Why there still are no people

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191 (2005)
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Abstract

This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, especially that morality cannot survive the loss of persons

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Jim Stone
University of New Orleans

Citations of this work

Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (8):405-429.
The No Self View and the Meaning of Life.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2019 - Philosophy East and West 69 (2):419-438.
The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Skepticism about persons.John M. Doris - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.Eric Todd Olson - 1997 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.

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