Up to the present, there have not been any specific norms regarding medically assisted human reproduction in Romanian legislation. Due to this situation the general legislation regarding medical assistance, the Penal and Civil law and the provisions of the Code of Deontology of the Romanian College of Physicians are applied to the field of medically assisted human reproduction. By analysing the ethical and legal conflicts regarding medically assisted human reproduction in Romania, (...) some characteristics cannot be set apart because they derive from religious, cultural and socio-economic aspects. In this article the authors identify the development stages of medically assisted human reproduction in Romania, beginning from these characteristics and insisting upon the failure of the legal system in this specific field. The authors consider that the law regarding medically assisted human reproduction cannot be effective because it did not take into account the ethical and cultural aspects that might appear. Furthermore, in this framework of the legal process, no public debate involving the representatives of civil society was undertaken although the Council of Europe Oviedo Convention approved by our country according to law no. 17/2001 stipulated exactly this working method. Content Type Journal Article Pages 4-13 Authors Beatrice Ioan, PHD, MD, MA IN BIOETHICS, University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Iasi, Romania Vasile Astarastoae, PHD, MD, JD, University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Iasi, Romania Journal Human Reproduction & Genetic Ethics Online ISSN 2043-0469 Print ISSN 1028-7825 Journal Volume Volume 14 Journal Issue Volume 14, Number 2 / 2008. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper presents and briefly analyses some of the provisions of a Romanian legislative proposal which arrived at the Presidency for ratification twice, in slightly different forms, and which was rejected twice: the first time at the Presidency in October 2004, and the second at the Constitutional Court in July 2005. The proposal was finally dropped in February 2006. My intention here is to point to some of the most problematic deficiencies of the legislative document in the hope that (...) this may assist with future debates and regulations on assisted reproduction either in Romania or elsewhere. I have isolated the features to be discussed under two headings: (1) whose are the rights to reproduce, that the document claimed to ‘acknowledge, regulate and guarantee’ and (2) what is the status of the embryo, the child and the surrogate mother? (shrink)

While I am inclined to agree that in most cases a choice to become pregnant and bring to birth a child is an irrational choice, unlike Professor Häyry,1 I believe that choosing to do so is far from being necessarily immoral. In fact I will argue that it is often these irrational choices which make human life the valuable commodity many of us believe it is.Häyry argues that not only is the choice to have children always an irrational choice, (...) but also it is necessarily an immoral choice. Thus, for Häyry “human reproduction is fundamentally immoral”.1 He claims it is important to point out to prospective parents that their urge to have children is irrational. From this, he argues, it follows that once this is accepted the use of advance technologies to assist conception should be reassessed, and furthermore, the irrationality and immorality of having children should become a legitimate part of guidance given to those expressing a wish to have children.According to Häyry the reason it is irrational and immoral to choose to bring to birth a child is that “having a child can always realistically lead to the worse possible outcome, when the alternative is not having a child”.1 He argues that when people consider having children they are faced with the choice between deciding not to have children and thus harming or benefiting no-one , or having children where this life may be good or bad, and thus the value of this choice can be …. (shrink)

Human reproductive cloning has not yet resulted in any live births. There has been widespread condemnation of the practice in both the scientific world and the public sphere, and many countries explicitly outlaw the practice. Concerns about the procedure range from uncertainties about its physical safety to questions about the psychological well-being of clones. Yet, key aspects such as the philosophical implications of harm to future entities and a comparison with established reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilisation are (...) often overlooked in discussions about HRC. Furthermore, there are people who are willing to use the technology. Several scientists have been outspoken in their intent to pursue HRC. The importance of concerns about the physical safety of children created by HRC and comparisons with concerns about the safety of IVF are discussed. A model to be used to determine when it is acceptable to use HRC and other new assisted reproductive technologies, balancing reproductive freedom and safety concerns, is proposed. Justifications underpinning potential applications of HRC are discussed, and it is determined that these are highly analogous to rationalisations used to justify IVF treatment. It is concluded that people wishing to conceive using HRC should have a prima facie negative right to do so. (shrink)

Artificial gametes, derived from stem cells, have the potential to enable in vitro fertilization of embryos. Currently, artificial gametes are only being generated in laboratory animals; however, considerable efforts are underway to develop artificial gametes using human cell sources. These artificial gametes are being proposed as a means to address infertility through assisted reproductive technologies. Nonetheless, the availability of artificial gametes obtained from adult organisms can potentially expand the possibilities of reproduction. Various groups, such as same-sex couples, (...) post-menopausal women, and deceased donors, could potentially utilize artificial gametes to conceive genetically related offspring. The advent of artificial gametes raises significant bioethical questions. Should all these reproductive scenarios be accepted? How can we delineate the range of future reproductive choices? A normative bioethical framework may be necessary to establish a consensus regarding the use of human artificial gametes. This review aims to present the current state of research on the biological roadmap for generating artificial gametes, while also summarizing proposed approaches to establish a normative framework that delineates ethically acceptable paths for reproduction. (shrink)

This article examines how the recently introduced law on assisted reproduction in Italy, which gives symbolic legal recognition to the embryo, came about, and how a referendum, which would have repealed large sections of it, failed. The occupation of the legal space by the embryo is the outcome of a crusade by a well-organised alliance of theo-conservatives. These groups see in reproductive medicine an uncontrolled interference with their notion of the natural order of things. Such a worldview requires (...) a total ban on stem cell research, limitation of access to reproductive technologies and repressive laws to govern the area. This conservative dream scenario has come closer to being realised by the introduction of a law doing all of these things in the name of the protection of “Life”. In the case of this law, the “life” to be protected is the embryo. In the name of “Life”, scientific advances and individual liberty have been curbed. The politics of embryo citizenship is a politics which values the yet to come over the here and now, purgation over pleasure, and the transcendent over the material. (shrink)

Observing the practical situation of the techniques of assisted procreation in European societies, one is allowed to affirm that these techniques are largely in use in our societies, it did not find resistance among the secular groups of the society. It is not the case of the representatives of the Catholic church, hostile to each intervention on the reproductive mechanisms as being a violation against natural law, the most virulent opposition is linked to intervention on embryos or to each (...) way of reproduction outside of the canonic marriage, considering therefore artificial insemination as immoral and anti-juridical.The opposition between secular and the catholic groups is of unequal intensity in the different European countries, it did not stop the application and the use of these reproductive techniques although it made the adoption difficult of measures in some states, and even in the European Parliament. However, they could not oppose the scientific and medical corporation and their arguments of treatment of diseases and of sterility of men or women. This way to present these reproductive techniques in terms of lowering of suffering of couples not able to reproduce naturally received a full social acceptance and legitimation, acceptation because the origin of these techniques is incontestably scientific and legitimation because the goal is essentially medical. (shrink)

Observing the practical situation of the techniques of assisted procreation in European societies, one is allowed to affirm that these techniques are largely in use in our societies, it did not find resistance among the secular groups of the society. It is not the case of the representatives of the Catholic church, hostile to each intervention on the reproductive mechanisms as being a violation against natural law, the most virulent opposition is linked to intervention on embryos or to each (...) way of reproduction outside of the canonic marriage, considering therefore artificial insemination as immoral and anti-juridical.The opposition between secular and the catholic groups is of unequal intensity in the different European countries, it did not stop the application and the use of these reproductive techniques although it made the adoption difficult of measures in some states, and even in the European Parliament. However, they could not oppose the scientific and medical corporation and their arguments of treatment of diseases and of sterility of men or women. This way to present these reproductive techniques in terms of lowering of suffering of couples not able to reproduce naturally received a full social acceptance and legitimation, acceptation because the origin of these techniques is incontestably scientific and legitimation because the goal is essentially medical. (shrink)

A reductive reading of Humanae vitae seeks to limit its appeal to a ban on contraception. In truth, however, it offers a vision of human sexuality and conjugal love with broad and enduring relevance. In setting forth the intrinsic complementarity and irreducibility of the unitive and procreative dimensions of the conjugal act, Paul VI has given us a hermeneutical key for assessing many contemporary ethical dilemmas in human reproductive medicine. From this perspective, this article seeks to apply the (...) logic of Humanae vitae to several real-life scenarios confronted by medical practitioners, educators, and ethicists working in the field of fertility and reproductive health. These include a consideration of the ethics of prescribing hormonal contraceptives, the possibilities of investigating male infertility, issues of cooperation in counseling and assisting conception in same-sex relationships, the ethics pertaining to assisted reproductive technology, the contested case of prenatal adoption, and the application of double-effect reasoning. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the promulgation of Pope Paul VI's encyclical Humanae vitae, this article seeks to defend its enduring relevance to modern-day society, through application of its reasoning to contemporary dilemmas in reproductive medicine. It considers real cases of the ethics of prescribing hormonal contraceptives, of investigating male infertility, of cooperating in counseling and assisting conception in same-sex relationships, of ART, of prenatal adoption, and the application of double-effect reasoning. (shrink)

Based on the "Guide to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990", this volume reviews the regulation of assisted conception including complex moral issues such as abortion, embryo research and cloning.

What are human rights? Do they exist? I propose to answer these questions by advancing a contractarian account of human rights. I focus on the human right to found a family and have children. I also show how the contractarian approach to human rights can explain the current relevance of reproductive rights in the human rights discourse, and how the emergence of ART has contributed to this shift. The contractarian account of human rights asks, (...) firstly, the following question: which basic needs and desires can be ascribed to any human being regardless of gender, nationality, sexual orientation, age, ethnicity etc.? Having an interest, for instance, in preserving one’s own bodily integrity, freedom, and private property qualifies as a basic human need or basic desire. But a basic human need or desire does not constitute in itself a human right. Secondly, the contractarian account of human rights asks, then, which basic human needs or basic desires individuals and states representatives would consider so important that they would agree to create institutional frameworks, both at the domestic and international level, in such a way as to enable individuals to pursue the fulfilment of their basic needs or desires without state interference. Human rights exist and can only be claimed in the context of these normative frameworks. (shrink)

The central importance of reproduction in all human cultures has given rise to many methods and techniques of assisting reproduction or overcoming infertility. Such methods and techniques have achieved spectacular successes in the Western world, where processes like in vitro fertilization (IVF) constitute a remarkable breakthrough. In this paper, the author attempts to reflect critically on assisted reproduction technologies (ART) from the background and perspective of African culture, a culture within which human reproduction (...) is given the highest priority but which also exhibits a highly ambivalent attitude to modern technology-assisted methods of reproduction. The author considers the ethical crux of reproductive technologies to be linked to the issue of the moral status of the human embryo and argues that a morally significant line of demarcation cannot be drawn between embryos and other categories of humans. (shrink)

Contemporary medical imaging technologies produce images on the level of human cells. As a result of such images, egg and sperm cells have become well-known artefacts of popular culture. Medical imaging technology has transformed these gametes from invisible matter integrated in biological processes within the body to identifiable objects. The visualisation of egg and sperm cells has literally lifted the process of human reproduction out of the female body and made the gametes appear as protagonists in the (...) story of human reproduction. The article argues that visualisation of the gametes and the central role they play in contemporary imaginations of reproduction may offer vital contributions to the rather rapid acceptance and normalisation of assisted reproduction. (shrink)

The recent case of the UK woman who lost her legal struggle to be impregnated with her own frozen embryos, raises critical issues about the meaning of reproductive autonomy and the scope of regulatory practices. I revisit this case within the context of contemporary debate about the moral and legal dimensions of assisted reproduction. I argue that the gender neutral context that frames discussion of regulatory practices is unjust unless it gives appropriate consideration to the different positions women (...) and men occupy in relation to reproductive processes and their options for autonomous choice. First, I consider relevant legal rulings, media debate, and scholarly commentary. Then I discuss the concept of reproductive autonomy imbedded in this debate. I argue that this concept conflates informed consent and reproductive autonomy, thereby providing an excessively narrow reading of autonomy that fails to give due regard to relations among individuals or the social, political and economic environment that shapes their options. I contrast this notion of autonomy with feminist formulations that seek to preserve respect for the agency of individuals without severing them from the conditions of their embodiment, their surrounding social relationships, or the political contexts that shape their options. Taking these considerations into account I weigh the advantages of regulation over the commercial market arrangement that prevails in some countries and suggest general guidelines for a regulatory policy that would more equitably resolve conflicting claims to reproductive autonomy. (shrink)

Embryo litigation -- Access to ART treatment : insurance and discrimination -- General professional liability litigation -- Paternity and donor insemination -- Maternity and egg donation -- Traditional and gestational surrogacy arrangements -- Posthumous reproduction : access and parentage -- Same-sex parentage and ART -- Genetics (PGD) and ART -- ART-related embryonic stem cell legal developments -- ART-related adoption litigation -- ART-related fetal litigation and abortion-related litigation.

We live in an era when increasing numbers of babies are conceived through assisted reproduction technologies (ART). Using a comprehensive approach, the present research seeks to contribute to the understanding of gender differences in experiencing and coping with infertility, and in dealing with ART treatment. Our sample consisted of 10 heterosexual couples aged 24 to 43 and the data were collected through semi-structured interviews. In the studied sample, gender differences existed not only in experiences of infertility, but also (...) in understanding it, and in dealing with ART treatment. Responses to stress caused by infertility were stronger in women and they also perceived this stress more intensely than men. For women the central aspect of infertility was the desire for a child, while for men it was perceived more as a socially imposed obligation to fulfill the male role. (shrink)

Recent results from studies on animals suggest that functional germ cells may be generated from human pluripotent stem cells, giving rise to three possibilities: research with these so‐called artificial gametes, including fertilization experiments in vitro; their use in vivo for therapy for the treatment of human infertility; and their use in assisted reproductive technologies in vitro. While the legal, philosophical, and ethical questions associated with these possibilities have been already discussed intensively in other countries, the debate in (...) Germany is still at its beginning. A systematic and detailed analysis of the legal framework in Germany is provided with regard to the three possibilities, including the applicable statutory laws as well as the constitutional law. The question emerges as to whether the statutory laws as well as the constitution justify a distinction to be made between embryos of artificial and natural origin. This question is subject to philosophical analysis, discussing the distinction between person and thing, dignity and price, personality and property, and nature and technique. As a result, the criterion of naturalness alone may not be sufficient to differentiate between embryos of natural and artificial origin, and other criteria need to be identified. (shrink)

The 2004 Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act bans commercial contract pregnancy and egg provision, but Canadians undertake cross-border reproductive travel to access these services. Feminist bioethicists have argued that the ethical justification for enforcing the ban domestically, namely exploitation, grounds its extraterritorial enforcement. I raise an additional problem when Global Southern or low-income countries are destinations for travel: neocolonialism. Further, I argue that a ban on commercialized reproduction is problematic. Although well-suited to address neocolonial forces of (...) exploitation and commodification, a ban reinforces neocolonialism by paying insufficient attention to the agency of gestational laborers and egg providers. (shrink)

In Canada, the use of reproductive technologies is largely governed by the Assisted Human Reproduction Act . One of the founding principles of the AHR Act is that “trade in the reproductive capabilities of women and men, and the exploitation of children, women and men for commercial ends raise health and ethical concerns that justify their prohibition” ). This principle is instantiated in several sections of the AHR Act, including s. 7, which prohibits the purchase of gametes. (...) It follows that, in Canada, the legal supply of human eggs is limited to eggs from donors.1Donors, by definition, are women who do not receive payment for their eggs. Typically, known .. (shrink)

To avoid the commercialization of reproduction, the Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act prohibits the purchase of human eggs. We endorse this legal prohibition and moreover believe that this facet of the law should not be allowed to have as an unintended consequence an increase in transnational trade in human eggs. In an effort to avoid this consequence, and to be consistent with the AHR Act, we advocate the pursuit of national altruistic self-sufficiency. This article (...) briefly outlines a number of strategies to increase the domestic altruistic supply of third-party eggs and decrease the domestic demand for them. (shrink)

The relationships between socioeconomic and biogenetic reproduction are always socially constructed but not always acknowledged. These relationships are examined as they apply to an instance of infertility and assisted reproduction presented in a seventeenth-century English play, Thomas Middleton’s 1613 comedy, A Chaste Maid in Cheapside. Middleton’s satirization of the effects of secrecy on the category of reproductive disability is analyzed and its applicability to our own time considered. The discussion is in four parts, focusing on: the attribution (...) of disabled status to one member of the couple, the wife; the use of this attribution to protect the husband’s reputation for sexual and reproductive health; the concealment of the nature of assisted reproduction; and the interests of the child conceived with such assistance. (shrink)

In Canada, the Assisted Human Reproduction Act received royal assent on 29 March 2004. The approach proposed by the federal government responds to Canadians’ strong desire for an enforceable legislative framework in the field of reproduction technologies through criminal law. As a result of the widening gap between the rapid pace of technological change and governing legislation, a distinct need was perceived to create a regulatory framework to guide decisions regarding reproductive technologies.In this article the three (...) main topics covered in the new legislation are commented on: cloning, germline therapy, and purchase of gametes and embryos. Some important issues also covered in the new legislation, such as privacy and access to information, data protection, identity of donors, and inspection, will not be addressed. (shrink)

Although use of assisted reproduction techniques was examined by an ad hoc act in 2004 in Italy, there are many opposing views about ethical and economic implications of the technologies dealing with infertility and sterility problems. In this paper, the authors examine a recent judge's decision that ordered the removal and subsequent adoption of a 1-year-old child because her parents were considered too old to be parents. The couple had had recourse to heterologous artificial insemination abroad and decided (...) to give birth in Italy. The judgement deals with and discusses the complex issue of the right to procreate in order to balance the opportunities offered by scientific progress with the unborn child's condition. (shrink)

The article discusses questions on the significance of blood relatedness in the context of identity arguments about artificial reproduction (AR). Kinship, origins, and biological connections are significant to human beings. The author explains that family relationships bear on the identity of human beings. Moreover, she emphasizes that once these principles are neglected, it is possible to create people in ways that threaten significant human bonds and alienate people who are naturally related spelling loss, confusion and grief (...) for them. (shrink)

This paper argues that we ought to distinguish between ‘assisted’ gestation and ‘delegating’ gestation—and that the relevant difference does not depend on whether it is another human or technological system doing the work.1 In the philosophy of action, there is an important theoretical gap between S ‘helping A to φ’ and S ‘φ-ing on behalf of A’: the former is an instance of joint agency while the latter is an individual’s action. This matters because if the latter counts (...) as an intentional action, then only S is being said to have acted intentionally while, if the former is an intentional action, then both S and A have acted intentionally—which might have consequences for responsibility attributions, for example. To put it brutally, it is the difference between Belarus supporting Putin’s invasion and Belarus doing Putin’s dirty work—and you do not have to be a Russian mother to see that these two alternatives will have very different consequences. In another context, the economics of outsourcing is also built around the same theoretical distinction. But does this matter to gestation and reproduction? It does, argues this paper. Insisting on an ‘assisted’ reproduction framework2–8 reinforces patriarchal stereotypes and continues to put undue burdens on prospective mothers both by perpetuating the stereotype of women as needing help and also by implicating them in an action that might genuinely not be theirs. Delegation, on the other hand, empowers parents—who are in charge, rather than needing help. Furthermore, an action-theoretical delegation framework might be better placed to regulate and anticipate future technological developments, …. (shrink)

The Wall Street Journal article “Putting a Price on a Human Egg” triggered extensive media coverage of a rather unusual challenge to payments made to women providing ova for use in assisted reproduction. In Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine and Society for Assisted Reproductive Technologies, plaintiffs claim that ASRM and SART policies adopting limits on such payments violate the federal antitrust prohibition against price fixing.In 2007, an ASRM Ethics Committee Report, confirming a 2000 report, (...) asserted that, “[a]lthough there is no consensus on the precise payment that oocyte donors should receive, at this time sums of $5,000 or more require justification and sums above $10,000 are not appropriate.” SART is an affiliate organization of ASRM and counts as its members 90 percent of the clinics providing assisted reproductive technologies in the United States. SART requires that its members “[adhere] to all ASRM/SART Guidelines including ethical, practice, advertising, and laboratory.” The plaintiffs in Kamakahi claim that the agreement among SART members to abide by the ASRM policy restricts competition among agencies procuring oocytes and produces lower payments than women would otherwise be able to negotiate. It is through the requirement that SART members adhere to ASRM ethical guidelines that ethics goes to market and encounters antitrust law. Ethicists continue to debate whether payment for oocytes inappropriately commodifies the human body, and ASRM policy consistently refers to their procurement as the “donation process” and to women who participate as “donors.” Nevertheless, in the context of antitrust law, the procurement of oocytes is a business and clearly falls within the reach of antitrust restrictions on business conduct. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that some human reproductive genome editing interventions can be therapeutic in nature, and thus that it is false that all such interventions just create healthy individuals. I do this by showing that the conditions established by a therapy definition are met by certain reproductive genome editing interventions. I then defend this position against two objections: (a) reproductive genome editing interventions do not attain one of the two conditions for something to be a therapy, and (...) (b) some reproductive genome editing interventions are therapeutic but in a nonstandard way. In the Conclusion I call for a more nuanced discussion of the nature of reproductive genome editing interventions. (shrink)

Reproductive tourism is a manifestation of a larger, more inclusive trend toward globalization of capitalist cultural and material economies. This paper discusses the development of cross-border assisted reproduction within the globalized economy, transnational and local structural processes that influence the trade, social relations intersecting it, and implications for the healthcare systems affected. I focus on prevailing gender structures embedded in the cross-border trade and their intersection with other social and economic structures that reflect and impact globalization. I apply (...) a social connection model of responsibility for unjust outcomes and consider strategies to counter structural injustices embedded in this industry. The concluding section discusses policy reforms and proposals for collaborative action to preclude further injustices and extend full human rights to all. (shrink)

In Turkey, as in many other countries, infertility is generally regarded as a negative phenomenon in a woman’s life and is associated with a lot of stigma by society. In other words, female infertility and having a baby using Assisted Reproductive Technologies have to be taken into consideration with respect to gender, motherhood, social factors, religion and law. Yet if a woman chooses to use ART she has to deal with the consequences of her decision, such as being ostracized (...) by society. Other types of procedures in this area, such as sperm and ova donation or surrogate motherhood, are not permitted in law. However, both before and after the development of this techonology, society has been finding its own solutions which are rarely questioned and are still performed. This article will discuss what these practices are and try to reach some pragmatic conclusions concerning female infertility, the concept of motherhood and some traditional practices in Turkey. (shrink)

The ever-growing acceptance and use of assisted human reproduction techniques has caused demand for “donated” sperm and eggs to outstrip supply. Medical professionals and others argue that monetary reward is the only way to recruit sufficient numbers of “donors”. Is this a clash between pragmatics and policy/ethics? Where monetary payments are the norm, alternative recruitment strategies used successfully elsewhere may not have been considered, nor the negative consequences of commercialism on all participants thought through. Considerations leading some (...) countries to ban the buying and selling of sperm, eggs and embryos are outlined and a case made that the collective welfare of all involved parties be the primary consideration in this, at times heated, debate. (shrink)

The predominant position in the reproductive rights literature argues that access to assisted reproductive technologies (ART) forms part of an individual’s right to reproduce. On this reasoning, refusal of treatment by clinicians (via provision) violates a hopeful parent’s reproductive right and discriminates against the infertile. I reject these views and suggest they wrongly contort what reproductive freedom entitles individuals to do and demand of others. I suggest these views find their origin, at least in part, in the way we (...) define “reproduction” itself. This paper critically analyses two widely accepted definitions of human reproduction and demonstrates that both are fundamentally flawed. While the process of reproduction includes the biological acts of begetting and bearing a child, I argue that it does not extend to include rearing. This reworked definition has little impact in the realm of sexual reproduction. However, it has significant ethical implications for the formulation and assignment of reproductive rights and responsibilities in the non-sexual realm in two important ways. First, a claim to access ART where one has an intention to rear a child (but does not beget or bear) cannot be grounded in reproductive rights. Second, lacking an intention to rear does not extinguish the reproductive rights and responsibilities for those who collaborate in the process. I conclude that clinicians collaborate in non-sexual reproduction at the point of triggering conception (begetting) and therefore have the right to refuse to be involved in non-sexual reproduction, in some instances, as do all reproductive collaborators. (shrink)

This paper gives an introduction to the interdisciplinary special section. Against the historical and ethical background of reproductive technologies, it explores future scenarios of human reproduction and analyzes ways of mutual engagement between fictional and academic endeavors. The underlying idea is that we can make use of human reproduction scenarios in at least two ways: we can use them to critique technologies by imagining terrible consequences for humanity but also to defend positions that favor scientific and (...) technological development. (shrink)

Assisted reproductive technology is a global market engaging a variety of local moral economies where the construction of the demand–supply relationship takes different forms through the operation of the politics of value. This paper analyzes how the market–culture relationship works in different settings, showing how power and resources determine what value will, or will not, accrue from that relationship. A commodity’s potential economic value can only be realized through the operation of the market if its cultural status is seen (...) to be legitimate. At the same time, local moral economies and their associated social orders are potentially susceptible to the destabilizing implications of new commodities. The formal or informal organization of power relationships in the market–culture interaction can enable potential value to become manifest and tangible over time or block its path. The interaction is steered through national institutional sources of cultural authority embedded in state and religion, where the visible contest in the politics of value is conducted. Increasingly, that interaction finds its expression in transnational institutions of governance where the struggle for control of the cultural agenda reflects the global nature of the ART market. (shrink)

Much work in contemporary bioethics defends a broadly liberal view of human reproduction. I shall take this view to comprise (but not to be exhausted by) the following four claims.1 First, it is permissible both to reproduce and not to reproduce, either by traditional means or by means of assisted reproductive techniques such as IVF and genetic screening. Second, it is permissible either to reproduce or to adopt or otherwise foster an existing child to which one is (...) not biologically related. Third, it is permissible either to bring into existence a child with the greatest chance of a life of maximum human flourishing or to bring into existence a child with a life worth living but with less than the greatest chance of a life of maximum human flourishing. Fourth, it is impermissible to bring into existence a child whose life is either certain or likely to fall below some baseline of a human life minimally worth living. (shrink)

The use of modern medical technologies and interventions involves ethical and legal dilemmas which are yet to be solved. For the religious Jews the answer lies in Halakhah. The objective of this paper is to unscramble the difficult conundrum possessed by the halakhalic standing concerning the use of human embryonic cell for research. It also aims to take contemporary ethical issues arising from the use of technologies and medical advances made in human reproduction and study them from (...) an abstract philosophical perspective. Instead of providing any Jewish practical ruling the paper have tried to incite, stimulate and encourage philosophical thoughts about the issue through the intensive understanding of traditional Jewish thoughts. In this paper, an objective as well as a deep-rooted study has been adopted about the use of human embryos for research and the Jewish adoption of assisted reproductive technologies through the prism of the knowledge of Halakhah, Torah and Talmud. The paper finds that the embryo research sits at the crossroads of many halakhalic issues. Judaism adopts the belief that God has created man in his own image. The Jews not being dogmatic decipher “the image” of the creator as the ability to discern and reason. It follows that Judaism does not subscribe to the notion that tampering with nature is prohibited. To the Jews the mitzvah for procreation is so great that they are open to reason and adopt newer medical advancement in procreation. The Jewish laws are not only for engagement in intellectual exercise or academic pursuit but subscribe to a higher order of moral conduct. The Jewish approach is not situational but also casuistic in resolving conflicting medical issues. (shrink)

In the previous chapter, Stephen Levick presents several reasons for thinking that human reproductive cloning would be unacceptable even if it were safe. His main concern is that it is likely to have adverse psychological and social consequences. Levick takes an interesting approach. He discusses five existing situations that are analogous in some respect to human reproductive cloning. In each case he argues that human reproductive cloning is likely to involve either the same or more serious adverse (...) consequences than those associated with the putatively analogous situation. Using analogies is a common method in applied ethics and philosophy. Analogies allow us to think more clearly about situations that are otherwise difficult to imagine, or about which we do not have any empirical information, as in the case of cloning. I will, however, argue that Levick's analogies do not establish the conclusions he wishes to draw from them. (shrink)

In this paper, we will discuss the prospect of human reproduction achieved with gametes originating from only one person. According to statements by a minority of scientists working on the generation of gametes in vitro, it may become possible to create eggs from men’s non-reproductive cells and sperm from women’s. This would enable, at least in principle, the creation of an embryo from cells obtained from only one individual: ‘solo reproduction’. We will consider what might motivate people (...) to reproduce in this way, and the implications that solo reproduction might have for ethics and policy. We suggest that such an innovation is unlikely to revolutionise reproduction and parenting. Indeed, in some respects it is less revolutionary than in vitro fertilisation as a whole. Furthermore, we show that solo reproduction with in vitro created gametes is not necessarily any more ethically problematic than gamete donation—and probably less so. Where appropriate, we draw parallels with the debate surrounding reproductive cloning. We note that solo reproduction may serve to perpetuate reductive geneticised accounts of reproduction, and that this may indeed be ethically questionable. However, in this it is not unique among other technologies of assisted reproduction, many of which focus on genetic transmission. It is for this reason that a ban on solo reproduction might be inconsistent with continuing to permit other kinds of reproduction that also bear the potential to strengthen attachment to a geneticised account of reproduction. Our claim is that there are at least as good reasons to pursue research towards enabling solo reproduction, and eventually to introduce solo reproduction as an option for fertility treatment, as there are to do so for other infertility related purposes. (shrink)

In vitro gametogenesis (IVG) is believed to be the next big breakthrough in reproductive medicine. The prima facie acceptance of this possible future technology is notable when compared to the general prohibition on human reproductive cloning. After all, if safety is the main reason for not allowing reproductive cloning, one might expect a similar conclusion for the reproductive application of IVG, since both technologies hold considerable and comparable risks. However, safety concerns may be overcome, and are presumably not the (...) sole reason why cloning is being condemned. We therefore assess the non‐safety arguments against reproductive cloning, yet most of these can also be held against IVG. The few arguments that cannot be used against IVG are defective. We conclude from this that it will be hard to defend a ban on reproductive cloning while accepting the reproductive use of IVG. (shrink)

Reproduction is broadly recognised as fundamental to human flourishing. The presumptive priority of reproductive freedom forms the predominant position in the literature, translating in the non-sexual reproductive realm as an almost inviolable right to access assisted reproductive technology (ART). This position largely condemns refusal or restriction of ART by clinicians or the state as discriminatory. In this paper, I critically analyse the moral rights individuals assert in reproductive pursuit to explore whether reproductive rights entitle hopeful parents to (...) ART. I demonstrate that none of the protected actions performed, or entitlements generated are sui generis ‘reproductive’ rights, leading to the claim that there is no such thing as a right to reproduce. Under scrutiny, the reproductive right is a far narrower and weaker rights assertion than is recognised in the literature. I argue that the predominant position is grounded in a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope and strength of reproductive claims.I also highlight a significant conceptual inconsistency in the literature. On one hand, there is broad consensus that reproductive rights are predominantly negative, yet access to fertility treatment is framed as a component of the right. This wrongly contorts the negative nature of reproductive rights into a positive claim-right to ART. I conclude that this mistakenly frames ART access as sitting within the scope of reproductive freedom. I offer a revised conceptual paradigm of reproductive rights that has important clinical and policy implications for the provision and regulation of ART. (shrink)

What responsibilities, if any, do we have towards our genetic offspring, before or after birth and perhaps even before creation, merely by virtue of the genetic link? What claims, if any, arise from the mere genetic parental relation? Should society through its legal arrangements allow 'fatherless' or 'motherless' children to be born, as the current law on medically assisted reproduction involving gamete donation in some legal systems does? Does the possibility of establishing genetic parentage with practical certainty necessitate (...) reform of current legal regimes of parenthood? And what limits, if any, should we set on parental procreative choices in the interests of future children, particularly with regard to genetic engineering and related techniques? These are the questions explored in this book by some of the foremost legal, bioethical and biomedical thinkers. Assembled with a view to assisting the reader to reflect critically on the ongoing social experiment which medically assisted reproduction is today, the essays in this collection highlight what are - and what else might in the nearby future become - possible reproductive options and respond to the difficulties we encounter in assessing these practices and possibilities from our traditional ethical vantage points. Contributions by: Andrew Bainham, Thomas Baldwin, Lisa Bortolotti, John Harris, Martin H. Johnson, Judith Masson, Martin Richards, Alison Shaw, Sally Sheldon, Bonnie Steinbock and Mary Warnock. (shrink)

With technological advances in reproduction no longer confined to the laboratory or involving only the isolated individual, women and men are increasingly resorting to a variety of technologies unheard of a few decades ago to assist them in becoming parents. The public at large, and feminists as a group, are confused and divided over how to view these technologies and over what positions to take on the moral and legal dilemmas they give rise to. Farquhar argues that two perspectives (...) have tended to dominate feminist discussions of these issues. She labels these: "fundamental feminism" and "market liberalism." By linking a theoterical approach with a practical set of issues, Farquhar's The Other Machine provides a rigorous analysis of contemporary feminist debates. (shrink)