Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ?On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy?, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could (...) not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant's thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Leibniz’s form/matter defense of omnipotence is paradoxical, but not irretrievably so. Leibniz maintains that God necessarily must concur only in the possibility for evil’s existence in the world (the form of evil), but there are individual instances of moral evil that are not necessary (the matter of evil) with which God need not concur. For Leibniz, that there is moral evil in the world is (...) contingent on God’s will (a dimension of divine omnipotence), with the result that even though it is necessary that God exerts his will, there are particular products of his will that are contingent and unnecessary—including human moral evil. If there are instances of evil which are contingent on God’s will and yet unnecessary, then the problematic conclusion for Leibniz’s view must be that human evil depends upon divine concurrence, not just for its possibility in the world (which is necessary) but for its instance (which is contingent). If the form/matter defense of omnipotence contains a true paradox, then God concurs in the form as well as the matter of evil. To assuage this difficulty for Leibniz, I will argue that he could either give up an Augustinian notion of evil, or rely upon a distinction between *potenta absoluta* and *potenta ordinate*, which was popular among important thinkers in the medieval period. (shrink)

Moral disagreement has long been thought to create serious problems for certain views in metaethics. More specifically, moral disagreement has been thought to pose problems for any metaethical view that rejects relativism—that is, for any view that implies that whenever two thinkers disagree about a moral question, at least one of those thinkers’ beliefs about the question is not correct. In this essay, I shall outline a solution to one of these problems. As I shall argue, it (...) turns out in the end that this problem is not really a special problem about moral disagreement at all: it is a general problem about disagreement as such. For this reason, in the later sections of this essay, I shall turn to some general questions in epistemology, about the epistemic significance of disagreement. (shrink)

There is, I shall assume, such a thing as moral evil (more on which below). My question is whether is also such a thing as non-moral evil, and in particular whether there are such things as aesthetic evil and epistemic evil. More exactly, my question is whether there is such a thing as moral evil but not such a thing as non-moral evil, in some sense that reveals something special about (...) the moral, as opposed to such would-be non-moral domains as the aesthetic and the epistemic. The philosophical issue at stake here is that of the nature of these different normative domains, and the nature and extent of their difference. (shrink)

It is universally agreed that Plato inherited from Socrates, and consistently maintained to the end, the doctrine that no man does evil of set purpose—οδες κν μαρτνει—but because he mistakes evil for good. All moral evil, therefore, for Plato, involves ignorance. There are, however, two passages, one in the Sophist, the other in Laws ix, which on the face of them appear to recognize a type of moral evil in which ignorance is not involved, (...) a type which is indeed contrasted with that arising from ignorance. These passages have not, of course, been overlooked by scholars: they are regularly referred to in the best-known accounts of Platonic ethical theory; yet I do not think they have been sufficiently considered, nor is a clear answer forthcoming to the question whether or no in these later dialogues Plato really intends, as he seems to intend, a modification of his earlier ethical doctrine. My purpose is to show that he does not, and to account if possible for his apparent inconsistency. (shrink)

It is universally agreed that Plato inherited from Socrates, and consistently maintained to the end, the doctrine that no man does evil of set purpose—οδες κν μαρτνει—but because he mistakes evil for good. All moral evil, therefore, for Plato, involves ignorance. There are, however, two passages, one in the Sophist, the other in Laws ix, which on the face of them appear to recognize a type of moral evil in which ignorance is not involved, (...) a type which is indeed contrasted with that arising from ignorance. These passages have not, of course, been overlooked by scholars: they are regularly referred to in the best-known accounts of Platonic ethical theory; yet I do not think they have been sufficiently considered, nor is a clear answer forthcoming to the question whether or no in these later dialogues Plato really intends, as he seems to intend, a modification of his earlier ethical doctrine. My purpose is to show that he does not, and to account if possible for his apparent inconsistency. (shrink)

This chapter charts the evolution of Kant’s approach to moral evil. It lays out an apparent problem with Kant’s account of the connection between the freedom required for moral responsibility and the freedom of rational autonomy: that if the former requires the latter, then imputable moral evil is impossible.

Paradigmatic examples of logical arguments from evil are attempts to establish that the following claims are inconsistent with one another: (1) God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. (2) There is evil in the world. Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense resists such arguments by providing a positive case that (1) and (2) are consistent. A weakness in Plantinga’s free will defense, however, is that it does not show that theism is consistent with the proposition that there are non- (...) class='Hi'>moral evils in the world (i.e., that there obtain morally bad states of affairs for which no creature is morally responsible). But many of us firmly believe that there are evils of that sort. I show how Plantinga’s free will defense can be extended so as to redress this weakness. (shrink)

The idea of moral evil has always held a special place in philosophy and theology because the existence of evil has implications for the dignity of the human and the limits of human action. Andrew M. Flescher proposes four interpretations of evil, drawing on philosophical and theological sources and using them to trace through history the moral traditions that are associated with them. The first model, evil as the presence of badness, offers a traditional (...) dualistic model represented by Manicheanism. The second, evil leading to goodness through suffering, presents a theological interpretation known as theodicy. Absence of badness—that is, evil as a social construction—is the third model. The fourth, evil as the absence of goodness, describes when evil exists in lieu of the good—the "privation" thesis staked out nearly two millennia ago by Christian theologian St. Augustine. Flescher extends this fourth model—evil as privation—into a fifth, which incorporates a virtue ethic. Drawing original connections between Augustine and Aristotle, Flescher’s fifth model emphasizes the formation of altruistic habits that can lead us to better moral choices throughout our lives. Flescher eschews the temptation to think of human agents who commit evil as outside the norm of human experience. Instead, through the honing of moral skills and the practice of attending to the needs of others to a greater degree than we currently do, Flescher offers a plausible and hopeful approach to the reality of moral evil. (shrink)

Contemporary historians examining moral theology in the Middle Ages question whether the practice of proscribing certain kinds of human acts as intrinsic moral evils has a legitimate basis in the Christian ethical tradition. John Dedek argues that this proscription does not fully emerge until the work of the fourteenth-century thinker Durandus of St. Pourçain. Dedek’s historical focus, however, is upon theological discussions which consider God’s absolute power and his ability to dispense from or command any human act whatsoever. (...) The focus for addressing this question should be instead to examine how medieval thinkers understand the structural elements of a human act, especially in response to the ethical intentionalism promoted by the twelfth-century thinker Peter Abelard. An examination of Peter Lombard’s response to Abelard reveals that certain human acts were proscribed as intrinsic moral evils long prior to Durandus, and that Augustine serves as a source for this doctrine. (shrink)

In this paper, I highlight three objections to vice-based accounts of moral evil: (1) the worry that vice-based accounts of evil are explanatorily inadequate; (2) the worry that even extreme vice is not sufficient for evil; and (3) the worry that not all vices are inversions of virtue (and so vice-based accounts will struggle to explain the “mirror thesis”). I argue that it is possible to respond to these objections by developing a vice-based account of (...) class='Hi'>evil that draws on insights from virtue (and vice) epistemology. In this way, I seek to defend the strategy of understanding evil in terms of vice, and to provide guidance on how best to develop such an account. I also briefly consider what vice-based accounts of moral evil might imply about evil in other normative domains where it is common to talk of virtue and vice, including the possibilities of epistemic evil and aesthetic evil. (shrink)

Many theists believe that the so-called ‘free will defence’ successfully undermines the antitheist argument from moral evil. However, in a recent issue of Sophia Joel Thomas Tierno provides the ‘adequacy argument’ in order to show an alleged difficulty with the free will defence. I argue that the adequacy argument fails because it equivocates on the notion of moral evil.

Theists may argue that, although theism does not explain the presence of all evils well, it provides an explanation that is as good as (or better than) the explanation provided by some (or all) of theism’s metaphysical rivals. Let us call this approach “The Comparative Response” since it involves comparing theistic explanations of evil with explanations provided by theism’s metaphysical rivals. The Comparative Response has received little attention in recent discussions of the problem of evil, and I propose (...) to develop it in this paper. Specifically, I shall argue that although theism may not explain all evils well, on the whole theism explains the presence of moral evil as well as (or better than) naturalism does. (shrink)

The concept of evil is one of the most powerful in our moral vocabulary, and is commonly used today in both religious and secular spheres to condemn ideas, people, their actions, and much else besides. Yet appeals to evil in public debate have often deepened existing conflicts, through corruption of rational discourse and demonization of the other. With its religious overtones and implied absolutism, the concept of evil seems ill-suited to advancing public discourse and pro-social relations (...) in a liberal democracy, as evidenced by its use in the abortion debate. International relations have also suffered from references to an ¿axis of evil.¿ Recently, however, philosophers have begun reconceptualising evil within a secular, moral framework, using the idea of evil as the worst kind of immorality to inform and shape our responses to issues like torture, genocide and rape as a weapon of war. This book continues this trend, exploring a constructive role for the concept of evil in practical ethics. Part I of the book begins with two examinations of the concept itself, one focusing primarily on its secular manifestations and the other on evil in its religious context. Individuals are perhaps the primary focus of attributions of evil, and Part II looks at two particular manifestations of evil, in bullying and in mass killing, before considering the nature of evil as an immoral character trait. Part III moves beyond the individual to issues of collective evildoing, evil environments, and political evil. The final part considers responses to evil: can some evil be unforgiveable, and to what extent should we ¿enhance¿ ourselves morally so as to prevent future evildoing? These essays, written by leading philosophers from around the world, including the late Claudia Card, will take the philosophical debate on moral evil in practical ethics to a new level. (shrink)

It is quite clear that sin like any other evil involves the privation of a requisite perfection, that it has what is called a negative malice. But is that all? Even a superficial examination of a sin of transgression shows that there is another element, an act, which is something positive: peccatum non est pura privatio, sed est actus debito ordine privatus; peccatum est actus inordinatus. Is this positive element the formal constituent of sin, so that sin may be (...) said not only to have a negative malice, but also a positive one? Or, in other words, is a sin bad not only on account of what it lacks, of what it is not, but also—and principally—on account of what it is? (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that -- contrary to widely received opinion -- logical arguments from evil are well and truly alive and kicking.

One of the most vexing problems in the philosophy of religion is the existence of moral evil in light of an omnipotent and wholly good deity. A popular mode of diffusing the argument from evil lies in the appeal to free will. Traditionally it is argued that there is a strong connection, even a necessary one, between the ability to exercise free will and the occurrence of wrong-doing. Transworld depravity, as characterized by Alvin Plantinga, is a concept (...) which has gone far to explain this relationship. Essentially, the notion of transworld depravity involves the claim that in any world where a person is significantly free that person would, on some occasion, act morally wrongly, or as Plantinga phrases it: ‘If S' were actual, P would go wrong with respect to A’ (where S' is a possible world, P is a person and A is an action). Not only, Plantinga claims, is it possible that there are persons who suffer from transworld depravity, but ‘it is possible that everybody suffers from it’. If transworld depravity obtains, Plantinga notes, God ‘might have been able to create worlds in which moral evil is very considerably outweighed by moral good; but it was not within His power to create worlds containing moral good but no moral evil – and this despite the fact that He is omnipotent’. On this view, God could not instantiate perfect-person essences who would not ever sin. Although Plantinga argues that these instantiated beings are significantly free in that they could have done otherwise (i.e. not sinned), it does seem that his claim about transworld depravity amounts to a claim about transworld depravity amounts to a claim about the existence of a necessary connection obtaining between freedom and evil. For even though it makes sense to claim that an individual may have unactualized dispositions, to claim that everyone, past, present and future, has unactualized dispositions seems to be a significantly different claim. It is therefore difficult to see how this latter claim differs in substance from the claim of a necessary connection obtaining between the capacity for free will and the commission of evil acts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE INSCRUTABILITY O:F MORAL EVIL IN KANT ((W:HENCE COMETH EVIL?" Late in his career, Immanuel Kant would turn his attention to this perennial question with an elaborate account of " radical evil " in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. His discussion produced consternation among his admirers, such as Goethe, and continues to produce puzzlement among his commentators. Among the chief difficulties facing the (...) modern-day interpreter has been the welter of complex terminology tossed up by Kant's attempts to tame his topic. The Kant specialist can justifiably suppose that if only he or she could un-scramble the terminology, grasp the intended interconnections among the terms, and set the discussion within the context of the entire critical philosophy, the result would be a reasonably clear view of Kant's theory of the nature and source of moral evil. There is of course some justification to this vaguely masochistic approach to the matter, yet such an approach, I fear, leads inevitably to frustration. This is because, despite all the appearances to the contrary, Kant never really explains moral evil in the discussion of radical evil in Religion. To be sure, he offers a definition of what moral evil is, by the terms of his philosophy. Nevertheless, he never really accounts for evil, nor does he offer anything remotely approaching an answer to my opening question. The deepest part of Kant's analysis is not a response to that question, but a link between moral evil and human freedom, and this link is utterly inexplicable, for the same reason that freedom itself is, for Kant, ultimately inexplicable. Thus, by this reading of the theory of radical evil, we are not finally led to comprehend Kant's view of evil. Instead, we are 246 THE INSCRUTABILITY OF MORAL EVIL IN KANT 247 reminded of the contingent nature of the exercise of freedom, the unfathomable quality of the process of character-building, and, finally, the sheer inscrutability of moral evil itself. Kant is theorizing about human nature in a way that gradually discloses the futility of domesticating this topic conceptually or rationally. This point is worth stressing, partly because of certain stereotypes that persist regarding the things Kant's philosophy supposedly renders in rational form. And, obviously, the point can be stressed in the present context by pursuing further the notion that moral evil is, for Kant, inscrutable. The inscrutability of moral evil does not pop into view all at once, for Kant's discussion in Religion is set in the context of a complex account of the structure of the will, the nature of the incentives capable of determining the will, and the issue of freedom. Consequently, in what follows I shall attempt to trace the Kantian line of thought lying behind his agnosticism regarding the source of moral evil. -IFor Kant, moral evil resides in a maxim.1 A maxim is for him a special kind of principle, one which guides or informs actionin effect, a "practical principle." The very idea of a maxim is a key element in Kant's efforts to determine how reason can be practical. Discourse about maxims is Kant's way of accounting for those practical principles by which we actually do act, instead of only those principles by which we ought ideally to act.2 In effect, a maxim is the guiding principle that I could state to myself were I to reflect upon the overall policy determining a given act (" I should enrich myself by whatever 1 Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, ed. W. Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), p. 6*7. English translation, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 17. Hereafter referred to as Religion, followed by page numbers in both Weischedel and Greene/Hudson, with all translations taken from the latter. 2 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. trans. Lewis White Beeck, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), pp. 17 n.l, 38 n.9. Q48 GORDON E. MICHALSON means possible," " I should at all times tell the truth "). This distinction between guiding principles by which we actually do... (shrink)

On a traditional account, God causes sinful acts and their properties, insofar as they are real, but God does not cause sin, since only the sinner causes the privations in virtue of which such acts are sinful. After explicating this privation solution, I defend it against two objections: (1) that God would cause the sinful act’s privation simply by causing the act and its positive features; and (2) that there is no principled way to deny that God causes the privation (...) yet still affirm that the sinner causes it. I close by considering a limitation of the privation solution. (shrink)

The privation account of moral evil holds that the badness of morally bad acts consists not in the positive act itself or in any positive feature of the act but rather in the act’s lack of conformity to the moral standard. Traditionally recognized for its theological usefulness, the account has been the target of at least five recent objections. In this paper I offer a positive philosophical argument for the account and then show that the objections fail.

This chapter argues for an interpretation of Kant's psychology of moral evil that accommodates the so-called excluded middle cases and allows for variations in the magnitude of evil. The strategy involves distinguishing Kant's transcendental psychology from his empirical psychology and arguing that Kant's character rigorism is restricted to the transcendental level. The chapter also explains how Kant's theory of moral evil accommodates 'the badass'; someone who does evil for evil's sake.

La tesis principal de este trabajo es que el principio con el que Kant comprende el origen de la cultura o de la historia humana en la tesis cuarta de I dea de una historia universal desde el punto de vista cosmopolita, la insociable sociabilidad, no implica “conceptualmente” el mal moral. Defiendo así, contra una larga tradición de lectura que sostiene lo contrario, que la cultura es producto de dos disposiciones diferentes de la especie humana que son originarias e (...) independientes de su carácter moral y, por lo tanto, también son independientes de su propensión inmoral. Esto significa, específicamente, que si hubiera unos seres racionales que fueran como nosotros, sociables e insociables, pero que no tuvieran noticia, a diferencia de nosotros, de la ley moral, esto es, que fueran moralmente inocentes, producirían, sin embargo, cultura. Como tesis secundarias muestro que se pueden establecer otras relaciones de implicación entre los conceptos de insociable sociabilidad y mal moral: por un lado, inversamente, el mal moral puede implicar “conceptualmente” la insociable sociabilidad; por otro lado, este último principio implica “contingentemente” el mal moral cuando es referido a la especie humana. (shrink)

In this article 1 I have two theological interests and a less direct philosophical one.

In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques, is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free will is (...) compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive. (shrink)

Thomas' theory of sin is a specification of his general theory of metaphysical evil. Both his theory of evil in general and his theory of moral evil specifically provide an understanding that constitutes a scientia, for both theories consist of an explanation of the four causes of evil. As a contrary of good, evil can be explained by means of its causes, for the scientia of good includes the understanding of the contrary of good. (...) Thus sin can be understood precisely as it is opposed to the good proper to rational creatures. ;The fact that Thomas's theory of evil consists of an explanation of its four causes is most evident in his Disputed Questions De malo. Thomas' explanation of moral evil parallels his explanation of metaphysical evil, as it demonstrates the four causes of sin in a similar fashion. Further, Thomas' theory of metaphysical evil provides the foundation for his explanation of moral evil; thus Thomas will apply the principles established concerning evil in general to the particular difficulties that arise in regard to the evil found in the rational creature. ;In his general theory of evil, Thomas determined that evil itself was not a thing, for there is no form or end proper to an evil nature. Evil can be understood according to the form that it opposes, and it is only found in some subject that properly possesses that form. Something that acts according to its end as a final cause may be the efficient cause of evil, either deficiently as it or the matter it acts upon is deficient, or as the good it acts for is accidentally an evil to another. The particular good that the efficient cause of evil intends or acts for, then, is a particular good that is in some way contrary to the particular good of some creature. In the case of sin, the will is the efficient cause of evil, as it intends something good, but there is some evil joined to it either accidentally or through its deficiency. Moral evil, then, is known by way of these causes. (shrink)

In this short article, I argue that (a) the distinction between what counts as natural and moral evil is not fixed; that (b) science and technology can transform natural evil into moral evil; that (c) two main philosophical anthropologies explain moral evil as due to ignorance (Socrates) or wickedness (Hobbes); and hence that (d) a society that seeks to counter evil should rely on science and technology to transform natural evil into (...) moral evil and then on education (Paideia) and regulations (Nomos) to minimise or even eliminate moral evil. (shrink)

EVER SINCE PLOTINUS SOUGHT CLARITY in the notion of privation to dispel our human perplexity about evil, philosophers have debated whether this concept is adequate to the task. The intensity and scope of evil in the twentieth century—which has seen the horrors of world war and genocide—have added fuel to the debate. Can the idea of a falling away from the good, however refined, come anywhere close to capturing the calculation, the commitment, the energy, and the drive that (...) underlie the most virulent projects in malfeasance? While the privation account might appear a reasonable strategy for explaining passive wrongdoing—indifference to people in grave need, or cooperation with injustice—the more active and dynamic forms of evil would nevertheless seem to elude its conceptual net. (shrink)

EVER SINCE PLOTINUS SOUGHT CLARITY in the notion of privation to dispel our human perplexity about evil, philosophers have debated whether this concept is adequate to the task. The intensity and scope of evil in the twentieth century—which has seen the horrors of world war and genocide—have added fuel to the debate. Can the idea of a falling away from the good, however refined, come anywhere close to capturing the calculation, the commitment, the energy, and the drive that (...) underlie the most virulent projects in malfeasance? While the privation account might appear a reasonable strategy for explaining passive wrongdoing—indifference to people in grave need, or cooperation with injustice—the more active and dynamic forms of evil would nevertheless seem to elude its conceptual net. (shrink)

Those who advance the traditional argument from human freedom presume that human freedom provides an adequate explanation of moral evil. I argue that this presumption is erroneous. An adequate explanation of our capacity to make choices that produce moral evil must be distinguished from an adequate explanation of the actuality of such choices. Human freedom may account for our ability to make choices that issue in moral evil. It cannot, by itself, account for our (...) actually making such choices. Something more than our potential for choices that produce moral evil is required to adequately explain the profusion of moral evil that we actually find in the world. (shrink)

In this essay, I respond to two criticisms of my essay, ‘On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom’. According to Yujin Nagasawa, I equivocate on the meaning of ‘moral evil.’ I respond by offering what I believe to be an unobjectionable stipulative under-standing of what counts as moral evil which is sufficient for my argument. According to Nick Trakakis, I seriously misunderstand the conception of freedom characteristic of free will theodicists. He (...) suggests that my argument presupposes compatibilism. I respond by showing that my argument does not presuppose the denial of the capacity to have done otherwise. (shrink)

In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy. I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thinking that our being weakly benevolent, morally bivalent, or weakly malevolent by nature is sufficient to refute my critique of the traditional freewill theodicy. I still maintain that the argument from freedom of (...) the will offers an explanation of moral evil that is, in the final analysis, manifestly inadequate. (shrink)

This paper will examine the problem of suffering as it arises from both moral and natural evil through a Christian philosophical and theological perspective. Suffering throughout our planet is pervasive. We all experience it in one form or another. In western culture, we are bombarded, through the media with the terrible tragedies that occur in our home country and abroad. Inevitably we ask ourselves, the following question, as Professor Ramon Martinez, probes into his book, Sin and Evil, (...) “Why does God permit suffering?” In order to address the question of suffering and its relation to the God of Christianity, we must understand what suffering is and how it affects humanity. (shrink)

Part 3 of this book shows how God has to allow the possibility of bad things if he is to provide the good things described in Part 2. First, he has to allow creatures to freely choose what is bad. Although it is implausible to suppose that all possible creatures would suffer from ‘transworld depravity’, as Plantinga supposes, creatures do need bad desires if they are to have a choice between good and bad.

If God is to give to creatures significant responsibility for themselves and others, he must allow them to damage their characters, and to cause pain and ignorance. It is good that humans, who do not seek to benefit their fellow humans, should have the temptations of sloth—to hurt them by doing nothing, as well as the more serious temptation of actively causing them hurt.