More than 5 billion people in the world own a smartphone. More than half of these have been used to collect and process health-related data. As such, the existing volume of potentially exploitable health data is unprecedentedly large and growing rapidly. Mobile health applications (apps) on smartphones are some of the worst offenders and are increasingly being used for gathering and exchanging significant amounts of personal health data from the public. This data is often utilized for health research purposes and (...) for algorithm training. While there are advantages to utilizing this data for expanding health knowledge, there are associated risks for the users of these apps, such as privacy concerns and the protection of their data. Consequently, gaining a deeper comprehension of how apps collect and crowdsource data is crucial. To explore how apps are crowdsourcing data and to identify potential ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI), we conducted an examination of the Apple App Store and the Google Play Store in North America and Europe to identify apps that could potentially gather health data through crowdsourcing. Subsequently, we analyzed their privacy policies, terms of use, and other related documentation to gain insights into the utilization of users’ data and the possibility of repurposing it for research or algorithm training purposes. More specifically, we reviewed privacy policies to identify clauses pertaining to the following key categories: research, data sharing, privacy/confidentiality, commercialization, and return of findings. Based on the results of these app search, we developed an App Atlas that presents apps which crowdsource data for research or algorithm training. We identified 46 apps available in the European and Canadian markets that either openly crowdsource health data for research or algorithm training or retain the legal or technical capability to do so. This app search showed an overall lack of consistency and transparency in privacy policies that poses challenges to user comprehensibility, trust, and informed consent. A significant proportion of applications presented contradictions or exhibited considerable ambiguity. For instance, the vast majority of privacy policies in the App Atlas contain ambiguous or contradictory language regarding the sharing of users’ data with third parties. This raises a number of ethico-legal concerns which will require further academic and policy attention to ensure a balance between protecting individual interests and maximizing the scientific utility of crowdsourced data. This article represents a key first step in better understanding these concerns and bringing attention to this important issue. (shrink)

Opposing Viewpoints is the leading source for libraries and classrooms in need of current-issue materials. The viewpoints are selected from a wide range of highly respected sources and publications.

Introduction: free presence -- Conscious reference -- Fragile styles -- Real presence -- Experience of the world in time -- Presence in pictures -- On over-intellectualizing the intellect -- Ideology and the third realm.

"Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...

In 1967 I began writing this book in New York as an analysis of what had been enunciated in the visual arts, conditioned between technology and rebellion. When I return to Buenos Aires I continued to write (until 1972) in a different context where rebellion had revolutionary cravings for the prevailing dictatorship. In the early 1970s, very tough times began in our country (Argentina) and in Latin America in general. For that reason, I didn't publish it. It is now unquestionable (...) that what this work called "militant thinking of change" begins to develop again: the creative and answering act first and foremost in action. Its development in certain fields such as the feminist revolution, ecological awareness and the assessment of free sexual choice are manifestations of a cultural revolution. For this reason, publishing [this book] today makes sense again even if it was written half a century ago. The coordinator of the Centro Cultural de la Cooperación, Juan Pablo Pérez, wrote the appendix of the book and is the result of a series of reflections that occupied Luis Felipe Noé during his stay in New York and on his return to Argentina, between 1967 and 1972. The book was written in a period of estrangement from painting, overturned to intense writing at a time of crisis, which led Noé to another type of intellectual, political and theoretical production. (shrink)

Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. (...) Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? If active externalism is right, then the boundary cannot be drawn at the skull. The mind reaches – or at least can reach --- beyond the limits of the body out into the world. (shrink)

The Featurally Underspecified Lexicon theory predicts that [coronal] is the language universal default place of articulation for phonemes. This assumption has been consistently supported with adult behavioral and event-related potential data; however, this underspecification claim has not been tested in developmental populations. The purpose of this study was to determine whether children demonstrate [coronal] underspecification patterns similar to those of adults. Two English consonants differing in place of articulation, [labial] /b/ and [coronal] /d/, were presented to 24 children characterized by (...) either a typically developing phonological system or a phonological disorder. Two syllables, /bɑ/ and /dɑ/, were presented in an ERP oddball paradigm where both syllables served as the standard and deviant stimulus in opposite stimulus sets. Underspecification was examined with three analyses: traditional mean amplitude measurements, cluster-based permutation tests, and single-trial general linear model analyses of single-subject data. Contrary to previous adult findings, children with PD demonstrated a large positive mismatch response to /bɑ/ while the children with TD exhibited a negative mismatch response ; significant group differences were not observed in the /dɑ/ responses. Moreover, the /bɑ/ deviant ERP response was significantly larger in the TD children than in the children with PD. At the single-subject level, more children demonstrated mismatch responses to /dɑ/ than to /bɑ/, though some children had a /bɑ/ mismatch response and no /dɑ/ mismatch response. While both groups of children demonstrated similar responses to the underspecified /dɑ/, their neural responses to the more specified /bɑ/ varied. These findings are interpreted within a proposed developmental model of phonological underspecification, wherein children with PD are functioning at a developmentally less mature stage of phonological acquisition than their same-aged TD peers. Thus, phonological underspecification is a phenomenon that likely develops over time with experience and exposure to language. (shrink)

Neural markers, such as the mismatch negativity, have been used to examine the phonological underspecification of English feature contrasts using the Featurally Underspecified Lexicon model. However, neural indices have not been examined within the approximant phoneme class, even though there is evidence suggesting processing asymmetries between liquid and glide phonemes. The goal of this study was to determine whether glide phonemes elicit electrophysiological asymmetries related to [consonantal] underspecification when contrasted with liquid phonemes in adult English speakers. Specifically, /ɹɑ/ is categorized (...) as [+consonantal] while /wɑ/ is not specified [i.e., ]. Following the FUL framework, if /w/ is less specified than /ɹ/, the former phoneme should elicit a larger MMN response than the latter phoneme. Fifteen English-speaking adults were presented with two syllables, /ɹɑ/ and /wɑ/, in an event-related potential oddball paradigm in which both syllables served as the standard and deviant stimulus in opposite stimulus sets. Three types of analyses were used: traditional mean amplitude measurements; cluster-based permutation analyses; and event-related spectral perturbation analyses. The less specified /wɑ/ elicited a large MMN, while a much smaller MMN was elicited by the more specified /ɹɑ/. In the standard and deviant ERP waveforms, /wɑ/ elicited a significantly larger negative response than did /ɹɑ/. Theta activity elicited by /ɹɑ/ was significantly greater than that elicited by /wɑ/ in the 100–300 ms time window. Also, low gamma activation was significantly lower for /ɹɑ/ vs. /wɑ/ deviants over the left hemisphere, as compared to the right, in the 100–150 ms window. These outcomes suggest that the [consonantal] feature follows the underspecification predictions of FUL previously tested with the place of articulation and voicing features. Thus, this study provides new evidence for phonological underspecification. Moreover, as neural oscillation patterns have not previously been discussed in the underspecification literature, the ERSP analyses identified potential new indices of phonological underspecification. (shrink)

In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No (...) longer need one spend time attempting … to endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Con- sciousness is now largely a scientific problem’ (Crick, 1996, p. 486).2 Yet the question of what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from straightforward, for it involves fundamental empirical, methodological, and _philosophical _issues about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the brain. Even if one assumes, as we do, that states of consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, such a thing as a neural correlate of consciousness. (shrink)

Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. (...) Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? If active externalism is right, then the boundary cannot be drawn at the skull. The mind reaches – or at least can reach --- beyond the limits of the body out into the world. (shrink)

Experiments on scene perception and change blindness suggest that the visual system does not construct detailed internal models of a scene. These experiments therefore call into doubt the traditional view that vision is a process in which detailed representations of the environment must be constructed. The non-existence of such detailed representations, however, does not entail that we do not perceive the detailed environment. The “grand illusion hypothesis” that our visual world is an illusion rests on (1) a problematic “reconstructionist” conception (...) of vision, and (2) a misconception about the character of perceptual experience. (shrink)

This interesting and provocative work develops a new theological approach to language in the light of contemporary critical theory.

_Philosophy of Art_ is a textbook for undergraduate students interested in the topic of philosophical aesthetics. It introduces the techniques of analytic philosophy as well as key topics such as the representational theory of art, formalism, neo-formalism, aesthetic theories of art, neo-Wittgensteinism, the Institutional Theory of Art. as well as historical approaches to the nature of art. Throughout, abstract philosophical theories are illustrated by examples of both traditional and contemporary art including frequent reference to the avant-garde in this way enriching (...) the readers understanding of art theory as well as the appreciation of art. Unique features of the textbook are: * chapter summaries * summaries of major theories of art and suggested analyses of the important categories used when talking and thinking of art * annotated suggested readings at the ends of chapters. Also available in this series: _Epistemology_ Pb: 0-415-13043-3: £12.99 _Ethics_ Pb: 0-415-15625-4: £11.99 _Metaphysics_ Pb: 0-415-14034-X: £12.99 _Philosophy of Mind_ Pb: 0-415-13060-3: £11.99 _Philosophy of Religion_ Pb: 0-415-13214-2: £12.99. (shrink)

This classic in film theory, presents a systematic study of the techniques of the film medium and of their potential uses for creating formal structures in individual films such as Dovzhenko's Earth, Antonioni's La Notte, Bresson's Au Hasard Balthazar, Renoir's Nana, and Godard's Pierrot le Fou. Originally published in 1981. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of (...) these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Die blosse Redensart "ich nehme x wahr" ist schon aus der physikalischen Ausdrucksweise genommen und x soll hier ein physikalischer Gegenstand—z.B. ein Körper—sein. Es ist schon falsch, diese Redeweise in der Phänomenologie zu verwenden, wo dann x ein Datum bedeuten muss. Denn nun kann auch "ich" und "nehme wahr" nicht den Sinn haben, wie oben.

A noted philosopher and member of the Institute for Cognitive and Brain Science examines flaws in current understandings about consciousness while proposing a radical solution that argues that consciousness must not be limited to the confines of the brain.

A selection of essays written by one of the leading critics of film over the last two decades, this volume examines theoretical aspects of film and television through penetrating analyses of such genres as soap opera, documentary, comedy, and such topics as 'sight gags', film metaphor, point-of-view editing, and movie music. Throughout, individual films are considered in depth. Carroll's essays, moreover, represent the cognitivist turn in film studies, containing in-depth criticism of existing approaches to film theory, and heralding a new (...) approach. (shrink)

In The Entanglement, philosopher Alva Noë explores the inseparability of life, art, and philosophy, and argues that we have radically underestimated the significance of this long recognized but underappreciated reality, what he refers to as the "entanglement." The core of The Entanglement is the idea that human existence is inextricably aesthetic and philosophical. In the first half of the book, Noë offers a detailed examination of pictures and seeing, writing and speech, and choreography and dancing, which serve as case studies (...) and the base in which the phenomenon of entanglement is set. In later chapters, Noë deepens this analysis by exploring the nature of the aesthetic itself, and its place in our lives, examining what the entanglement can teach us about science, and, in particular, the project of applying science in the domain of the human. In these later chapters he covers a range of topics, including sex, gender, and the body, psychology and AI, the problem of style, and the nature of 'nature.' Drawing on his work in perception, consciousness, and the philosophy of art, Noë offers a new model for thinking about the nature of the human, the limits to what a natural science of the human can do on its own, and the irreplaceable importance of art and philosophy for the larger project of studying and understanding ourselves. (shrink)

The world shows up to perceptual consciousness in virtue of the deployment of distinct sensorimotor and also conceptual skills. The availability of the world to thought is, in contrast, to be explained in connection with the different sorts of skills put to work in thought. I show that thought and experience are varieties of skilful access to the world. The aim of the paper is to present the outlines of a general theory of access.

_Philosophy of Motion Pictures_ is a first-of-its-kind, bottom-up introduction to this bourgeoning field of study. Topics include film as art, medium specificity, defining motion pictures, representation, editing, narrative, emotion and evaluation. Clearly written and supported with a wealth of examples Explores characterizations of key elements of motion pictures –the shot, the sequence, the erotetic narrative, and its modes of affective address.

In visual science the term filling-inis used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to theoretical issues about neuralignoring an absencejumping to a conclusionanalytic isomorphismCartesian materialism, a particular (...) neural stage that forms the immediate substrate of perceptual experience enactiveanimatesubpersonal” considerations about internal processing, but rather by considerations about the task of vision at the level of the animal or person interacting with the world. (shrink)

This paper investigates the idea that perception can be, at once, a mode of direct awareness of the world and an encounter, in the first instance, with mere appearances. In developing this point, I introduce a sensorimotor account of perception according to which the senses are ways of exploring the environment mediated by different patterns of sensorimotor contingency (i.e. by the distinctive ways in which what the perceiver does affects how things appear).

In the “Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience‘ and “Sense Data‘", Wittgenstein endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected. I will attempt to explicate the difference between the innocuous and dangerous scenarios, to give arguments in favor of the coherence of the dangerous scenario, (...) and to show that the standard arguments to the effect that the dangerous scenario is impossible are flawed or ineffective against the version of the dangerous scenario whose coherence I will be advocating. I will also agree with what I think is Wittgenstein’s position that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected lets qualia in the door, where qualia are qualities of experiential states whose phenomenal character cannot be expressed in natural language. Further, I will argue that acknowledging the coherence of the innocuous inverted spectrum commits Wittgenstein to the coherence of the dangerous inverted spectrum, thereby undermining Wittgenstein’s deepest views about the mind. In other work, I have used the inverted spectrum hypothesis as an argument against functionalism and representationism, but here the focus is on its role in arguing for the possibility of qualia. (shrink)

Modernist Objects is a unique mix of cultural studies, literature, and visual arts applied to the discrete materiality of modernist objects. Contributors explore the many tensions surrounding the modernist relationship to objects, things, products and artIfacts through the prism of poetry, prose, visual arts, culture and crafts.

Comment comprendre phénoménologiquement la crise? Pour Husserl et Henry, la crise revêt un aspect négatif, de mise à l'écart et de rejet. Heidegger a une position paradoxale parce qu'il en va de notre condition d'être en crise. Tous les trois phénoménologues sont d'avis que Galilée est le précurseur de la crise non seulement de la science elle-même mais aussi à travers la science et la technique de la crise du sujet et de l'être. La crise de la subjectivité (Husserl) va (...) alors coïncider avec le sujet qui n'est plus à même de constituer le sens de sa vie ; celle de l'être (Heidegger) avec la fuite de la vérité et du sens de l'être lui-même, celle de la vie (Michel Henry) avec le rejet de la sensibilité. Comment alors sortir de ces crises? Il s'agit de retrouver le monde-de-la-vie, la différence ontologique entre l'être et l'étant et une phénoménologie radicale qui rend compte de la vie. Tout ceci doit offrir un déplacement vers l'éthique. (shrink)

As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do. This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self- consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self- consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.

_The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature_ is an in-depth examination of literature through a philosophical lens, written by distinguished figures across the major divisions of philosophy. Its 40 newly-commissioned essays are divided into six sections: historical foundations what is literature? aesthetics & appreciation meaning & interpretation metaphysics & epistemology ethics & political theory _The Companion_ opens with a comprehensive historical overview of the philosophy of literature, including chapters on the study’s ancient origins up to the 18 th -20 th (...) centuries. The second part defines literature and its different categories. The third part covers the aesthetics of literature. The fourth and fifth sections discuss the meaning and consequences of philosophical interpretation of literature, as well as epistemological and metaphysical issues such as literary cognitivism and imaginative resistance. The sixth section contextualizes the place of philosophy of literature in the "real world" with essays on topics such as morality, politics, race and gender. Fully indexed, with helpful further reading sections at the end of each chapter, this Companion is an ideal starting point for those coming to philosophy of literature for the first time as well as a valuable reference for readers more familiar with the subject. (shrink)

In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness. A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive. No longer need one spend time (...) attempting to endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Consciousness is now largely a scientific problem’. Yet the question of what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from straightforward, for it involves fundamental empirical, methodological, and philosophical issues about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the brain. Even if one assumes, as we do, that states of consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, such a thing as a neural correlate of consciousness. (shrink)

Art in Three Dimensions is a collection of essays by one of the most eminent figures in philosophy of art.

There is a traditional scepticism about whether the world "out there" really is as we perceive it. A new breed of hyper-sceptics now challenges whether we even have the perceptual experience we think we have. According to these writers, perceptual consciousness is a kind of false consciousness. This view grows out of the discovery of such phenomena as change blindness and inattentional blindness, which show that we can all be quite blind to changes taking place before our very eyes. Such (...) radical scepticism has acute and widespread implications for the study of perception and consciousness. The writings collected in this volume explore these implications. The contributors are scientists and philosophers at the forefront of this research, and include well-known authors such as psychologists Susan Blackmore and Arien Mack, and philosophers Andy Clark and Daniel Dennett. They have an gift for bringing these paradoxical issues to life and sharing their excitement with the non-specialist. (shrink)

Perhaps the most influential compatibilist response to this question is Fodor's strategy of levels. Fodor argues that although psychological laws range over world-involving propositional attitudes and their contents, these laws are implemented in computational mechanisms that supervene on the individual's intrinsic states.

In this paper I explore a brand of scepticism about perceptual experience that takes its start from recent work in psychology and philosophy of mind on change blindness and related phenomena. I argue that the new scepticism rests on a problematic phenomenology of perceptual experience. I then consider a strengthened version of the sceptical challenge that seems to be immune to this criticism. This strengthened sceptical challenge formulates what I call the problem of perceptual presence. I show how this problem (...) can be addressed by drawing on an enactive or sensorimotor approach to perceptual consciousness. Our experience of environmental detail consists in our access to that detail thanks to our possession of practical knowledge of the way in which what we do and sensory stimulation depend on each other. (shrink)

binding of colour and alphanumeric form in synaesthesia. Nature 410.

Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action and The Embodied Mind, by ClarkAndy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.