First published in 2004, this book is a rigorous textbook on the metaphysics of the mind for advanced students of philosophy, covering the background they need to understand the debates and bringing them to the frontiers of current research. It is also a monograph on the nature of de re and de se states of mind, incorporating material the author published in journals. The short file you will see is only a gateway to more than two dozen other files which (...) are rewrites of the book. (shrink)

Journal Name: The Law & Ethics of Human Rights Issue: Ahead of print.

This essay develops a theory of natural signs in order to show how evolutionary theory breathes new life into teleology. An argument to the contrary presented by Richard Taylor is refuted. The essay defends the view that the concept of negative feedback explicates purposiveness and that symbiotic evolution explains the occurrence of naturally adapted feedback systems. But evolution itself is not a teleological process, nor is it a negative feedback system. There is an exploration of the nature of the dissatisfaction (...) we feel with an evolutionary account of purposiveness from which the fortuitous cannot be eliminated. (shrink)

The author argues that faith survives as a rational option, despite science rendering improbable distinctively theological claims about the world and history. After rejecting justifications of faith from natural theology and natural law, he defends a seemingly weaker strategy, a corrected version of Pascal's wager argument. The wager lets one's desires count toward showing one's faith to be rational, and the faith requires that oneÕs desires undergo radical transformation to protect the faith, making the wager argument really quite strong. As (...) Nietzsche insisted, to be an atheist in the face of this challenge, one would have to become superhuman and transform one's values radically in the opposite direction. (shrink)

In this two-part essay I develop a theory of natural signs. Since even primordial signs signify values, in the first part I develop the theory’s valuative aspect. Goods are as primary in nature as facts are, and together facts and values generate semeiosis in all life without excess extrapolation from human psychology. To ward off over-extrapolating on values, I defend a major discontinuity between man and nature on the goods of ethics. In the essay’s second part I develop the semeiotic (...) dimensions of the negative feedback model of purposive systems. I provide tests for the truth and falsity of the primitive representations in these systems. I account for the holism of representational systems and their non-extensionality, and I define functions. I solve this important definitional problem by inverting the usual mode of thinking: Functions do not explain signs; signs explain functions. Finally I defend this theory’s way of understanding the continuity between human beings and the rest of living nature against several criticisms. (shrink)

Discourse-based processes seek to arrive at socially acceptable decisions by adhering to a specific set of procedures. In this case study, we empirically test how successful the,Cooperative Discourse' was in identifying a socially acceptable site for a solid-waste landfill in Switzerland. Our results indicate that even individuals living in the community designated as the prospective site think highly of the,Cooperative Discourse', but they know close to nothing about this procedure. This ignorance is rational, because, under Swiss laws, the recommendations of (...) the discourse are not legally binding and siting projects can easily be thwarted by town hall meetings. In this case, the,Cooperative Discourse' may have reached a consensus proposal because this proposal is socially not very relevant. (shrink)

Intentionality occurs in connectionist nets among those traits of the nets that scientists call flaws. This label has obscured for philosophers the fact that the naturalistic basis of intentionality has been discovered. I show this while staying on our profession's common ground of discourse about ancient philosophy. In the "Theaetetus", Plato invokes a homunculus to explain perceptual misrecognition, and in "On Memory and Recollection", Aristotle invokes a mental operation of disregarding in order to overcome the extraneous determinateness of mental images. (...) I develop a connectionist alternative to images that does not invoke a homunculus or spurious mental operations. I describe in detail an ultra-simple Hopfield net that provides an inus (indispensable part of a sufficient) condition for misrecognition. In addition, it exhibits properties that make it an inus condition for two marks of the intentionality of singular terms, namely, failures of existential generalization and of intersubstitutability of names. I also define the sense of a singular term. (shrink)

New definitions of theism and of faith are offered that are consistent with low degrees of belief in a god. Theism and atheism are as much differences of desire as of belief. The argument depends on a new conception of knowledge. I use decision theory to reconstruct the Kantian distinction between speculative reason and practical reason, but I make the distinction in a non-Kantian way. The former, which is knowledge, is characterized in terms of an effect in probability theory---what I (...) call diachronic bootstrapping---which distinguishes our knowledge from the corpus of beliefs that guide our actions. The latter can include theism, even when the former does not. (shrink)

Reflection on the self's way of being "in" consciousness yields two arguments for a theory of self-reference not based in any way all all on self-cognition. First, I show that one theory of self-reference predicts an experience of the self because the theory inadequately analyzes the semantical facts about indexicality. I construct a dilemma for this cognitivism, which it cannot get out of, for it requires even solitary self-reference to be based on some original self-knowledge, which is not available. I (...) describe my "kinetic model" of unspoken self-reference, and I show how it fits the facts of four forms of consciousness, all of which presuppose self-reference, rather than yield it. Second, a speaker uses the first person pronoun in sentences because she is aware of the unmediated role in agency of the beliefs she would express, and not because she is aware of herself in their content. The cognitive model, in contrast, succumbs to a vicious regress and is exposed as an obstacle to an understanding of consciousness. (shrink)

This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...

Diese Arbeit stellt Bertrand Russell als politischen Menschen vor und untersucht Erschließungspotentiale für die politische Bildung von heute. Hierbei sind Leitfragen von Bedeutung, wie: Welche Ereignisse bedingten Russells Lebensweg, wie kam er zu seinen politischen Ansichten und seinem Engagement? Wie lässt sich seine politische Philosophie verorten und systematisieren? Wie sieht seine pädagogische Konzeption aus und wie steht diese im Zusammenhang mit seinen politischen Überzeugungen? Wie ist Russells Wirkungsgeschichte zu beurteilen? Inwiefern eröffnen sich mit der Person Russell, seinen Schriften und mit (...) seinem politischen Handeln Erschließungschancen für politische Bildung? Inwieweit kann Russell als Vorbild für einen politischen Aktivbürger dienen? (shrink)

I define the Gaia hypothesis as the descriptive claim, supposedly supported by biology and the earth sciences, that there's a fitness for one-and-all, and the owner of that fitness is Gaia. Much of the argument for Gaia turns on the supposed discovery of negative feedback loops serving its fitness. I present an argument against such a fitness, and so against Gaia. I distinguish two types of negative feedback systems. Systems in the engineering sense are information exploiters, whereas systems in the (...) Boolean sense are simply producers of stability. I address three arguments presented by the advocates of Gaia for thinking that they have discovered a special variety of the Boolean system that is most supportive of Gaia's reality. I show that these arguments are specious. Furthermore I show that systems in the engineering sense would be the most supportive of the Gaia hypothesis, and no global feedback systems of that type have ever been found. These analyses have a constructive consequence of fundamental importance to biology: a theory of the way negative feedback, taken in the purely quantitative sense of information theory, comes to acquire the semantic character of being information about various features of an organism's niche. (shrink)

‘Ifs’ come washed or unwashed. The washed ifs are embedded in precise theories: the constantly strict implication of deductive inference, the variably strict implication of ‘nearness’ conditionals, and statements of conditional probability. By a nearness conditional I mean the common part of Stalnaker's and D. Lewis's theory of counterfactual conditionals, which depends on a notion that possible worlds are more or less near to each other, as a measure of their over-all similarity to each other.

The author argues for a purely naturalistic underpinning of the linguistic practice of reporting one's introspections. In doing so he avoids any commitments about the ontological status of entities referred to in introspective reports. He also presents evidence of the inadequacy of peripheralistic behaviorism as a naturalistic underpinning of introspective reports. The paper includes (a) a definition of 'introspection' and criticism of alternative definitions, (b) a classification scheme that sorts introspections into six different types, and (c) a presentation of evidence (...) that the reporting of certain of these is based on such fundamental psychological phenomena as stimulus generalization, and possibly also conditioning to covert mediating responses. (shrink)

Russell's concept of the self as relevant to semantics, distinct from the psychological concept, evolved from a judger with no complexity of relevance to semantics to a mind with much relevant complexity. The evolution transformed his semantic conceptions: He reassessed what constitutes intentionality, giving up his theory of acquaintance as the aboriginal intentional relation, favoring a contextually constituted intentionality in his theory of neutral monism. His anti-idealism extricated itself from an unwarranted antirepresentationalism. Truth went from being an adverb of acts (...) to an adjective of propositions. He formulated a theory of singular knowledge based on a relation of noticing that anticipated Kaplan's "vivid Names." But, although he saw that the judger-adjudged relation could not account for a judgment's unity, he did not discover what did unify it. Stenius and Geach discovered it in that complex state of the judger which underlies the judgment's verb. (shrink)

Three dialogues introducing the mathematical way of treating desire and belief, that is to say, the theory of probability interpreted as degree of belief, and decision theory in the way that Ramsey envisioned it being developed. Suitable as a textbook.

A valid logical form is exhibited which underlies many arguments for logical, precognitive, and causal fatalism. The tools of modal and metrical tense logic are employed. And the logic of subjunctive conditionals is employed to display for the first time the valid variant of this form which underlies the most plausible causal fatalisms. Eleven arguments from ancient, medieval, and modern authors are shown to have variants of this valid form.The truth of the premises is examined, especially the premise that the (...) past is necessary. This is made precise and defended as Ockham and Montague suggest, and this defence's implicit logic of the interrelations of time, modality, and counterfactual dependence is explored, A novel argument is given to refute the ancient view that unchangeable truth of a tensed sentence is proof of its necessity. Logical fatalism is shown to be not falsifiable independently of the falsity of causal fatalism. (shrink)

According to philosophical naturalism, the main anti-naturalism in philosophy derives from Kant and depends on transcendental arguments, which are invalid or polemically toothless. Many of naturalism's characteristic features follow from this repudiation of Kantian method. Anti-naturalists should be aware that the rationale for naturalism depends on this attack on their own position. There remains for philosophy a distinctively philosophical role that depends on the indexical element in our thought, the role of elaborating a scientific worldview.

Given the personalist's latitudinarian conception of rationality, what is progress toward wisdom? An answer is in C. I. Lewis's concept of the "congruence" of propositions, propositions so related that the antecedent probability of any one of them will be increased if the remainder can be assumed. This effect can be modelled in the probability calculus with due attention to the temporal sequencing of our learning of contingent propositions without ever becoming certain of them, as Jeffrey proposes. A diachronic bootstrapping effect (...) is obtained for Ockham's razor and premises of arguments about a god's existence. As a theory's probability rises with increased evidence, the probability of our earlier evidence rises too. (shrink)

Discourse-based processes seek to arrive at socially acceptable decisions by adhering to a specific set of procedures. In this case study, we empirically test how successful the,Cooperative Discourse' was in identifying a socially acceptable site for a solid-waste landfill in Switzerland. Our results indicate that even individuals living in the community designated as the prospective site think highly of the,Cooperative Discourse', but they know close to nothing about this procedure. This ignorance is rational, because, under Swiss laws, the recommendations of (...) the discourse are not legally binding and siting projects can easily be thwarted by town hall meetings. In this case, the,Cooperative Discourse' may have reached a consensus proposal because this proposal is socially not very relevant. (shrink)