Research ethics committees and institutional review boards spend considerable time developing, scrutinising, and revising specific consent processes and materials for survey-based studies conducted on crowdsourcing and online recruitment platforms such as MTurk and Prolific. However, there is evidence to suggest that many users of ICT services do not read the information provided as part of the consent process and they habitually provide or refuse their consent without adequate reflection. In principle, these practices call into question the validity of their consent. (...) In this paper we argue that although the ‘no read problem’ and the routinisation of consent may apply to research participants’ consent practices for studies on crowdsourcing platforms, this is not a serious problem. Furthermore, given that the informational requirements for informed consent in these contexts are minimal, we argue that these participants are, nevertheless, sufficiently informed to give valid consent. We conclude that research ethics committees and institutional review boards should only agonise over the precise details of the informed consent process and materials in those rare cases where appreciable risks to research participants need to be managed. (shrink)

To agonise is to undergo great mental anguish through worrying about something, according to the New Oxford Dictionary of English. I suggest that agonising in this sense is a fundamental response to any ethical dilemma. It has a long intellectual and literary lineage. In this essay, I agonise over the dilemmas posed by street beggars, their intrusiveness and their appeal to our intuitive sense of social duty. I explore the discomfort we may feel at their presence, and the value (...) that discomfort may have for the evolution of our ethical lives. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is changing healthcare and the practice of medicine as data-driven science and machine-learning technologies, in particular, are contributing to a variety of medical and clinical tasks. Such advancements have also raised many questions, especially about public trust. As a response to these concerns there has been a concentrated effort from public bodies, policy-makers and technology companies leading the way in AI to address what is identified as a "public trust deficit". This paper argues that a focus on trust (...) as the basis upon which a relationship between this new technology and the public is built is, at best, ineffective, at worst, inappropriate or even dangerous, as it diverts attention from what is actually needed to actively warrant trust. Instead of agonising about how to facilitate trust, a type of relationship which can leave those trusting vulnerable and exposed, we argue that efforts should be focused on the difficult and dynamic process of ensuring reliance underwritten by strong legal and regulatory frameworks. From there, trust could emerge but not merely as a means to an end. Instead, as something to work in practice towards; that is, the deserved result of an ongoing ethical relationship where there is the appropriate, enforceable and reliable regulatory infrastructure in place for problems, challenges and power asymmetries to be continuously accounted for and appropriately redressed. Data sharing not applicable as no datasets generated and/or analysed for this study. (shrink)

Doubt is a much-maligned state. We are racked by doubts, tormented by doubts, plagued by them, paralysed. Doubts can be troubling, consuming, agonising. But however ill-regarded is doubt, anxiety is more so. We recognise the significance of doubting in certain contexts, and allow ourselves to be guided by our doubts. For example, the criminal standard of proof operative in the U.K., U.S., as well as in most other anglophone countries, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Israel, requires for conviction to be (...) permissible that the defendant’s guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt; to feel a doubt about a defendant’s guilt, so long as it is reasonable, is reason to refrain from convicting. But our folk understanding of anxiety ascribes no value to that state. Anxiety is inherently unpleasant and irrational; it prevents us from being able to perform well when it is most important to us that we do; it is an emotion that, if we could, we’d eliminate from our emotional toolbox. Yet in this thesis, I offer a vindication of doubt – a defence of doubt in terms of what it does for us – on which it ultimately turns out to be a kind of anxiety. The basic idea is that the concept of doubt serves a function for us that we couldn’t do without: it signals when we should begin inquiry. I will argue that the concept doubt is able to serve this function because the state it picks out, the state of doubt, is a kind of anxiety: epistemic anxiety. I develop a picture of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: potential disvalue in the epistemic realm. Because doubt is a kind of anxiety, it has the right kind of representational and motivational profile to track epistemic risk in our environments, and motivate us to reduce or avoid that risk. This makes it hugely valuable for us, as knowledge-seeking creatures, given the incompatibility of knowledge with high levels of epistemic risk. (shrink)

Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false.

Is there a human right to be governed democratically – and how should we approach such an issue philosophically? These are the questions raised by Joshua Cohen’s 2006 article, ‘Is There a Human Right to Democracy?’ – a paper over which I have agonised since I saw it in draft form, many years ago. I am still uncomfortable with its central claim, that while justice demands democratic government, the proper standard for human rights is something less. But, as I hope (...) to show, the reasons for that discomfort are occasioned less by the thought that democracy may not be a human right than by the very significant gaps in our understanding of rights which debates about the human rights status of democracy exemplify. (shrink)

This article was championed in view of the notion of (perceived) economic rationalisation which seem to be the foremost of patients' care in the NHS as opposed to addressing distress to their existing well-being, while in a state of being tormented with agonising news of prolonged ill health. Serious consideration is given to addressing the need to rationalise resources in ensuring the long standing history of the NHS' free health care is critically addressed, but not in a way that (...) destroys confidence on the ability of professionals to manifest ethical prudence in their acts of judgments about whether patients' care is to be imminent or prolonged on a waiting list. There is certainly serious impacts to be comprehended with in situations of economic rationality through services provided by the NHS, but it is believed that tangible outcomes about definitive care for patients should be addressed collaboratively. (shrink)

This essay argues that the representation of pain in Beckett’s writing exposes the paradox in his work concerning the relationship of the individual suffering subject and the community. Making reference to studies of pain and literature generally and to salient studies of Beckett, the essay shows how the narration of pain in Beckett’s prose works in particular is closely linked to its more general interrogation of subject-object relations. As the preeminent agent, source as well as repository of pain, writing in (...) Beckett itself comes to occupy, in a transpositional manner, the poles of subject, object and work. If ‘pain’ names the subject-object continuum, that very conjunction exposes the co-habitants to their own mutual espacement – qua subject and object. The common feeling is countermanded in advance by separation. The conjunction gives rise to a sapping, devastating and agonising attempt to conjure an image, an image which holds out the possibility of the felicity, or at least palliation, offered by community. The image is, however, both a wounding regime and a generative regime. The two components, pain and community, are illustrated with specific reference to Texts for Nothing, through an analysis of which a new conjuncture of the themes of pain, community and the role of the work of art is proposed. (shrink)

Thanks to the Inlaks Foundation in India, I was able to do my doctoral research on Our Talk About Nonexistents at Oxford in the early eighties. The two greatest philosophers of that heaven of analytical philosophy - Peter Strawson and Michael Dummett - supervised my work, reading and criticising all the fledgling philosophy that I wrote during those three years. At Sir Peter's request, Gareth Evans, shortly before his death, lent me an unpublished transcript of Kripke's John Locke Lectures. Work (...) on the Appendix about Indian Philosophy was supervised by the late Professor Bimal Krishna Matilal with whom informal but intense philosophical conversations used to spill over into dinner at his place almost every other day. It was Professor Matilal who sent me, over a summer, to study a tough Navya-Nyaya text under his own Nyaya teacher Pandit Visvabandhu Tarkatirtha at Calcutta. All four of these teachers were as kind to me as my life-long mentor in philosophy Professor Pranab Kumar Sen, whose clarity and depth remain the unreachable regu lative ideal of my intellect. When I came back to India, my life became blissfully free of the agonising anxiety to publish, until, after a conference at Jadavpur University where I gave an impromptu paper, ironically enough, on Non-doings, I met Derek Parfit. He had a six-hour conversation with me, explicitly planning my life. Five years had already elapsed since I had finished my D. Phil, but Derek read my thesis and liked it. (shrink)

Mumford presents the friends of laws with a Central Dilemma, either horn of which is supposed to be utterly unpalatable. The thrust of the dilemma is this: laws are either external or internal to their instances. If they are external, they cannot govern (or determine) their instances. If they are internal, they cannot govern (or determine) their instances. Ergo, laws cannot govern (or determine) their instances. The role of this dilemma is central to Mumford’s argument against laws: they are supposed (...) to have no credible role to play. The dilemma rests on the premise that laws, if they exist, must do something: they must play a governing role. Of course, it is one thing to say that laws play a governing role and it is quite another to say that laws must play some role. Mumford (§9.4) agonises a lot about this, but his considered view is that laws must play an x- role in virtue of which they make a difference in the determination of the world’s history. As Mumford is fully aware, the supposed ‘governing role’ of laws might be just a metaphor. Still, he thinks his Central Dilemma is powerful against any x-role that laws are supposed to play. We shall see later that this is not so. For the time being, let us play along. The central dilemma is faulty, anyway. (shrink)

This essay argues that the representation of pain in Beckett’s writing exposes the paradox in his work concerning the relationship of the individual suffering subject and the community. Making reference to studies of pain and literature generally and to salient studies of Beckett, the essay shows how the narration of pain in Beckett’s prose works in particular is closely linked to its more general interrogation of subject-object relations. As the preeminent agent, source as well as repository of pain, writing in (...) Beckett itself comes to occupy, in a transpositional manner, the poles of subject, object and work. If ‘pain’ names the subject-object continuum, that very conjunction exposes the co-habitants to their own mutual espacement – qua subject and object. The common feeling is countermanded in advance by separation. The conjunction gives rise to a sapping, devastating and agonising attempt to conjure an image, an image which holds out the possibility of the felicity, or at least palliation, offered by community. The image is, however, both a wounding regime and a generative regime. The two components, pain and community, are illustrated with specific reference to Texts for Nothing, through an analysis of which a new conjuncture of the themes of pain, community and the role of the work of art is proposed. (shrink)

Machiavelli's continuing fascination arises not just from his hard‐headed maxims but at a deeper level from his willingness to face up to agonising moral choices. The author is a former editor of The Director, a Renaissance scholar, and currently edits International Minds.

– Le mensonge? – Depuis la nuit des temps, il foisonne dans le discours public et infecte le monde; aujourd’hui, il prolifère sur la Toile informatique, sape notre conscience citoyenne et nourrit la cacocratie. – La cacocratie? – C’est une oligarchie financière, informe, amorale, ubiquiste, insidieuse et nocive, qui se cache dans l’assourdissant brouillard informationnel pour siphonner les richesses de la planète. – Et alors? – C’est le régime politique qui nous gouverne aujourd’hui, à notre insu. – Ne sommes-nous pas (...) en démocratie? – Elle n’est plus qu’une façade... elle agonise. – Ne devons-nous pas réagir? – C’est l’objet de cet ouvrage. (shrink)

Machiavelli's continuing fascination arises not just from his hard‐headed maxims but at a deeper level from his willingness to face up to agonising moral choices. The author is a former editor of The Director, a Renaissance scholar, and currently edits International Minds.

North American scholarship has charted resonances between 1990s legislative and feminist discourse concerning violence against women. Feminist critique of official discourse surrounding the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 suggests that 1990s resonances did not reach the UK: however, an examination of the Hansard debates suggests this under-estimates the influence of feminist discourse. Halley’s discussion of “bad faith” helps to explain both the tendency of feminists to under-estimate their influence and why this matters. A commitment to an understanding of themselves as (...) powerless may encourage feminists to underplay similarities between feminist and official discourse, leading feminists to find only what they expect. Such an understanding gives feminism the capacity to change social life without acknowledging, let alone agonising over, the full range of its distributive effects. This is most troubling in relation to “carceral” feminism, since under-assessment of feminist impact encourages amplification and intensification of the carceral message. (shrink)

Nurse educators, like many of their health care professional colleagues, frequently face moral dilemmas when they identify a student as presenting an unacceptable risk to public safety. In this situation, the statutory requirement of nurse educators to protect the public, under the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act , competes with the rights of the student to receive education under the Education Act . Using the different moral voices of justice and care, identified by Gilligan , this moral dilemma is examined (...) within the context of one school of nursing in a New Zealand tertiary education organisation. Overall, the justice voice dominated within the tertiary education organisation. Academic committees, and appeal panels, operating within the educational statutory framework, used democratic processes to reach decisions. The individual committee members, acting as autonomous moral agents, made decisions using universal principles and abstract moral reasoning. The focus was on individual rights, natural justice and due process. Nurse educators articulated both justice and care moral voices. Those with care voices described how they agonised between their duty to protect the public, and their wish to facilitate students, with whom they had built relationships, to succeed. The education management process did not acknowledge the statutory obligations of nurse educators, as registered nurses, or the implications of this within the education context. The moral dilemmas were either ignored, or rendered invisible. As a result of this, nurse educators engaged in various survival strategies, and the broader educational context remained intact and unchallenged. (shrink)

Nurse educators, like many of their health care professional colleagues, frequently face moral dilemmas when they identify a student as presenting an unacceptable risk to public safety. In this situation, the statutory requirement of nurse educators to protect the public, under the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act (2003), competes with the rights of the student to receive education under the Education Act (1989). Using the different moral voices of justice and care, identified by ), this moral dilemma is examined within (...) the context of one school of nursing in a New Zealand tertiary education organisation. Overall, the justice voice dominated within the tertiary education organisation. Academic committees, and appeal panels, operating within the educational statutory framework, used democratic processes to reach decisions. The individual committee members, acting as autonomous moral agents, made decisions using universal principles and abstract moral reasoning. The focus was on individual rights, natural justice and due process. Nurse educators articulated both justice and care moral voices. Those with care voices described how they agonised between their duty to protect the public, and their wish to facilitate students, with whom they had built relationships, to succeed. The education management process did not acknowledge the statutory obligations of nurse educators, as registered nurses, or the implications of this within the education context. The moral dilemmas were either ignored, or rendered invisible. As a result of this, nurse educators engaged in various survival strategies, and the broader educational context remained intact and unchallenged. (shrink)

Nous assistons aujourd'hui à un formidable mouvement de reféodalisation du monde. C'est que le 11 septembre n'a pas seulement été l'occasion pour George W. Bush d'étendre l'emprise des Etats-Unis sur le monde, l'événement a frappé les trois coups de la mise en coupe réglée des peuples de l'hémisphère Sud par les grandes sociétés transcontinentales. Pour parvenir à imposer ce régime inédit de soumission des peuples aux intérêts des grandes compagnies privées, il est deux armes de destruction massive dont les maîtres (...) de l'empire de la honte savent admirablement jouer : la dette et la faim. Par l'endettement, les Etats abdiquent leur souveraineté ; par la faim qui en découle, les peuples agonisent et renoncent à la liberté. Cette formidable machine à broyer et à soumettre ne supporte plus aucune des limitations que le droit international prétendait traditionnellement imposer aux rapport entre les États et entre les peuples. Du coup, c'est le régime de la violence structurelle et permanente qui, partout, gagne du terrain au Sud, tandis que le droit international agonise. Mais qui sont donc ces cosmocrates qui, peu à peu, privatisent jusqu'à l'eau que les peuples doivent désormais leur acheter? Ce livre traque leurs méthodes les plus sournoises : ici on brevète le vivant, là on casse les résistances syndicales, ailleurs on impose la culture des OGM par la force. Oui, c'est bien l'empire de la honte qui s'est mis subrepticement en place sur la planète. Mais c'est précisément sur la honte qu'est fondé le ressort révolutionnaire, comme nous l'ont appris les insurgés de 1789. Cette révolution, elle est en marche : insurrections des consciences ici, insurrections de la faim là-bas. Elle seule peut conduire à la refondation du droit à la recherche du bonheur, cette vieille affaire du XVIIIe siècle. Jean Ziegler, qui témoigne ici d'une connaissance exceptionnelle du terrain, y appelle sans réserve en conclusion. (shrink)

Résumé La critique éthique considère que la valeur éthique d’une œuvre d’art affecte sa valeur artistique. Elle s’intéresse ordinairement à la valeur éthique du point de vue que l’œuvre adopte, ou à celui des effets qu’elles produisent, mais ne considère guère celle du processus de production de l’œuvre. Or celui-ci peut intéresser l’éthique comme lorsqu’une toile est réalisée en laissant des poissons rouges enduits de peinture agoniser et s’agiter sur une toile. C’est précisément de la valeur éthique des procédés utilisés (...) dont il est ici question. L’auteur défend un moralisme des moyens, selon lequel le jugement éthique des procédés a une place légitime dans l’évaluation artistique, et formule deux versions compatibles de cette position : la thèse esthétique et la thèse artistique. (shrink)

Résumé La critique éthique considère que la valeur éthique d’une œuvre d’art affecte sa valeur artistique. Elle s’intéresse ordinairement à la valeur éthique du point de vue que l’œuvre adopte, ou à celui des effets qu’elles produisent, mais ne considère guère celle du processus de production de l’œuvre. Or celui-ci peut intéresser l’éthique comme lorsqu’une toile est réalisée en laissant des poissons rouges enduits de peinture agoniser et s’agiter sur une toile. C’est précisément de la valeur éthique des procédés utilisés (...) dont il est ici question. L’auteur défend un moralisme des moyens, selon lequel le jugement éthique des procédés a une place légitime dans l’évaluation artistique, et formule deux versions compatibles de cette position : la thèse esthétique et la thèse artistique. (shrink)