A student's future as a knowledge worker (one who "thinks for a living" with the task of problem solving) is the starting point of this book. With this in mind, the book combines a review of philosophical positions and problems with practical examples and perspectives gained from everyday challenges faced by knowledge workers in their businesses and organizations. Through the use of summative chapters, highlighted key concepts, questions for reflection, and illustrative examples on how to work with the theories presented, (...) the book provides a clear and accessible introduction to this challenging subject. Philosophy of Science primarily addresses students studying language, communication, marketing, economics, and management. However, the survey of the theoretical schools of thought - as well as the discussions on research ethics and the role of research in society - will be equally relevant for other students in the humanities and the natural and social sciences. (shrink)

Anche se siamo comunemente abituati a pensare alla scienza come a un qualcosa di assolutamente atemporale e indipendente da tutto, in realtà essa è profondamente influenzata dalla cultura e dalla società del tempo in cui vive. Infatti né la scienza è isolabile dalla società, né la società è isolabile dalla scienza, tanto meno come si sta configurando oggi. Per approfondire questi aspetti, esistono però due visioni antagoniste che bisogna superare: secondo la visione scolastica, retaggio del positivismo ottocentesco ancora molto diffuso (...) fra scienziati e pubblico di non esperti, la scienza è conoscenza senza soggetto conoscente. All'opposto, la visione cinica della scienza, sull'onda di talune elaborazioni della sociologia della scienza, la riduce a nient'altro che a una costruzione di soggetti che partecipano al gioco scientifico, una cultura come altre e da "mediare", e comunque una conoscenza relativa, se non frutto di una costruzione puramente soggettiva, arbitraria, ideologica. Un'analisi della costituzione sociale della scienza può, invece, mirare a un'indagine scientifica sulla scienza proprio configurando una relatività della conoscenza che supera sia l'assolutismo idealistico sia il relativismo soggettivistico. (shrink)

We define the notion of ordinal computability by generalizing standard Turing computability on tapes of length ω to computations on tapes of arbitrary ordinal length. We show that a set of ordinals is ordinal computable from a finite set of ordinal parameters if and only if it is an element of Gödel's constructible universe L. This characterization can be used to prove the generalized continuum hypothesis in L.

We generalize ordinary register machines on natural numbers to machines whose registers contain arbitrary ordinals. Ordinal register machines are able to compute a recursive bounded truth predicate on the ordinals. The class of sets of ordinals which can be read off the truth predicate satisfies a natural theory SO. SO is the theory of the sets of ordinals in a model of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms ZFC. This allows the following characterization of computable sets: a set of ordinals is ordinal register (...) computable if and only if it is an element of Gödel’s constructible universe L. (shrink)

Infinite time register machines (ITRMs) are register machines which act on natural numbers and which are allowed to run for arbitrarily many ordinal steps. Successor steps are determined by standard register machine commands. At limit times register contents are defined by appropriate limit operations. In this paper, we examine the ITRMs introduced by the third and fourth author (Koepke and Miller in Logic and Theory of Algorithms LNCS, pp. 306–315, 2008), where a register content at a limit time is set (...) to the lim inf of previous register contents if that limit is finite; otherwise the register is reset to 0. The theory of these machines has several similarities to the infinite time Turing machines (ITTMs) of Hamkins and Lewis. The machines can decide all ${\Pi^1_1}$ sets, yet are strictly weaker than ITTMs. As in the ITTM situation, we introduce a notion of ITRM-clockable ordinals corresponding to the running times of computations. These form a transitive initial segment of the ordinals. Furthermore we prove a Lost Melody theorem: there is a real r such that there is a program P that halts on the empty input for all oracle contents and outputs 1 iff the oracle number is r, but no program can decide for every natural number n whether or not ${n \in r}$ with the empty oracle. In an earlier paper, the third author considered another type of machines where registers were not reset at infinite lim inf’s and he called them infinite time register machines. Because the resetting machines correspond much better to ITTMs we hold that in future the resetting register machines should be called ITRMs. (shrink)

We generalize standard Turing machines, which work in time ω on a tape of length ω, to α-machines with time α and tape length α, for α some limit ordinal. We show that this provides a simple machine model adequate for classical admissible recursion theory as developed by G. Sacks and his school. For α an admissible ordinal, the basic notions of α-recursive or α-recursively enumerable are equivalent to being computable or computably enumerable by an α-machine, respectively. We emphasize the (...) algorithmic approach to admissible recursion theory by indicating how the proof of the Sacks–Simpson theorem, i.e., the solution of Post’s problem in α-recursion theory, could be based on α-machines, without involving constructibility theory. (shrink)

Recently, Gitik, Kanovei and the first author proved that for a classical Prikry forcing extension the family of the intermediate models can be parametrized by $\mathscr{P}(\omega)/\mathrm{finite}$. By modifying the standard Prikry tree forcing we define a Prikry-type forcing which also singularizes a measurable cardinal but which is minimal, i.e., there are \emph{no} intermediate models properly between the ground model and the generic extension. The proof relies on combining the rigidity of the tree structure with indiscernibility arguments resulting from the normality (...) of the associated measures. (shrink)

By using the notion of a simplified (κ,1)-morass, we construct κ-thin-tall, κ-thin-thick and, in a forcing extension, κ-very thin-thick superatomic Boolean algebras for every infinite regular cardinal κ.

We survey the definition and fundamental properties of the family of short core models, which extend the core model K of Dodd and Jensen to include α-sequences of measurable cardinals . The theory is applied to various combinatorial principles to get lower bounds for their consistency strengths in terms of the existence of sequences of measurable cardinals. We consider instances of Chang's conjecture, ‘accessible’ Jónsson cardinals, the free subset property for small cardinals, a canonization property of ω ω , and (...) a non-closure property of elementary embeddings of the universe. In some cases, equiconsistencies are obtained. (shrink)

Using the Friedman-Koepke Hyperfine Structure Theory of [2], we provide a short construction of a gap 1 morass in the constructible universe.

Émile Durkheim remains one of the most controversial, and deeply misunderstood, classics of social theory. His work differs from the dominant version of sociology that has essentially accepted the modernist self-description of contemporary societies; and it contradicts the individualism that has come to dominate the social sciences. For everybody who is interested in constructing theoretical alternatives to this individualism, Durkheim's sociology can be a useful inspiration - not only because of the solutions it suggests, but already because of the questions (...) it asks. Making use of the theoretical possibilities offered by the Durkheimian tradition, however, requires going beyond the familiar appropriations. The Oxford Handbook of Émile Durkheim takes stock of the different recent debates on Durkheimian sociology, and makes them accessible to a wide audience spanning various disciplines; this includes crucial debates that, due to language barriers, are not easily accessible for an English-reading public. The handbook's chapters elucidate the controversial key concepts of Durkheimian sociology; situate them within the contemporary political and theoretical debates they were originally responding to; offer surveys of empirical research that uses Durkheimian concepts (on topics that were already central for Durkheim's own work as well as on topics that Durkheim hardly touched upon), thus demonstrating the possibilities of a Durkheimian sociology; bring out the divergent, and competing, ways in which Durkheim's ideas have been appropriated and reformulated within more recent theoretical developments in the social sciences. In doing so, this volume is an important resource for all scholars and students looking to understand Durkheimian sociology. (shrink)

We give a proof ofTheorem 1. Let κ be the smallest cardinal such that the free subset property Fr ω (κ,ω 1)holds. Assume κ is singular. Then there is an inner model with ω1 measurable cardinals.

Simondon adopts some concepts of social psychology as ‘in group’ and ‘out group’, namely from Kurt Lewin and Gordon Allport, that allow him to describe the fundamental processes shaping the domain of collective individuation, and to challenge Bergson’s distinction between a ‘closed’ community and an ‘open’ society. Reconstructing Simondon’s sources is necessary to understand how he tries to provide an analysis of the social system without presupposing a given anthropology, but rather exploring different perspectives on the human/nature threshold through the (...) concept of transindividual. In his study of the social system Simondon progressively gives conceptual shape to the processes he calls transindividual thanks to the ontogenetic analysis of the phenomena of belief, work and language. In all these domains, a ‘basic community’ emerges just over the threshold of the biological group, where the structural ambivalence of all collective processes as simultaneously closed and open becomes clear. That is why Simondon does not present the concept of the transindividual as a solution to the epistemological problem of psychic and collective individuation, but rather as the ‘field’ in which a whole series of social, biological and technical dimensions can be made converge towards a science of anthropogenic processes. (shrink)

Author: Koepke Ireneusz Title: ANDRZEJ WALICKI AND “WARSAW SCHOOL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS” (Andrzej Walicki i „warszawska szkoła historyków (historii) idei”) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 259-276 Keywords: ANDRZEJ WALICKI, WARSAW SCHOOL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:This article is an attempt of presenting Andrzej Walicki connections with the so called Warsaw School of the History of Ideas and his research on (...) basic methodological issues created by this “school”, which are linked with the history of ideas and the history of philosophy. The most important are research rules which has been used by A. Walicki, and their consequences on his intellectual work as well as some critical remarks. (shrink)

We propose a simple notion of "extender" for coding large elementary embeddings of models of set theory. As an application we present a self-contained proof of the theorem by D. Martin and J. Steel that infinitely many Woodin cardinals imply the determinacy of every projective set.

We examine combinatorial aspects and consistency strength properties of almost Ramsey cardinals. Without the Axiom of Choice, successor cardinals may be almost Ramsey. From fairly mild supercompactness assumptions, we construct a model of ZF + ${\neg {\rm AC}_\omega}$ in which every infinite cardinal is almost Ramsey. Core model arguments show that strong assumptions are necessary. Without successors of singular cardinals, we can weaken this to an equiconsistency of the following theories: “ZFC + There is a proper class of regular almost (...) Ramsey cardinals”, and “ZF + DC + All infinite cardinals except possibly successors of singular cardinals are almost Ramsey”. (shrink)

We give the proof of a theorem of Jensen and Zeman on the existence of a global □ sequence in the Core Model below a measurable cardinal κ of Mitchell order ) equal to κ++, and use it to prove the following theorem on mutual stationarity at n.Let ω1 denote the first uncountable cardinal of V and set to be the class of ordinals of cofinality ω1.TheoremIf every sequence n m. In particular, there is such a model in which for (...) all sufficiently large m<ω, the class of measurables λ with oM≥ωm is, in V, stationary below m+2. (shrink)

We prove that every homogeneously Souslin set is coanalytic provided that either (a) 0long does not exist, or else (b) V = K, where K is the core model below a μ-measurable cardinal.

We determine exact consistency strengths for various failures of the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis (SCH) in the setting of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom system ZF without the Axiom of Choice (AC). By the new notion of parallel Prikry forcing that we introduce, we obtain surjective failures of SCH using only one measurable cardinal, including a surjective failure of Shelah's pcf theorem about the size of the power set of $\aleph _{\omega}$ . Using symmetric collapses to $\aleph _{\omega}$ , $\aleph _{\omega _{1}}$ , (...) or $\aleph _{\omega _{2}}$ , we show that injective failures at $\aleph _{\omega}$ , $\aleph _{\omega _{1}}$ , or $\aleph _{\omega _{2}}$ can have relatively mild consistency strengths in terms of Mitchell orders of measurable cardinals. Injective failures of both the aforementioned theorem of Shelah and Silver's theorem that GCH cannot first fail at a singular strong limit cardinal of uncountable cofinality are also obtained. Lower bounds are shown by core model techniques and methods due to Gitik and Mitchell. (shrink)

We show that for all natural numbers n, the theory “ZF + DC $_{\aleph_n}$ + $\aleph_{\omega}$ is a Rowbottom cardinal carrying a Rowbottom filter” has the same consistency strength as the theory “ZFC + There exists a measurable cardinal”. In addition, we show that the theory “ZF + $\aleph_{\omega_1}$ is an ω 2-Rowbottom cardinal carrying an ω 2-Rowbottom filter and ω 1 is regular” has the same consistency strength as the theory “ZFC + There exist ω 1 measurable cardinals”. We (...) also discuss some generalizations of these results. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend the structural concept of representation, as defined by homomorphisms, against its main objections, namely: logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, theobjection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. The logical objections can be met by reserving the relation ‘to be homomorphic to’ for the explication of potential representation (or, of the representational content). Actual reference objects (‘targets’) of representations are determined by (intentional or causal) representational mechanisms. Appealing to the independence of (...) the dimensions of ‘content’ and ‘target’ also helps to see how the structural concept can cope with misrepresentation. Finally, I argue that homomorphic representations are not necessarily ‘copies’ of their representanda, and thus can convey scientific insight. (shrink)

The paper defends the structural concept of representation, defined by homomorphisms, against the main objections that have been raised against it: Logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, the objection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. Homomorphic representations are not necessarily ‘copies’ of their representanda, and thus can convey scientific insight.

We present here an approach to the fine structure of L based solely on elementary model theoretic ideas, and illustrate its use in a proof of Global Square in L. We thereby avoid the Lévy hierarchy of formulas and the subtleties of master codes and projecta, introduced by Jensen [3] in the original form of the theory. Our theory could appropriately be called ”Hyperfine Structure Theory”, as we make use of a hierarchy of structures and hull operations which refines the (...) traditional Lα -or Jα-sequences with their Σn-hull operations.§1. Introduction. In 1938, K. Gödel defined the model L of set theory to show the relative consistency of Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis. L is defined as a unionof initial segments which satisfy: L0 = ∅, Lλ = ∪α<λLα for limit ordinals λ, and, crucially, Lα + 1 = the collection of 1st order definable subsets of Lα. Since every transitive model of set theory must be closed under 1st order definability, L turns out to be the smallest inner model of set theory. Thus it occupies the central place in the set theoretic spectrum of models.The proof of the continuum hypothesis in L is based on the very uniform hierarchical definition of the L-hierarchy. The Condensation Lemma states that if π : M → Lα is an elementary embedding, M transitive, then some ; the lemma can be proved by induction on α. If a real, i.e., a subset of ω, is definable over some Lα,then by a Löwenheim-Skolem argument it is definable over some countable M as above, and hence over some, < ω1. This allows one to list the reals in L in length ω1 and therefore proves the Continuum Hypothesis in L. (shrink)

Responsibility as accountability is normally taken to have stricter control conditions than responsibility as attributability. A common way to argue for this claim is to point to differences in the harmfulness of blame involved in these different kinds of responsibility. This paper argues that this explanation does not work once we shift our focus from other-directed blame to self-blame. To blame oneself in the accountability sense is to feel guilt and feeling guilty is to suffer. To blame oneself in the (...) attributability sense, it will be argued, is to feel shame and feeling shame is also to suffer. The different control conditions cannot be explained by a difference in the harm of blame. Instead, this paper argues that accountability and attributability are governed by different kinds of appropriateness: an agent S is accountability blameworthy for X only if S deserves to feel guilty; an agent S is attributability blameworthy for X only if it is fitting that S feels shame for X. (shrink)

This article investigates the hitherto under-examined relations between affirmative action, paternalism and respect. We provide three main arguments. First, we argue that affirmative action initiatives are typically paternalistic and thus disrespectful towards those intended beneficiaries who oppose the initiatives in question. Second, we argue that not introducing affirmative action can also be disrespectful towards these potential beneficiaries because such inaction involves a failure to adequately recognize their moral worth. Third, we argue that the paternalistic disrespect involved in affirmative action is (...) alleviated when the potential beneficiaries’ preferences against such initiatives are adaptive. We conclude that although there is a relevant sense in which paternalistic affirmative action is disrespectful, it may well be more disrespectful not to pursue such policies. (shrink)

The paper defends the structural concept of representation, defined by homomorphisms, against the main objections that have been raised against it: Logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, the objection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. Homomorphic representations are not necessarily ‘copies’ of their representanda, and thus can convey scientific insight.

Affirmative action is standardly pursued in relation to admissions to prestigious universities, in hiring for prestigious jobs, and when it comes to being elected to parliament. Central to these forms of affirmative action is that they have to do with competitive goods. A good is competitive when, if we improve A’s chances of getting the good, we reduce B’s chances of obtaining the good. I call this Competitive Affirmative Action. I distinguish this from Non-competitive Affirmative Action. The latter has to (...) do with non-competitive goods, e.g., being granted early parole or freedom from arbitrary arrest. I argue that some of the most prominent objections against affirmative action—in particular, the reverse discrimination objection and the merit objection—speak less against Non-competitive Affirmative Action. And that some of the most prominent arguments in favor of affirmative action, insofar as they justify Competitive Affirmative Action, also justify Non-competitive Affirmative Action. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a regularity theory of causation. The theory aims to be reductive and to align with our pre‐theoretic understanding of the causal relation. We show that our theory can account for a wide range of causal scenarios, including isomorphic scenarios, omissions, and scenarios which suggest that causation is not transitive.

This article works out the main characteristics of `practice theory', a type of social theory which has been sketched by such authors as Bourdieu, Giddens, Taylor, late Foucault and others. Practice theory is presented as a conceptual alternative to other forms of social and cultural theory, above all to culturalist mentalism, textualism and intersubjectivism. The article shows how practice theory and the three other cultural-theoretical vocabularies differ in their localization of the social and in their conceptualization of the body, mind, (...) things, knowledge, discourse, structure/process and the agent. (shrink)

We present here an approach to the fine structure of L based solely on elementary model theoretic ideas, and illustrate its use in a proof of Global Square in L. We thereby avoid the Lévy hierarchy of formulas and the subtleties of master codes and projecta, introduced by Jensen [3] in the original form of the theory. Our theory could appropriately be called ”Hyperfine Structure Theory”, as we make use of a hierarchy of structures and hull operations which refines the (...) traditional Lα -or Jα-sequences with their Σn-hull operations.§1. Introduction. In 1938, K. Gödel defined the model L of set theory to show the relative consistency of Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis. L is defined as a unionof initial segments which satisfy: L0 = ∅, Lλ = ∪α<λLα for limit ordinals λ, and, crucially, Lα + 1 = the collection of 1st order definable subsets of Lα. Since every transitive model of set theory must be closed under 1st order definability, L turns out to be the smallest inner model of set theory. Thus it occupies the central place in the set theoretic spectrum of models.The proof of the continuum hypothesis in L is based on the very uniform hierarchical definition of the L-hierarchy. The Condensation Lemma states that if π : M → Lα is an elementary embedding, M transitive, then some ; the lemma can be proved by induction on α. If a real, i.e., a subset of ω, is definable over some Lα,then by a Löwenheim-Skolem argument it is definable over some countable M as above, and hence over some, < ω1. This allows one to list the reals in L in length ω1 and therefore proves the Continuum Hypothesis in L. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend the structural concept of representation, as defined by homomorphisms, against its main objections, namely: logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, theobjection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. The logical objections can be met by reserving the relation.

This English translation of the author's original work has been thoroughly revised, expanded and updated. The book covers logical systems known as type-free or self-referential . These traditionally arise from any discussion on logical and semantical paradoxes. This particular volume, however, is not concerned with paradoxes but with the investigation of type-free sytems to show that: (i) there are rich theories of self-application, involving both operations and truth which can serve as foundations for property theory and formal semantics; (ii) these (...) theories provide a new outlook on classical topics, such as inductive definitions and predicative mathematics; (iii) they are particularly promising with regard to applications. Research arising from paradoxes has moved progressively closer to the mainstream of mathematical logic and has become much more prominent in the last twenty years. A number of significant developments, techniques and results have been discovered. Academics, students and researchers will find that the book contains a thorough overview of all relevant research in this field. (shrink)

This article explores how neutralisation can explain people's lack of commitment to buying Fair Trade products, even when they identify FT as an ethical concern. It examines the theoretical tenets of neutralisation theory and critically assesses its applicability to the purchase of FT products. Exploratory research provides illustrative examples of neutralisation techniques being used in the FT consumer context. A conceptual framework and research propositions delineate the role of neutralisation in explaining the attitude-behaviour discrepancies evident in relation to consumers' FT (...) purchase behaviour, providing direction for further research that will generate new knowledge of consumers' FT purchase behaviour and other aspects of ethical consumer behaviour. (shrink)

Critical algorithm scholarship has demonstrated the difficulties of attributing accountability for the actions and effects of algorithmic systems. In this commentary, we argue that we cannot stop at denouncing the lack of accountability for algorithms and their effects but must engage the broader systems and distributed agencies that algorithmic systems exist within; including standards, regulations, technologies, and social relations. To this end, we explore accountability in “the Generated Detective,” an algorithmically generated comic. Taking up the mantle of detectives ourselves, we (...) investigate accountability in relation to this piece of experimental fiction. We problematize efforts to effect accountability through transparency by undertaking a simple operation: asking for permission to re-publish a set of the algorithmically selected and modified words and images which make the frames of the comic. Recounting this process, we demonstrate slippage between the “complication” of the algorithm and the obscurity of the legal and institutional structures in which it exists. (shrink)

I offer a new understanding of Descartes’ metaphysics, arguing that his primary question is ‘what is real and true?’ – not as we have been accustomed to believe, ‘how can I be certain?’ – an inquiry that requires both reason’s authority and freedom’s autonomy. I argue that without freedom and its internal relation to reason, Descartes’ undertaking would not get off the ground; yet that relation has gone unnoticed by successive studies of his philosophy. I demonstrate that it is only (...) when we grasp the centrality of freedom to his Meditations that we can understand what motivates key parts of his metaphysics. I present Descartes’ distinctive metaphysics of freedom and resolve what has been seen as an intractable inconsistency between his account of freedom in the Meditations, and the account of freedom he presents in the Principles I 37 and the notorious letter to Mesland (1645). I defend his compelling conception of the true unity of the self, a thinking active being, and its place in the world. (shrink)

Confronted with mounting pressure to ensure accountability vis-à-vis customers, citizens and beneficiaries, organizational leaders need to decide how to choose and implement so-called accountability standards. Yet while looking for an appropriate standard, they often base their decisions on cost-benefit calculations, thus neglecting other important spheres of influence pertaining to more broadly defined stakeholder interests. We argue in this paper that, as a part of the strategic decision for a certain standard, management needs to identify and act according to the needs (...) of all stakeholders. We contend that the creation of a dialogical understanding among affected stakeholders cannot be a mere outcome of applying certain accountability standards, but rather must be a necessary precondition for their use. This requires a stakeholder dialogue prior to making a choice. We outline such a discursive decision framework for accountability standards based on the Habermasian concept of communicative action and, in the final section, apply our conceptual framework to one of the most prominent accountability tools (AA 1000). (shrink)