This article re-examines the theoretical basis for environmental and heritage interpretation in tourist settings in the light of hermeneutic philosophy. It notes that the pioneering vision of heritage interpretation formulated by Freeman Tilden envisaged a broadly educational, ethically informed and transformative art. By contrast, current cognitive psychological attempts to reduce interpretation to the monological transmission of information, targeting universal but individuated cognitive structures, are found to be wanting. Despite growing signs of diversity, this information processing approach (...) to interpretation remains dominant. The article then presents the alternative paradigm of hermeneutics through the works of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer, to provide a broader interpretation of interpretation. This not only captures the essence of Tilden’s definition but construes heritage interpretation as a more inclusive, culturally situated, critically reflexive and dialogical practice. (shrink)

This article attempts to define, beyond the normative aspects, what heritage education exemplifies today. It seeks to understand how heritage education and cultural mediation can contribute to the affirmation of identity and individualization among young people and, by analogy, reduce inequalities of access to cultural practices, otherwise called cultural democracy, in which the school plays a pivotal role. It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the interest of this educational practice not only within the framework of schools, but also (...) outside to ensure that all students have equal access to their own culture. The present article addresses the main question on how heritage education and its concrete projects constitute an effective tool—one that is conducive to cultural equalities and democracy. Also included in this conception is a project, initiated by the Majorelle Garden Foundation in Marrakech, Morocco, which helped lend public school students the necessary tools to assimilate the notions of history, art, and culture during their visits to museums to promote education of the gaze through a cognitive and sensitive approach. (shrink)

A scholarly examination of the centrality of the mind-body problem within and across the science of cognition--from philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to neural science. Conceptions of the mind-body problem range from the heritage of Cartesianism to the identification of the circumscribed brain structures responsible for domain specific cognitive mechanisms. Neither narrowly technical nor philosophically vague, this is a structured and detailed account of advancing intellectual developments in theory, research, and knowledge illumined by the conceptual vicissitudes of (...) the mind-body problem. This unique treatment will be of special interest to creative scholars in the disciplines of he sciences of cognition. (shrink)

This paper focuses on some specific aspects of the theory developed by Karl Marx, who as a philosopher distanced himself from philosophy because he questioned its traditional forms. Marx postulated tying philosophical cognition to scientific study, he also strongly emphasised the importance of complementarity between social theory and social praxis. Marxism brought a breakthrough which paved the way for the philosophies of the 20th-century. The author devotes particular attention to Marxism’s forecasts, and concludes that, although Marx can be counted among (...) the pioneers of globalisation having foreseen capitalism’s global expansion, today’s social trends appear to be steering away from the kingdom of freedom he envisioned. (shrink)

While quick to question the claims to knowledge that others make, philosophers have not so readily submitted their own affirmations to the same scrutiny. In fact, it seems to be the common conviction of philosophers that the assertions they make are cognitive, are true or false, and that philosophical disagreement is genuine disagreement. In this stimulating essay Professor Lange confronts this assumption, presents his own view of philosophy as proposal, and then seeks a solution to the paradox that his (...) view poses for philosophy. Originally published in 1970. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

This article describes various ways actors in Kashmiri carpet weaving practice deploy a range of artifacts, from symbolic, to material, to hybrid, in order to achieve diverse cognitive accomplishments in their particular task domains: information representation, inter and intra-domain communication, distribution of cognitive labor across people and time, coordination of team activities, and carrying of cultural heritage. In this repertoire, some artifacts position themselves as naïve tools in the actors’ environment to the point of being ignored; however, (...) their usage-in-context unfolds their cognitive involvement in the tasks. These usages-in-context are shown through artifact analysis of their routine, improvised, and opportunistic uses, where cognitive artifacts like talim—the central artifact of this practice—are shown to play not only multifunctional roles beyond representation, but are also complemented by trade-specific skills bearing strong cognitive implications in a task. (shrink)

Cognition, it is often heard nowadays, is embodied. My concern is with embodied accounts of language comprehension. First, the basic idea will be outlined and some of the evidence that has been put forward in their favor will be examined. Second, their empiricist heritage and their conception of abstract ideas will be discussed. Third, an objection will be raised according to which embodied accounts underestimate the cognitive functions language fulfills. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to (...) arguing for the cognitive indispensability of non-embodied, abstract representations by highlighting some of the cognitive benefits they bestow upon us. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous proposons d’examiner certains des usages qui sont faits de Descartes en sciences cognitives. Il s’agit plus précisément de s’attacher à la façon dont se trouve pensé l’héritage du cartésianisme dans la science cognitive orthodoxe, souvent conçue comme « cartésienne ». Comment en vient-on à former cette idée de science cognitive cartésienne? Nous répondons en nous appuyant sur deux analyses, celles de Timothy van Gelder et de Michael Wheeler, avec pour objectif de mettre au jour (...) les aspects de la philosophie de Descartes qui sont ici mobilisés, ainsi que les opérations intellectuelles et pratiques qui permettent à ces auteurs d’extraire le cartésianisme de son milieu originel pour le placer sur le terrain de la science cognitive contemporaine. (shrink)

I review recent work from armchair and cross-cultural epistemology on whether humans possess a knowledge concept as part of a universal “folk epistemology.” The work from armchair epistemology fails because it mischaracterizes ordinary knowledge judgments. The work from cross-cultural epistemology provides some defeasible evidence for a universal folk epistemology. I argue that recent findings from comparative psychology establish that humans possess a species-typical knowledge concept. More specifically, recent work shows that knowledge attributions are a central part of primate social cognition, (...) used to predict others’ behavior and guide decision-making. The core primate knowledge concept is that of truth detection (across different sensory modalities) and retention (through memory) and may also include rudimentary forms of indirect truth discovery through inference. In virtue of their evolutionary heritage, humans inherited the primate social-cognitive system and thus share this core knowledge concept. (shrink)

This article explores communicative processes in Chinese involving Chinese American children in order to explain the notion of preference for ambiguity, a characteristic often invoked when describing the Chinese as a group. It also speculates on the impact this notion has on children's socialization. Preference for ambiguity can be defined as making ambiguous something that is otherwise clear-communicating ambiguously or conveying something that is ambiguous-communicating ambiguity. Treating ambiguity as an interaction-centered and activity-bound phenomenon rather than a purely semantic or logical (...) problem, this article locates ambiguity in the intersubjectivity co-constructed by all participants and explores its role in the construction of cultural, situational and interpersonal contexts. It shows that ambiguity is shaped not only by lexico-grammar but also by discourse structure. This article draws data from a total of 30 hours of audio/video recorded classroom interactions involving 4 teachers and about 35 students in two Chinese Heritage Language Schools in the USA as well as from observations and interviews. In the classroom context, children are compelled to make speculations and draw inferences regarding their interlocutors' references, intentions, dispositions and goals. They do so without confronting their interlocutors or holding their interlocutors accountable. In contrast, teachers freely and vocally formulate, clarify, question and interpret children's utterances in an effort to make the children's stances unequivocal. This study suggests that the communicative patterns observed with respect to ambiguity may play an important part in the socialization of cultural knowledge and cognitive styles. (shrink)

The purpose is to help college students start their own businesses and protect and develop China’s intangible cultural heritage. The entrepreneurship of college students in the field of intangible culture is studied from the perspective of entrepreneurial psychology. First, the related characteristics, main content, and research status of college entrepreneurship education are described in detail. Entrepreneurial psychology is divided into entrepreneurial cognition, entrepreneurial emotion and entrepreneurial will. Then, the concept and development status of intangible cultural heritage are briefly (...) summarized to illustrate the importance of inheriting and developing intangible cultural heritage. A questionnaire is designed based on intangible cultural heritage development mode to interview local college students randomly. Finally, the results are analyzed by descriptive statistics. The results show that massive students do not understand the entrepreneurial policy, and only 16% of them know it very well. More than 30% of the students think that entrepreneurship will improve personal responsibility. Nearly 50% of the students believe that entrepreneurship can increase their life experience. Almost 50% of the students have the psychological quality of persistence and courage in entrepreneurship. The final results show that there are great differences in entrepreneurial cognition among students of different grades. Regarding entrepreneurial emotion, there are obvious differences among students of different genders, disciplines, and grades. Regarding the entrepreneurial will, there are only differences among students with different grades. In entrepreneurship education, different teaching methods should be adopted for different ages to comprehensively improve the effect of entrepreneurship education for students of all grades and help them obtain good entrepreneurship results. This exploration provides technical support for the inheritance of material and cultural inheritance and contributes to the entrepreneurship education of college students. (shrink)

Image has been considered an influential factor in tourists’ perceptions and evaluations of a destination. This paper analyzes the formation of the tourist destination image of Segóbriga Archaeological Park, a cultural destination of great heritage value, located in the province of Cuenca (Spain). The image is analyzed using a multidimensional approach, considering not only its cognitive and affective components, but also the unique-image component. The latter has received less attention in the literature and is a novelty in the (...) context of this type of cultural destination. The results show that this component is essential to the overall image of an archaeological destination and that it is not influenced by information sources. PLS-SEM was used. (shrink)

dolce, the first top-level ontology to be axiomatized, has remained stable for twenty years and today is broadly used in a variety of domains. dolce is inspired by cognitive and linguistic considerations and aims to model a commonsense view of reality, like the one human beings exploit in everyday life in areas as diverse as socio-technical systems, manufacturing, financial transactions and cultural heritage. dolce clearly lists the ontological choices it is based upon, relies on philosophical principles, is richly (...) formalized, and is built according to well-established ontological methodologies, e.g. OntoClean. Because of these features, it has inspired most of the existing top-level ontologies and has been used to develop or improve standards and public domain resources. Being a foundational ontology, dolce is not directly concerned with domain knowledge. Its purpose is to provide the general categories and relations needed to give a coherent view of reality, to integrate domain knowledge, and to mediate across domains. In these 20 years dolce has shown that applied ontologies can be stable and that interoperability across reference and domain ontologies is a reality. This paper briefly introduces the ontology and shows how to use it on a few modeling cases. (shrink)

Aristotle clearly states that in syllogistic theory local/environmental cognitive factors—external to that peculiar inferential process, for example regarding users/reasoners, are given up. Indeed, to define syllogism Aristotle first of all insists that all syllogisms are valid and contends that the necessity of this kind of reasoning is related to the circumstance that “no further term from outside is needed”, in sum syllogism is the fruit of a kind of eco-cognitive immunization. At the same time Aristotle presents a seminal (...) perspective on abduction, which contrasts with the previous one on syllogismos: the second part of the article considers the famous passage in the chapter B25 of Prior Analytics concerning ἀπαγωγή, also studied by Peirce. I contend that some of the current well-known distinctive characters of abductive cognition are already expressed, which are in tune with what I have called Eco-cognitive Model of abduction. By providing an illustration of the role of the method of analysis and of the middle terms in Plato’s dialectic argumentation, considered as related to the diorismic/poristic process in ancient geometry I maintain that it is just this intellectual heritage which informs Aristotle’ chapter B25 on ἀπαγωγή. Even if, in general, Aristotle seems to sterilize, thanks to the invention of syllogistic theory, every “dialectic” background of reasoning, nevertheless in chapter B25 he is still pointing to the fundamental inferential role in reasoning of those externalities that substantiate the process of “leading away”. Hence, we can gain a new positive perspective about the “constitutive” eco-cognitive character of abduction, just thanks to Aristotle himself. (shrink)

This book by Dr. Desmarais is by all means a positive contribution in the field of Yoga, Indology and cognitive neurosciences. It covers Eastern and Western, ancient and modern, religion and metaphysics, psychology and epistemology, as well as the cultural heritage for these. The book is arranged in six chapters using our common concept of show as a metaphysical stage: getting ready for the show; entering the theatre; taking the stage; all the world as stage; following the plot; (...) thickening of the plot; and finally, the lights come up. This has its source in the Samkhya metaphor of prakrti as analogous to a divine actor, on the world stage and in a cosmic drama. Another symbolic metaphor that comes before our mind is that of Ardhanarinatesvara of Lord Siva, depicted as the Cosmic divine Supreme actor endowed with half-female in his person. The reader, the spectator or audience member, symbolizes the Purusa of Samkhya and yoga. (shrink)

In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is a (...) comprehensive examination of what a plausible moral science would look like.Casebeer begins by discussing the nature of ethics and the possible relationship between science and ethics. He then addresses David Hume's naturalistic fallacy and G. E. Moore's open-question argument, drawing on the work of John Dewey and W. V. O. Quine. He then proposes a functional account of ethics, offering corresponding biological and moral descriptions. Discussing in detail the neural correlates of moral cognition, he argues that neural networks can be used to model ethical function. He then discusses the impact his views of moral epistemology and ontology will have on traditional ethical theory and moral education, concluding that there is room for other moral theories as long as they take into consideration the functional aspect of ethics; the pragmatic neo-Aristotelian virtue theory he proposes thus serves as a moral "big tent." Finally, he addresses objections to ethical naturalism that may arise, and calls for a reconciliation of the sciences and the humanities. "Living well," Casebeer writes, "depends upon reweaving our ethical theories into the warp and woof of our scientific heritage, attending to the myriad consequences such a project will have for the way we live our lives and the manner in which we structure our collective moral institutions.". (shrink)

In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is a (...) comprehensive examination of what a plausible moral science would look like.Casebeer begins by discussing the nature of ethics and the possible relationship between science and ethics. He then addresses David Hume's naturalistic fallacy and G. E. Moore's open-question argument, drawing on the work of John Dewey and W. V. O. Quine. He then proposes a functional account of ethics, offering corresponding biological and moral descriptions. Discussing in detail the neural correlates of moral cognition, he argues that neural networks can be used to model ethical function. He then discusses the impact his views of moral epistemology and ontology will have on traditional ethical theory and moral education, concluding that there is room for other moral theories as long as they take into consideration the functional aspect of ethics; the pragmatic neo-Aristotelian virtue theory he proposes thus serves as a moral "big tent." Finally, he addresses objections to ethical naturalism that may arise, and calls for a reconciliation of the sciences and the humanities. "Living well," Casebeer writes, "depends upon reweaving our ethical theories into the warp and woof of our scientific heritage, attending to the myriad consequences such a project will have for the way we live our lives and the manner in which we structure our collective moral institutions.". (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous proposons d’examiner certains des usages qui sont faits de Descartes en sciences cognitives. Il s’agit plus précisément de s’attacher à la façon dont se trouve pensé l’héritage du cartésianisme dans la science cognitive orthodoxe, souvent conçue comme « cartésienne ». Comment en vient-on à former cette idée de science cognitive cartésienne? Nous répondons en nous appuyant sur deux analyses, celles de Timothy van Gelder et de Michael Wheeler, avec pour objectif de mettre au jour (...) les aspects de la philosophie de Descartes qui sont ici mobilisés, ainsi que les opérations intellectuelles et pratiques qui permettent à ces auteurs d’extraire le cartésianisme de son milieu originel pour le placer sur le terrain de la science cognitive contemporaine. (shrink)

The syllables and series of sounds composing Gayatri Mantra, and the sense and meaning attached to them are analyzed using Upanishadic Wisdom, Advaitha Philosophy and Sabdabrahma Siddhanta. The physical structure of mind as revealed by this analysis is presented. An insight of various phases of mind, their rise and set, their significance and implications to cognitive sciences and natural language comprehension branch of artificial intelligence are discussed. The possible applications of such an insight in the fields of cognitive (...) sciences, modeling of human mental processes and language learning/communication processes are hinted. (shrink)

A survey of a wide range of social?scientific disciplines reveals a definite convergence of theoretical interest in human cognition and communication as situated, concerned, and embedded in social commitment. Recent contributions within situation semantics and cognitive science explicitly reject some of the constraints inherent in their shared philosophical heritage and prepare novel ground for dialogues between fields as far apart as formal semantics and ?dialogical? text theory. Issues such as purely cognitive versus motivational aspects of human situatedness, (...) and the relationship between models of individual information processing, on the one hand, and hermeneutic?dialectic assumptions about social and collective features of meaning and mind, on the other, are thus made topics of cross?disciplinary discussions. These are some of the many problems in need of further clarification if we want to explore the possibility of bridging and/or transcending the gulf between analytic?rationalist and hermeneutic?dialectic contributions to our insight into human cognition and communication. (shrink)

Summary: The aim of this collection is to provide a two-fold access to von Foerster's legacy and his work at the Biological Computer Laboratory, the institution he founded and directed at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign from 1958 to 1976. It represents a precious contribution for the understanding of BCL, a crucial but still not properly understood chapter in the history of cybernetics and, more generally, of cognitive science. It is greatly recommended.

It is sometimes said that humans are unlike other animals in at least one crucial respect. We do not simply form beliefs, desires and other mental states, but are capable of caring about our mental states in a distinctive way. We can care about the justification of our beliefs, and about the desirability of our desires. This kind of observation is usually made in discussions of free will and moral responsibility. But it has profound consequences, or so I shall argue, (...) for our conception of the very nature of beliefs and other mental states. Suitably developed, it allows us to draw a line between two distinct ways in which a creature may possess a belief, represent a scene, and fall into error. The first way (which I shall call the 'mindless' way) involves little more than an encoding of information in some way designed to guide appropriate response. This is the common heritage of humans, and many other animals. The second way (which I shall call the 'mindful' way) requires that the creature be capable in addition of a special kind of second-order reflection, and (importantly) be expert at detecting the kinds of situation in which such reflection is called for. The differences between these two ways of 'believing that P' are sufficiently deep and significant to warrant (or so I claim) our treating them as two distinct classes of mental states. For it is only courtesy of the second layer of complexity, I shall argue, that it becomes proper to hold someone accountable for their beliefs or other mental states, and it is this fact of (something like) accountability that in turn raises the most significant challenge for philosophical attempts to give naturalized accounts of meaning, belief, and mentality. (shrink)

Volume 34, Issue 8, December 2020, Page 1573-1590.

Dans le sillage de la pensée rawlsienne, plusieurs défenseurs du « coopérativisme » soutiennent que l’étendue de la justice est strictement nationale et non mondiale. Dans cet article, nous défendons l’idée que la coopération internationale, malgré son caractère tantôt informel, tantôt imparfait, n’en est pas moins fondamentale, et qu’elle génère bel et bien une exigence égalitaire. Nous appuierons cette thèse par un examen attentif du rôle joué par le patrimoine cognitif mondial. Dans l’économie du savoir qui est la nôtre, ce (...) qui fait la richesse d’une société est l’ensemble de ses savoir-faire, techniques productives, etc. Mais le savoir est un bien public mondial puisque son partage ne s’arrête pas aux frontières nationales. Ainsi, la simple possibilité de créer la moindre richesse – au niveau prétendument « national » – dépend d’entrée de jeu d’un produit coopératif mondial. (shrink)

The cognitive, psychological and sociological mechanisms underpinning complex social relationships among small groups are a part of our primate heritage. However, among human groups, relationships persist over much greater temporal and spatial scales, often in the physical absence of one or other of the individuals themselves. This chapter examines how such individual face-to-face social interactions were ‘scaled up’ during human evolution to the regional and global networks characteristic of modern societies. One recent suggestion has been that a radical (...) change in human sociality occurred with the shift to sedentary and agricultural societies in the early Neolithic. The discussion presents the results of a focused study of the long-term development of regional social networks in the Near East, using the distribution of different forms of material culture as a proxy for the social relationships that underpinned processes of trade, exchange and the dissemination of material culture practices. (shrink)

Our cognitive competence is well accounted for by our evolutionary niche in the world's scheme of things. The development of inquiry in natural science is best understood on analogy with exploration -- to be sure, not in the geographical mode but rather exploration in nature's parametric space of such physical quantities as temperature, pressure, and field strength. The technology-mediated exploration at issue here involves an interaction between us humans and nature that becomes increasingly difficult as we move ever farther (...) away from the home base of the accustomed environment of our evolutionary heritage. The course of scientific progress accordingly involves a technological escalation -- an ascent to successively higher levels of technological sophistication that is unavoidably required for the production of the requisite observational data. (shrink)

Contemporary cognitive psychology is dominated by an individualistic and mentalistic approach to the mind.This Cartesian heritage is evident in studies of social understanding, that is, how we understand others. It is argued that this approach and metaphors like reading minds have failed, and should be replaced with a discursive approach, where public and shared socio-linguistic intenand normative activities order and shape individual mental activities.

After a critique of the conservative and speculative approaches dominating the field of the protection and promotion of cultural heritage, the paper introduces a sociological perspective that considers cultural heritage an essential factor of identification and belonging, as well as a mean for the reproduction of life forms. The heritage of the past, in fact, is a living body contributing to the symbolic transmis-sion of the aesthetic, ethical and cognitive values of communities. Rather than the protection (...) of guardians and the exploitation of traders, this heritage needs the ac-tive participation of citizens to its regeneration. The paper then argues for a “secularization” of the cultural heritage, shielding it from the separetedness of musealization and returning the religious sense of bond to its sacredness. The sociological perspective has the task of revealing that awareness and proposing strategies for the construction of integrated networks of rational practices. (shrink)

Finding the demarcation criterion for the identification of scientific knowledge is the most important task of normative epistemology. Pseudoscience is not a harmless leisure activity, it can pose a danger to the functioning of liberal democratic societies and the well-being of their citizens. First, there is an outline of how to define science instrumentally without slipping into the detrimental heritage of conceptual essentialism. The second part is dedicated to Popper’s falsification criterion and the objections of its opponents, which eventually (...) led to the abandonment of “naïve” falsificationism. Then I present two promising solutions to the problem, namely the ostensive definition of pseudoscience and the cognitive research of pseudoscientific thinking. In conclusion, I suggest to further extend the typology of alternatives to science to include parascience. (shrink)

Author considers cognitive assumptions of practical consciousness: some preconditions on which an interaction with the social and natural objects is based. Author follows the “constructivist" program in social theory in its classic version which is represented by social phenomenology and phenomenological sociology of knowledge (A. Schutz, P. Berger, T. Luckmann). Author analyzes some latent axioms and presuppositions, “idealizations" and mechanisms of everyday consciousness which constitute individual social experience at the level of micro-interactions with the objects and the “others". This (...) analysis also refers to the intellectual heritage of classical theory of knowledge (epistemological ideas of I. Kant, E. Husserl). Author considers the status of the Other in the elementary systems of social interaction; discusses the necessity to assume the relative constancy and uniformity of the objective world elements including the existence of an integral self-identical “I" (actor's personality). The organized process of social experience uninterruptedly operated by cognitive schemes of practical consciousness is considered as one of the main conditions of reproduction of coordinated routines which support social order and institutional structures of the society. (shrink)

This stimulating book critically examines a wide range of physicalistic conceptions of mind in the works of Jerry A. Fodor, Stephen P. Stich, Paul M. Churchland, Daniel C. Dennett, and others. Part I argues that intentional concepts cannot be reduced to nonintentional concepts; Part II argues that intentional concepts are nevertheless indispensable to our cognitive enterprises and thus need no foundation in physicalism. As a sustained challenge to the prevailing interpretation of cognitive science, this timely book fills a (...) large gap in the philosophical literature. It is sure to spark controversy, yet its clarity makes it attractive as a text in upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Saving Belief should be read by philosophers, psychologists, and others interested in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

The margins of philosophy are populated by non-human, non-animal living beings, including plants. While contemporary philosophers tend to refrain from raising ontological and ethical concerns with vegetal life, Michael Marder puts this life at the forefront of the current deconstruction of metaphysics. He identifies the existential features of plant behavior and the vegetal heritage of human thought so as to affirm the potential of vegetation to resist the logic of totalization and to exceed the narrow confines of instrumentality. Reconstructing (...) the life of plants "after metaphysics," Marder focuses on their unique temporality, freedom, and material knowledge or wisdom. In his formulation, "plant-thinking" is the non-cognitive, non-ideational, and non-imagistic mode of thinking proper to plants, as much as the process of bringing human thought itself back to its roots and rendering it plantlike. (shrink)

To investigate the unique kinds of mentality involved in skilled performance, this paper explores the performance ecology of the Māori haka, a ritual form of song and dance of the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand. We respond to a recent proposal to program robots to perform a haka as ‘cultural preservationists’ for ‘intangible cultural heritage’. This ‘Robot Māori Haka’ proposal raises questions about the nature of skill and the transmission of embodied knowledge; about the cognitive and affective (...) experiences cultivated in indigenous practices like haka; and about the role of robots in the archival aspirations of human societies. Reproducing haka, we suggest, requires more than copying physical actions; preserving the ‘intangible’ entails more than programming postures and movements. To make this case, we discuss the history of European responses to the haka, and analyse its diverse performance features in cultural context. Arguing that indigenous movement practices incorporate genuinely embodied knowledge, we claim that skilled performance of haka is deeply mindful, embodying and transmitting dynamic, culturally shared understandings of the natural and social world. The indigenous psychologies incorporated in haka performance are animated by a shared history integrated with its environment. Examining haka performance through the lens of 4E cognitive skill theory for mutual benefit, we discuss the effects of synchrony in collective action, the social and environmental scaffolding of affect and emotion, and the multilayered relations between past and present. Culturally-embedded systems of skilled movement like the Māori haka may, we suggest, constitute specific ways of thinking and feeling. (shrink)

Attempts to ‘naturalize’ phenomenology challenge both traditional phenomenology and traditional approaches to cognitive science. They challenge Edmund Husserl’s rejection of naturalism and his attempt to establish phenomenology as a foundational transcendental discipline, and they challenge efforts to explain cognition through mainstream science. While appearing to be a retreat from the bold claims made for phenomenology, it is really its triumph. Naturalized phenomenology is spearheading a successful challenge to the heritage of Cartesian dualism. This converges with the reaction against (...) Cartesian thought within science itself. Descartes divided the universe between res cogitans, thinking substances, and res extensa, the mechanical world. The latter won with Newton and we have, in most of objective science since, literally lost our mind, hence our humanity. Despite Darwin, biologists remain children of Newton, and dream of a grand theory that is epistemologically complete and would allow lawful entailment of the evolution of the biosphere. This dream is no longer tenable. We now have to recognize that science and scientists are within and part of the world we are striving to comprehend, as proponents of endophysics have argued, and that physics, biology and mathematics have to be reconceived accordingly. Interpreting quantum mechanics from this perspective is shown to both illuminate conscious experience and reveal new paths for its further development. In biology we must now justify the use of the word “function”. As we shall see, we cannot prestate the ever new biological functions that arise and constitute the very phase space of evolution. Hence, we cannot mathematize the detailed becoming of the biosphere, nor write differential equations for functional variables we do not know ahead of time, nor integrate those equations, so no laws “entail” evolution. The dream of a grand theory fails. In place of entailing laws, a post-entailing law explanatory framework is proposed in which Actuals arise in evolution that constitute new boundary conditions that are enabling constraints that create new, typically unprestatable, Adjacent Possible opportunities for further evolution, in which new Actuals arise, in a persistent becoming. Evolution flows into a typically unprestatable succession of Adjacent Possibles. Given the concept of function, the concept of functional closure of an organism making a living in its world, becomes central. Implications for patterns in evolution include historical reconstruction, and statistical laws such as the distribution of extinction events, or species per genus, and the use of formal cause, not efficient cause, laws. (shrink)

This article presents the works of great Polish philosopher, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, whose creative output can be applied to professional nursing practice. Krąpiec's philosophical heritage is extensive and encompasses many philosophical fields: metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of law, philosophy of culture, philosophy of politics and philosophy of language. Krąpiec created an original philosophical synthesis characterized by a realistic approach. In this paper, I present only one of several original philosophical concepts developed by Krąpiec: the theory of the person based (...) on seven essential characteristics, that is the ability for cognition, love, freedom, religion, legal subjectivity, completeness and dignity. I attempt to show how these personal characteristics correspond to various patient needs. I argue that the qualitative deficit of any personal characteristics indicated by Krąpiec corresponds to a patient's real need that must be satisfied. I also stress that the skilful diagnosing of all—not only selected—qualitative deficits of characteristics can be defined as holistic care in the nursing profession. (shrink)

The rise of the sitar from a limited accompaniment instrument used in the regional courts of Northern India to an internationally recognized cultural icon underscores its importance both as an instrument and a cultural symbol—the sitar mirrors India’s social complexity. This story encapsulates the social, political and economic trauma resulting from the dismantling of Mughal empire to the partition of Pakistan, reflecting contesting social narratives and Hindu/Muslim cultural heritages through the distinctive musical styles modern India. A musical instrument and material (...) object of contested origins, the sitar extends from wood, gourd, wire, and ivory into complex social and cultural networks. I argue that the sitar, as object, cannot be reduced to either an empirical or phenomenological entity; it is a space of potentiality, the actualization of a virtual object. I examine the sitar as both byproduct and narrative, demonstrating how it defies attempts to limit its constantly rupturing borders with imposed cognitive frames, and how materiality and philosophical systems can inform ethnographic practice. (shrink)

Evolution is littered with paraphyletic convergences: many roads lead to functional Romes. We propose here another example - an equivalence class structure factoring the broad realm of possible realizations of the Baars Global Workspace consciousness model. The construction suggests many different physiological systems can support rapidly shifting, sometimes highly tunable, temporary assemblages of interacting unconscious cognitive modules. The discovery implies various animal taxa exhibiting behaviors we broadly recognize as conscious are, in fact, simply expressing different forms of the same (...) underlying phenomenon. Mathematically, we find much slower, and even multiple simultaneous, versions of the basic structure can operate over very long timescales, a kind of paraconsciousness often ascribed to group phenomena. The variety of possibilities, a veritable rainbow, suggests minds today may be only a small surviving fraction of ancient evolutionary radiations - bush phylogenies of consciousness and paraconsciousness. Under this scenario, the resulting diversity was subsequently pruned by selection and chance extinction. Though few traces of the radiation may be found in the direct fossil record, exaptations and vestiges are scattered across the living mind. Humans, for instance, display an uncommonly profound synergism between individual consciousness and their embedding cultural heritages, enabling efficient Lamarkian adaptation. (shrink)

This volume explores various themes at the intersection of archaeology and philosophy: inference and theory; interdisciplinary connections; cognition, language and normativity; and ethical issues. Showcasing this heterogeneity, its scope ranges from the method of analogical inference to the evolution of the human mind; from conceptual issues in assessing the health of past populations to the ethics of cultural heritage tourism. It probes the archaeological record for evidence of numeracy, curiosity and creativity, and social complexity. Its contributors comprise an interdisciplinary (...) cluster of philosophers, archaeologists, anthropologists, and psychologists, from a variety of career stages, of whom many are leading experts in their fields. Chapter 3 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com. (shrink)

Despite increased interest in “intuition” within cognitive psychology, the conceptual framework of this notion remains problematic. This paper argues that conceptual shortcomings stem from a tendency to ignore the philosophical heritage of intuition or to dismiss the relevance of this heritage to contemporary theory. The paper outlines major understandings of intuition within psychology and prominent philosophical traditions, highlighting important points of inconsistency in these and examining consequences of the inconsistency. It also considers psychological conceptions of intuition that (...) more readily overlap with philosophical accounts and offers some suggestions toward a more philosophically informed notion of intuition relevant to contemporary psychological theory. (shrink)

Which and how much of our current drives –individually and as a global community– are driven by ancestral, inherited traits or imprinted on our animal condition? An attempt to approximate this intriguing query is explored here. It pertains to our identity, social constructions, and our ecological interaction. The origin of our species has its roots in ancestral habits, behaviors and a survival drive, transformed from changing environmental conditions. We were not born in a mother-of-pearl cradle nor were protected by magical (...) agents. We grew on the thread of time within the complex nature of bio-ecological interactions. They carved our identity, our genetic expression and the possible origin of our beliefs, resulting in an arch of various behaviors and cultural phenotypes. The biological nature of our construction dragged through millennia through species trials with variable rates of survival times provided traces of inconstant and multiple evolutive chains. Our modern cultural contexts –norms, priorities, values– appear as newly born. Yet, socio-cultural ecology upon which our brain organization and behavioral constructs derive include shared basic behavioral drives with non-human primates. The emergence of humans with a sophisticated language allowed the development of complex virtual constructs based on symbolism and the instruments of culture. This has enhanced cognitive capacity and emotional interaction supported by processes anchored in neural networks distributed within cortical and subcortical levels. Basic, essential neural connectivities were preserved during the evolutionary development of the species. The biological matrix and inheritance are usually segregated from the social and cultural construction. Sophistication of our cultural development tends to set up a divisive fault from primitive foundations of non-human animal behavior (survival, territory, reproduction, prevalence, access to nutrients). These are basic templates and underlie essential individual and group basic drives, and cultural constructs. Humans have not ceased from being territorial (whether applied to virtual or material dimensions). Various forms of social inequities have been expressed in our time and through human history. On evolutive terms, the notion of individual social status within the social structure of a gregarious community generated the probability of an individual ascending or descending that hierarchy. Thus, becoming a potential figure of leadership, or the subordinate or the marginalized. Is there an evolutive antecedent for human social inequities? How do we construct a different future? Post-industrial societies became increasingly dependent on material consumerism and technological cultures, to the point of embraining them; conceptually becoming technological hybrids. Are these a developmental must, or an uncontrolled spin-off of human inventiveness affecting our future? Construction of supernatural agents played a significant role in the socialization/domestication processes. Agents’ intentionality flourished through altered states of conscience, or under fear of natural phenomena attributed to supposed inhabitants of the Natural Kingdom or virtual beings. This imaginary universe, reinforced by ritual behaviors, contributed to control personal/collective distress of various possible origins and conditioned our degrees of emotional and cognitive freedom. (shrink)

Many discussions between realists and non-realists have centered on the issue of reference, especially whether there is referential stability during theory change. In this paper, I shall summarize the debate, sketching the problems that remain within the two opposing positions, and show that both have ended on their own slippery slope, sliding away from their original position toward that of their opponents. In the search for a viable intermediate position, I shall then suggest an account of reference which, to a (...) degree, follows the causal theory in explaining reference as carving the world at its joints. Contrary to the causal theory, however, I submit that this world is a phenomenal world whose variable joints exist only in a historical process in which they are transmitted gradually from one generation to the next. According to this account, the joints of the phenomenal world are constituted by family resemblance, where bundles of features that span bounded areas in perceptual space underlie the joints. Furthermore, the integrity of the cognitive process by which these joints are recognized depends on a transmission process by which new generations are presented with given joints and bundles by the preceding generation. Contrary to a traditional realist account, this heritage from the preceding generation may be transformed into new joints and bundles before transmission to new generations. This permits a continuous process of referential change in which the joints and bundles at different stages in the development of a theory can be connected by chains-of-reasoning. (shrink)

Many discussions between realists and non-realists have centered on the issue of reference, especially whether there is referential stability during theory change. In this paper, I shall summarize the debate, sketching the problems that remain within the two opposing positions, and show that both have ended on their own slippery slope, sliding away from their original position toward that of their opponents. In the search for a viable intermediate position, I shall then suggest an account of reference which, to a (...) degree, follows the causal theory in explaining reference as carving the world at its joints. Contrary to the causal theory, however, I submit that this world is a phenomenal world whose variable joints exist only in a historical process in which they are transmitted gradually from one generation to the next. According to this account, the joints of the phenomenal world are constituted by family resemblance, where bundles of features that span bounded areas in perceptual space underlie the joints. Furthermore, the integrity of the cognitive process by which these joints are recognized depends on a transmission process by which new generations are presented with given joints and bundles by the preceding generation. Contrary to a traditional realist account, this heritage from the preceding generation may be transformed into new joints and bundles before transmission to new generations. This permits a continuous process of referential change in which the joints and bundles at different stages in the development of a theory can be connected by chains-of-reasoning. (shrink)

The aim of my dissertation is to investigate how universal concepts are formed according to the later medieval Franciscan theologian Peter Auriol (d. 1322). Specifically, in the dissertation I inquiry into the relation between Auriol's ontology - according to which only individuals, and not universals, have real, extra-mental existence - and his philosophical psychology, a study of how extra-mental particulars can give rise to universal concepts, according to Auriol's view. In the past academic year I refined the topic of my (...) PhD thesis in two ways : first, I have delineated the definitive table of content ; second, I have wrote down the results of my research. The thesis comprises two volumes. The second one contains a collation of Peter Auriol's,Reportatio II, d. 9, qq. 2 - 3. The text has been obtained by confronting two manuscripts, considered as the exemplars of the two main families that convey his Second Book of the Sentences: ms. Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale centrale, ms. conv. soppr. A.3.120 (Fb); (iii) il ms. Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, ms. 161 scaff. IX (Pg). The first volume, instead, has been divided into five chapters: the first two offer a historical introduction, while the remaining three are dedicated to the study of Auriol's doctrine, starting from the analysis of the text proposed in the collation, then extending the investigation to all the documentary heritage available relating to the Franciscan master. The first chapter provides a survey of the main theories of the universals of the early fourteenth century, taking into account in particular the opinions of those thinkers who, like Duns Scotus, in addition to marking a philosophical era, have been significant for Auriol's developing of his theory of universals. These are: John Duns Scotus, Henry of Harclay, Walter Bulery and Hervaeus Natalis. In order to properly understand the philosophical proposal of the Doctor facundus, it is necessary to know how it fits into a debate that in the academic debate of the fourteenth century. The second chapter is mainly aimed at the identification of the sources of Rep. II, d. 9, qq. 2 - 3. In the quaestio secunda, Auriol deals with the foundation of the universals. In a.1, he discusses the opinion of multiwho he labels as 'platonic'. We tried, therefore, to detect the targets of his criticism. Burley, Wylton, Bacon, Duns Scotus have been identified as possible addresses. In a. 2 of the same question, Auriol analyzes the position of Duns Scotus on the common nature. It has been then hypothesized that the two articles - aa. 1-2 - has to be considered as a general presentation and specific case of it; as a thesis common to several forms of realism and the realism of one of its most important interpreters. The third chapter focuses Auriol's criticism of the different forms of realism reported in a. 1 and of Duns Scotus's theory, as it is found in a. 2. In both cases, Auriol reproaches the realists for breaking the unity of substance, into a multiplicity of formalitatesreally occurring in reand corresponding to the concepts of genus and difference. On the contrary, Auriol maintains that universal concepts have no unity in the extra-mental reality. Only individuals really exist and numerical unity the only fully existing unity. As a consequence, the unity of the universal concept is just similitudinaria,that is only given a concept. Successively, the criticisms that Auriol makes to the principle of individuation are considered. Generally speaking, everything that exists, insofar as it exists, is singular, according to him. It is a primitive fact and it is not, therefore, necessary to search for the causes of its individuation. Thus, mirroring the structure of the quaestio secunda, in q. 3, Auriol discusses, in the first place, Duns Scotus's position and secondly a group of theories, arisen during the scholastic debate between the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century. Interestingly, to reconstruct this set of doctrines, Auriol follows almost literally the reconstruction that Scotus himself makes of the same theories in his Ordinatio. Now, relying on the assumption that everything that exists is individual, Auriol gives shape to the notions of individuality and singularity and their mutual difference. This is one of the hubs of the dissertation. According to Auriol, a singularity is an entity that does not admit the existence of other realities that can be considered as similar with it. In this sense, God is the only authentic singularity. Ordinary reality, on the other hand, is made up of individualities. An individuality is an entity that, being finite, does not exhaust in itself the totality of the species to which it belongs (as far as the species as such exists only in virtue of an act of the intellect), admits the existence of other realities conceivable as similar with it. Thus, inasmuch as reality is made up of individuals or individualities, the mind is able to form the corresponding universal concepts. Being finite, for Auriol, is the condition of the validity of universals. In this respect, the relation between the concept of individuality and that of singularity is taken into account. Subsequently, we analyze the function of the category of Quantity, as it is related to individuality. According to Auriol, Quantity has no individuating capacity. At most, in bodily substances, it functions as principle of distinction. Being, in fact, discrete realities, a material substance spatially ends where another one begins. The fourth chapter is a kind of juncture between the third one, in which the structure of the concrete individual is analyzed, and the fifth one, in which the cognitive side of the process of concept formation is discussed. What is discussed here are the rationes. According to Auriol, the rationesare the basic units that constitute the quiddity of each individual and serve to direct our thought to form certain concepts. Each concept is the concept of a ratio,indeed. In this respect, Auriol claims that, say, Socrates has the rationes substance, corporeality, sensitivity, rationality. Additionally, rationes of the same type occurring in different objects are "maximally similar" (simillimae). For example, the rationesof Socrates are utterly similar with those of Plato (Cf. Scriptum, d. 2, q. 1, a. 4). Therefore, although these rationes are non-universal characteristics - inasmuch as a ratio belongs to one and only one individual - due to their maximal similarity they do count as the extramental ground for our general concepts (Cf.II Sent., d. 9, q. 3, a. 1). According to these premises, Auriol can hold that different singulars can be mutually highly similar, without participating in the same common nature (Cf. II Sent., d. 9, q. 3, a. 3).At the same time, it is relevant to note these rationesdo not compromise the unity of an existing particular. Rather each ratiocoagulates into each other giving birth to the individual's ultimate ratio. This final ratiois an indivisible ratio (ratio atoma), which cannot be further specified or divided (II Sent., d. 9, q. 3). According to Auriol, then, the rationesqua rationesdo not exist in extra-mental reality. Rather, the exist as such only in virtue of an act of the intellect. This means that they have an ambiguous being. On the one hand, they indicate a nature that cannot be altered by the intellect. On the other, the need the mind's activity to exist as rationes. According to Auriol, therefore, the rationesare independent of any cognitive act, with regard to the content they express, while they depend on mind's activity with regard to their unity and their existence. Now, the opaqueness concerning the ontological consistency of rationesdirectly depends on Auriol's understanding of cognition. Chapter five mainly deals with the different stages of the process of formation of the universal concept. In this respect, the notion of impressiois what is firstly analyzed. The impressionescan be considered, for Auriol, as the rationesthat are 'deposited' in the intellect and constitute, in cooperation with the cognitive faculty, what the Franciscan theologian calls the actus intellectus. The intellectual act, according to Auriol, is an entity composed of the impressed similarity of the object and the intellectual power, in fact. Moreover, in his view, it is really identical to the intelligible species. Now, the identity that the Franciscan theologian establishes between these two noetic tools, which were traditionally considered as distinct, imposes a reinterpretation of the notion of species. Coinciding with the act, the species can no longer be considered as an entity juxtaposed to it, deputed to the activation of the cognitive process performed by the intellect. Indeed, all those theories of universal concepts that add other noetic tools to the act, be they a species, a quality, or something else, would necessarily compromise intellection, preventing it from having acquaintance with extra-mental reality. According to Auriol, considering intellectual cognition as a connotation allows us to avoid such inconveniences. According to this view, the intellectual cognition must be regarded as an activity that poses nothing but to allow something to appear to the cognizer. In this respect, the concept, for Auriol, is nothing but the real object qua appearingto the intellect, fully identical with the intellectual act in recto,while denominatively distinct in obliquo. In this perspective, the definition of intellection that the Franciscan theologian proposes is analyzed, trying, in particular, to determine the ontological status of the concept and its epistemological function. In conclusion, with this study we have tried to give an account of Auriol's philosophical attitude, of the scope of his theory of universals, focusing on the relationship between ontology and philosophical psychology. Using Auriol's texts and specifically the collation of Rep. II, d. 9, qq. 2 - 3, the answers to these questions were searched for in the words of the Franciscan theologian himself. The picture emerged is that of an autonomous, critical thinker, but perfectly inserted in the historical context in which he lives. A thinker who places himself, so to speak, halfway between Duns Scotus's realism and Ockham's nominalism, nevertheless succeeding, albeit with some opacity, in balancing an ontology in which the metaphysical priority is granted only to the individual and the universal concepts have a solid foundation and validity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionPiers H.G. StephensThis special issue of Ethics and the Environment is dedicated to the philosophical contributions of our founding editor, Victoria Davion, who launched the journal in 1996 and edited it until shortly before her death in November 2017. Vicky was a pioneering figure in ecofeminist philosophy, as well as being both the first woman to become a full professor and the first to be chair of the Philosophy (...) Department here at the University of Georgia. Naturally we have endeavored to give her a suitable tribute in this issue, which we hope you will appreciate.In addition to these achievements, Vicky developed and practiced a pedagogy that consistently complemented her philosophical perspective, and in the issue's opening piece, Cecilia Herles reflects personally on the enduring legacy and influence of Vicky Davion's teaching work, and the rich heritage that has flowed out of it for her students, encouraging egalitarian dialogue, interdisciplinarity, and a practicality that extended beyond the University and into the wider community. It is surely appropriate to begin our special issue with such an appreciation of the ways that Vicky touched and lifted up so many lives.These reflections are built upon in Chaone Mallory's essay, which takes Davion's key essay "Is Ecofeminism Feminist?" as its touchstone, examining that essay's vital influence on scholarship and activism as well as its key role in defining contemporary ecofeminism itself. Drawing upon Davion's arguments, Mallory tracks a series of vital questions for the development of the field. She demonstrates how Davion's early critical insights have helped sort the wheat from the chaff in dealing with concerns such as spirituality, irrationality, essentialism, and sexism within environmentalism, concerns that made ecofeminism questionable in some feminists' eyes, and she concludes with a positive exposition as to why "all feminisms, whether named this or not, should in some sense, be eco."From here we move to Ronnie Hawkins' extensive and detailed application of Davion's work to the neurobiological, cultural, and axiological roots of our contemporary ecological situation, in which Hawkins invokes [End Page 1] and applies the insights of Davion's 2002 essay "Anthropocentrism, Artificial Intelligence, and Moral Network Theory: An Ecofeminist Perspective." Drawing upon Davion's inventive use of Val Plumwood's account of dualisms, Hawkins stresses Davion's pioneering work in avoiding the reason/nature dualistic fracture, and uses this work to critique the predominant current discourses of AI and neuroscience, in the process further expounding Davion's critiques of anthropocentrism and logocentrism. Cashing out the wider implications of Davion's perspective for our models of the mind, Hawkins connects these to Iain McGilchrist's recent work on the neuropsychology of perception and morality, arguing that this new account of the interaction of the two cerebral hemispheres and their role in generating an orientation to the world for cognition and valuing is consistent with Davion's insights, and can both help explain the environmental failings of modern Western culture and give support for non-instrumentalizing and nonanthropocentric alternatives.Finally, Trish Glazebrook and Emmanuela Opoku offer an extended ecofeminist examination of the roles, significance, dangers, and current status of environmental protectors in contemporary global environmental politics. In a paper dedicated to Davion that addresses many of her concerns with the interlocking character of forms of oppression, they systematically investigate and elucidate the importance of environmental protectors, the struggles that they engage in, the increasing threats of violence that they face, and their significance in the fight against climate change, ultimately arguing that the UN should extend explicit protection to land and environmental defenders under its human rights umbrella.We think these contributions are a fitting tribute to our founding editor, and offer you this special issue with the wish that her legacy will endure. [End Page 2]Copyright © 2018 The Trustees of Indiana University... (shrink)

This qualitative study describes and interprets the lived experiences of African RomanCatholic Church seminarians. The interpretive lens employed was worldview, a conceptual tool extensively used in African-centred psychology. Sixteen Africanseminarians were purposely selected and interviewed in depthAdditional sources of data were reflexive notes and observation notes. Data were subjected tovarious iterative cycles of analysis. Participants described their difficulty in adjusting in theseminaries where teaching and living predominantly reflects a Western world view. Theyevidenced cognitive dissonance, emotional discomfort and feelings of (...) marginalisation. Thefindings point to the importance of acknowledging the world views and cultural heritage ofseminarians in their training. (shrink)

I respond to Ned Block’s claim that it is ridiculous to suppose that consciousness is a cultural construction based on language and learned in childhood. Block is wrong to dismiss social constructivist theories of consciousness on account of it being ludicrous that conscious experience is anything but a biological feature of our animal heritage, characterized by sensory experience, evolved over millions of years. By defending social constructivism in terms of both Julian Jaynes’ behaviorism and J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology, I (...) draw a distinction between the experience or what-it-is-like of nonhuman animals engaging with the environment and the secret theater of speechless monologue that is familiar to a linguistically competent human adult. This distinction grounds the argument that consciousness proper should be seen as learned rather than innate and shared with nonhuman animals. Upon establishing this claim, I defend the Jaynesian definition of consciousness as a social–linguistic construct learned in childhood, structured in terms of lexical metaphors and narrative practice. Finally, I employ the Jaynesian distinction between cognition and consciousness to bridge the explanatory gap and deflate the supposed hard problem of consciousness. (shrink)

The five-volume set Kant and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense contains the proceedings of the Eleventh International Kant Congress, which took place in Pisa in 2010. The proceedings consist of 25 plenary talks and 341 papers selected by a team of international referees from over 700 submissions. The contributions span 14 sections: Kant’s Concept of Philosophy; Theory of Cognition and Logic; Ontology and Metaphysics; Ethics; Law and Justice; Religion and Theology; Aesthetics; Anthropology and Psychology; Politics and History; Science, Mathematics, and (...) the Philosophy of Nature; Kant and the Leibnizian Tradition; Kant and the Philosophical Tradition; Kant and Schopenhauer; and Kant’s Heritage. Thanks to cooperation from the Schopenhauer Gesellschaft, the 2010 conference was the first in the history of the International Kant Congress to include a session on Kant and Schopenhauer. -/- . (shrink)