Traditional theories of sarcasm treat it as a case of a speaker's meaning the opposite of what she says. Recently, 'expressivists' have argued that sarcasm is not a type of speaker meaning at all, but merely the expression of a dissociative attitude toward an evoked thought or perspective. I argue that we should analyze sarcasm in terms of meaning inversion, as the traditional theory does; but that we need to construe 'meaning' more broadly, to include illocutionary force and evaluative attitudes (...) as well as propositional content. I distinguish four subclasses of sarcasm, individuated in terms of the target of inversion. Three of these classes raise serious challenges for a standard implicature analysis. (shrink)

This is a most complete English edition of Kant's correspondence. The letters are concerned with philosophical and scientific topics but many also treat personal, historical and cultural matters. On one level the letters chart Kant's philosophical development. On another level they expose quirks and foibles, and reveal a good deal about Kant's friendships and philosophical battles with some of the prominent thinkers of the time: Herder, Hamann, Mendelssohn and Fichte. What emerges from these pages is a vivid picture of the (...) intellectual, religious and political currents of the late eighteenth-century Prussia, in which there is much to be learnt about topics such as censorship, and the changing status of Jews and women in Europe. Amongst the special features of this volume are: a substantial introduction, detailed explanatory notes, a glossary, and biographical sketches of correspondents and people referred to in the letters. (shrink)

Introduction -- The epistemology of human development -- Culture and cultural psychology -- Mind, psyche and consciousness -- Brain -- Mind : brain : culture -- Index.

As an Introduction to the Special Issue on “Formulation, generalization, and abstraction in interaction,” this paper discusses key problems of a conversation analytic (CA) approach to semantics in interaction. Prior research in CA and Interactional Linguistics has only rarely dealt with issues of linguistic meaning in interaction. It is argued that this is a consequence of limitations of sequential analysis to capture meaning in interaction. While sequential analysis remains the encompassing methodological framework, it is suggested that it needs to be (...) complemented by analyzing semantic relationships between choices of formulation in the interaction, ethnography, and structural techniques of comparing selected options with possible alternatives. The paper describes the methodological approach taken to interactional semantics by the papers in the Special Issue, which analyse practices of generalization and abstraction in interaction as they are accomplished by formulations of prior versions of reference and description. (shrink)

To attribute confusion to someone is to take up a paternalistic stance in evaluating his reasoning.

Likert-scale surveys are frequently used in cross-cultural studies on leadership. Recent publications using digital text algorithms raise doubt about the source of variation in statistics from such studies to the extent that they are semantically driven. The Semantic Theory of Survey Response (STSR) predicts that in the case of semantically determined answers, the response patterns may also be predictable across languages. The Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) was applied to 11 different ethnic samples in English, Norwegian, German, Urdu and Chinese. Semantic (...) algorithms predicted responses significantly across all conditions, although to varying degree. Comparisons of Norwegian, German, Urdu and Chinese samples in native versus English language versions suggest that observed differences are not culturally dependent but caused by different translations and understanding. The maximum variance attributable to culture was a 5% unique overlap of variation in the two Chinese samples. These findings question the capability of traditional surveys to detect cultural differences. It also indicates that cross-cultural leadership research may risk lack of practical relevance. (shrink)

Der einleitende Satz des Paragraphen 16 der transzendentalen Deduktion der Kategorien in Immanuel Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft „Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können” kann als einer der prominentesten Sätze der Philosophiegeschichte gelten. Seine Auslegung darf in keiner Monographie des Kantschen Werkes fehlen. Er bildet einen zentralen Bezugspunkt etwa für die Möglichkeit einer transzendentalen Deduktion der Kategorien, für die These der Einheit des Bewußtseins oder für den Zusammenhang von Erkenntnis und Subjektivität. Diese Passage kann jedoch naturgemäß auch (...) einen Ausgangspunkt für die Analyse von Kants Konzeption von Selbstbewußtsein und Selbsterkenntnis bieten. (shrink)

In naturally occuring argumentation, words which play a crucial role in the argument often acquire different meanings on subsequent occasions of use. Traditionally, such semantic shifts have been dealt with by the ‘fallacy of equivocation’. In my paper, I would like to show that there is considerably more to semantic shifts during arguments than their potentially being fallacious. Based on an analysis of a debate on environmental policy, I will argue that shifts in meaning are produced by a principle I (...) call ‘local semantic elaboration’. I will go on to show that semantic shifts in the meaning of a word, the position advocated by a party, and the questions that the parties raise during an argumentative process are neatly tailored to one another, but can be incommensurable to the opponent's views. Semantic shifts thus may have a dissociative impact on a critical discussion. By linking the structure of argumentation to its pragmatics, however, it may be revealed that there are two practices that account for a higher order of coherence of the debate. The first practice is a general preference for disagreeing with the opponent, the second practice is the interpretation of local speech acts in terms of an overall ideological stance that is attributed to the speaker. Because of these practices, parties do not criticize divergent semantic conceptions as disruptive, but they treat them as characteristic and sometimes even metonymic reflections of the parties' positions. (shrink)

I take up three puzzles about our emotional and evaluative responses to fiction. First, how can we even have emotional responses to characters and events that we know not to exist, if emotions are as intimately connected to belief and action as they seem to be? One solution to this puzzle claims that we merely imagine having such emotional responses. But this raises the puzzle of why we would ever refuse to follow an author’s instructions to imagine such responses, since (...) we happily imagine many other implausible things. A natural response to this second puzzle is that our responses to fiction are real, and so can’t just be conjured up in response to an author’s demands. However, this simple response is inadequate, because we often respond differently to people and events in fiction than we would if we encountered them in real life. Solving these three puzzles in a consistent way requires the notion of a “perspective” on a fictional world. I sketch an account of this intuitive but frustratingly amorphous notion: perspectives are tools for organizing our thinking, which can in turn alter our emotional and evaluative responses. Cultivating a perspective can be illuminating, entertaining, or corrupting — or all three at once. (shrink)

According to Positioning Theory, participants in narrative interaction can position themselves on a representational level concerning the autobiographical, told self, and a performative level concerning the interactive and emotional self of the tellers. The performative self usually is much harder to pin down, because it is a non-propositional, enacted self. In contrast to everyday interaction, psychotherapists regularly topicalize the performative self explicitly. In our paper, we study how therapists respond to clients' narratives by interpretations of the client’s conduct, shifting from (...) the autobiographical identity of the told self, which is the focus of the client’s story, to the present performative self of the client. Drawing on video-recordings from three psychodynamic therapies (tiefenpsychologisch fundierte Psychotherapie) with 25 sessions each, we will analyze in detail five extracts of therapists‘ shifts from the representational to the performative self. We highlight four findings: • Whereas clients’ narratives often serve to support identity-claims in terms of personal psychological and moral characteristics, therapists rather tend to focus on clients’ feelings, motives, current behavior and ways of interacting. • In response to clients’ stories, therapists first show empathy and confirm clients’ accounts, before shifting to clients’ performative self. • Therapists ground the shift to clients’ performative self by references to clients’ observable behavior. • Therapists do not simply expect affiliation with their views on clients’ performative self. Rather they use such shifts to promote the clients’ self-exploration. Yet, if clients resists to explore their selves in more detail, therapists more explicitly ascribe motives and feelings that clients do not seem to be aware of. The shift in positioning levels thus seems to have a preparatory function for engendering therapeutic insights. (shrink)

Philosophers have traditionally inclined toward one of two opposite extremes when it comes to metaphor. On the one hand, partisans of metaphor have tended to believe that metaphors do something different in kind from literal utterances; it is a ‘heresy’, they think, either to deny that what metaphors do is genuinely cognitive, or to assume that it can be translated into literal terms. On the other hand, analytic philosophers have typically denied just this: they tend to assume that if metaphors (...) express any genuine content at all, then that content can in principle be paraphrased into literal terms. They often conclude on this basis that metaphor is theoretically dispensable, and so that it poses no special challenges and affords no distinctive insights for the philosophy of language and mind. (shrink)

Theorists often associate certain “poetic” qualities with metaphor – most especially, producing an open-ended, holistic perspective which is evocative, imagistic and affectively-laden. I argue that, on the one hand, non-cognitivists are wrong to claim that metaphors only produce such perspectives: like ordinary literal speech, they also serve to undertake claims and other speech acts with propositional content. On the other hand, contextualists are wrong to assimilate metaphor to literal loose talk: metaphors depend on using one thing as a perspective for (...) thinking about something else. I bring out the distinctive way that metaphor works by contrasting it with two other poetic uses of language, juxtapositions and “telling details,” that do fit the accounts of metaphor offered by non-cognitivists and contextualists, respectively. (shrink)

Victoria Camps analiza en estas páginas la fragilidad de una ética que nace y se desarrolla con el triunfo del pensamiento liberal. La defensa de las libertades individuales, de donde emanan los derechos humanos, potencia los intereses privados frente al interés público. Desde esta perspectiva, una ética liberal es tolerante y laica, carece de dogmas, se nutre de principios abstractos, aceptados en teoría, pero con escasa incidencia en la práctica, como lo muestran la impotencia frente a la corrupción y (...) las dificultades para educar cívicamente y construir una moralidad pública. Como es habitual en otras publicaciones de la autora, su interés parte de las teorías filosóficas que han estructurado el pensamiento moral contemporáneo pero no se limita a elaborar un discurso circunscrito al debate académico. Le importa mostrar la relevancia de la filosofía para abordar las debilidades ético-políticas de nuestro tiempo. (shrink)

Most of us create and use a panoply of non-sentential representations throughout our ordinary lives: we regularly use maps to navigate, charts to keep track of complex patterns of data, and diagrams to visualize logical and causal relations among states of affairs. But philosophers typically pay little attention to such representations, focusing almost exclusively on language instead. In particular, when theorizing about the mind, many philosophers assume that there is a very tight mapping between language and thought. Some analyze utterances (...) as the outer vocalizations of inner thoughts (e.g. Grice 1957, Devitt 2005), while others treat thought as a form of inner speech (e.g. Sellars 1956/1997, Carruthers 2002). But even philosophers who take no stand on the relative priority of language and thought still tend to individuate mental states in terms of the sentences we use to ascribe them. Indeed, Dummett (1993) claims that it is constitutive of analytic philosophy that it approaches the mind by way of language. In many ways, this linguistic model is salutary. Our thoughts are often intimately intertwined with their linguistic expression, and public language does provide a comparatively tractable proxy for, and a window into, the messier realm of thought. However, an exclusive focus on thought as it is expressed in language threatens to leave other sorts of thought unexplained, or even to blind us to their possibility. In particular, many cognitive ethologists and psychologists find it useful to talk about humans, chimpanzees, birds, rats, and even bees as employing cognitive maps. We need to make sense of this way of talking about minds as well as more familiar sentential descriptions. In what follows, I investigate the theoretical and practical possibility of non-sentential thought. Ultimately, I am most interested in the contours of distinctively human thought: what forms does human thought take, and how do those different forms interact? How does human thought compare with that of other animals? In this essay, however, I focus on a narrower and more basic theoretical question: could thought occur in maps? Many philosophers are convinced that in some important sense, thought per se must be language-like.. (shrink)

In diesem Buch wird Friedrich Schleiermachers Sozialtheorie des Christentums entfaltet. Grundlage sind die bisher unzulänglich publizierten Vorlesungen über die Christliche Sittenlehre, in denen der Berliner Theologe die kulturelle Wirksamkeit der christlichen Religion diachron und synchron entfaltet. Neben den Kirchen werden eine Reihe von sozialen Formationen identifiziert, in denen sich der christliche Glaube durch das Handeln der Christinnen und Christen realisiert und gesellschaftlich sichtbar wird. Die christliche Sittenlehre mündet in einer multiplen Sozialtheorie des Christentums, aus der man für die Beschreibung der (...) Lage der christlichen Religion in der Gegenwart methodische und kategoriale Anregungen entnehmen kann, insofern die übliche Gleichsetzung von Christentum und Kirche(n) überwunden wird und Formen der Vergemeinschaftung auf der Basis schwacher oder volatiler Institutionalisierung in den Blick genommen werden. (shrink)

This paper analyses one specific conversational practice of formulation called ‘notionalization’. It consists in the transformation of a description by a prior speaker into a categorization by the next speaker. Sequences of this kind are a “natural laboratory” for studying the differences between descriptions and categorizations regarding their semantic, interactional, and rhetorical properties: Descriptive/narrative versions are often vague and tentative, multi unit turns, which are temporalized and episodic, offering a lot of contingent, situational, and indexical detail. Notionalizations turn them into (...) condensed, abstract, timeless, and often agentless categorizations expressed by a noun (phrase) within one turn constructional unit (TCU). Drawing on audio- and video-taped German data from various types of interaction, the paper focuses on one particular practice of notionalization, the formulation of purportedly common ground by TCUs prefaced with the connective also . The paper discusses their turn-constructional and morphological properties, pointing out affinities of notionalization with language for special purposes. Notionalizations are used for reducing detail and for topical closure. They provide grounds for emergent keywords, which can be reused to re-contextualize topical issues and interactional histories efficiently. Notionalizations are powerful means for accomplishing intersubjectivity while pursuing (sometimes one-sided) practical relevancies at the same time. Their inevitably perspective design thus may lead to re-open the issue they were deemed to settle. The paper closes with an outlook to other practices of notionalization, pointing to dimensions of interactionally relevant variation and commonalities. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Bibliography.

Metaphors are powerful communicative tools because they produce ”framing effects’. These effects are especially palpable when the metaphor is an insult that denigrates the hearer or someone he cares about. In such cases, just comprehending the metaphor produces a kind of ”complicity’ that cannot easily be undone by denying the speaker’s claim. Several theorists have taken this to show that metaphors are engaged in a different line of work from ordinary communication. Against this, I argue that metaphorical insults are rhetorically (...) powerful because they combine perspectives, presupposition, and pragmatics in the service of speech acts with assertoric force. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have discovered that they have a lot to learn from, or at least to ponder about, fiction. Many metaphysicians are attracted to fiction as a model for our talk about purported objects and properties, such as numbers, morality, and possible worlds, without embracing a robust Platonist ontology. In addition, a growing group of philosophers of mind are interested in the implications of our engagement with fiction for our understanding of the mind and emotions: If I don’t believe that (...) Anna Karenina exists, can I really pity her, or hope or desire that she extricate herself from her tragic situation? And why is there no “morality fiction,” analogous to science fiction? I suspect that philosophers have been especially comfortable thinking about fiction because it seems, at least prima facie, to employ the imagination in a way that conforms to a standard model of the mind. Specifically, contemporary philosophers tend to think of imagination as a form of mental pretense. Mental pretense can take two main forms: a cognitive attitude of supposing a set of propositions to be true (make-believe) or else an experiential state of imaging a scenario as if it were before one (imaging). Much of our pretense intertwines the cognitive and experiential modalities, of course. But both share a crucial common feature: all of one’s imaginative effort is invested in pretending that certain contents obtain. In this sense, we can understand imagination as the “offline” simulation of actual beliefs and perceptions (and perhaps other attitudes as well), where we analyze these in the normal way, as states individuated by their attitude and representational content. While I share the burgeoning interest in fiction, I want to suggest that we also have a lot to learn from poetry, and in particular from poetic metaphor. I will argue.. (shrink)

Everyone has mistaken one thing for another, such as a stranger for an acquaintance. A person who has mistaken two things, Joseph Camp argues, even on a massive scale, is still capable of logical thought. In order to make that idea precise, one needs a logic of confused thought that is blind to the distinction between the objects that have been confused. Confused thought and language cannot be characterized as true or false even though reasoning conducted in such language can (...) be classified as valid or invalid. To the extent that philosophers have addressed this issue at all, they take it for granted that confusion is a kind of ambiguity. Camp rejects this notion; his fundamental claim is that confusion is not a mental state. To attribute confusion to someone is to take up a paternalistic stance in evaluating his reasoning. Camp proposes a novel characterization of confusion, and then demonstrates its fruitfulness with several applications in the history of philosophy and the history of science. (shrink)

Drawn from the Prussian Academy edition of Kant's collected works, these letters make it possible to trace the development of Kant's thought from his earliest worries about the topics discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason to his attempts in later life to meet the objections of his critics and erstwhile disciples. "Perhaps the major value of these writings is their demonstration of Kant's own attitude towards his philosophical works."—Paul Arthur Schilpp, Saturday Review.

Does thought precede language, or the other way around? How does having a language affect our thoughts? Who has a language, and who can think? These questions have traditionally been addressed by philosophers, especially by rationalists concerned to identify the essential difference between humans and other animals. More recently, theorists in cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and developmental psychology have been asking these questions in more empirically grounded ways. At its best, this confluence of philosophy and science promises to blend the (...) respective strengths of each discipline, bringing abstract theory to bear on reality in a principled and focused way. At its worst, it risks degenerating into a war of words, with each side employing key expressions in its own idiosyncratic way – or worse, contaminating empirical research with a priori dogmas inherited from outmoded philosophical worldviews. In Baboon Metaphysics (2007), Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth offer an analysis of baboon cognition that promises to exemplify the very best interaction of philosophical theory and empirical research. They argue that baboons have a language of thought: a language-like representational medium, which supports the sophisticated cognitive abilities required to negotiate their complex social environment. This claim is intended to be surprising in its own right, and also to shed light on the evolution of spoken language. Because our own ancestors likely lived in a similarly complex social environment, Cheney and Seyfarth propose that the earliest humans also developed language first as a cognitive medium, and that spoken language evolved as a means to express those thoughts. There are two potential difficulties here. First, ‘Language of Thought’ (LOT) is a term of art, with much associated theoretical baggage and often comparatively little careful exposition. Thus, evaluating the claim requires getting clearer about just what LOT implies in this context.. (shrink)

Änderungen im Bereich der medizinischen Technologie können Änderungen der Begriffswelt, Änderungen der ethischen Perspektiven und Änderungen im Recht hervorrufen. Neue Entwicklungen der Reproduktionstechnik, z.B. in vitro Fertilisation, Leihmutterschaft etc., bilden eine Herausforderung für die traditionellen Konzepte von "Elternschaft", die von uns verlangen, die sonst vorausgesetzte Identität von genetischer Mutter, Geburtsmutter und Sozialmutter etc. zu überdenken. Ich untersuche in diesem Beitrag die möglichen Auswirkungen des Genomprojekts auf einige der geläufigen Annahmen über menschliche Beziehungen, Willensentschlüsse und Tugenden. Ein Beispiel: Würden Sie jemanden (...) heiraten, von dem bekannt ist, daß er/sie in einigen Jahren die Alzheimersche Krankheit ausbilden wird? Würde die Idee einer "lebenslangen Verbindung" hier eine andere moralische Bedeutung erlangen, vielleicht schlicht veralten oder sogar als supererogatorisch einzuschätzen sein? (shrink)