Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind

Philosophical Review 106 (3):434 (1997)
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Abstract

Perhaps the most influential compatibilist response to this question is Fodor's strategy of levels. Fodor argues that although psychological laws range over world-involving propositional attitudes and their contents, these laws are implemented in computational mechanisms that supervene on the individual's intrinsic states.

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Alva Noë
University of California, Berkeley

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