Constructive empiricism is not just a view regarding the aim of science; it is also a view regarding the epistemological framework in which one should debate the aim of science. This is the focus of this book -- not with scientific truth, but with how one should argue about scientific truth.

Quine's thesis of holism is justly regarded as the cornerstone of his naturalized epistemology. It is, to use Quine's own image, the crucial milestone in the development of post-Humean empiricism. Quine's holism constitutes a transition from the individual sentence to the organized system of sentences as the basic unit of empirical meaning. This system-centered approach allows him to dispense with theoretical reductions by dispensing not with the empiricist rejection of non-empirical facts, but with traditional assumptions concerning uniqueness and (...) determinacy in matters of scientific theory. It allows the holist to affirm, rather than abandon, the empiricist commitment to science without having to secure this position on some a priori, neutral foundation. (shrink)

1960년대에 집중적으로 제기된 논리경험주의에 대한 대다수의 철학적 공격은 이른바 논리경험주의의 ‘수용된 견해’를 향한 것이었고, 이후 과학철학자들이 공공연히 ‘논리경험주의는 죽었다’라는 표현을 쓸 정도로까지 논리경험주의 과학철학의 위상은 낮아졌다. 문제는 이와 같은 논리경험주의의 ‘수용된 견해’가 대부분 비엔나 학파를 대표하는 카르납의 철학적 관점을 반영하고 있다는 데 있다. 최근의 논리경험주의에 대한 역사철학적 탐구가 보여주듯, 논리경험주의 내에 다양성이 존재했고 특히 카르납으로 대표되는 비엔나 학파와 라이헨바흐로 대표되는 베를린 학파 사이에는 중요한 철학적 입장의 차이가 있었다. 만약 우리가 라이헨바흐의 과학철학적 입장을 카르납과 비견될 만한 논리경험주의의 중요한 인식론적 입장이라고 간주한다면, (...) 과연 그의 입장이 이후 논리경험주의에 대해 제시된 각종 비판을 견딜 수 있는지 다시 점검해 볼 필요가 있다. 이를 위해 우선 나는 논리경험주의의 입장과 이에 대한 비판을 체계적으로 정리하는 과학철학자 수피(Suppe)의 논의를 검토한 후, 논리경험주의에 대한 후대 철학자들의 비판이 결정적이지는 않았음을 보인다. 다음으로 나는 ‘과학적 철학’ 개념, ‘발견의 맥락’과 ‘정당화의 맥락’ 구분, ‘과학 이론의 합리적 재구성’, ‘과학자와 철학자의 노동 분업’ 등 논리경험주의의 주요 인식론적 논제에 관한 라이헨바흐의 입장을 재구성한다. 이러한 재구성을 통해 나는, 라이헨바흐의 인식론적 입장이 구체적인 과학 이론의 인식론적 의의와 함축을 도출해내는데 있어 여전히 유효한 입장이라는 것을 보일 것이다. 실제로 라이헨바흐가 주장한 ‘이론 구체적인 인식론적 분석’은 오늘날에도 여전히 유용하고 필요한 철학적 방법론이며, 이 방법론은 논리경험주의에 반대하면서 얻어진 것이 아니라 논리경험주의가 오늘날의 과학철학에 남긴 소중한 유산이라고 보아야 한다. (shrink)

Beginning with a group of essays on education, the author shows the constricting and limiting effects of empirical assumptions. In his essays on values, he makes it clear that the ethics of empiricism so pervade modern moral philosophy that it can find no place for the notion of absolute value.

Philosophers have always taken an interest not only in what is actually the case, but in what is necessarily the case and what could possibly be the case. These are questions of modality. Epistemologists of modality enquire into how we can know what is necessary and what is possible. This dissertation concerns the meta-epistemology of modality. It engages with the rules that govern construction and evaluation of theories in the epistemology of modality, by using modal empiricism – a (...) form of modal epistemology – as a running example. In particular, I investigate the assumption that it is important to be able to meet the integration challenge. Meeting the integration challenge is a source of serious difficulty for many approaches, but modal empiricism is supposed to do well in this respect. But I argue that once we have a better grasp of what the integration challenge is, it is not obvious that it presents no problem for modal empiricism. Moreover, even if modal empiricism could be said to be in a relatively good position with respect to integration, it comes at the cost of a forced choice between far-reaching partial modal scepticism and non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality. Non-uniformism is the view that more than one modal epistemology will be correct. While non-uniformism might not in itself be unpalatable, it must be defined and defended in a way which squares with the modal empiricist’s other commitment. I explore two ways of doing so, both involving a revised idea of the integration challenge and its role for the epistemology of modality. One involves a bifurcation of the integration challenge, and the other a restriction of the integration challenge’s relevance. Both ways are interesting, but neither is, as it turns out, a walk in the park. (shrink)

Current developments in feminist epistemology stem from the recognition that knowledge is socially constructed and therefore, must be seen in the context of the social relations in which its production occurs. This version of epistemology stresses the view that individual experiences and knowledge claims are possible only within a community.The concern of this paper is to examine the empiricist account of knowledge. It questions the adequacy of the empiricist attempt to base knowledge on perceptual experience, pointing (...) out that experience has a wider focus than what empiricists allow.Feminist epistemology takes off as a critique of empiricist epistemology on the grounds that the empiricist conception of knowledge fails to acknowledge the fact that knowledge operates in sociohistorical contexts. This accounts for a major limitation in the empiricist conception of knowledge. In order to underscore the thesis of feminist epistemology, the Yoruba women's experience is used, drawing on such factors as women's reproductive experiences and how these experiences can bear upon epistemological inquiry. (shrink)

The empiricist theory of epistemological warrant is not without its attractions. If our beliefs are to be more than “hypothetical”, if they are to be beliefs about our world, then surely at some point our beliefs must be warranted by and anchored to the world by our experience. If our beliefs were not so anchored by our experience, then—to switch metaphors now with C.I. Lewis—“… the whole system of such would provide no better assurance of anything in it than (...) that which attaches to the contents of a well-written novel.” Quinton has argued “… that it is through their connection with experience that basic statements derive that initial support without which no statement whatever would have any justification …”. Roderick Firth speaks of “the central thesis of epistemic priority—the thesis that some statements have some degree of warrant which is independent of the warrant that they derive from their coherence with other statements”. Quinton, again, has distinguished between the evidence that one proposition can lend another, i.e. propositional evidence, and the evidence that, ultimately, only experience can provide for foundation or basic propositions, experiential evidence. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider two interpretations of Xenophanes’ epistemology – that he is an empiricist and that he is a global skeptic. I argue that two these interpretations are not mutually exclusive, and that Xenophanes should, in fact, be thought of as both an empiricist and a global skeptic.

The empiricist theory of epistemological warrant is not without its attractions. If our beliefs are to be more than “hypothetical”, if they are to be beliefs about our world, then surely at some point our beliefs must be warranted by and anchored to the world by our experience. If our beliefs were not so anchored by our experience, then—to switch metaphors now with C.I. Lewis—“… the whole system of such would provide no better assurance of anything in it than (...) that which attaches to the contents of a well-written novel.” Quinton has argued “… that it is through their connection with experience that basic statements derive that initial support without which no statement whatever would have any justification …”. Roderick Firth speaks of “the central thesis of epistemic priority—the thesis that some statements have some degree of warrant which is independent of the warrant that they derive from their coherence with other statements”. Quinton, again, has distinguished between the evidence that one proposition can lend another, i.e. propositional evidence, and the evidence that, ultimately, only experience can provide for foundation or basic propositions, experiential evidence. (shrink)

There are scientific theories that can be tested only through the use of instruments. Thus, we use, for example, instruments such as microscopes, telescopes, Wilson cloud chambers, and so on, to test theories. This use of instruments in science has been pointed out often by philosophers of science, who then correctly draw the conclusion that what is tested is not so much a single theory T but rather a conjunction.

Solomon has made the case, in Social Empicism (2001) for socially naturalized analysis of the dynamics of scientific inquiry that takes seriously two critical insights: that scientific rationality is contingent, disunified, and socially emergent; and that scientific progress is often fostered by factors traditionally regarded as compromising sources of bias. While elements of this framework are widely shared, Solomon intends it to be more resolutely social, more thoroughly naturalizing, and more ambitiously normative than other contextualizing epistemologies currently on offer. Four (...) focal issues are addressed in the commentaries that follow: Solomon's characterization of empirical success as a goal of science (Clough); her distinction between empirical and non-empirical decision vectors and the viability of the multivariate analysis she proposes for assessing epistemic fairness in their distribution (Clough; Richardson); the plausibility of her thesis that normatively appropriate consensus is a (rare) limiting case rather than an intrinsically desirable outcome of inquiry (Oreskes; Richardson); and her conviction that a socially naturalized analysis of science can ground norms of scientific rationality (Longino; Oreskes). (shrink)

The present paper purports partly to reexamine and partly to summarize several points which occupied and still occupy a central position in more recent discussions among empiricist philosophers. As such discussions are essentially attempts at the clarification of terms, it might also be said that this essay intends to contribute to the analysis of certain very general and highly ambiguous expressions. The words in question are, first and mainly, ‘hypothetical’ and, more incidentally or by the way of exposition, ‘atomic', (...) ‘elementaristic', and ‘extensional.’ In general, it is an attempt to show the impact of some of the ideas developed in the work of Carnap; within a prevailingly logical frame of reference in The Logical Syntax of Language and, in a more epistemological setting, in Testability and Meaning. In particular, it wants to eliminate some ambiguities which could arise from an oversimplified reading of certain passages in TM, as for instance: “If by verification is meant definitive and final establishment of truth, then no sentence is ever verifiable”. If this passage is understood to assert that every synthetic sentence is hypothetical, then it is either false or several meanings of ‘hypothetical’ are to be distinguished. This distinction, implicit in TM, will upon closer examination prove to be related to the fundamental distinction between statements within and statements about a linguistic structure. (shrink)

Vivacity, the “liveliness” of perceptions, is central to Hume’s epistemology. Hume equated belief with vivid ideas. Vivacity is a conscious quality so believable ideas are felt to be lively. Hume’s empiricism revolves around a phenomenological, inner epistemology. Through copying, Hume bases vivacity in impressions. Sensory vivacity also concerns liveliness or patterns of change. Through learnt skillful use, it tracks change specific to intentional sense-perceptual experience, Hume’s “coherent and constant” complex impressions. Copying, in turn, communicates the conscious skill of (...) vivacity to ideas where it becomes an indicator of believable ideas. Hume’s copying concerns then the causation of conscious skills required for the identification of empirically warranted structures. Copying allows Hume to combine a radically externalist empiricism with a portable phenomenological inner epistemology. (shrink)

While the earlier work of Philip Kitcher, in particular The Advancement of Science (1993), continues to inform his more recent studies, such as Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001), there are significant "changes of opinion" from those articulated in the 1990s. One may even speak of two different stages in the configuration of epistemological proposals. An analysis, from an empiricist standpoint, of the shifts between one and the other indicates further evolution towards realist positions but much more modest ones than (...) those previously endorsed. Kitcher qualifies former individualism with an ensuing defence of pluralism, vital to his effort to develop a social epistemology. The present centrality of the achievement of a well-ordered science , one that promotes the common good within the context of democracies, encapsulates recent variation in the work of Kitcher and may be considered one of the author's most defendable proposals, even including its classically empiricist resonance. (shrink)

The main topic of the paper is the problem of empiricism in the context of contemporary debates in the feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. The author examines several important arguments for an alliance between feminist epistemology and a newer version of empiricism, influenced mainly by W. V. O. Quine. Attention is also paid to the relevance of empiricism for a feminist criticism of gender biases in various fields of science, for a feminist criticism of epistemological individualism and (...) for the attempts to rethink and redefine the concept of knower. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, a naturalistic approach to epistemology seeks to explain human knowledge – and justification in particular – as a phenomenon in the natural world, in keeping with the tenets of naturalism. Naturalism is typically defined, in part, by a commitment to scientific method as the only legitimate means of attaining knowledge of the natural world. Naturalism is often thought to entail empiricism by virtue of this methodological commitment. However, scientific methods themselves may incorporate a priori elements, so empiricism (...) does not follow from the methodological commitments of naturalism alone. And given a suitably-naturalistic conception of the a priori, a priori forms of justification may be compatible with naturalism generally. A priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism – and hence naturalistic epistemologies – if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of some of the inessential properties that have been associated with the concept. I argue that some of the more prominent strategies for accommodating normative notions within a naturalistic framework allow for the possibility of a priori justification. These include reliabilism, instrumental rationality, and nonfactualism about justification. A priori justification thus need not be seen as standing in opposition to all naturalistic epistemologies. It is only with nonnormative naturalistic epistemologies that a priori justification per se is incompatible, and this only because the notion of justification itself has no role to play within a nonnormative approach to epistemology. (shrink)

This essay reconsiders Davidson's critical attribution of the scheme‐content distinction to Quine's naturalized epistemology. It focuses on Davidson's complaint that the presence of this distinction leads Quine to mistakenly construe neural input as evidence. While committed to this distinction, Quine's epistemology does not attempt to locate a justificatory foundation in sensory experience and does not then equate neural intake with evidence. Quine's central epistemological task is an explanatory one that attempts to scientifically clarify the route from stimulus to (...) science. Davidson's critical remarks wrongly assign concerns to Quine's view that it does not have and further obscures the status of his naturalized conception of epistemology. (shrink)

This essay reconsiders Davidson's critical attribution of the scheme‐content distinction to Quine's naturalized epistemology. It focuses on Davidson's complaint that the presence of this distinction leads Quine to mistakenly construe neural input as evidence. While committed to this distinction, Quine's epistemology does not attempt to locate a justificatory foundation in sensory experience and does not then equate neural intake with evidence. Quine's central epistemological task is an explanatory one that attempts to scientifically clarify the route from stimulus to (...) science. Davidson's critical remarks wrongly assign concerns to Quine's view that it does not have and further obscures the status of his naturalized conception of epistemology. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to gain better insight into Russell's positive account of inductive inference. I contend that Russell's postulates play only a supporting role in his overall account. At the center of Russell's positive view is a probabilistic, Bayesian model of inductive inference. Indeed, Russell and Maxwell actually held very similar Bayesian views. But the Bayesian component of Russell's view in Human Knowledge is sparse and easily overlooked. Maxwell was not aware of it when he developed his own (...) view, and I believe he was never fully aware of the extent to which Russell's account anticipates his own. The primary focus of this paper will be the explication of the Bayesian component of the Russell-Maxwell view, and the way in which it undermines judgment empiricism. (shrink)

Although the title proper is certainly a misnomer, the subtitle may be adequate for a collection of fourteen fairly miscellaneous essays by a professional philosopher reaching out to a wider public. It should be said, however, that Holland believes that much of what he undertakes to "speak for can be found in Plato.".

T. H. Morgan (1866–1945), the founder of the Drosophila research group in genetics that established the chromosome theory of Mendelian inheritance, has been described as a radical empiricist in the historical literature. His empiricism, furthermore, is supposed to have prejudiced him against certain scientific conclusions. This paper aims to show two things: first, that the sense in which the term empiricism has been used by scholars is too weak to be illuminating. It is necessary to distinguish between empiricism as (...) an epistemological position and the so-called methodological empiricism. I will argue that the way the latter has been presented cannot distinguish an empiricist methodology from a non-empiricist one. Second, I will show that T. H. Morgan was not an epistemological empiricist as this term is usually defined in philosophy. The reason is that he believed in the existence of genes as material entities when they were unobservable entities when they were unobservable entities introduced to account for the phenotypic ratios found in breeding experiments. These two points, of course, are interrelated. If we were to water down the meaning of empiricis, perhaps we could call Morgan an empiricist. But then we would also fail to distinguish empiricism from realism. (shrink)

This book offers a novel account of the relationship of experience to knowledge. The account builds on the intuitive idea that our ordinary perceptual judgments are not autonomous, that an interdependence obtains between our view of the world and our perceptual judgments. Anil Gupta shows in this important study that this interdependence is the key to a satisfactory account of experience. He uses tools from logic and the philosophy of language to argue that his account of experience makes available an (...) attractive and feasible empiricism. (shrink)

Offers an extremely bold, far-reaching, and unsuspected thesis in the history of philosophy: Aristotelianism was a dominant movement of the British philosophical landscape, especially in the field of logic, and it had a long survival. British Aristotelian doctrines were strongly empiricist in nature, both in the theory of knowledge and in scientific method; this character marked and influenced further developments in British philosophy at the end of the century, and eventually gave rise to what we now call British empiricism, (...) which is represented by philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Beyond the apparent and explicit criticism of the old Scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy, which has been very well recognized by the scholarship in the twentieth century and which has contributed to the false notion that early modern philosophy emerged as a reaction to Aristotelianism, the present research examines the continuity, the original developments and the impact of Aristotelian doctrines and terminology in logic and epistemology as the background for the rise of empiricism.Without the Aristotelian tradition, without its doctrines, and without its conceptual elaborations, British empiricism would never have been born. The book emphasizes that philosophy is not defined only by the ‘great names’, but also by minor authors, who determine the intellectual milieu from which the canonical names emerge. It considers every single published work of logic between the middle of the sixteenth and the end of the seventeenth century, being acquainted with a number of surviving manuscripts and being well-informed about the best existing scholarship in the field. ​. (shrink)

‘British Empiricism’ is a name traditionally used to pick out a group of eighteenth-century thinkers who prioritised knowledge via the senses over reason or the intellect and who denied the existence of innate ideas. The name includes most notably John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. The counterpart to British Empiricism is traditionally considered to be Continental Rationalism that was advocated by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, all of whom lived in Continental Europe beyond the British Isles and all embraced innate (...) ideas. This article characterizes empiricists more broadly as those thinkers who accept Locke’s Axiom that there is no idea in the mind that cannot be traced back to some particular experience. It includes British-Irish Philosophy from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century. As well as exploring the traditional connections among empiricism and metaphysics and epistemology, it examines how British empiricists dealt with issues in moral philosophy and the existence and nature of God. The article identifies some challenges to the standard understanding of British Empiricism by including early modern thinkers from typically marginalised groups, especially women. Finally, in showing that there is nothing uniquely British about being an empiricist, it examines a particular case study of the eighteenth-century philosopher Anton Wilhelm Amo, the first African to receive a doctorate in Europe. (shrink)

The most important work by one of America's greatest twentieth-century philosophers, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is both the epitome of Wilfrid Sellars' entire philosophical system and a key document in the history of philosophy. First published in essay form in 1956, it helped bring about a sea change in analytic philosophy. It broke the link, which had bound Russell and Ayer to Locke and Hume--the doctrine of "knowledge by acquaintance." Sellars' attack on the Myth of the Given in (...) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind was a decisive move in turning analytic philosophy away from the foundationalist motives of the logical empiricists and raised doubts about the very idea of "epistemology." With an introduction by Richard Rorty to situate the work within the history of recent philosophy, and with a study guide by Robert Brandom, this publication of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind makes a difficult but indisputably significant figure in the development of analytic philosophy clear and comprehensible to anyone who would understand that philosophy or its history. (shrink)

The ten essays in this collection were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the lectures which became Wilfrid Sellars's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, one of the crowning achievements of 20th-century analytic philosophy. Both appreciative and critical of Sellars's accomplishment, they engage with his treatment of crucial issues in metaphysics and epistemology. The topics include the standing of empiricism, Sellars's complex treatment of perception, his dissatisfaction with both foundationalist and coherentist epistemologies, his commitment to realism, and the (...) status of the normative. The volume shows how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century. (shrink)

Constructive empiricism, the view introduced in The Scientific Image, is a view of science, an answer to the question "what is science?" Arthur Fine's and Paul Teller's contributions to this symposium challenge especially two key ideas required to formulate that view, namely the observable/unobservable and acceptance/belief distinctions. I wish to thank them not only for their insightful critique but also for the support they include. For they illuminate and counter some misunderstandings of Constructive Empiricism along the way. That leaves me (...) free to focus on those two main challenges. (shrink)

Computational methods such as computer simulations, Monte Carlo methods, and agent-based modeling have become the dominant techniques in many areas of science. Extending Ourselves contains the first systematic philosophical account of these new methods, and how they require a different approach to scientific method. Paul Humphreys draws a parallel between the ways in which such computational methods have enhanced our abilities to mathematically model the world, and the more familiar ways in which scientific instruments have expanded our access to the (...) empirical world. This expansion forms the basis for a new kind of empiricism, better suited to the needs of science than the older anthropocentric forms of empiricism. Human abilities are no longer the ultimate standard of epistemological correctness.Humphreys also includes arguments for the primacy of properties rather than objects, the need to consider technological constraints when appraising scientific methods, and a detailed account of how the path from computational template to scientific application is constructed. This last feature allows us to hold a form of selective realism in which anti-realist arguments based on formal reconstructions of theories can be avoided. One important consequence of the rise of computational methods is that the traditional organization of the sciences is being replaced by an organization founded on computational templates.Extending Ourselves will be of interest to philosophers of science, epistemologists, and to anyone interested in the role played by computers in modern science. (shrink)

Leading philosophers from both sides of the Atlantic present essays on Wilfrid Sellars's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, one of the crowning achievements of 20th-century analytic philosophy. They discuss empiricism, perception, epistemology, realism, and normativity, showing how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.

constructive empiricism asserts that it is not for science to reach a verdict on whether a theory is true or false, if the theory is about unobservable entities; science's only interest here, says Van Fraassen, is to discover whether the theory is ‘empirically adequate’. However, if a theory is soley about observables, empirical adequacy and truth are said to ‘coincide’, here discovering the theory's truth value is an appropriate scientific goal. Constructive empiricism thus rests an epistemological thesis on a semantical (...) distinction. This paper critically examines the notion of aboutness and its epistemological significance. * I am grateful to members of my philosophy of science seminar during Spring, 1983 for useful discussion and to the two anonymous referees of this journal for providing helpful suggestions. I also thank the University of Wisconsin, Madison Graduate School for support in the form of a Romnes Faculty Fellowship. (shrink)