A survey of primitive groups that live today as they did thousands of years ago, their customs and culture unchanged.

This book was undertaken before the terms 'fake news' and 'alternative facts' were coined and the further escalation of America's ideological civil war. It was prompted by deep wonderment at the way people tend to be wholly enclosed within their ideological frames and deaf to claims about reality that come from the opposite camp, no matter how valid they might be. Ideology consists of normative prescriptions regarding how society should be shaped, together with an interpretive roadmap indicating how this (...) normative vision can be implemented in reality. Ideological fixation is the result of tensions and conflicts between these two elements. The book does not focus on the normative aspect of ideology, which is largely subjective, but on its factual claims about the world, typically subordinate to, and often distorted by, the normative commitment. After theorists around 1960 proclaimed the 'death of ideology', ideological divides and clashes have reemerged with renewed intensity throughout the world, including in the liberal democracies. In the United States they have become particularly venomous. The other side is widely viewed as malicious, irrational or downright stupid, and, often, as barely legitimate. The zeal of the opposing sides is often scarcely less than that which characterized the religious ideologies of old. Indeed, historical religious ideologies have largely been replaced by 'secular religions' or 'religion substitutes'. The book is not another survey of past and present ideologies. It is an attempt to understand the cognitive, emotional and social roots of ideology and ideological fixation. It combines insights from evolutionary psychology regarding the nature of some of our deepest proclivities with a broad sweep through history. It proceeds from the Stone Age to the rise of civilization, the great religions and modernity, to a critique of fundamental factual premises that underlie some of the major debates dominating today's liberal democracies. (shrink)

After we die, our persona may live on in the minds of the people we know well. Two essential elements of this process are mourning and acts of commemoration. These behaviors extend well beyond grief and must be cultivated deliberately by the survivors of the deceased individual. Those who are left behind have many ways of maintaining connections with their deceased, such as burials in places where the living are likely to return and visit. In this way, culturally defined (...) places often serve as metaphors of social association and shared experience. Humans are the only kind of animal that buries their dead, and this gesture is preserved in Paleolithic sites as early as 120,000 years ago. Though not the only method of honoring the dead in human cultures, the emergence of burial traditions in the Middle Paleolithic implies that both Neandertals and early anatomically modern humans had already begun to conceive of the individual as unique and irreplaceable. Claims of primitive mortuary behavior in earlier periods than the Middle Paleolithic fall short in that they lack any signs of positive social-spatial associations between the deceased and survivors. The archaeological evidence for burial behavior in the Middle Paleolithic provides the first clear translation of mourning into a stereotypical action. These burials therefore may represent the first ritualized bridge between the living and the deceased in human evolutionary history. (shrink)

This chapter explores some general aspects of the tension between one’s role as a believer and one’s role as an appraiser of oneself as a believer in philosophy. The proposal is to replace true belief by knowledge in a principle of charity constitutive of content. Knowledge maximization need not make the ascription of knowledge come too cheap. By contrast, Davidson’s principle of charity gives good marks to an interpretation for having Stone Age people assent to many truths of (...) quantum mechanics, if it happens to fit the compositional structure of their language. Perhaps the underlying worries about knowledge maximization can be captured in a more abstract form. A subtler attempt to extract knowledge from Davidson’s principle of charity exploits beliefs that one knows. Knowledge maximization implies that our ancestors had some primitive knowledge as soon as they had some primitive beliefs; it is not as though archaeology suggests otherwise. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Recovering the Vestiges of Primeval Europe: Archaeology and the Significance of Stone Implements, 1750–1800Matthew R. GoodrumFor the antiquaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who studied the few broken monuments and obscure artifacts that survived from the earliest periods of human history there was a dawning realization that these remote epochs were not as inaccessible as had previously been believed. This attitude was mirrored in geological research where (...) natural historians were using fossils and geological formations to reconstruct the history of the earth, which was turning out to be considerably longer and more dynamic than had previously been thought.1 Antiquarianism and natural history shared many features and problems in common during this period and their fates would become more intertwined than either discipline realized at the time.2Despite the growing hope that archaeological monuments could illuminate the past, a great deal of early human history remained hidden, enveloped in a fog that the antiquary could only occasionally peer through.3 Yet [End Page 51] the nascent science of archaeology made great strides during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Antiquaries throughout Europe were investigating field monuments, collecting artifacts, and excavating barrows in an attempt to throw some light on the original inhabitants of the continent. 4 Antiquarianism, a scholarly discipline dedicated to the study of antiquities and other historical documents, had close links with natural history during this period and many antiquaries employed methods and a mode of reasoning drawn from the sciences.5 By By the late eighteenth century, antiquarianism itself was changing and a new science of archaeology was emerging and defining its own professional identity.6Among the objects investigated by these antiquaries was a particularly curious class of artifacts that had long been collected and examined in Europe. Natural historians throughout the early modern period had collected a type of stone called ceraunia, or thunderstones. It was not until the end of the seventeenth century that antiquaries and natural historians suggested that these stones were not produced in clouds by natural processes but instead were stone arrowheads, axe-heads, and other implements fabricated by early Europeans. Once these objects were accepted as ancient human artifacts, entirely new sets of questions arose: for example, why would early Europeans make tools out of stone instead of metal, what were these objects used for, and what could they tell us about the culture of ancient peoples.7 The latter question was all the more disturbing since it [End Page 52] was apparent that the stone artifacts found in Europe were very similar to the stone implements and weapons used by the so-called “savages” of the New World and the South Pacific. By the middle of the eighteenth century there was an increasing amount of evidence and a growing consensus that the inhabitants of many parts of northern Europe prior to the Roman era possessed only stone implements and culturally were rude and barbarous peoples. This idea that early Europeans had been barbarians was not new; Roman historians had asserted as much, but what was new was the quantity of archaeological evidence for this idea and the way it was understood within the context of European contact with the indigenous peoples of the New World and the South Pacific who still used stone tools.Antiquaries and natural historians during the first half of the eighteenth century were still accumulating evidence to support the idea that so-called thunderstones were in fact archaeological artifacts. They were also attempting to understand what they meant as historical and cultural artifacts, and importantly they were trying to integrate this new understanding within the traditional biblical view of human history.8 A great deal has been written about the study of prehistoric stone artifacts in the early nineteenth century, especially since it was during this period that Scandinavian archaeologists formulated the Three Age System that organized prehistory into a succession of periods from the Stone Age through the Bronze Age to the Iron Age.9 In addition, the important theoretical breakthroughs of the early nineteenth century, combined with the expansion and professionalization of archaeology as a discipline during this period, have tended to focus the attention of historians of archaeology... (shrink)

Historians of archaeology have noted that prehistoric stone artefacts were first identified as such during the seventeenth century, and a great deal has been written about the formulation of the idea of a Stone Age in the nineteenth century. Much less attention has been devoted to the study of prehistoric artefacts during the eighteenth century. Yet it was during this time that researchers first began systematically to collect, classify and interpret the cultural and historical meaning of these objects (...) as archaeological specimens rather than geological specimens. These investigations were conducted within the broader context of eighteenth-century antiquarianism and natural history. As a result, they offer an opportunity to trace the interrelationships that existed between the natural sciences and the science of prehistoric archaeology, which demonstrates that geological theories of the history of the earth, ethnographic observations of ‘savage peoples’ and natural history museums all played important roles in the interpretation of prehistoric stone implements during the eighteenth century. (shrink)

In 1998 I asked my friend Tjiniman, who is a stone-age hunter, to give us his non-western perspective on ‘Tucson III’ (Murinbata&Whitehead, 1998).Most people thought I just made Tjiniman up and the whole thing was intended as a joke, and he has spent the last two years worrying about this. Since then he has gained a modest BSc in Social Anthropology, though in my view the examiners failed to appreciate some of his less obvious insights, and he deserved (...) a higher mark. He now has a better understanding of us white people and our ways, and this is his second attempt to make us see the truth. He did ask me to edit his text and take out anything that white people might mistake for a joke, but in many cases he accused me of cutting the best bits and made me put them back in. I had to add the notes and references because Tjiniman thinks all ideas come from the ancestors and no one should claim credit for them — CW. (shrink)

This thesis examines the hogbacks and hammerhead crosses of Viking Age Strathclyde and Northumbria. Both are Insular forms of carved stone sculpture often found in Christian contexts. This thesis aims to highlight the significance of these carved stones within a contemporary landscape dominated by a complex historical and archaeological narrative, with the overall aim of ascribing them functions, beyond those of funerary. The approach this thesis takes is theoretical in its construct, both methodologically and analytically, and is grounded in (...) the phenomenological principles of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It is hoped that this thesis will break down the perceived barrier imposed on research by the modern Scotland-England border, thus potentially alleviate the implied disconnect between Viking Age Strathclyde and Northumbria. While acknowledging the current art-historical work, this thesis archaeologically reappraises hogbacks and provides an original and detailed archaeological treatise of hammerhead crosses. Additionally, this thesis espouses a conceptual framework for approaching, analysing and interpreting carved stones, which considers the idea of what makes space become a place. This framework involves the adoption of a reflexive phenomenological approach to the recording of carved stone monuments in the landscape, and, in approaching material, the adoption and adaption of the concepts of hybrid practice, supervenience, Deleuzian difference, common difference, the third space, and art and agency. In integrating these approaches and concepts, the idea of place-making emerges, discerned via non-dialectical interrelationships between people, material, and space. It is conceptualised here in abstract form as the person/object/place framework. In applying this framework to postulate the functions of hogbacks and hammerhead crosses in the landscape, the following, non-mutually exclusive, themes are considered: commemorative space, economic space, biblical space, mythological space, political space, and sacred space. Considering these themes in the application of the conceptual framework to approaching notable carved stones gives rise to the concept of functional landscapes. These abstract landscapes emerge and are understood through a network of functional places, developing out of particular carved stone monuments inhabiting specific spaces. Ascribing functions to Viking Age carved stones allows for interpretation beyond the traditional and uncritical narrative that hogbacks and hammerhead crosses are simply Viking ‘calling cards’ or gravestones. Furthermore, in considering the Christian context and syncretic nature of many hogbacks, this thesis challenges the common idea that their origins and models often lie solely in Scandinavian paganism and culture. (shrink)

Humans are such violent and hate-filled animals. At the group level, think of the endless wars—First World War, Second Word War, Korea, Vietnam, and so the dismal list expands. At the individual level, humans show hatred and suspicion—prejudice—against fellow humans. Outsiders, class, color, sexual orientation, handicap, religion, women. The Mexican wall. Brexit. There are few characteristics that people have not at some time despised and use as the basis for belittlement and exclusion. How does this book speak to this (...) paradox? In one word: agriculture. Ten thousand years ago humans changed from hunter-gatherers into farmers, and with this came unexpected consequences. A massive population growth, coveting of each other’s property, women reduced to little more than childbearing, and so much more. Culture changes far faster than biology: “Our modern skulls house a Stone age mind.” This is the challenge faced in Why We Hate: The Roots of Human Conflict. First comes the empirical background; next problems of war and prejudice are discussed in the light of previous analyses of these topics; finally, the empirical and the cultural are brought together and suggestions are offered for a more understanding and happier future. (shrink)

"This is an exceedingly long short book, stretching at least fifty thousand years into the past and who knows how many into the future." So begins Visions of the Future, the prophetic new book by eminent economist Robert Heilbroner. Heilbroner's basic premise is stunning in its elegant simplicity. He contends that throughout all of human history, despite the huge gulf in social organization, technological development, and cultural achievement that divides us from the earliest known traces of homo sapiens, there have (...) really only been three distinct ways of looking at the future. During a period Heilbroner refers to simply as the Distant Past, stretching from prehistory to the appearance of modern nation-states in seventeenth century Europe, there was no notion of a future measurably and materially different from the present or the past. From the Stone Age to the Bronze, Mesopotamia and Egypt to Greece and Rome, and throughout the Middle Ages, a continuum of cultures and civilizations shared one defining expectation--the absence of any expectation of material progress for the great masses of people. Heilbroner maintains that it was not until the first stirrings of the period he refers to as Yesterday, spanning from roughly 1700 to 1950, that the future entered into human consciousness as a great beckoning force. Capitalism, continually reinvigorated by the seemingly endless forward march of science and an evolving sense of democracy, appeared to promise all levels of society some expectation of a future at least somewhat better than the past. It was this unwavering faith in the superiority of the future that separated Yesterday from the age we have now entered, that of Today. While we are still driven towards tomorrow by the same forces that determined the recent past, the lessons of Hiroshima and Chernobyl, the chaos in the former Soviet Union, the stagnation of the West, and the anarchic rage unleashed in our inner cities and in hot spots around the globe have brought on a palpable anxiety that is quite apart from both the resignation of the Distant Past or the bright optimism of Yesterday. In a brilliant conclusion drawing together the threat of nuclear blackmail, global warming and the growing commodification of life represented by video games, voice mail, and VCRs, Visions of the Future issues a call to face the challenges of the twenty-first century with a new resolve strengthened by the inspiration of our collective past. (shrink)

'Art and Adaptability' argues for a co-evolution of theory of mind and material/art culture. The book covers relevant areas from great ape intelligence, hominin evolution, Stone Age tools, Paleolithic culture and art forms, to neurobiology. We use material and art objects, whether painting or sculpture, to modify our own and other people's thoughts so as to affect behavior. We don't just make judgments about mental states; we create objects about which we make judgments in which mental states are (...) inherent. Moreover, we make judgments about these objects to facilitate how we explore the minds and feelings of others. The argument is that it's not so much art because of theory of mind but art as theory of mind. (shrink)

What effects do archaeological discoveries, and in particular some of the new archaeological discoveries, have on research into ancient history and culture, and especially on the research into [ancient] intellectual culture that all of us present today are concerned about? This is a subject that very much deserves to be studied. Archaeological discoveries have a very substantial effect on research into history. I believe everyone recognizes this fact today. This is probably a matter of common knowledge. However, very few (...) class='Hi'>people give any thought to its effect on research into intellectual culture. People do not attach sufficient importance to this. Very few people realize that it has such an effect. Why is that? I believe that one of the reasons is that the archaeology of earlier times did not emphasize research into intellectual culture. For a very long period of time we were, in particular, influenced by Britain's Gordon Childe. As we all know, Childe was, in a certain sense, a Marxist. For instance, we can see in his books, such as What Happened in History and others, that he was basically a Marxist. However, we also note that he brought with him the influence of the Danish school of thought in early archaeology. The Danish school of thought started out by operating museums, and its founder was the person who invented such terms as "Stone Age," "Bronze Age," and "Iron Age." They operated museums and displayed objects but did little explaining. Nor was it possible in those times to talk about ideology and culture. That is why Childe's books brought that kind of an influence. We all know that for a long time in the former Soviet Union, the archaeological research institutes were not called "archaeological institutes," nor did they use the term "archaeology." Their institutes were called "institutes of material culture." What is "material culture?" This term is unclear, because the things discovered by archaeology cannot be defined simply as "material culture." How can one call all the things dug up by archaeology "material culture?" I myself have never looked at the matter that way. That is why I wrote that pamphlet "Dong Zhou yu Qin dai wenming" , and especially put in that particular statement. Many people have since quoted that statement, and fortunately everyone seems to think it is all right. What I meant to say is that the things discovered by archaeology are, of course, material things, but many of them also reflect spiritual things. Actually, the reason is simple. A tomb, for example, always has to do with certain funerary ceremonies and certain rites, and all of these reflect things of the spirit. A bronze vessel, or a pottery vessel—such things reflect the society and the customs and habits of those times. If you are only looking at it from the material side, then the effects of this [other] sort of archaeology are worth considering. This is my view of the matter, and I hope everyone will comment on it. So, today I would like to talk about the influence of archaeological culture on things of the spirit. (shrink)

When man emerged from the millions of years of evolution in the Early and Late Stone-ages he had shed his ape-like characters; he was erect, large-brained, and he had become an agriculturist and a craftsman. He must have wondered—as we wonder still—at the sun, the moon and the stars, the land and the sea, the thunder and lightning, at his own birth, and growth and death. Endowed with intuition and reason, and with curiosity, he must have concluded— as we (...) conclude—that all this did not explain itself. There must have existed, and still exist, Something Else, that he could not perceive and did not understand. Endowed also with imagination, he peopled the earth and the sky with spirits—gods and demigods, ghosts and fairies, demons and angels. There followed beliefs in direct communication from this other world, through dream or trance, ecstasy or intuition; sometimes an individual assurance of personal contact and inspiration. So religion came to be: in the form, first of animism, then of mythology, finally of monotheism. (shrink)

There is more than one ‘hard problem'. Just as it is hard for consciousness to grasp itself, it is also hard to examine your own society from the ‘outside'. The same problem applies to scientific paradigms , our taken-for-granted assumptions generally, and the collective representations that sustain them -- such as soup spoons and scientific conferences . To get an ‘outside’ view of ‘Tucson III', I asked my friend Tjiniman, who is a stone-age hunter, to help me out. He (...) is studying anthropology part-time, though he does not believe everything he is told, and prefers to retain his traditional world-view. The following account is mainly his, with a few suggestions from me. (shrink)

After a year at Brandeis I was hired by MIT, and then I realized for the first time that there was a struggle and that I was on the losing end of it. The people there, particularly Judith Thomson, who is still at MIT, called Continental philosophy “stone-age philosophy,” and wouldn’t let me teach in the graduate program at all, because they thought that it would just corrupt the students and waste their time. I did feel a little (...) unhappy because I wasn’t allowed to teach graduate students, but not very, because I had never taught graduate students, so I didn’t think I had to, and I was still feeling grateful that I could teach philosophy anywhere at all. And I had Todes to talk to, and he was writing his brilliant thesis. (shrink)

The privileged often regard these struggles as an assault on their rights, violent outbursts instigated by evil forces bent on our destruction: world Communism, or crazed terrorists and fanatics. The struggle for freedom seems inexplicable in other terms. After all, living standards are higher in Soweto than they were in the Stone Age, or even elsewhere in Black Africa. And the people in the West Bank and Gaza who survive by doing Israel 's dirty work are improving their (...) lot by standard economic measures. Slave owners offered similar arguments. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, (...) especially that morality cannot survive the loss of persons. (shrink)

This paper will argue that there are no people. Let me summarize the argument. In part II of what follows, I argue that if identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Psychological connectedness, according to Derek Parfit, is the 'holding of particular direct psychological connections,' for example, when a belief, a desire, or some other psychological feature continues to be had ; psychological connectedness consists in two other relations—resemblance plus a cause that produces it. (...) For our purposes, to say of a relation that it is 'what matters in survival' is to say that it carries the burden of responsibility, remorse, and regret for past misdeeds; and that it is what makes rational the anticipation of, and the special hopes and fears we have about, our own future experiences. A consequence of II is that if identity isn't what matters in survival, either something other than psychological connectedness is what matters or nothing matters. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, (...) especially that morality cannot survive the loss of persons. (shrink)

This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World History with respect to colonialism. For Hegel, freedom can be recognized and practised only in classical, Christian and modern Europe; therefore, the world’s other peoples can acquire freedom only if Europeans impose their civilization upon them. Although this imposition denies freedom to colonized peoples, this denial is legitimate for Hegel because it is the sole condition on which these peoples can gain freedom in the longer term. The article then considers (...) whether Hegel’s basic account of freedom can be extricated from his Eurocentric and pro-colonialist interpretation of the course of history. The article argues that matters are more complicated because that interpretation has significant connections with Hegel’s conception of freedom as self-determination. (shrink)

To promote so-called cultural competence in work of direct-care providers and other health professionals among diverse peoples, cross-cultural training is now widely advised. However, in ethically assessing aims and content of CCT, and surrounding issues and concerns, what should guide us? And if we can elaborate satisfactory moral touchstones, what do they imply for healthcare professionals, overarching structures, and bioethicists? Building on prior work, this paper tries to help answer these questions.

In this volume, the author argues that mediaeval thinkers had a way of calling humankind natural without implying that humans are bound by a universal, a historical essence. He seeks to show that in the Middle Ages nature and history were not regarded polar opposites. Using Boccaccio's theory of poiesis as a focal point, he offers fresh interpretations of the works covered, particularly of Boccaccio's writings.

In his three books J. Wentzel van Huyssteen develops a complex and helpful notion of rationality, avoiding the extremes of foundationalism and postmodern relativism and deconstruction. Drawing from several postmodern philosophers of science and evolutionary epistemologists who seek to devise a usable notion of rationality, he weaves together a view that allows for a genuine duet betweenscience and theology. In the process he challenges much contemporary nonfoundationalist theology as well as the philosophical naïveté of some cosmologists and sociobiologists.

Circumscribed delusional beliefs can follow brain injury. We suggest that these involve anomalous perceptual experiences created by a deficit to the person's perceptual system, and misinterpretation of these experiences due to biased reasoning. We use the Capgras delusion (the claim that one or more of one's close relatives has been replaced by an exact replica or impostor) to illustrate this argument. Our account maintains that people voicing this delusion suffer an impairment that leads to faces being perceived as drained (...) of their normal affective significance, and an additional reasoning bias that leads them to put greater weight on forming beliefs that are observationally adequate rather than beliefs that are a conservative extension of their existing stock. We show how this position can integrate issues involved in the philosophy and psychology of belief, and examine the scope for mutually beneficial interaction. (shrink)

I argue that people who believe fetuses have the same moral right to life as the rest of us have sufficient reasons to refuse to classify abortion as legal murder and to refuse to punish abortion as severely as legal murder.

As technology continues to grow (and sex-robots gain a more prominent position in our society), so too does concern about the way they will impact our lives and our sexuality. While many ethicists have started to assess what this impact could be (and if it would be positive or negative), the challenges and opportunities presented by sex-robots span over a wide range of topics and cannot be assessed easily. Hence, in this paper, I will attempt to categorize the main questions (...) concerning the ethics of sexual robotics in order to help ethicists gather their thoughts on this new technology. While doing so, I will principally identify four overarching issues: (1) how robots’ representation of human sexuality affects human gender issues; (2) how robots could potentially be utilized for medical purposes; (3) if robots could possibly deceive their users; (4) if sex-robots could end up as a new form of sex-slaves. (shrink)

This paper examines how a delusive social imaginary of criminal-justice has underpinned contemporary U.S. mass incarceration and encouraged widespread indifference to its violence. I trace the complicity of this criminal-justice imaginary with state-organized violence by comparing it to an imaginary that supported colonial violence. I conclude by discussing how those of us outside of prison can begin to resist the entrenched images and institutions of mass incarceration by engaging the work and imagining the perspective of incarcerated people.

Poor people predominate as a subgroup of those who take part in healthy volunteer research. They are subjected to minimised but unknown risks and unpleasant burdens so that the safety of new medicines can be evaluated. This is prima facie unfair especially given that the poor are often unable to access expensive medicines. Although participants in this kind of research often do receive compensation for their time, these payments are usually capped at a very low level. This paper defends (...) a version of a reimbursement model for the payment of research subjects. This model is practical, would benefit those without an income who take part in research, and would make it possible for those in regular work to take part in phase 1 research. (shrink)

In recent years, democrats both inside and outside the academy have begun to reconsider the merits of the age-old practice of sortition, the random selection of political officials. Despite this fact, however, the comparative assessment of the merits of voting and sortition remains in its infancy. This paper will advance this project by treating the problem of assigning public responsibilities as a problem of allocative justice. To treat the problem in this manner is to treat public office as a type (...) of good to which citizens might have various claims. Random selection is the appropriate method for distributing public office when all citizens have equal claims to that office and there is not enough to go around. Universal distribution is more appropriate when all claimants have equal claims to the office and there is enough to go around (as with universal suffrage, for example). Election (or possibly other procedures, such as appointment) makes sense when citizens do not enjoy equal claims to the office and that office is in scarce supply. This approach captures a crucial component of democratic equality. Different understandings of democratic equality lay behind sortition and election. Each might be appropriate under different circumstances, but both place rights-based constraints on the design of a democratic political system. (shrink)

This essay lays out the common reasoning underlying a diversity of arguments for decision making using lotteries. This reasoning appeals to the sanitizing effects of ignorance. Lotteries ensure that bad reasons are unable to affect a decision. (They also ensure that good reasons have no effect as well, which is why care must be applied in deciding to use them.) All arguments for or against the use of a lottery to make a particular decision will thus appeal to the same (...) property that lotteries possess. This fact is compatible with continued vigorous disagreement about whether particular decisions should be made by lot. Such disagreements, however, will focus on the nature of the circumstances surrounding the decision. People can thus agree that a given set of circumstances calls for the use of a lottery even as they disagree over whether those circumstances hold. (shrink)

Recent, well-publicized scandals, involving unethical conduct have rekindled interest in academic misconduct. Prior studies of academic misconduct have focussed exclusively on situational factors (e.g., integrity culture, honor codes), demographic variables or personality constructs. We contend that it is important to also examine how␣these classes of variables interact to influence perceptions of and intentions relating to academic misconduct. In a sample of 217 business students, we examined how integrity culture interacts with Prudence and Adjustment to explain variance in estimated frequency of (...) cheating, suspicions of cheating, considering cheating and reporting cheating. Age, integrity culture, and personality variables were significantly related to different criteria. Overall, personality variables explained the most unique variance in academic misconduct, and Adjustment interacted with integrity culture, such that integrity culture had more influence on intentions to cheat for less well-adjusted individuals. Implications for practice are discussed and future research directions are offered. (shrink)

Circumscribed delusional beliefs can follow brain injury. We suggest that these involve anomalous perceptual experiences created by a deficit to the person's perceptual system, and misinterpretation of these experiences due to biased reasoning. We use the Capgras delusion (the claim that one or more of one's close relatives has been replaced by an exact replica or impostor) to illustrate this argument. Our account maintains that people voicing this delusion suffer an impairment that leads to faces being perceived as drained (...) of their normal affective significance, and an additional reasoning bias that leads them to put greater weight on forming beliefs that are observationally adequate rather than beliefs that are a conservative extension of their existing stock. We show how this position can integrate issues involved in the philosophy and psychology of belief, and examine the scope for mutually beneficial interaction. (shrink)

Classical realist thought provides a diagnosis of the significance nuclear weapons that calls into question the very possibility of politics in the nuclear age. While sharing similarities with this...

Finding Time for the Old Stone Age explores a century of colourful debate over the age of our earliest ancestors. In the mid nineteenth century curious stone implements were found alongside the bones of extinct animals. Humans were evidently more ancient than had been supposed - but just how old were they? There were several clocks for Stone-Age time, and it would prove difficult to synchronize them. Conflicting timescales were drawn from the fields of geology, palaeontology, anthropology, (...) and archaeology. Anne O'Connor draws on a wealth of lively, personal correspondence to explain the nature of these arguments. The trail leads from Britain to Continental Europe, Africa, and Asia, and extends beyond the world of professors, museum keepers, and officers of the Geological Survey: wine sellers, diamond merchants, papermakers, and clerks also proposed timescales for the Palaeolithic. This book brings their stories to light for the first time - stories that offer an intriguing insight into how knowledge was built up about the ancient British past. (shrink)

Advance directives typically have two defects. First, most advance directives fail to enable people to effectively avoid unwanted medical intervention. Second, most of them have the potential of ending your life in ways you never intended, years before you had to die.

Background Academic integrity (AI) is of increasing importance in higher education. At the same time, students are becoming more consumer-oriented and more inclined to appeal against, or complain about, a penalty imposed for a breach of AI. This combination of factors places pressure on institutions of higher education to handle alleged breaches of AI in a way acceptable to students that motivates them to continue to engage with their studies. Method Students (n = 8) were interviewed to discover their perceptions (...) of the process for dealing with breaches of AI. All students were based in one university in a very diverse area of London which has many first-generation students from non-traditional academic backgrounds. Results Students reported strong emotional reactions featuring high levels of anxiety and stress. Some found the process to be threatening and demotivating and questioned continuation on their course of study, while others used more adaptive coping strategies. Students also went to great pains to make it clear that their own, and their friends’, breaches of AI were unintentional, while expressing the view that other people were deliberately cheating and should be penalised. Key recommendations include: support for students to re-engage after the intervention; support for students to develop effective self-regulatory learning strategies and time management; provision of specific examples to clarify what is, and is not, acceptable academic practice; recognition of the strong emotions likely to be invoked, especially if accompanied by declarations of unintentionality. (shrink)

This article offers some hypotheses to explain Later Stone Age lithic miniaturization: the systematic creation of small stone flakes on the finest-grained materials. Fundamentally, this phenomenon appears to represent the prioritization of stone tool sharpness over longevity, and a disposable mode of using stone tools. Ethnographic evidence from Australasia, the Andaman Islands, and Africa is used to suggest some specific functions for miniaturized lithics, as well as their relationship to other aspects of Later Stone Age (...) material culture, including ochre crayons, shell beads, and notched bones. Miniaturized lithic functions are hypothesized to have a common basis in the cognitive capacity for abstraction: having ideas about ideas. The technological and social affordances of abstraction may have given later Homo sapiens significant adaptive advantages over other members of our genus. (shrink)

Recent decades of women's rights advocacy have produced numerous regional and international agreements for protecting women's security, including a UN convention that affirms the state's responsibility to protect key gender-specific rights, with no exceptions on the basis of culture or religion. At the same time, however, the focus on universal women's rights has enabled influential feminists in the United States to view women's rights in opposition to culture, and most often in opposition to other people's cultures. Not surprisingly, then, (...) feminists across the global South have criticized the universal-women's-rights agenda. This article reviews representative critical responses to universal-women's-rights advocacy. The author argues that, taken collectively, these critical responses do not reject the possibility of cross-cultural feminist advocacy but they do suggest the need for feminists in the United States and Europe to focus less on transferring rights across the obstacles of culture and more on how they can revise and expand their own understanding of women's rights in response to the struggles of other women, many of whom view women's rights as organic to their own cultures and as connected to broader social struggles. (shrink)