This research aims to monitor the current situation of confinement in Spanish society motivated by COVID-19 crisis. For this, a study of its socio-family, psychological and educational impact is conducted. The sample (N= 165 families, 89.1% nuclear families with children living in the same household and 20.5% with a relative in a risk group) comes from the Aragonese region (Spain). The instruments used are: Beck-II Depression Inventory (BDI-II); Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright’s Empathy Quotient (EQ) with its cognitive empathy subscale, as well (...) as an ad-hoc questionnaire, reviewed by a panel of experts, to learn about socio-personal, family and housing conditions, use of technology, involvement in school tasks and household, and working condition. The multiple regression analysis results show that the anxiety derived from the current situation is explained in 23.1% (p< 0.001) by the variables: gender (t = -2.31,p= 0.022), level of Internet consumption (t = 2.139,p= 0.034), increase of family conflicts (t = 2.980,p= 0.003) and help with school tasks (t = 2.980,p= 0.040). On the other hand, cognitive empathy is explained in 24.6% (p< 0.001) by the variables: gender (t = -4.690,p< 0.001) and mother’s hours of teleworking (t = 2.101,p= 0.037). All this leads us to conclusions related to preventive systems of social, psychological, and educational aspects to better serve families. These conclusions can be also be transferred to the future with an inclusive care to family settings from those three parameters. (shrink)

Wittgenstein defiende que los problemas filosóficos son ilegítimos. Sin embargo, no resulta del todo claro qué se entiende en general por problema filosófico, cuál es, pues, su naturaleza. El presente artículo intenta elucidar la observación de Wittgenstein que sostiene que la forma de un problema filosófico se puede presentar con la expresión “Yo no sé salir del atolladero” (IF § 123). En el artículo se elige, a manera de ejemplo, el escándalo kantiano, que demanda que demostremos con el uso de (...) la razón que la proposición “hay objetos físicos” es verdadera. Sin renunciar al ejemplo, se explora en qué sentido la expresión de Wittgenstein caracteriza en buena medida la naturaleza misma de la dificultad filosófica. En el ejercicio se atienden recomendaciones formales del Tractatus, terapias desplegadas en Sobre la Certeza y el recurso de distinguir entre sentido primario y sentido secundario de una expresión insinuado en las Investigaciones Filosóficas. (shrink)

What is racism? is a timely question that is hotly contested in the philosophy of race. Yet disagreement about racism’s nature does not begin in philosophy, but in the sociopolitical domain. Alberto G. Urquidez argues that philosophers of race have failed to pay sufficient attention to the practical considerations that prompt the question “What is racism?” Most theorists assume that “racism” signifies a language-independent phenomenon that needs to be “discovered” by the relevant science or “uncovered” by close scrutiny of (...) everyday usage of this term. (Re-)Defining Racism challenges this metaphysical paradigm. Urquidez develops a Wittgenstein-inspired framework that illuminates the use of terms like “definition,” “meaning,” “explanation of meaning,” and “disagreement,” for the analysis of contested normative concepts. These elucidations reveal that providing a definition of “racism” amounts to recommending a form of moral representation—a rule for the correct use of “racism.” As definitional recommendations must be justified on pragmatic grounds, Urquidez takes as a starting point for justification the interests of racism's historical victims. (shrink)

Desde la perspectiva de las ciencias jurídicas y, en particular, del derecho internacional ambiental, la presente intervención aborda la emergencia de un Derecho internacional contemporáneo y acude a las ideas del cosmopolitismo blando y la vertiente normativa del constitucionalismo global, como debates filosóficos-jurídicos que podrían cimentar un terreno fértil, un sustrato material, para incidir en las fuentes formales de creación de normas internacionales para enfrentar los problemas globales ambientales. En ese sentido, hace mención a la emergencia y reconocimiento del derecho (...) humano al ambiente sano y saludable como un derecho humano autónomo y exigible, desde su vertiente sustantiva y procesal, lo que puede vislumbrase como el embrión de una ciudadanía global ambiental. (shrink)

El presente trabajo busca exponer las premisas y la fundamentación teológica que subyace a la moral de Pedro Abelardo, con el fin de mostrar cómo en el sistema filosófico de dicho autor, conocido por su racionalismo, hay una justificación que extralimita dicho sistema. Para ello, se expondrá la terminología clave de su moral, la aplicación práctica de dichos conceptos, y una serie de objeciones tanto teológicas como filosóficas.

Este artículo busca problematizar parcialmente la constitución ontológica de la noción de praxis hegemónica en Antonio Gramsci; producir una definición de posthegemonía como posición política y no como doctrina; arriesgar la noción de que, de haber una “ontología” posthegemónica, convendría asentarla bajo tacha en el lugar de un posible pensamiento de la diferencia ontológica; describir brevemente un espacio de praxis emergente en el que la noción posthegemónica se hace explícita; y regresar a Antonio Gramsci a partir de una posible entrada (...) en crisis del concepto de hegemonía en su obra misma. (shrink)

Con esta ceremonia culminan los actos del otorgamiento del título de Doctor Honoris Causa de la Universidad de Buenos Aires al filósofo, maestro de maestros, Thomas Moro Simpson.De este modo nuestra Universidad, siguiendo una noble idea iniciada por los romanos mucho antes de que existieran las universidades, la idea de destacar la labor de aquellos ciudadanos que hubieran contribuido notablemente a mejorar la vida de la ciudad común, ha resuelto hacer público su reconocimiento de los excepcionales méritos intelectuales, éticos y (...) académicos de nuestro querido Tomás Simpson. He sido encargado de recordar ahora, sumariamente, ante la comunidad universitaria y, con eso, ante nuestra comunidad simpliciter, algunos de los motivos que condujeron a esta resolución. (shrink)

Unamuno saw in his defense of religious faith a response to Nietzsche’s criticisms of the Christian, agapeic way of life. To Nietzsche’s claim that engaging in this way of life is something antinatural and life‐denying, insofar as it goes against the (alleged) natural tendency to increase one’s own power, Unamuno responded that an agapeic way of life is precisely a direct expression of this natural tendency. Far from being something that goes against our natural inclinations, Unamuno says, an agapeic way (...) of life is a life‐affirming exercise, something we are led to given our own natural condition. Hence, the aim of this essay is to comment on Unamuno’s criticism of Nietzsche and to point out the philosophical relevance of Unamuno’s attempt to provide a natural foundation for religious faith when assessing Nietzsche’s criticisms of the possibility of carrying out a Christian, agapeic way of life. (shrink)

En un estilo claro, despojado de t rminos t cnicos, Alberto Clemente de la Torre traza un recorrido por los principales t picos de la f sica cu ntica destinados a todos aquellos que quieren descubrir uno de los temas m s sugerentes de la ciencia contempor nea, sin exigirles Para ello conocimientos previos.

In a paper published recently in this journal, Buben attempted to show the philosophical relevance of Unamuno’s philosophical works when addressing the current debate on whether an endless existence would be something desirable—a debate which is nowadays commonly known as “The Makropulos Debate” since it was Bernard Williams’s “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality” that aroused interest in this question among contemporary analytic philosophers. Unfortunately, Buben’s paper fails to capture or even outline the reasoning behind Unamuno’s claim (...) that we all naturally long for an endless existence —and consequently it also fails to clarify how Unamuno’s position may contribute to the current philosophical debate on the question as to whether an endless existence would be something desirable. In this paper I will point out that Unamuno’s affirmation that we all, without exception, long for an endless existence is grounded in his metaphysical claim that the most basic and natural inclination of all singular things is to increase their own singularity. In doing so, I will also be showing that Unamuno’s proposal is not philosophically relevant when addressing the current debate on the question as to whether living an endless existence would be something desirable. (shrink)

Il saggio si interroga sul rapporto tra immagine di libro e lettura, muovendo dalla constatazione che solo la trasformazione dei lettori in ambito umanistico (con il rifiuto della glossa) ha cambiato l’idea del libro diffusa nel Medioevo. Il nuovo disegno della pagina, di maggiore ordine e leggibilità, si è consolidato nei secoli, e la nuova immagine di libro è rimasta immutata, nonostante le innovazioni, nell’editoria moderna. Solo l’avvento delle nuove tecnologie digitali ha suggerito una nuova immagine, che, tuttavia, non è (...) ancora né pienamente definita né ben consolidata; alle posizioni di chi ha individuato il libro nuovo nella forma dell’ipertesto (letto anche sui vecchi pc), il saggio affianca le riflessioni di chi cerca l’immagine nuova nell’e-book letto su un e-reader, sottolineando tuttavia che si è solo agli inizi di una lunga trasformazione. This essay concerns the relationship between the image of the book and how it reads. It begins from the observation that only the change of the readers during the humanistic age has transformed the widespread perception of the book in the Middle Ages. The new layout of the page, neater and more readable, became well established in the following centuries, and that image of the book in the modern publishing industry has remained unchanged, in spite of innovations. New digital technologies have proposed a new image, that however is neither clearly defined nor well established. The essay underlines the observations of those who believe that the hypertext form is the new book, even readable on the old pc, and the observations of those that think of e-book as a new image, that can be read only on the e-reader. The essay ends with the idea that we are at the beginning of a long change. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p319 In Re-Thinking Science. Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty (2001) H. Nowotny, P. Scott, e M. Gibbons vindicate a “socially robust” scientific knowledge in accordance with the social needs of our time. Such a knowledge would not be just epistemically reliable; in addition, it would also fit the situations to which will be put to use, and take into account the consequences of its utilization. In the authors’ view, this new kind of science, which they call (...) “Mode 2 knowledge” in another book, would do justice to a society that is not restrained to receive or ask for scientific information, but also requires sharing in its production. Nowotny and her colleagues mention several epistemological changes which a “robust” knowledge would involve. In this paper I analyze some of those alleged changes. (shrink)

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Francis Bacon foi considerado por alguns pensadores o pai do método experimental. Outros filósofos o acusaram de advogar um empi-rismo naif. Em nosso artigo pretendemos identificar as peculiaridades do tipo de empirismo abraçado por Bacon. Os mais duros críticos de Bacon têm destacado sua retórica fatualista e têm dispensado pouca atenção à complexidade de um sistema metodológico que atribui papel crucial à evidência negativa. Negligenciam principalmente o real significado epis-temológico de sua proposta de uma indução eliminatória. Associando Bacon rigidamente a (...) uma espécie de empirismo justificacionista deixam de detectar importantes ingredientes falibilistas em sua obra. Por aspirar a identificar o que pode haver de falibilismo na obra de Bacon este artigo questionará a avaliação que Popper faz de Bacon ao apresentá-lo como o grande representante do empirismo ingênuo e dogmático. Por mais que sejam procedentes algumas das críticas que Popper dirige a Bacon, mos-traremos que sua leitura repete velhos clichês sobre o autor do Novum Organum.Some philosophers regard Francis Bacon as the father of ex-perimental method. Others accuse Bacon of defending a naïf empiricist theory of knowledge. In this article I try to identify the peculiarities of the empiricism supported by Bacon. Bacon’s most severe critics emphasize his factualist rhetoric, paying no sufficient attention to the complexity of a methodological system that attributes a crucial role to negative evidence. They neglect the real epistemological meaning of Bacon’s proposal of an eliminative induction. As a rule, such critics are unable to detect the important fallibilist features present in Bacon’s work because they tend to, uncritically, identify him with a kind of em-piricist justificationism. The purpose of this article is to investigate the possible fallibilist elements in Bacon’s writings. By so doing, I shall challenge Popper’s evaluation of Bacon’s philosophy of science. I dis-agree with Popper when he describes Bacon as a dogmatic and naïf empiricist. Although some of the criticisms Popper addresses to Bacon are well-founded, I will argue that the general reconstruction of Ba-con’s inductivism carried out by Popper is not fully defensible. (shrink)

Baseado no cogito cartesiano, mas também o submetendo a importantes reformulações, Husserl desenvolve o seu próprio conceito de subjetividade transcendental. Tais reformulações concernem, sobretudo, aos tópicos do tempo, da redução e da intersubjetividade. O presente artigo pretende apresentar e discutir como se vinculam tais temas, visando a contribuir na compreensão do estatuto do transcendental na fenomenologia husserliana. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Husserl. Subjetividade transcendental. Tempo. ABSTRACT Based on Cartesian cogito, but also submitting it to important reformations, Husserl develops his own concept of (...) transcendental subjectivity. These reformations concern especially the topics of time, reduction and intersubjectivity. This article intends to present and discuss the link of these themes, aiming contribute to the comprehension of the status of transcendental in husserlian phenomenology. KEY WORDS – Husserl. Transcendental subjectivity. Time. (shrink)

Assessing the scope of his own phenomenological project was always of philosophical concern to Husserl. Perhaps because of this, he has never ceased to reformulate his concepts and theories, aimed at an ever greater degree of depth. This interest by the limits of Husserlian phenomenology continues in the activity of his interpreters. This article intends to present and discuss some of these readings, trying to stress that the strategy of favouring ethical components to think the limits of Husserl’s phenomenology is (...) not a fruitful alternative. The discussion should favour ontological parameters, based in the approach of key concepts correctly selected, especially the concepts of infinite and living present. (shrink)

Giulio Preti’s third book, Praxis ed empirismo, appeared in 1957. The present paper, written on the occasion of 50 years since its publication, deals with its first chapter, in which the extraction of basic ideas of logical empiricism, pragmatism and historical materialism leads to a Program for a democratic culture pivoting on the role of scientific education. The main tenets of this Program are listed and the resulting role of philosophy, as “philosophy of culture”, is analysed and discussed.

The internet changes our ways of both knowing and thinking. A person who has grown up using the internet, whether for school or simply to play videogames, tends to extend and reproduce the same model of knowing in other instances. The internet replaces a linear and centralized model with a circular and diffused framework for self-learning that presents certain familiar limits: it demands speed or, at least, not pausing. The internet user is omnivorous, in a rush, and develops a memory (...) that is limited to the short term. However, there are some positive aspects of circular learning that should be emphasized: the possibility of constructing personal paths, comparing different opinions, innovating, overcoming old disciplinary divisions, surmounting the drawbacks of linear learning that often lead to uncritical and purely molecular thinking. La Rete modifica sia il modo di conoscere che di pensare. Una mente cresciuta sulla Rete, facendo ricerche per la scuola, o semplicemente giocando, tende a riprodurre anche in altre occasioni lo stesso modello di conoscenza. A un modello lineare la Rete sostituisce un modello circolare e diffuso di autoapprendimento che presenta alcuni noti limiti: richiede di correre, o per lo meno richiede di non fermarsi. L’utente della Rete è onnivoro e ha fretta e matura una memoria chiusa nel breve termine. Ci sono tuttavia aspetti positivi dell'apprendimento circolare che vanno sottolineati: la possibilità di costruirsi propri percorsi, sondare diverse opinioni, innovare, superare vecchie partizioni disciplinari, superando i difetti dell'apprendimento lineare che molto spesso induce a un pensiero acritico e premente molecolare. (shrink)

Unamuno saw in his defense of religious faith a response to Nietzsche’s criticisms of the Christian, agapeic way of life. To Nietzsche’s claim that engaging in this way of life is something antinatural and life-denying, insofar as it goes against the (alleged) natural tendency to increase one’s own power, Unamuno responded that an agapeic way of life is precisely a direct expression of this natural tendency. Far from being something that goes against our natural inclinations, Unamuno says, an agapeic way (...) of life is a life-affirming exercise, something we are led to given our own natural condition. Hence, the aim of this essay is to comment on Unamuno’s criticism of Nietzsche and to point out the philosophical relevance of Unamuno’s attempt to provide a natural foundation for religious faith when assessing Nietzsche’s criticisms of the possibility of carrying out a Christian, agapeic way of life. (shrink)

There has been some concern m recent years that economic interests in the biotechnology area could, particularly through patenting, have a constricting influence on scientific research. Despite this concern, there have been no studies of this phenomenon beyond isolated cases. In this article we examine the evolution of the biomedical field of hybridoma/monoclonal antibody research with detailed examples of the three types of patent claims that have emerged there—basic claims, claims on application techniques, and claims on specific antibodies. We analyze (...) the impact of these claims and their legal histories on the free flow of scientific information and, the activity of scientific researchers. We conclude that such patent claims present severe restrictions for both, not only in the monoclonal area but in general, amounting to a subtle but significant shift in the political economy of science and technology. (shrink)