This paper is the introduction to the Special Issue “Philosophical Methods”. The Special Issue will be published by Synthese.

This book presents a comprehensive study into Plato's theological doctrines, offering an important re-valuation of the status of Plato's gods and the relation between metaphysics and theology according to Plato. Starting from an examination of Plato's views of religion and the relation between religion and morality, Gerd Van Riel investigates Plato's innovative ways of speaking about the gods. This book is invaluable to readers interested in philosophical theology and intellectual history.

In his discussion of pleasure, Aristotle assumes the thesis that a perfect activity always and necessarily yields pleasure. The occurrence of pleasure is even presented as a sign that the activity is perfect. But this assumption seems to be too easy. It is possible that we do feel pleasure in activities which are not perfectly performed, and on the other hand, it is not certain at all that I will enjoy a perfect activity. Pleasure falls into the category of what (...) J. Elster has called 'states that are essentially by-products'. Up to a point, Aristotle acknowledges this, but he does not follow this analysis to its final consequences. If one agrees, as Aristotle does, that there is a difference between the perfect activity and pleasure, it should be possible that an activity is perfect without yielding pleasure, or that pleasure will accompany even an activity which is not perfect. (shrink)

This paper contains a novel and coherent reading of Weberian ideal type construction, based on recent philosophical approaches to conceptual engineering. This reading makes transparent the dialectics of Weber's approach, resulting in a more nuanced interpretation of his methodological work. It will become apparent that Weber, when introducing his notion of an ideal type, did not merely summarize his views on methodology in the social sciences, but, rather, presented a two-step argument in favor of these views. The reconstruction will directly (...) bear on issues in the methodology of the social sciences. Weber not only presented a methodology that is, at some level of abstraction, strikingly similar to Carnapian explication (the canonical point of reference in the contemporary debate on conceptual engineering). He also diagnosed, in a systematic fashion, types of problems we face when dealing with ordinary and scientific concepts that play a key role in the description of social reality, and he foreshadowed what is today sometimes described as “debunking” projects. From a philosophy of science perspective, I propose Weber's view (on the reconstruction proposed here) as a serious candidate for an adequate theory of concept replacement in the social sciences. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to reconstruct Nagel’s approach to idealization in the sciences and present his views as a viable option. In a nutshell, the theory that emerges can be described as follows: There are various types of idealization, which can be found in theoretical and experimental laws, and which, according to Nagel, play various important epistemic roles. In particular, they help organize complex knowledge and allow for approximations to truth. A cognate of idealization, which Nagel does not (...) refer to under this label but describes in terms of assimilation to the familiar and in terms of analogy, is key to scientific models, whose value is primarily heuristic in nature. The fact that theories involve idealization supports an instrumentalist perspective on science, a perspective which also determines a particular scope of the account of idealization. By these lights, particular types of questions simply do not arise, for instance: questions pertaining to the alleged peculiarity of scientific representation, the truth of law statements, etc. (shrink)

It is common to note that social environment and cultural formation shape mental disorders. The details of this claim are, however, not well understood. The paper takes a look at the claim that culture has an impact on psychiatry from the perspective of metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Its aim is to offer, in a general fashion, partial explications of some significant versions of the thesis that culture and social environment shape mental disorders and to highlight some of the (...) consequences social constructionism about psychiatry has for psychiatric explanation. In particular, it will be argued that the alleged dependence of facts about particular mental disorders and about the second order property of being a mental disorder on social facts amounts to a robust form of constructivism, whereas the view that clinician–patient interaction is influenced by cultural facts is perfectly compatible with an anti-constructivist stance. (shrink)

Criticizing Gallagher’s view on direct perception, I develop a basic model of social perception. According to the Cartesians another person’s intentions are not directly accessible to an observer. According to the cognitivist Cartesians conscious processes are necessary for social understanding. According to the Anti-Cartesians social perception is direct. Since both of these latter approaches face serious problems, I will argue in favor of an alternative: anti-cognitivist Cartesianism. Distinguishing between an active- and a passive part of the perceptual system we can (...) describe the situation as follows: Some functionally individuated parts of our nervous system generate percepts that correspond to the properties that causally trigger the system, whilst others form percepts of properties that do not causally trigger the system. The model is basic in that it merely helps clarifying some of the fundamental concepts we need in order to describe empirical findings. (shrink)

Assume that water reduces to H2O. If so water is identical to H2O. At the same time, if water reduces to H2O then H2O does not reduce to water–the reduction relation is asymmetric. This generates a puzzle–if water just is H2O it is hard to see how we can account for the asymmetry of the reduction relation. The paper proposes a solution to this puzzle. It is argued that the reduction predicate generates intensional contexts and that in order to account (...) for the asymmetry, we should develop conditions on the meanings of expressions that flank the reduction predicate in true reduction statements. Finally, it is argued that if we adopt this interpretation, we can illuminate the epistemological difference between reduced and reducing item commonly referred to in the literature. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss a view proposed by Carl Hempel in his paper Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets, published in 1969. Here, Hempel suggested that questions regarding the identification of mental states with physiological states, the relation between sociological phenomena and individual behavioral states, and between biological and physicochemical states should be given what he calls a ‘linguistic’ interpretation. His main point is that whether or not an object is physical or biological depends on how it is, or can (...) be, described. In this paper, I wish to, firstly, explicate Hempel's suggestion, and, secondly, explore one argument in favor of Hempel's account. I will suggest that there is at least one use of the term ‘physical’ in philosophical discourse (and, for that matter, of related terms such as ‘biological’, ‘mental’, ‘natural’ etc.) that should be cashed out in linguistic or representational terms. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that a particular assertion-based account of lying, which rests on Stalnaker’s theory of assertions, proposed by Andreas Stokke, is both too broad and too narrow. I tentatively conclude that the account fails because lying does not necessarily involve a conversational purpose.

Abstract:The goal of this article is to examine some differences between two types of incompatibilism, concerning, on the one hand, incompatibilism about free will and past causes, and, on the other, incompatibilism concerning free will and past divine beliefs or past truths about future actions. On standard conceptions, determinism comes relatively cheap. On van Inwagen's explication, all that is required is that truths about our actions are implied by appropriate descriptions of the past and the laws. Here, the author proposes (...) a more robust notion of determinism and explore some of its consequences for the free will debate. (shrink)

This volume investigates the notion of reduction. Building on the idea that philosophers employ the term ‘reduction’ to reconcile diversity and directionality with unity, without relying on elimination, the book offers a powerful explication of an “ontological” notion of reduction the extension of which is (primarily) formed by properties, kinds, individuals, or processes. It argues that related notions of reduction, such as theory-reduction and functional reduction, should be defined in terms of this explication. Thereby, the book offers a coherent framework, (...) which sheds light on the history of the various reduction debates in the philosophy of science and in the philosophy of mind, and on related topics such as reduction and unification, the notion of a scientific level, and physicalism. (shrink)

There is disagreement as to the ontological status of works associated with an original. Some hold that works like paintings are identical to the concrete particular the artist worked on while creating the artwork. Others suggest that works of this sort cannot be instantiated more than once. In this paper, it is argued that, even if artworks like paintings cannot be instantiated in reproductions, they are nevertheless possibly instantiated more than once. Moreover, it is tentatively suggested that the same holds (...) for improvisations in music. Therefore, even the best candidates on offer do not allow for an identification of the work with a particular or for an identification of the work with a type that is instantiated maximally once. The argument rests on thought experiments, and an inference to the ‘best’ explanation. This inference is, of course, defeasible. Four alternatives, three of which are potentially fruitful, will be identified, and it will be argued that, on balance, these alternatives should be dismissed. (shrink)

This volume deals with the general theory of pleasure of Plato and his successors. The first part describes the two paradigms between which all theories of pleasure oscillate: Plato's definition of pleasure as the repletion of a lack, and Aristotle's view that pleasure is the perfect performance of an activity. After an excursus on Epicureans and Stoics, the book concentrates on Neoplatonism, opposing the 'standard Neoplatonic view' of Plotinus and Proclus to the original viewpoint of Damascius' commentary on Plato's "Philebus," (...) The volume sheds light on the discussion between hedonists and anti-hedonists, by concentrating on the 'crucial point' at which any philosophical analysis of the good life (hedonistic or other) ought to argue that the life of the philosopher is the most desirable, and thus truly pleasurable, life. (shrink)

Nagel’s official model of theory-reduction and the way it is represented in the literature are shown to be incompatible with the careful remarks on the notion of reduction Nagel gave while developing his model. Based on these remarks, an alternative model is outlined which does not face some of the problems the official model faces. Taking the context in which Nagel developed his model into account, it is shown that the way Nagel shaped his model and, thus, its well-known deficiencies, (...) are best conceived of as a mere by-product of his philosophical background. (shrink)

The paper offers an account of the structure of information provided by models that relevantly deviate from reality. It is argued that accounts of scientific modeling according to which a model’s epistemic and pragmatic relevance stems from the alleged fact that models give access to possibilities fail. First, it seems that there are models that do not give access to possibilities, for what they describe is impossible. Secondly, it appears that having access to a possibility is epistemically and pragmatically idle. (...) Based on these observations, an alternative is developed. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine how organizations’ impression management evolves in response to rising stakeholder pressures regarding organizations’ corporate responsibility initiatives. We conducted a comparative case study analysis over a period of 13 years for two organizations—Exxon and BP—that took extreme initial stances on climate change. We found that as stakeholder pressures rose, their IM tactics unfolded in four phases: advocating the initial stance, sensegiving to clarify the initial stance, image repairing, and adjusting the stance. Taken together, our analysis of (...) IM over these four phases provides three key insights about the evolution of IM in the face of rising pressures. First, when faced with stakeholder pressures, it seems that organizations do not immediately resort to conforming but tend to give in gradually when pressures increase and start to come from relatively powerful stakeholders. Second, evolution of IM seems to be characterized by path dependence, i.e., even as organizations’ positions evolve, they continue to show their conviction in their initial positions and try to convey that their subsequent positions flow logically from the previous ones. Finally, IM involves navigation between symbolism and substance, and companies tend to strive toward harmonizing their symbolic and substantive actions as stakeholder pressure increases. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine how organizations’ impression management evolves in response to rising stakeholder pressures regarding organizations’ corporate responsibility initiatives. We conducted a comparative case study analysis over a period of 13 years for two organizations—Exxon and BP—that took extreme initial stances on climate change. We found that as stakeholder pressures rose, their IM tactics unfolded in four phases: advocating the initial stance, sensegiving to clarify the initial stance, image repairing, and adjusting the stance. Taken together, our analysis of (...) IM over these four phases provides three key insights about the evolution of IM in the face of rising pressures. First, when faced with stakeholder pressures, it seems that organizations do not immediately resort to conforming but tend to give in gradually when pressures increase and start to come from relatively powerful stakeholders. Second, evolution of IM seems to be characterized by path dependence, i.e., even as organizations’ positions evolve, they continue to show their conviction in their initial positions and try to convey that their subsequent positions flow logically from the previous ones. Finally, IM involves navigation between symbolism and substance, and companies tend to strive toward harmonizing their symbolic and substantive actions as stakeholder pressure increases. (shrink)

What is the 'good life'? Is it a life completely devoted to intellect, or should we take for granted the hedonistic position, which says that pleasure is the absolute good? The hedonist subordinates everything to pleasure, and tests anything in a rigorous calculus for the amount of pleasure it yields. It is against this hedonism that Plato turns himself in a unique manner in his dialogue Philebus. After having reached a deadlockin a sterile opposition between hedonism and intellectualism in his (...) former works, Platonow wants to dig deeper. He wants to criticize hedonism from within. In the first place, Plato investigates the proper nature of pleasure. It is to be situated within the continuous fluxus of our lives; a going back and forth between lack and replenishment. The limit that gives sense to this movement is the 'natural state', which we never attain in its purity. The role of intellect is hereby reduced to a strictminimum. It seems to be mainly a faculty which concerns the recognition and experience of pleasure as pleasure. In this way, Plato strives to establish a certain degree of consensus of opinion with hedonism, in order to be able to refute it afterwards. This refutation is supported by the formal structure of the dialogue: it consists in a gradual 'conversion' of a hedonist, who will eventually be brought into the intellectualist camp of Socrates. The critique to which Socrates' interlocutor yields is based on three main ideas. 1.Hedonism pretends to know what the good is. Plato counters this with a moderate intellectualism, taking the good to be undecided, and providing a place also for pleasure within the good life. 2. Moreover, Plato reveals an internal contradiction in hedonism: every hedonist will, if possible, prefer a 'pure' pleasure, in which the mixture with its contrary, pain, is as small as possible. However, this purity cannot be reduced to the hedonistic calculus. 3. Finally, the choice of the title of this dialogue is to be seenas a part of Plato's critique against hedonism. The main character Philebus refuses to engage in the debate. Plato suggests by this that he who proclaimspleasure to be the only intrinsic good is unable to partake in a discussion about pleasure. For he would, before any argument whatever, subordinate pleasure to truth and reason. If a hedonist is willing to argue he has already surrendered, and will be 'converted' whether he wants it or not. (shrink)

According to Plato, pleasure consists in the replenishment of a lack, i.e., in restoring the natural condition. At first sight, this might seem to mean that pleasure is always linked to previous pain. However Plato stresses the importance of so-called ‘true’ or ‘pure’ pleasure, which is not paired by pain. The acceptance of this type of pleasure depends on a dissociation of the definition of pleasure and pain from the physiological condition that underlies them . The latter are inescapable: our (...) condition is subject to an everlasting whirl of lack and replenishment, although they are not always perceptible. Pleasure is, then, the experienced replenishment of a lack. This qualification allows one to introduce important nuances in the theory of pleasure: ‘pure’ or ‘true’ pleasure occurs in those cases where the preceding lack was not felt, and thus did not give rise to pain. ‘Mixed’ or ‘impure’ pleasures, on the other hand, refer to cases where both the lack and the replenishment are perceptible. A third situation is the so-called ‘neutral state’, which consists in a coincidence of unfelt lack and imperceptible replenishment. According to Aristotle, who disagrees with Plato on almost every detail of the doctrine of pleasure, pleasure consists in the unimpaired activity of a disposition in its natural condition, i. e., pleasure is a sign of nature indicating that the situation is all right, when any faculty operates as it should. In this model, pleasure is not a ‘movement’ or a process, and neither can it be excessive in se. These two models are criticized for accepting a necessary link between pleasure and the conditions described in the definitions. This seems to misrepresent an essential characteristic of pleasure: pleasure can always fail to occur, even if the concrete situation completely fits the terms set by the definition. Or, conversely, it can suddenly occur, even if the conditions outlined in the definition are not met. (shrink)

Ce collectif présente les actes d’un colloque tenu à Iéna en 2003, qui ras­semblait un groupe de spécialistes de Proclus. Le volume a été édité avec soin, et la qualité des contributions est très élevée. Le contenu général manque un peu de cohérence. Non seulement les thèmes annoncés dans le titre (méthode, psychologie, métaphysique) sont déjà des passe-partout, mais en outre ils recouvrent des contributions sur la critique textuelle du commentaire du Parmé­nide, sur la doctrine éthico-politi...

La présentation ambiguë de la χώρα dans le Timée a donné lieu à une grande diversité d’interprétations, dont la plupart se sont inspirées de la critique aristotélicienne du discours de Timée. Depuis l’Antiquité, ceux qui ont voulu sauver l’analyse de Platon face aux objections formulées par Aristote se sont servis des notions et des présuppositions que celui‑ci a imposées au débat. Or, il importe d’essayer de dépouiller de ces présupposés la question de la χώρα, en cherchant à identifier les questions (...) que Platon lui‑même s’est posé, et qu’il a voulu résoudre en établissant la notion de χώρα. Vu que, en Tim. 52d‑53b, Platon indique que la χώρα contenait des qualités avant l’intervention démiurgique, il faut accepter que ce réceptacle qui reçoit les éléments n’est pas sans forme et, dès lors, qu’il ne correspond pas à la notion aristotélicienne de la matière. Il s’agit plutôt d’une masse corporelle douée d’une motion déséquilibrée, et dont la nature n’est pas changée lors de l’imposition de la forme. La matérialité de cette masse corporelle ne faisant l’objet d’aucune conceptualisation, ce passage sur la χώρα, comme d’ailleurs l’analyse des éléments en Tim. 53b‑61c, montre que Platon n’a pas élaboré une theorie de la matière. (shrink)

People are using the future to search for better ways to achieve sustainability, inclusiveness, prosperity, well-being and peace. In addition, the way the future is understood and used is changing in almost all domains, from social science to daily life. This book presents the results of significant research undertaken by UNESCO with a number of partners to detect and define the theory and practice of anticipation around the world today. It uses the concept of ‘Futures Literacy’ as a tool to (...) define the understanding of anticipatory systems and processes – also known as the Discipline of Anticipation. This innovative title explores: • new topics such as Futures Literacy and the Discipline of Anticipation; • the evidence collected from over 30 Futures Literacy Laboratories and presented in 14 full case studies; • the need and opportunity for significant innovation in human decision-making systems. This book will be of great interest to scholars, researchers, policy-makers and students, as well as activists working on sustainability issues and innovation, future studies and anticipation studies. The Open Access version of this book, available at https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781351047999, has been made available under a Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 IGO (CC-BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license. (shrink)

Among philosophers of mind, it is common to assume that at least some mental properties are functional in nature, and that functional properties are second-order properties. In the functionalist literature, the notion of being a second-order property is cashed out in three different ways: (i) in terms of semantic features of characterizations or definitions of properties, (ii) in terms of syntactic features of second-order quantification, and (iii) in terms of a metaphysical criterion, according to which properties are second order if (...) they are properties of first-order properties. It is shown that in the context of functionalism reference to these interpretations is misguided, and it is suggested that the notion of an ordering of properties in this context is best understood as being tied to dependence-relations. (shrink)

This paper investigates under what conditions a good corporate social responsibility (CSR) can compensate for a relatively poor corporate ability (CA) (quality), and vice versa. The authors conducted an experiment among business administration students, in which information about a financial services company’s CA and CSR was provided. Participants indicated their preferences for the company’s products, stocks, and jobs. The results show that for stock and job preferences, a poor CA can be compensated by a good CSR. For product preferences, a (...) poor CA could not be compensated by a good CSR, at least when people thought that CA is personally relevant to them. Furthermore, a poor CSR could be compensated by a good CA for product, stocks, and job preferences. (shrink)

In order to do justice to the intuition that medical treatments as such do not form proper instances of bio-enhancement, as the notion is employed in the ethical debate, we should construe bio-enhancements as interventions, which do not aim at states that, other things being equal, ought to obtain. In the light of this clarification, we come to see that cases of moral enhancement are not covered by the notion of bio-enhancement, properly construed.

Recently, a time-honored assumption has resurfaced in some parts of the free will debate: if past divine beliefs or past truths about what we do depend on what we do, then these beliefs and truths are, in a sense, up to us; hence, we are able to act otherwise, despite the existence of past truths or past divine beliefs about our future actions. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a novel incompatibilist argument that rests on. This argument is interesting (...) in itself, for it is independent of a number of assumptions about the nature of God that have played an essential role in the classical defense of incompatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human free will. Moreover, the argument enables us to identify a difficulty compatibilists encounter when employing to block incompatibilism. (shrink)

Cet article examine la façon dont Damascius, le dernier diadoque de l’académie platonicienne à Athènes, intègre les principes ontologiques du Philèbe dans son système. A l’opposé de ses prédécesseurs, Damascius refuse d’accepter une opposition des principes de la limite et de l’illimitation immédiatement au-dessous de l’Un (principe de la cause), car une telle opposition briserait l’unité de l’Un. Après une présentation de la doctrine des premiers principes selon Damascius, l’auteur discute la critique de ce dernier vis-à-vis de ses précurseurs, avant (...) de se tourner vers la question complémentaire : étant donné que Damascius n’accepte pas la solution offerte par la tradition, quel rôle attribue-t-il lui-même aux principes tirés du Philèbe? (shrink)

As one of the world's most eminent living philosophers, John Perry has covered a remarkable breadth of subjects in his published work, including semantics, indexicality, self-knowledge, personal identity, and consciousness. Looking particularly at the way in which he deals with issues of self, communication, and reality, this volume is organized in seven chapters that highlight a different aspect of Perry's work on the intersection of these subjects. A fundamental work for students and scholars, Identity, Language, and Mind explores questions that (...) are not only essential in understanding Perry's writings, but also contemporary philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

The present paper argues that there is a structural difference between classical cases involving knowledge-undermining environmental luck, and cases where a subject acquires understanding in the presence of environmental luck. This difference appears to bear on arguments against the reductionist thesis that understanding is a special form of knowledge.

This paper investigates under what conditions a good corporate social responsibility (CSR) can compensate for a relatively poor corporate ability (CA) (quality), and vice versa. The authors conducted an experiment among business administration students, in which information about a financial services company's CA and CSR was provided. Participants indicated their preferences for the company's products, stocks, and jobs. The results show that for stock and job preferences, a poor CA can be compensated by a good CSR. For product preferences, a (...) poor CA could not be compensated by a good CSR, at least when people thought that CA is personally relevant to them. Furthermore, a poor CSR could be compensated by a good CA for product, stocks, and job preferences. (shrink)

Based on the discussion of a novel version of the Barn County scenario, the paper argues for a new explication of knowledge undermining luck. In passing, an as yet undetected form of benign luck is identified.

In this chapter, the arguably most complex and most important part of Proclus’ metaphysics is under scrutiny: the One, the Henads, and the principles. The author discusses the transcendence and knowability of the One/Good, and how it can be a cause; the Iamblichean principles Limit and Unlimited, as the first coupling of unity and multiplicity, and how they invert the Aristotelian notion of dunamis. Together these principles produce ‘the mixture’, and all beings result from the triad Limit-Unlimited-Mixture. The author then (...) moves on to analysing the structure of the intelligible world in detail as an accumulation of determinations derived from these principles and the second hypothesis of the Parmenides, and to showing how the fourteen layers of the intelligible allow a rationalization of the controversial Henads, as participated forms of unity: they do not form a hypostasis in their own right, but they are all supra-essential. (shrink)

At In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii II, 1.393.31–394.5 Diehl, Proclus follows Porphyry's inferences against the theory of Atticus, focussing more precisely on the fact that the latter's account of the principles does not correspond to the views expounded by Plato himself. In Diehl's text, based on a limited selection of primary manuscript-witnesses, the introductory phrase to this criticism contains a reference to the maker, which cannot easily be explained within the context. On the basis of a new examination of the manuscript (...) tradition, and of the context of the passage, we will present a new conjecture that allows one to avoid the problems involved in Diehl's reading of the text. (shrink)

In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs about future actions are merely soft facts, rather than hard facts about the past. Under the assumption that if Ockhamism can solve the problem of divine foreknowledge then it should also yield a solution to the problem (...) of the prophet’s foreknowledge, it is concluded that Ockhamism fails. (shrink)

Focused correlation compares the degree of association within an evidence set to the degree of association in that evidence set given that some hypothesis is true. Wheeler and Scheines have shown that a difference in incremental confirmation of two evidence sets is robustly tracked by a difference in their focus correlation. In this essay, we generalize that tracking result by allowing for evidence having unequal relevance to the hypothesis. Our result is robust as well, and we retain conditions for bidirectional (...) tracking between incremental confirmation measures and focused correlation. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that an important notion of reduction depends on a four-place relation holding between expressions, concepts, properties, and events or states of affairs. I define this notion and argue against alternative accounts that are based on syntactic features of theories. Whilst these latter attempts fail to deliver a satisfactory explanation of why a certain theory or a certain expression reduces to another, the former can give a complete explanation of why, say, ‛human pain’ reduces to ‛C-fiber (...) stimulation’ or why the mind reduces to the physical. I briefly sketch the difference between the semantic approach that I favor, which is based on a particular notion of hyper-intensions, and classical model-theoretic versions of reduction. (shrink)

Ethics of any kind basically assume that all human beings by nature aim at happiness. However, this general starting point has to be made concrete in order to be relevant for action, and hence suitable for moral appreciation. What does my happiness consist in? Contrary to what has often been taken for granted, the concrete aim is not instrumental or subsidiary to the overall aim of happiness. To me, my particular aim is rather identical with happiness. The choice I make (...) — if choice it is — indeed constitutes my happiness, i.e. the overall aim that directs my existential choices. This article is focused on the way Aristotelian ethics envisages the concreteness of this overall aim. This is not the concreteness of the means leading to the aim, which has often been discussed in Aristotelian scholarship, but happiness itself, taken as the specific but nevertheless universal aim that I seek to accomplish in my life. The main arguments are taken from Nicomachean Ethics VI and III. These texts, central to any discussion of Aristotle's views on the role of choice and deliberation in acquiring happiness, are re-interpreted, avoiding the deadlock of a debate between intellectualists and non-intellectualists. (shrink)

Plato’sPhilebusfamously combines a deliberation on the virtuous life as a balancing act between prudence and pleasure with a theory of the composition of mixtures from limit and limitedness. The latter aspect of the dialogue is used by the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus as a basis for his own metaphysical analysis of the ultimate first principle, the One, and the manner in which it produces all things which exist. Multiple scholarly analyses have been provided of Proclus’ use of the Phileban theory of (...) limit and the unlimited for his description of the first principle’s creation process. However, this paper shows that Proclus reads thePhilebusnot merely for its discussion of limit and unlimited, but also for its description of the good life. After all, the Neoplatonic One is also the Good from Plato’sRepublic. InPhil. 20d1–11, Socrates suggest that the good is perfect, sufficient, and desirable. Proclus’Commentary on the RepublicandPlatonic Theologyreveal that these three aspects of the good provide Proclus with a framework to describe the Neoplatonic first principlequaGood. In Proclus’ view, the three Phileban concepts constitute the base elements of the good which reappear in all of its manifestations, and thus link the good in us to the transcendent and unqualified Good: the desirable element represents the good’s singularity and its position as the centre around which all beings circle; the sufficient element represents the non-reciprocal bestowal of existence and generative power by any form of the good upon its participants; lastly, the perfect element reverts all creatures to the good in which they participate, even when not all genera of beings in the Neoplatonic universe are equally capable of such participation. Furthermore, Proclus uses the description of the good life as not merely intellectual from thePhilebusto fortify his arguments in disagreements with other Neoplatonic commentators regarding the transcendence of the Good over the intelligible principles, and conversely employs the Neoplatonic definition of the first principle to affirm the ethics of the Platonic dialogue. Thus, although Proclus’ primary goal in reading thePhilebusis to obtain knowledge of the ultimate first principle, Socrates’ analysis of the virtuous life in the dialogue is just as important for his purposes as the theory of mixtures. (shrink)