharma-body is the result of a bodhisattva's enduring practice in the phenomenal world, and hence does not transcend over the phenomenal world; on the other hand, the Dharma-body correctly knows the Dharma- realm through the non-discriminating cognition , and hence relates to the Dharma-realm. Furthermore, since sentient beings cannot see the Dharma-body, they can be taught only by the Enjoyment-body and the Transformation-body of the Buddha. The relation between the Dharma-body and the other two bodies is identical to the relation between the non-discriminating cognition and the subsequently-acquired cognition . Finally, this paper ends with a brief comparison between the soteriological scheme in the Mahāyānasamgraha and the scheme reflected in the issue of Christology. (shrink)

When I was first invited by Prof. Kim Yong -pyo, editor of the IJBTC, to review this book, I declined, due to the fact that Prof. Park was my teacher and mentor at SUNY Stony Brook, not only as a graduate student, but as an undergraduate as well. For this reason I was afraid that I would not be able to bring the requisite critical distance to the task. After having had the opportunity to read the book, however, I changed (...) my mind, for two main reasons: I realized that it might be personally satisfying to take the opportunity to re-engage myself in the kind of Buddhist soteriological discourse that originally attracted me to Buddhist Studies to begin with, and the potential for lapses in proper critical distance notwithstanding, I felt that there is some sense in which I could bring some insights into the appraisal of this book probably only accessible to myself, given my long relationship with Sung Bae Park and my deep personal interest in his project. So I hope readers of this review will accept it with these factors in mind. There is one question that we may want to ask before dealing with a book like this: Is there a place in our Buddhist Studies academia for the discussion of personal religious experience, or for the investigation of the phenomenon of religiosity? I know of more than a few who would answer such a question with an outright "no." Others might say, "It depends upon how one goes about it." And still others may be very excited by such a prospect. (shrink)

Did Chinese mysticism vanish after its first appearance in ancient Taoist philosophy, to surface only after a thousand years had passed, when the Chinese had adapted Buddhism to their own culture? This first integrated survey of the mystical dimension of Taoism disputes the commonly accepted idea of such a hiatus. Covering the period from the Daode jing to the end of the Tang, Livia Kohn reveals an often misunderstood Chinese mystical tradition that continued through the ages. Influenced by but ultimately (...) independent of Buddhism, it took forms more various than the quietistic withdrawal of Laozi or the sudden enlightenment of the Chan Buddhists. On the basis of a new theoretical evaluation of mysticism, this study analyzes the relationship between philosophical and religious Taoism and between Buddhism and the native Chinese tradition. Kohn shows how the quietistic and socially oriented Daode jing was combined with the ecstatic and individualistic mysticism of the Zhuangzi, with immortality beliefs and practices, and with Buddhist insight meditation, mind analysis, and doctrines of karma and retribution. She goes on to demonstrate that Chinese mysticism, a complex synthesis by the late Six Dynasties, reached its zenith in the Tang, laying the foundations for later developments in the Song traditions of Inner Alchemy, Chan Buddhism, and Neo-Confucianism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Conflict, Culture, Change: Engaged Buddhism in a Globalizing WorldMarwood Larson-HarrisConflict, Culture, Change: Engaged Buddhism in a Globalizing World. By Sulak Sivaraksa. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2005. 145 pp.Sulak Sivaraksa's Conflict, Culture, Change is a useful if uneven collection of essays that touch on many of the basic aspects of Engaged Buddhism. The book does not make an original contribution to the field, yet it serves as a good introduction (...) to the tenets and practice of socially responsible Buddhism.Though not as prolific as Thich Nhat Hanh or the Dalai Lama, Sulak Sivaraksa's contributions as a grassroots organizer and spokesperson are widely recognized, and he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his resistance to Thailand's military dictatorship. His few books bear witness to the ways that he and similar peacemakers have found innovative methods to prevent globalization from destroying traditional ways of life.It does not seem entirely relevant to criticize a book that is so well intentioned and written by such an exemplary human being. Nonetheless, Conflict, Culture, Change is an odd collection of essays. Most have been published elsewhere, and taken together they tend to be repetitive. They are loosely grouped into three sections; the first two—"Peace, Nonviolence, and Social Justice" and "Simplicity, Compassion, and Education"—lay out a range of ways that classic Theravada Buddhist values could bring sanity to a world out of balance, discussing global conflict, nonviolence, reconciliation, consumerism, and environmentalism. What ties them together is the use of Buddhist ideas to analyze and respond to current problems, but the ensuing discussion does not progress beyond an introductory level. While it is certainly true that the onslaught of capitalism is traceable to the three poisons (greed, hatred, and ignorance) and that sincere humility on the part of world leaders would help facilitate global diplomacy, [End Page 166] this kind of analysis will probably not convince anyone who is not already a fellow traveler.Indeed, some scholars have waited for the leaders of Engaged Buddhism to articulate a more consistent philosophical basis for their praxis. In some ways, this criticism is ironic. After all, the energies of Engaged Buddhism are appropriately directed toward action and not theory, and Sivaraksa and others rightly criticize the single-minded pursuit of meditation unless it is balanced by an active response to social problems. Sivaraksa is careful to balance these dimensions, arguing that either one without the other is unable to bring about real change. He also combines classical Buddhist concepts with modern approaches—liberation theology, for example. What is needed, in this regard, is a more sustained exploration of where precisely traditional Buddhism can be supplemented by modern critical discourse without losing its nature as a dharma-based soteriology. On the other hand, if Sivaraksa's book were more focused on practical steps and concrete agendas, it could have served as a blueprint for organizers. That it does neither philosophy nor pragmatics limits its shelf life.A third section, "Culture and Change," is the book's most coherent, focusing on Thailand and the rise and fall of its dictatorships and the decline of Thai Buddhism. Sivaraksa's many stories attest to an all-too-common dynamic in South Asian Theravada countries: monks becoming politically powerful and their spiritual discipline waning. Sivaraksa also finds reason for hope: some Buddhists have remained true to the values of simplicity and humility, and new movements have arisen to help the old culture resist the new. At times his descriptions seem, at least to the Western reader, to border on a romantic nostalgia for an agrarian, temple-centered past, when monks were the revered authorities in their villages and families sent their sons to be ordained early. Now, he points out, many monks have VCRs and air conditioning and sleep on "soft, fluffy mattresses." Sivaraksa's book vividly conveys the cultural memory of rural Thailand to the West, and one would want all CEOs of multinational companies to read these stories before they set about modernizing the Thai countryside. Yet modernity cannot be uninvented; there can be no return to the simplicity of yesterday. After an extended chapter describing how the Thai elites' fascination... (shrink)

Comparing Buddhist and contemporary analytic views about mereological composition reveals significant dissimilarities about the purposes that constrain successful answers to mereological questions, the kinds of considerations taken to be probative in justifying those answers, and the value of mereological inquiry. I develop these dissimilarities by examining three questions relevant to those who deny the existence of composite wholes. The first is a question of justification: What justifies denying the existence of composite wholes as more reasonable than affirming their existence? (...) The second is a question of ontology: Under what conditions are many partless individuals arranged composite-wise? The third is a question of reasonableness: Why, if there are no composites available to experience, do “the folk” find it reasonable to believe there are? I motivate each question, sketch some analytic answers for each, develop in more detail answers from the Theravādin Buddhist scholar Buddhaghosa, and extract comparative lessons. (shrink)