ABSTRACT A new ‘political philosophy’ is indispensable to the ‘post-Corona world,’ and this paper tries to analyze the future of ‘liberal democracy’ in it. It shows that ‘liberal democracy’ faces a ‘global crisis’ that has begun before, but the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic,’ as a setback for it, strongly encourages that crisis. ‘Liberalism’ and ‘democracy,’ which had long been assumed by ‘political philosophers’ to go together, are now becoming decoupled, and the ‘liberal values’ of ‘democracy’ are eroding. (...) To find why and how, this paper analyzes ‘authoritarianism,’ ‘totalitarianism,’ and the evils and propensities of ‘democracy’ that bring about further erosions of ‘liberal values.’ There may be difficult trade-offs to be made between ‘liberal’ and ‘authoritarian’ ‘values’ - and, after the experience of ‘Coronavirus,’ this paper shows the ‘illiberal or authoritarian democracy’ may become stronger. -/- KEYWORDS: democracy, liberalism, liberal democracy, illiberal democracy, the novel Coronavirus pandemic, Covid-19, authoritarianism, totalitarianism. -/- EXTENDED ABSTRACT For almost a century in West, ‘democracy’ has meant ‘liberal democracy’-a political system marked not only by ‘free and fair elections,’ but also by ‘liberal values.’ ‘Liberalism’ applied to the problem of the limits of the criminal law would require commitment to the presumption in favor of ‘liberty.’ If the word ‘liberal’ is to have any utility in this context, it should refer to one who has so powerful a commitment to ‘liberty’ that she is motivated to limit the number of acknowledged liberty-limiting or coercion-legitimizing principles as narrowly as possible. So, she only believes in ‘harm-principle’ as the morally relevant reason for criminal prohibitions. ‘Offense principle’ and ‘paternalistic’ and ‘moralistic’ considerations, when introduced as support for penal legislation, have no weight at all. So, it means ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-regarding vs. other-regarding actions distinction’ based on which the human is the owner of her mind and body and everything consenting adults do is beyond the realm of morality and law. It leads to ‘individual’ ‘basic rights and liberties’ such as ‘basic rights and liberties’ of ‘speech,’ ‘religion,’ and ‘property’ and ‘collective’ ‘basic rights and liberties’ such as ‘basic rights and liberties of assembly,’ ‘civil society,’ ‘political pluralism,’ ‘democratic institutions,’ and ‘non-governmental organizations.’ ‘Liberalism’ also believes in ‘equality of conditions, ‘equal and free participatory rights in political decision making,’ and ‘collective self-governance.’ It also believes in the ‘rule of law,’ a ‘separation of powers,’ and ‘checks and balances.’ However, even under fair and free elections, the elected leaders can be ‘populists,’ ‘ultra-nationalists,’ ‘racists,’ ‘fascists,’ and ‘authoritarians’ who do not respect ‘inviolable basic rights and liberties,’ and suppress ‘minorities.’ Democratically elected leaders can routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power and deprive their citizens of ‘basic rights and liberties.’ The two strands of ‘liberal democracy’ have been coming apart in the world, and the ‘liberal’ elements of ‘democracy’ have been fraying and eroding even before the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic.’ Even before the Coronavirus hit, there was already much discussion of a crisis of ‘liberal democracy.’ In particular, there has been a debate about whether ‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy,’ which had long been assumed to go together, were becoming decoupled. This paper shows ‘liberal democracy’ faces a ‘global crisis’ that had begun before the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic.’ It also analyzes ‘authoritarianism,’ ‘totalitarianism,’ ‘liberalism,’ and ‘democracy’ and shows that Covid-19 is a setback for ‘liberal democracy.’ What is striking about the current moment is that many of the ‘liberal’ elements of ‘democracy’ are so far holding up under immense pressure. ‘Illiberal democracies’ seemed to be emerging in many countries. This model of ‘illiberal democracy,’ in which elections continue to be held but some individual rights and liberties are curtailed, may emerge stronger from this new crisis. In that sense, the ‘pandemic’ may become a challenge not only to ‘democracy’ as such but also to ‘liberal democracy’ in particular – in other words, a system of popular sovereignty together with guaranteed basic rights, such as freedom of association and expression and checks and balances on executive power. ‘Authoritarian’ procedures may succeed in mitigating the spread of the ‘Coronavirus,’ but the world now faces another problem: that when the virus recedes, many ‘liberal democracies’ will be far less ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ than they were before. In times of crisis, ‘liberal values’ have been ignored temporarily in the name of executive power. However, the ‘temporary’ can become ‘permanent.’ In addition, if citizens lose their faith in the legitimacy of ‘liberal democracy’ as the best form of government, and think ‘liberal democracy’ cannot function effectively during a crisis, and ‘authoritarian regimes’ manage the crisis more decisively, the world will slide towards ‘illiberal or authoritarian democracy,’ and many ‘liberal democracies’ will be at grave risk of failure. There may now be difficult trade-offs to be made between those basic rights and security - and, after the experience of Covid-19, many citizens may choose security. (shrink)

Human rights and democracy have been regarded as a mutually reinforcing couple by many political theorists to date. The internationalisation of human rights post-1945 is often said to have severed those links, however. Accounting for the legitimacy of international human rights requires exploring how human rights and democracy, once they have been decoupled or disconnected, can be recoupled or reunited across governance levels and maybe even at the same governance level albeit beyond the state. The article does so (...) in three steps. The first prong of the argument is dedicated to presenting the moral-political nature of human rights and their relationship to political equality and, hence, their inherent legal nature from a democratic theory perspective. The second section of the article then draws some implications for the domestic or international levels of legal recognition and specification of human rights by reference to their legitimation within the domestic democratic community. It explains the mutual relationship between human rights and citizens’ rights and where international human rights draw their democratic legitimacy from. In the third and final section, the author discusses potential changes in the nature and legitimacy of international human rights once political structures beyond the state become more democratic, and human rights and democracy are being recoupled again at various levels of governance. The European Union being one of the most advanced examples of post-national political integration, recent developments in the regime of human rights protection within the EU are discussed in this new light. In a final step, the transposition to the global level of the argument developed in the European case is assessed and the author flags issues for further research on what democratic theorists should hope for in the new global order.Keywords: democracy; human rights; legitimacy; citizens’ rights; Maus; right to have rights; Arendt; legal rights; international law; EU; global institutions; Habermas; Lafont. (shrink)

The argument of this paper is that the justification of democracy’s core principles of popular control over government in conditions of political equality, and the defense of them against paternalist alternatives, requires appeal to basic features of political decision-making and of human nature, respectively*its capacities and limitations*which are universal in their scope, and do not stop at borders. It follows that if a democratic form of government is appropriate anywhere, it must be so everywhere, though differences of social structure (...) and historical tradition may make it more difficult to establish and sustain in practice in some countries than in others. However, these common features do not entail uniformity. The fundamental freedoms necessary to popular selfgovernment in any form encourage diversity, and allow it to find full expression in the public sphere. Yet, there is a limit to the movements and beliefs that are compatible with democracy, and that comes when they reject one or other of its core principles. At the same time, some of democracy’s characteristic elements*freedoms of expression and association, electoral competition for office, majoritarian procedures*can serve to exacerbate societal conflict, especially though not only in newly democratizing countries. In such circumstances only the establishment of a process of inclusive dialogue, involving respect for difference and an understanding of the requirements of political equality, can serve to resolve such conflicts. In other words, a commitment to democracy’s core principles is needed to moderate the effects of some of its own typical procedures. Keywords: democratic principles; universalist; paternalism; rights; democracy; majoritarianism; minorities (Published: 4 December 2009) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2009, pp. 281–296. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i4.2111. (shrink)

According to the G. Mosse, the economical and moral crisis after the Great War led to the European totalitarian regimes, because people need to be part of a great reconstruction project of their Nations. He focuses his attention especially on Italy and Germany. Moreover, Mosse criticizes Arendt about the notion of ‘banality of evil’, since he believes that Nazis were used to identify people with widespread stereotypes: all people who collaborated in the genocide of the Jewish were worn out by (...) this kind of aggressive propaganda which identified the Jews as the destructive element of the German moral and political integrity. According to him, those who adhered to the Nazis party ideology did so because, at that historical moment, the propaganda’s ideas met the political and cultural needs of that social crisis context: Jewish had to be killed since they were perceived as a threat. As Mosse, Arendt analyses totalitarianism and she recognizes its causes in ideology, but she also describes more in detail the kind of agent who acted during this tragic historical period. Therefore, she focuses her attention on both executioners and victims. Moreover, regarding the Nazis, Arendt speaks about the “banality of evil” in the sense that those people did not reflect on the consequences of their actions in ethical-political terms. To sum up, the aim of this paper is to highlight the value of philosophy as a discipline able to urge people to compare and critically analyse historical, social, ethical, political phenomena. Keywords: democracy, philosophy as a method, critical thinking. (shrink)

This article explores different theoretical and political dimensions of voice in democratic theory. Drawing on recent developments in political theory, ranging form James Bohman’s work on the movement from demos to demoi in transnational politics, to William Connolly’s writings on pluralization, it develops a critical account of the emphasis within conventional pluralism on the representation of extant identities. Instead, it foregrounds the need to engage with emerging identities, demands, and claims that fall outside the parameters of dominant discursive orders. Building (...) on the works of Rancie`re and Cavell, it highlights the importance of an analytical engagement with the emergence and articulation of new struggles and voices*the processes through which inchoate demands are given political expression*so as to counter the ongoing possibilities of domination, understood here as a ‘deprivation of voice.’ The article develops an account of the centrality of the category of responsiveness to such claims and demands for democratic theory, especially in relation to a range of democratic struggles in our contemporary world. In so doing, it contributes to a growing body of work that questions the taken for granted character and status of the institutional forms of liberal democaracy. Keywords: pluralism; demoi; Connolly; Rancie`re; responsiveness; deprivation of voice; domination; Cavell; democratic subjectivity; demands; claim-making (Published: 4 December 2009) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2009, pp. 297320. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i4.2118. (shrink)

_:_ Habermas believes that the foundation of democracy is to be found in the discourse principle. Also, some cognitive and experimental studies have suggested that democratic procedures can promote a debate between different opinions and ideas, thus improving the decision-making performance of public authorities. However, Habermas believes that, while, on the one hand, the democratic community is based on the premise that participants in the discourse collectively strive to find the best solutions, on the other, the democratic process allows (...) citizens to irrationally misuse their political rights. If, therefore, reasoned decision and dialogue have an important role in the justification of democracy, but it is a limited role, we propose the idea of an imperfect dialogic democracy. _Keywords:_ Jürgen Habermas; Collective Reasoning; Cognitive and Experimental Studies; Democracy; Decision Making _____La democrazia dialogica imperfetta: il principio discorsivo di Habermas e gli studi sperimentali sul ragionamento collettivo___ _Riassunto:_ Secondo Habermas il fondamento della democrazia risiede nel principio del discorso. Alcuni studi cognitivi e sperimentali suggeriscono che le procedure tipiche delle democrazia siano in grado di promuovere un dibattito fra opinioni e idee diverse, capace di migliorare le performances decisionali delle autorità pubbliche. Tuttavia, da un lato Habermas ritiene che la comunità democratica sia basata sulla presupposto che chi partecipa a un pubblico discorso si impegni a trovare la migliore soluzione, dall’altro le procedure democratiche non impediscono che i cittadini utilizzino in maniera irrazionale i loro diritti politici. Se le decisioni ragionate e il dialogo hanno un ruolo importante nella legittimazione della demcocrazia, un ruolo che tuttavia resta limitato, allora suggeriamo l’idea di una democrazia dialogica imperfetta. _Parole chiave:_ Jürgen Habermas; Ragionamento collettivo; Studi cognitivi e sperimentali; Democrazia; Processi decisionali. (shrink)

Prominent critical theorists (including Jürgen Habermas) have embraced a radical democratic version of the popular notion of ‘global governance without government’, according to which postnational democratization can be achieved without establishing robust firms of postnational statehood. The sources of the argument in Hauke Brunkhorst’s recent theorizing are critically interrogated. Brunkhorst’s interpretation of the European Union as an emerging case of postnational democracy, his critique of traditional ideas of state sovereignty, and Kelsenian notions about the primacy of global law are (...) criticized. Robust democracy ‘beyond the nation-state’ will necessarily require the establishment of democratic postnational statehood. Keywords: global governance; global democracy; state building; monopoly on violence; cosmopolitanism; critical theory (Published: 10 March 2009) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i1.1939. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the recent work on mirror neurons illuminates the character of our capacities for a politics of resonant receptivity in ways that both help us to comprehend the damages of our contemporary order and suggest indispensable alternative ethical-strategic registers and possible directions for organising a powerful movement towards radical democracy. In doing so, neuroscience simultaneously contributes to our understanding of the possibility and importance of a more durable radically democratic habitus. While the trope, ‘radically (...) democratic habitus’, may seem oxymoronic in light of Bourdieu’s extensive rendering of ‘habitus’, I suggest that research on mirror neurons discloses ways in which iterated practices and dispositional structures are crucial for democratic freedom.Keywords: radical democracy; mirror neurons; receptivity; political resonance; habitus; resonance machine; mimesis; affect. (shrink)

This article asks whether it is morally acceptable for a liberal democratic state to consider refugees' religious beliefs when determining which refugees it will allow to resettle in its territory. I examine four arguments that might be advanced to defend such religious discrimination: i) that it is not even pro tanto wrongful; ii) that refugee resettlement is a supererogatory act, and therefore the way in which a state might choose to engage in it cannot be a proper subject of moral (...) criticism; iii) that religious discrimination is necessary in the refugee resettlement context in order to preserve the political culture of the receiving state; and iv) that selecting refugees for resettlement in a religiously discriminatory manner may lead to a net increase in the total number of the world's refugees that are resettled. I conclude that the first and second rationales should be rejected outright. I argue that the third argument could theoretically succeed in justifying religious discrimination in refugee resettlement decisions, but is not at all plausible in the actual world we inhabit today, given the very low number of refugees that are resettled. I recommend caution in advancing the fourth defence of religious discrimination, and elucidate the range of considerations - as well as the empirical facts that cannot be assumed into existence in advance - upon which its success would depend. Keywords: religious discrimination, refugee resettlement, ethics, political philosophy, social philosophy, diversity, culture. (shrink)

This essay offers a critical review of Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani’s article ‘On agreed action without agreed notions.’ Ani’s paper makes a critique of Kwasi Wiredu’s consensual democracy to the conclusion that though desirable, left the way it is, the model of consensus on which the idea of Wiredu’s non-party democracy was founded is itself admirable but defective and, therefore, calls for further enhancements. While not suggesting that Wiredu’s idea is perfect, this paper provides some objections to Ani’s view (...) without necessarily aiming to make an apologetic defence of Wiredu. In the process, this paper, employing a critical conversation method, examines the most salient criticisms of Ani against Wiredu to the conclusion that Ani’s suggestion, by which he has opened up a new horizon in understanding human nature and assisting in making scholarly post-deliberation analysis, is impracticable. That is, it is still practically incapable of necessarily impacting any significant value to the process involved in attaining consensus itself. Keywords: Africa, Philosophy, Consensus, Democracy, Values. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that communalism is not uniquely African. It comes in different forms of social and psychological thinking which can be found in any culture and society whether capitalistic or socialistic where the notion of social belongingness through reasoned reflection transcends the desire for personal gratification. We claim that some values of communalism such as altruism, mutual cooperation, complementarity etc., can be useful in shaping a viable system of democracy for Africa, not because communalism is unique (...) to Africa, but because it is not. We contend that part of the challenges of democratic practice in Africa is the inclination to extreme form of individualism embedded in its capitalist roots. We show that the structure of democracy can evolve to adapt to changes mediated by communal values. Using the methods of hermeneutics and conversational thinking, we will argue that democratic practice in Africa can profit from communalism and should be restructured to admit relevant communal values. Keywords: African, Communalism, African Communalism, Democracy, Communalistic Democracy. (shrink)

Let me first thank Bill Scheuerman for his long and rich argument on my different considerations of global and European constitutionalism and democracy. It was an inspiring reading, and I have learnt a lot by it. I agree with most of his basic assumptions, and even with some of his more critical remarks. Here, I will first take the opportunity to make some revisions and clarify some conceptual misunderstandings. I will then make some additional remarks on my theoretical framework, (...) and the ideas of law and constitution which are fundamental for it. In the last section I discuss again the issue of state and constitution about which Scheuerman and I already had a short controversy in Constellations last year.1 This time, however, I will discuss the development of modern society in a broader historical, or evolutionary, perspective. Keywords: state; world state; monopoly of power; co-evolution; nation; national identity; territory; cituzenship; modern society (Published: 10 March 2009) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i1.1940. (shrink)

Starting from existing interpretations of Cavell’s account of moral perfectionism, this article seeks to elaborate an account of democratic responsiveness that foregrounds notions of ‘turning’ and ‘manifesting for another’. In contrast to readings of Cavell that privilege reason-giving, the article draws on the writings of Cavell as well as on Foucault’s work on parreēsia to elaborate a grammar of responsiveness that is attentive to a wider range of practices, forms of embodiment and modes of subjectivity. The article suggests that a (...) focus on the notions of ‘turning’ and ‘manifesting for another’ is crucial if we are to account for the processes through which political imagination is opened up so as to bring about novel ways of being and acting. The arguments are illustrated with reference to recent events in the Arab Spring as well as to the politics of redress in a posttransitional social movement, Khulumani. Keywords: democracy; responsiveness; Cavell; Foucault; parrēsia; frank-speaking; moral perfectionism; reason-giving; ‘turning’; ‘manifesting for another’; political imagination (Published: 23 December 2011) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4 , 2011, pp. 207-229. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v4i4.14448. (shrink)

Nuestro ensayo aborda el tema de la democracia y la sexualidad en las sociedades autoritarias. La importancia del tema para la reflexión filosófica política contemporánea no dejó de ser retomado por diversidad de autores, como ha quedado confirmado desde Freud, Reich, Marcuse a Foucacult, Giddens, Beck, entre otros. Para ello nos centramos en la idea de alternabilidad democrática y la constitución de la personalidad democrática a partir de la sexualidad. A la vez, queremos en esta oportunidad hacer un homenaje a (...) W. Reich, quien se propuso a lo largo de su extensa obra escrita a principios del siglo XX, buscar una mejoría para el hombre común por medio del conocimiento de la sexualidad humana con el fin de alcanzar una vida más completa y digna. Por sus investigaciones, este autor, tuvo como respuesta la ignorancia persecutoria de vida al proponer el gozo de ser sexual como principio para el restablecimiento de una socialidad democrática a partir del factor del principio democrático de vida erótico y sexual ilícito en los humanos. Palabras clave: democracia; sexualidad; alternabilidad; política; socialidad; terapia; represión; autoritarismo; militarismo; gozo de ser. Democracy and sexuality. Homage to Wilhelm ReichOur paper addresses the topic of democracy and sexuality in authoritarian societies. The importance of the topic to contemporary political philosophy has not been overlooked by diverse authors, from Freud, Reich and Marcuse to Foucault, Giddens and Beck, among others. We focus on the idea of democratic alternation and the constitution of the democratic personality from sexuality. We also would like to pay homage to W. Reich, who intended, throughout his extensive work written in the early XX century, the improvement of ordinary man by getting to know human sexuality, reaching thereby a more complete and dignified life. By means of his investigations, this author proposed the sexual joy of being as a principle to restore democratic sociality, based on the democratic principle of erotic and sexual life which is implicit in humans Keywords: Democracy; Sexuality; Alternation; Politics; Sociality; Therapy; Repression; Authoritarianism; Militarism; Joy of Being. (shrink)

En este artículo revisamos la relación que se establece entre la democracia y el proyecto socialista. Debido a que las democracias actuales son predominantemente representativas de tradición liberal, también analizamos su ideal central: la libertad, en relación con el valor más importante de toda propuesta socialista: la igualdad. Nos referimos a la propuesta de Cornelius Castoriadis de un proyecto de autonomía personal y colectiva que entiende la libertad y la igualdad como propósitos políticos, por lo que la verdadera democracia se (...) identificaría con el socialismo. Palabras clave: Democracia; socialismo; libertad; igualdad; autonomía. Democracy and Socialism? An approach to Cornelius Castoriadis’ proposalIn this paper we review the relation between democracy and the socialist project. Since current democracies are predominantly representative and liberal, we also analyze their central ideal, namely, freedom, in connection with the most important value of every socialist proposal, namely, equality. We will refer to Cornelius Castoriadis’ proposal, centered on a project of personal and collective autonomy that recognizes both freedom and equality as political purposes, whereby true democracy would be identified with socialism. Keywords: Democracy; socialism; freedom; equality; autonomy. (shrink)

La democracia vista desde premisas filosóficas críticas es la forma de poder que incentiva una estrategia vigorosa que sostiene el régimen económico globalizado y enajena los derechos fundamentales. Se explica su inicio en la antigüedad griega y su resurgimiento en el siglo de las luces en Francia con Rousseau hasta anclarse en la política contemporánea como el régimen “de las mayorías” y “de la equidad socio política”. La democracia desde la modernidad se desarrolla en América Latina como régimen de una (...) ideología que incentiva la retórica demagógica, siendo capaz de encubrir los totalitarismos y las dictaduras. La democracia, régimen político, ideología de instrumento constitucional de la economía globalizada somete hoy por hoy las consciencias y acapara con fuerza las estrategias de los dispositivos de dominación y de control. Nuestro propósito es tomar partido por una posición Latinoamericana, desde un cambio de valoración subjetiva que contrarreste los mecanismos que la promueven y respaldan. Palabras clave: democracia; democracia en América Latina; desarrollo histórico; subjetivación; autonomía social. Which Democracy for Latin America?Democracy, viewed from critical philosophical premises, is the form of power that incentives a vigorous strategy supporting the globalized economical regime and alienates fundamental rights. Its beginning can be tracked to Ancient Greece, and its resurgence in France’s Century of Lights with Rousseau, ultimately settling down in contemporary politics as the regime “of majorities” and of “socio-political equity”. From Modern Times democracy unfolds in Latin America as a regime linked with an ideology which encourages demagogical rhetoric and is capable of covering up totalitarianisms and dictatorships. Democracy, as a political regime and the ideology of globalized economy, subjugates consciences and fiercely monopolizes the devices of domination and control. Our aim is to argue for a Latin American stand, stemming from a change of subjective valuation which counteracts the mechanisms that promote and support the former. Keywords: Democracy; Democracy in Latin America; Human Development; Subjectivation; Social Autonomy. (shrink)

El súbito consenso que se ha producido en nuestros días alrededor de la importancia de la noción democracia no se ha acompañado de una reflexión filosófica sobre su sentido moderno. La obra filosófica de Claude Lefort ha contribuido a llenar este vacío teórico. Para Lefort, el sentido de la democracia moderna no puede revelarse, como ha supuesto la ciencia política, a través de la descripción del funcionamiento de sus instituciones, sino puede estudiarse mediante la exploración de su dimensión simbólica. En (...) efecto, la fundación y el destino de la democracia son inseparables de la indeterminación de sus fundamentos y de la infigurabilidad del poder, de la ley y del saber. Origen y destino que bien pueden ser rastreados a la luz del contraste entre la sociedad democrática y la sociedad totalitaria. El presente ensayo se ocupa de contrastar la dimensión simbólica de ambas formas de sociedad. Palabras clave: Democracia; totalitarismo; dimensión simbólica; político; Claude Lefort Democracy and totalitarianism: The Symbolic Dimension of the Political according to Claude LefortThe sudden consensus prevailing nowadays on the importance of the concept of democracy has not been accompanied by a philosophical reflection on its modern sense. Claude Lefort’s philosophical work has helped to fill this theoretical vacuum. According to Lefort, the sense of modern democracy cannot be disclosed, as political science has assumed, just by describing the operation of its institutions. Rather, it may be studied by exploring its symbolic dimension. In fact, democracy’s origin and fate are inseparable from the indeterminacy of its foundation and the non-figurable nature of power, law and knowledge. Such an origin and fate may indeed be tracked in light of the contrast between the democratic society and the totalitarian one. This essay aims to contrast the symbolic dimension of both forms of society. Keywords : Democracy; totalitarianism; symbolic dimension; political; Claude Lefort. (shrink)

Usualmente, Francisco de Miranda es conocido como el Precursor de la Independencia de América Latina. Sin entrar a detallar esta aseveración, podemos afirmar que su accionar estuvo orientado por su pensamiento político. Pensamiento poco conocido hasta entonces. No obstante, en él se encuentran elaboradas unas ideas que podemos señalar, sin lugar a dudas, de originales, tanto por el contexto político en que las realizó, como por su actualidad. En este sentido, su labor desplegada en Venezuela a su regreso de Londres, (...) (sólo un año y ocho meses) fue más productiva de lo que se conoce. Tal es el caso, de su participación en los actos preparativos de la independencia el 05 de julio de 1811, como los resultados de la Confederación de 1811, que se originan por la aprobación de la Constitución de ese mismo año el 21 de diciembre. Pretendemos analizar la actuación de Miranda en ese evento, al igual que revisar el alcance de sus opiniones con relación a aquella Constitución. Ello nos permitirá evaluar el pensamiento político de Miranda, en correspondencia con lo acaecido en la primera república. Palabras clave: democracia; cabildos; derechos humanos; confederación; federación. Francisco de Miranda and 1811’s ConstitutionFrancisco de Miranda is usually known as the forerunner of Latin America’s independence. Without getting into a detailed examination of this statement, we can say that his doing was oriented by his political thought, which was little known until then. Nevertheless, in the latter one can find some ideas which are undoubtedly original, due to both the political context in which he posed them, and their current validity. In this regard, his work in Venezuela upon returning from London (just one year and eight months) was more productive than is known. Such is the case of his participation in the preparatory actions of the independence, on July 5, 1811, as well as the results of 1811’s Confederation, which were brought about by the approval of that same year’s Constitution, on December 21. We aim to analyze Miranda’s role in that event, as well as to go over the reach of his opinions regarding that constitution. This will allow us to evaluate Miranda’s political thought Keywords: Democracy; City Councils; Human Rights; Confederation; Federation. (shrink)

En este artículo se señalan algunas condiciones que son necesarias para el desarrollo y estabilidad de la democracia contemporánea, las cuales están vinculadas tanto al problema de la limitación de su poder como al de la justicia social. El texto está estructurado en tres partes: en la primera, se presenta un breve panorama de los niveles de apoyo que tiene la democracia en América Latina, destacando en especial las condiciones de desigualdad que hay en México; en la segunda, se analiza (...) la propuesta de Norberto Bobbio, para quien la democracia se caracteriza por ser representativa, política y formal; en la tercera, se recuperan algunos elementos de uno de sus principales discípulos, Luigi Ferrajoli, quien ha señalado la necesidad de la democracia sustancial y los derechos fundamentales para limitar el poder de la democracia formal. Palabras clave: Democracia; derechos fundamentales; desigualdad social Limits of Democracy and Social JusticeIn this article I point out some necessary conditions for the development and stability of contemporary democracy; conditions which are linked to both, the problem of the limitation of its power and social justice. The text is structured into three parts. In the first I present a brief overview of the levels of support that democracy has in Latin America, focusing especially on the inequality conditions existing in Mexico. In the second part I analyze the proposal of Norberto Bobbio´s, for whom democracy is characterized by being representative, political and formal. In the third part, I recall some points dealt with by one of his disciples, Luigi Ferrajoli, who has pointed to the need for substantial democracy and fundamental rights to limit the power of formal democracy. Keywords: Democracy; fundamental rights; social inequality. (shrink)

"Donald Moon argues that neither rights nor equality can serve as adequate moral or political basis for a welfare state in addressing the Hegel’s dilemma. The Hegel’s dilemma is that organisation of economic life through the market in a democratic state produces great wealth as well as great poverty and individuals in such state fall in either category. The wide gulf in wealth among individuals in a market economy is a problem which a democratic welfare state seeks to address but, (...) for Moon, rights or equality is not adequate moral and political basis of the welfare state for solving the problem. He proposes the principles of economic management, provision of services and social insurance as alternative and adequate bases for a welfare state in addressing the problem. This paper queries Moon’s proposal. The paper argues that Moon’s proposed institutional principles are inadequate in addressing the problem without a fundamental moral and/or political basis upon which these principles can be justifiably founded. The paper posits that rights provide a plausible and adequate foundational moral and political basis for the principles in order to adequately address the problem created by the market economy without jeopardising the idea of human self-respect. Keywords: Democracy, Equality, Social Insurance, Market Economy, Rights, Welfare State ". (shrink)

O artigo defende que, desde a segunda metade do século XX, o processo de evolução de nossas sociedades é marcado pela acelerada fusão e pela cada vez mais intensa miscigenação de culturas, que apontam para o enfraquecimento das culturas e das instituições tradicionais por causa da constituição de uma nova cultura, fundida e miscigenada, afirmadora do pluralismo e do individualismo, bases para o universalismo moral. Além disso, nesse mesmo período, a crítica ao modelo de modernização ocidental, que estaria destruindo formas (...) alternativas de sociabilidade, de relação com o mundo e de produção da vida material, passou a dar a tônica da atuação de novos movimentos sociais, grupos culturais e iniciativas cidadãs. Com isso, é possível perceber-se um aspecto político-cultural altamente emancipatório em nossas sociedades, isto é, a desconstrução das culturas e da autoridade das instituições tradicionais, bem como a necessidade de repensar-se o modelo de progresso e de desenvolvimento ocidentais, em favor da democracia, dos direitos humanos e de formas alternativas de vida, o que aponta para uma reavaliação positiva, em termos de Ocidente e mesmo do Brasil, das culturas indígenas e negras para a formação das nossas sociedades e para a superação de seus problemas.: the paper argues that, since second half of twentieth century, the process of evolution of our societies is characterized by rapid fusion and very intense miscegenation of cultures, what points to impairment of traditional cultures and institutions, because the constitution of a new culture, fused and mixed, affirming pluralism and individualism that are the basis for moral universalism. Moreover, in this same period, the critic to the western model of modernization, that would be destroying alternative forms of sociability, relation with de world and production of material life, become current with new social movements, cultural groups and citizen initiatives. So, it is possible to perceive a highly emancipatory political-cultural aspect in our societies, namely the deconstruction of traditional cultures and authority of institutions, in favor of the democracy, human rights and alternative forms of life that conducts to a positive revaluation, in terms of Western and even Brazil, of indigenous and black cultures to the constitution of our societies and the overcoming of their social problems. Keywords: Democracy; Fusion of Cultures; Tradition; Modernization; Revaluation. (shrink)

Abstrak: Jacques Rancière, pemikir Prancis kelahiran Aljazair (1940-sekarang), konsisten dengan gagasannya tentang kesetaraan bagi setiap orang dan semua orang. Baginya, demokrasi bukanlah bentuk pemerintahan atau tatanan sosial. Kesetaraan yang kontingen dalam tatanan sosial, menurut Rancière, menjadikan demokrasi dapat terjadi kapan saja dan di mana saja, tidak dapat diprediksi. Rancière mengajak kita untuk terbuka pada gangguan-gangguan demos dan kemunculan subyek-subyek baru di masa datang sebagai dinamika dalam tatanan sosial yang tidak perlu ditumpas atau dihambat. Politik demokrasi adalah sebuah perselisihan. Namun perselisihan (...) tersebut bukan tindakan revolusi untuk menghancurkan tatanan sosial yang telah ada menjadi tatanan yang sama sekali baru. Demokrasi adalah subyektivasi politik yang mengganggu tatanan sosial dominan yang dilakukan oleh demos untuk memverifikasi kesetaraan. Kemunculan demos mentransformasi tatanan sosial menjadi bentuk yang berbeda, yang mengakomodasi keberadaan mereka yang tidak terhitung (the wrong, yang salah). Kata-kata Kunci: Demokrasi, kesetaraan, demos, perselisihan, subyektivikasi, yang salah. Abstract: Jacques Rancière, a French philosopher born in Algeria (1940-present), affirms the equality of anyone and everyone. He analyzes the so-called democracy not as a kind of state or social order. Equality which is contingent in the social order, for Rancière, shows that democracy could occurs everytime and everywhere, democracy could not be predicted. Rancière brings us to have an open eye in front of dispute of the demos and the subjectification of any new subjects. This is an inherent and a dynamic of the social order that should not be repressed or stopped. The democratic politics is a dispute. But the dispute is not an act of revolution to destroy the existing social order to create an entirely new order. Democracy is the political subjectification that disrupts the police order by the demos to verify the equality of anyone and everyone. The emergence of the demos transforms the social order into a different form when this order accommodates the existence of the wrong. Keywords: Democracy, equality, demos, dispute, subjectification, the wrong. (shrink)

This essay examines how Brazilian literature has broached changes in the country’s political and social scenario since 2013. Literary production has not only considered socio-political upheavals such as the 2013 protests, the 2016 impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, and, more recently, the assassination of Rio city council member Marielle Franco as well as the 2020-21 COVID-19 pandemic. Literature has also expanded the signification of “democracy,” broadening the democratic lexicon by employing a language of both demands and entitlements and dispute. (...) By creating a democratic imaginary that oscillates between vindication and exigency, contemporary Brazilian literature delineates the tensions inherent to present-day democratic culture, poised between expanding rights and what scholars have called a "democratic erosion."Keywords: Democracy. Democratic Erosion. Literature. Poetry. ResumoEste ensaio examina como a literatura brasileira tem abordado mudanças no cenário político e social do país desde 2013. A produção literária não aborda apenas levantes sociopolíticos como os protestos de 2013, o impeachment da presidente Dilma Rousseff em 2016 e, mais recentemente, o assassinato da vereadora Marielle Franco e a pandemia COVID-19. A literatura também tem expandido o significado de “democracia”, ampliando o léxico democrático ao empregar uma linguagem de demandas, direitos e disputa. Ao criar um imaginário democrático que oscila entre a reivindicação e a denúncia, a literatura brasileira contemporânea delineia as tensões inerentes à cultura democrática atual, equilibrada entre a expansão de direitos e o que os estudiosos chamam de "erosão democrática".Palavras-chave: Democracia. Erosão Democrática. Literatura. Poesia. (shrink)

Most analysts agree that democratic theorists have not offered a persuasive answer to the question of how the boundaries of a demos, a democratic people, should legitimately be defined. Some contend that boundaries should be maintained in ways that preserve sufficient sense of common identity to sustain support for redistributive policies. Many others endorse the “principle of all affected interests,” but it has been widely criticized as unrealistically destructive of too many existing community boundaries. This essay argues for an alternative (...) “principle of constituted identities.” It holds that, subject to certain important qualifications, modern constitutional democracies, at least, are morally obligated to extend the option of full membership to all those whose identities have been substantially constituted through such regimes’ coercive policies. Keywords : civic boundaries; principle of affected interests; constitutional democracy; stories of peoplehood; cultural identity (Published online: 25 August, 2008) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics 2008. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v1i3.1860. (shrink)

This essay considers the role of the ‘all affected interests’ principle in democratic theory, focusing on debates concerning its form, substance and relationship to the resolution of the democratic boundary problem. It begins by defending an ‘all actually affected’ formulation of the principle against Goodin’s ‘incoherence argument’ critique of this formulation, before addressing issues concerning how to specify the choice set appropriate to the principle. Turning to the substance of the principle, the argument rejects Nozick’s dismissal of its intuitive appeal (...) and considers the two arguments advanced in favour of the principle as a criterion of democratic inclusion: the interlinked interests argument and the tracking power argument. It is shown that neither of these arguments can substantiate a view of the principle as a criterion of democratic inclusion, although both ground a constitutional understanding of the principle as specifying the scope of a duty of justification. It is then proposed that the principle can play an important role in a two-stage resolution of the democratic boundary problem in which it addresses the question of who is entitled to inclusion in the ‘pre-political’ demos that determines whether to constitute a polity. The second stage of this resolution requires an answer to the question of who should constitute the ‘political demos’, that is, the demos of a constituted polity and it is argued that a version of the ‘‘all subjected persons’’ principle can appropriately play this role.Keywords: all affected interests; all subjected persons; democracy; boundary problem; demos problem. (shrink)

Keywords John Dewey - Pragmatism - Confucianism - Democracy.

This is a review of Gillian Brock’s new book, Global justice: a cosmopolitan account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) which sets out the central theses of the book and then offers a critical appraisal of its central arguments. My specific concern is that Brock gives an insufficiently robust account of human rights with which to define the nature of global justice and thereby leaves cosmopolitanism too vulnerable to the normative pull of local and traditional moral conceptions that fall short of (...) the universalism that cosmopolitans should be able to embrace. Keywords: cosmopolitanism; human rights; global justice; Rawls; humanitarian intervention; global governance; liberal nationalism; democracy; equality; immigration (Published: 4 December 2009) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2009, pp. 369–382. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i4.2107. (shrink)

Se presentan los resultados parciales de una investigación realizada entre los años 2010 Y 2011 cuya pretensión fue indagar la manera cómo van emergiendo en cuanto sujetos político, los jóvenes de una universidad pública. Para ello se desarrolló un diseño cualitativo constituido por ocho fases yvive..

The widespread impression that recent philosophy of science has pioneered exploration of the “social dimensions of scientific knowledge” is shown to be in error, partly due to a lack of appreciation of historical precedent, and partly due to a misunderstanding of how the social sciences and philosophy have been intertwined over the last century. This paper argues that the referents of “democracy” are an important key in the American context, and that orthodoxies in the philosophy of science tend to (...) be molded by the actual regimes of science organization within which they are embedded. These theses are illustrated by consideration of three representative philosophers of science: John Dewey, Hans Reichenbach, and Philip Kitcher.Author Keywords: Social dimensions of science; Logical positivism; Democracy; Context of discovery/justification; Goals of science. (shrink)

Many of the philosophers of African politics who have argued that the political challenges of Nigeria, and of Africa as a whole are as a result of the impunity and corruption of post-independence Nigeria leaders also give the impression that the people of Nigeria are mere innocent victims because in their arguments all the ills of the Nigerian state exist only because the country have not experienced or discovered an honest and capable political leader. The scholars argue to the effect (...) that all that Nigeria can do is simply to hope for the ascendance of a Messiah, who being an honest, capable and patriotic leader will on his own volition become committed to the cause of reversing the situation in order to turn around all the ills of the nation. Employing the examples of two prominent scholars of African politics the paper employs the epistemological rigor of analysis and logic to examine and make a critique of the underlying assumptions of the scholars and identifies the theoretical flaws of believing that political representatives are substantively political leaders, that Nigerians are helpless victims who on their own are incapable of reversing the situation and that Nigeria should hope for a political saviour who will turn around all the social and political ills of Nigeria on his own accord. Keywords : Ignocence, Messianism, Epistemology, Democracy, Nigeria. (shrink)

Resumen Hace 78 años, en “Un Mundo Feliz”, el escritor Aldous Huxley, en un prodigioso tono satírico, se anticipó con asombrosa precisión a los grandes temas de la agenda científica y política del Siglo XXI: la reproducción controlada, el choque de civilizaciones y la clonación humana, entre otros. Hace unos días, a mediados de mayo de 2010, el J. Craig Venter Institute anunció que había producido la primera célula sin historia genética creada en un laboratorio a partir de un genoma (...) sintetizado químicamente. Hoy, describiendo el estado “posthumano” de la historia, Francis Fukuyama afirma: “Huxley tenía razón”. Palabras clave: bioética; ingeniería genética; democracia; totalitarismo; biotécnica; eugenesia ;utopías; distopias. Huxley’s Prophecy and the Biotech Century: Post-human society is reaching usSeventy-eight years ago, in “A Happy World”, the writer Aldous Huxley, in a prodigious satiric tone, anticipated with astonishing accurateness the big topics of the XXI Century’s scientific and political agenda: controlled reproduction, civilization clash and human cloning, among others. Some days ago, in mid-May 2010, the J. Craig Venter Institute announced that it had produced the first genetic history free cell created in a laboratory from a chemically synthesized genome. Today, in describing the “post-human” state of history, Francis Fukuyama asserts: “Huxley was right”. Keywords: Bioethics;Genetic Engineering; Democracy; Totalitarianism; Biotechnology;Eugenics ; Utopias; Dystopias. (shrink)

The literature on transnational civil society encompasses a number of conflicting views regarding civil society organizations’ (CSOs) behavior and impacts and the desirability of civil society involvement in international policymaking. This piece suggests that this lack of consensus arises from the diverse range of contexts in which CSOs operate and the wide variety of activities in which it engages. This article seeks to organize and analyze the disparate data on civil society by developing a context-based standard of democratic legitimacy for (...) CSOs. The article disaggregates democracy into input, throughput, and output components, and shows how CSOs must support or manifest different aspects of democracy in order to be democratically legitimate in a given context. Applying this standard to existing works, the article identifies several problems in current research, including a failure to recognize ways the democratic imperatives of transnational advocacy differ from national advocacy, and the potential for international civil society interventions to undermine local democratic processes. Keywords: transnational civil society; democracy; global governance; NGOs; international policymaking (Published: 1 September 2010) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2010, pp. 217-238. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v3i3.4882. (shrink)

The “post-truth” phenomenon is not primarily a cognitive problem, but a moral or existential problem, a problem of self-deception. But what does this mean? In order to clarify that, two things need to be discussed. First, if the conception of belief is rejected according to which a belief has sense in isolation from the roles it, and the holding of it, plays in our lives, then the problem of self-deception needs to be met as a problem of life. Second, a (...) problem of life is not something that individuals get into all by themselves. In other words, ways of living can be self-deceptive. The task of the text is hence to discuss some of the ways in which truth, belief and self-deception unfold on this non-individual level, specifically on the political one. Keywords: post-truth, self-deception, belief, democracy, Simone Weil. (shrink)

En estas páginas sólo se enumeran de manera puntual un conjunto de prejuicios políticos que están impidiendo un debate razonable sobre la democracia; aún cuando también incluyen unas consideraciones sobre algunas consecuencias prácticas que han provocado esos prejuicios. En especial, se argumentará que en América Latina (para usar este nombre genérico que oculta diferencias culturales, realidades sociales e importantes matices políticos) esos prejuicios han cultivado y justificado una comprensión y una acción política que ha resultado perjudicial para el sistema democrático; (...) al igual que desastrosa para casi todos los ciudadanos, incluidos quienes se han encargado de promoverla y liderarla. Palabras clave: América Latina; democracia; política sin reglas; prejuicios políticos; fraude; estafa; uso instrumental del poder; consecuencias prácticas; debate razonable; comprensión de la política; lenguaje político, fe pública. Politics without Rules (The Four Prejudices of Apocalypse)In the following pages I simply list a series of political prejudices which prevent a reasonable debate on democracy. I also consider some practical consequences which such prejudices have brought about. Especially, I argue that in Latin America (a generic name that masks cultural differences, social realities and important political overtones), these prejudices have encouraged and justified both an understanding and a political action that have proven not only harmful to the democratic system, but also disastrous to almost all citizens, including those who have led and promoted the former. Keywords: Latin America; democracy; politics without rules; political prejudices; fraud; scam; instrumental use of power;practical consequences; reasonable debate; understanding of politics; political language; public faith. (shrink)

An egalitarian interpretation and defence of Rawls's principles of justice and their institutional and policy implications in response to G. A. Cohen's criticisms of Rawls's alleged justification of unequalizing incentives. Keywords Applied Philosophy Social and Political Philosophy Rawls G.A. Cohen difference priciple incentives justice property-owning democracy.

En el presente artículo analizamos cuáles son las posibilidades de una nueva democracia basada en las condiciones de producción de la sociedad y no en la representación política del Estado. Desarrollamos así el concepto negriano de La República constituyente, como democracia real de la multitud global, en contraposición a las ideas, intrínsecamente totalitarias, de pueblo y soberanía. Palabras clave: Antonio Negri; democracia real; república constituyente; multitud global; ideas totalitarias. Antonio Negri, the constituent Republic and the democracy to comeIn this (...) paper we analyze what are the possibilities for a new democracy, based on society’s production conditions rather than on the State’s political representation. We thereby develop Negri’s concept of constituent Republic as real democracy of the global multitude, as opposed to the intrinsically totalitarian ideas of people and sovereignty. Keywords : Antonio Negri; real democracy; constituent Republic; global multitude; totalitarian ideas. (shrink)

El propósito de este ensayo es explorar la doctrina política de Platón sobre la democracia a partir del concepto sinergia, es decir, de poder sinérgico, colaboración creativa que reduce los grados de dominación en el régimen político, tal como lo entiende James Craig. Aunque el concepto de poder sinérgico no fue conocido por Platón y ha sido descuidado tanto por la politología como por la filosofía política, considero que es el criterio indispensable para dejar en claro muchas de las ambigüedades (...) del pensamiento platónico. Partimos de la paradójica premisa que Platón pretende crear un autoritarismo absoluto sin dominación. En el desarrollo, se hará evidente que el pensamiento político de Platón está condicionado por unos supuestos que le obligan a aceptar un utopismo irrealizable. Entre esos supuestos destaca la Falacia Angélica, tal como la expone Mortimer Adler. También supone una concepción absolutista de la libertad positiva, así como que la libertad moral atrapada en un estado estancado. La conclusión se resume en un cuadro comparativo entre las características de la utopía platónica y el ideal sinérgico. Destaca en dicho cuadro como Platón toma partido por el autoritarismo virtuoso que condena la transformación política al reino de lo imaginario, en vez de tomar partido por las formas de gobierno compartido. Esto ha dado como resultado histórico la tentación totalitaria de pensar que hay algo mejor que la democracia. Palabras Clave : Platón; política; democracia; sinergia; libertad moral; libertad positiva; falacia angélica. Plato against democracy or the misfortunes of synergyThe purpose of this essay is to explore Plato’s political doctrine on democracy in the light of the concept of synergy, that is to say, of synergic power, which is a creative cooperation that lowers the degrees of domination within the political regime, as is understood by James Craig. Although the concept of synergic power was not known by Plato, and has been neglected by both political science and political philosophy, I consider it to be the indispensable criterion to clarify many ambiguities of Platonic thought. We start from the paradoxical premise that Plato intends to create an absolute authoritarianism without domination. As we progress it will become evident that Plato’s political thought is conditioned by assumptions that make him accept an unfeasible utopianism. Among those assumptions there stands out the Angelical Fallacy, as is exposed by Mortimer Adler. It also implies an absolutistic conception of positive freedom, as well as the idea that moral freedom is trapped in a stagnant state. The conclusion is summed up in a chart comparing the characteristics of Platonic utopia and synergic ideal. In that chart there stands out how Plato takes sides for virtuous authoritarianism, which dooms political transformation to the realm of the imaginary, instead of taking sides for the forms of shared government. This has brought as a historical result the totalitarian temptation of thinking that there might be something better than democracy. Keywords : Plato; Politics; Democracy; Synergy; Moral Freedom; Positive Freedom; Angelical Fallacy. (shrink)

Mi problema es como reconciliar una fundamentación racional de instituciones democráticas, que en nuestras sociedades tienden a ser de índole liberal, con la creciente complejidad demográfica de las sociedades contemporáneas. Mi punto de vista es que esta fundamentación debería ser deliberativa y discursiva, es decir, debería garantizar una participación reflexiva de todos los ciudadanos en el diseño y sostenimiento de sus instituciones públicas. Ahora bien, ¿cómo alcanzar este ideal en sociedades cuyas complejidades dificultan la coordinación de intereses y la participación (...) discursiva, lo que vuelve a sus ciudadanos dispuestos a sacrificar sus libertades para rendirlas a un poder político despótico y totalitario? Palabras claves: instituciones democráticas y sociedades complejas; democracia deliberativa. The constitution of democratic citizenship and the problem of the foundation of knowledge in complex societiesMy problem is how to reconcile a rational foundation of democratic institutions, which in our societies tend to be of a liberal nature, with the increasing demographic complexity of contemporary societies. My contention is that this rational and liberal foundation ought to be deliberative and discursive, that is to say, it must guarantee a reflective participation of all citizens in the design and maintenance of their public institutions. However, how could this ideal be achieved within societies with such complexities that make coordination of interests and discursive participation difficult, thus making their citizens willing to sacrifice their liberties, in order to surrender them to a despotic or totalitarian political power? Keywords: Democratic institutions and complex societies; Deliberative democracy. (shrink)

El trabajo somete a discusión algunos elementos y argumentos del ensayo "Anti-Nietzsche. La crueldad de lo político" de Jorge Polo Blanco. Analizo el libro de Polo considerando el problema de la diversidad de caracterizaciones parciales que obtiene la figura de Nietzsche en el pensamiento filosófico contemporáneo y el desafío que supone actualizar a Nietzsche a la luz de nuestras sensibilidades democráticas. Examino los capítulos del libro apuntando algunas de las incorrecciones y aspectos más dudosos de su argumentario “anti-nietzscheano” e incidiendo (...) en la importancia del estudio de fuentes (Quellenforschung) y de la historia de las ediciones de la obra de Nietzsche para una interpretación filosófica rigurosa. Palabras clave: Nietzsche, Política, Democracia, Crítica genética, Fuentes, Ediciones. -/- Abstract: This article discusses some elements and arguments of Jorge Polo Blanco’s book, Anti-Nietzsche. La crueldad de lo político. I analyze Polo’s book while considering the problem of the diversity of characterizations that Nietzsche receives in contemporary philosophical thought and the challenge of evaluating his philosophy in light of our democratic sensibilities. I examine the different chapters and identify some of the inaccuracies and most dubious aspects of Polo’s “anti-Nietzschean” argument. In doing so, I stress the importance of source research (Quellenforschung) and the history of the editions for rigorous philosophical analyses. Keywords: Nietzsche, Politics, Democracy, Genetic Criticism, Sources, Editions. (shrink)

The vertiginous rise of right-wing populism, especially in its “nationalist, xenophobic and conservative form”, and some “racist, anti-Semitic, homophobic and sexist” drifts associated with this phenomenon – whether real or perceived as such – make the mainstream media play a double role. On the one hand, the mainstream media reflect the struggle for political hegemony between different vested interests; on the other hand, they engage in the fight against right-wing populism blasting both right-wing populist candidates and their voters or supporters. (...) Many mainstream journalists ask citizens to realize a “sanitary cordon”, a “wall” or a “republican front” to block far-right populism and preserve liberal democracy. Moreover, they urge people to be wary of all attempts to “dediabolize” or “normalize” some tokens of right-wing populism. The main idea of this article is that right-wing populism is more harmless than is generally believed and, if excessive, negative media coverage doesn’t baffle but feed it. Populism is essentially a latent side effect of liberal democracy. Populism rises and becomes obtrusive only if a significant part of society perceives a regime of illiberal majoritarianism instead of one of liberal democracy. Right-wing populists are chiefly frustrated “ci-devants” who feel dispossessed of their past, identity, properties, qualities, privileges or titles. Inasmuch as the causes of collective frustration are many and varied (e.g. the real or just perceived corruption of the elites, the “system”, the deep state, the relocation of jobs, immigration, national sovereignty, national identity, communitarianism, radical Islamism, the status of some traditional institutions, some chapters of official history, etc.), there will always be right-wing populists, whether they are self-declared or covert. By adopting David G. Hackett’s thesis that the media are “agents of hegemony”, we applied the critical analysis of discourse to a set of 346 media articles in order to reveal the discursive sources of power, domination, inequality and partiality. The articles appeared in The New York Times and Le Monde during the period 2016-2017, at the time when the presidential elections took place in the United States and France. The articles were selected according to the occurrence of the keywords “Donald Trump” – “populism” and “Marine Le Pen” – “populisme” within the titles. The analysis of these articles reveals a divisive discursive structure that correspond to a real political cleavage in society. It is true that populism presents a “Manichean outlook”, in which there are only friends and foes” and no compromise is possible. It is also true that mainstream media reinforce this Manichean perspective on society and make populists feel marginalized and politically disempowered. The mainstream media may appease right-wing populism if they treat its followers as legitimate and equal political actors. For this, they have to give up the narrative structures that underscore insurmountable divergences and irreconcilable interests. In a liberal democracy, mass media should chiefly play the role of mediator. They may not aim to defeat or re-educate certain categories of citizens just because they advocate “wrong” political solutions. (shrink)

_One of the strongest arguments against hate speech legislation is the so-called Argument from Political Speech. This argument problematizes the restrictions that might be placed on political opinions or political critique when these opinions are expressed in a way which can be interpreted as ‘hateful’ towards minority groups. One of the strongest free speech scholars opposing hate speech legislation is Ronald Dworkin, who stresses that having restrictions on hate speech is, in fact, illegitimate in a liberal democracy. The right (...) to express oneself freely concerning any political decision is, according to Dworkin, a core democratic principle; it is what self-governance – and hence liberal democracies – are built upon. Dworkin and many other free speech scholars based in the United States see hate speech legislation as a threat to expressing oneself freely and critically. I argue that Dworkin and other US-based free speech scholars tend to overlook actual hate speech legislation in countries where such laws have been implemented and have functioned for decades. Furthermore, I argue that the real threat against political speech lies not in hate speech legislation but rather outside of the law, namely, in private institutions such as universities and museums. Restrictions on political speech in various societal circumstances have been on the rise over the last decades – first and foremost in the US. I analyse why these restrictions on political speech are more widespread in the only Western country without laws against hate speech than they are in countries with implemented hate speech laws._ _Keywords_: political speech, hate speech, hate speech legislation, private institu-tions, universities, USA. (shrink)

Este artículo ofrece una evaluación crítica de la revolución política en el contexto de una democracia constitucional y, en particular, de su justificación discursiva en el terreno de las propias instituciones democráticas. Para ello, se revisa el concepto mismo de revolución, mostrando que su definición política o técnica la hace incompatible con el modelo de cambio social aceptable o justificable en un sistema democrático. Esta revisión conceptual pretende clarificar de manera normativa la imposibilidad de justificar el encomio de la revolución (...) como uno de los recursos discursivos en el terreno del juego pluralista democrático de nuestra época. Palabras clave: revolución; democracia constitucional; progreso; filosofía de la historia; métodos pacíficos We Are All Revolutionary. Is Political Revolution Justifiable in Democratic Terms?This article offers a critical assessment of political revolution in the context of a constitutional democracy. Particularly, it assesses its discursive justification in the realm of democratic institutions themselves. In order to do so, I will go over the very concept of revolution, thus showing that its political or technical definition makes it incompatible with the model of social change which might be acceptable or justifiable within a democratic system. This conceptual analysis aims to normatively clarify the impossibility of justifying the praise of revolution as one of the discursive resources within the realm of the pluralistic, democratic game of our time. Keywords: Revolution; Constitutional Democracy; Progress; Philosophy of History; Pacific means. (shrink)

The concept of consensus is often appealed to in discussions of biomedical ethics and applied ethics, and it plays an important role in many influential ethical theories. Consensus is an especially influential notion among theorists who reject ethical realism and who frame ethics as a practice of discourse rather than a body of objective knowledge. It is also a practically important notion when moral decision making is subject to bureaucratic organization and oversight, as is increasingly becoming the case in medicine. (...) Two models of consensus are examined and criticized: pluralistic consensus and overlapping consensus. As an alternative to these models, the paper argues that consensus refers to the dialogic aspects of a broader normative conception of democratic moral agency. When the preconditions for that dialogic democratic practice are met, consensus has a justificatory role in ethics; when they are not, consensus, as distinct from mere agreement, does not emerge and can have no moral authority. Keywords: applied ethics, bioethics, consensus, contract theory, democracy, discourse ethics, liberalism CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This essay critically engages proposals by Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar meant to combat ‘the resource curse.’ Pogge and Wenar call for boycotts against stealing oppressors, sharing the expectation that the boycotts will significantly contribute to economic and political reform in the target countries. In contrast, I argue that liberal democracies should indeed stop trading with dictators and civil warriors, but for inward rather than outward looking reasons. We, the citizens of liberal democracies through our elected governments, ought to boycott (...) severely oppressive regimes for the sake of our own moral integrity*simply in order to stop being complicit in what is effectively massive scale armed robbery. This inward looking thesis is distinctive in three ways. First, it contrasts with the dominant assumption that global reform must be grounded in the achievement of better political and economic outcomes for others. Second, the inward look manages to avoid the profound empirical uncertainty associated with any attempt to predict the direct effects of global rule changes on domestic institutions. Third, by isolating each democracy’s responsibility for each case of illicit trade, the inward looking strategy deals more adequately than the outward view with collective action problems, and therefore has a greater chance of grounding actual reforms, with whatever prospects for better outcomes they may entail.Keywords: resource curse; boycotts; democratic trade; Thomas Pogge; Leif Wenar. (shrink)

This essay critically engages proposals by Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar meant to combat ‘the resource curse.’ Pogge and Wenar call for boycotts against stealing oppressors, sharing the expectation that the boycotts will significantly contribute to economic and political reform in the target countries. In contrast, I argue that liberal democracies should indeed stop trading with dictators and civil warriors, but for inward rather than outward looking reasons. We, the citizens of liberal democracies through our elected governments, ought to boycott (...) severely oppressive regimes for the sake of our own moral integrity*simply in order to stop being complicit in what is effectively massive scale armed robbery. This inward looking thesis is distinctive in three ways. First, it contrasts with the dominant assumption that global reform must be grounded in the achievement of better political and economic outcomes for others. Second, the inward look manages to avoid the profound empirical uncertainty associated with any attempt to predict the direct effects of global rule changes on domestic institutions. Third, by isolating each democracy’s responsibility for each case of illicit trade, the inward looking strategy deals more adequately than the outward view with collective action problems, and therefore has a greater chance of grounding actual reforms, with whatever prospects for better outcomes they may entail.Keywords: resource curse; boycotts; democratic trade; Thomas Pogge; Leif Wenar. (shrink)

Hygge Philosophies: Between Cultural Heritage and Personal Development in the Face of the Hypermodern Quest for Individual Well-Being In this article, we are interested in hygge, often presented as a Danish philosophy of life. We question hygge as it is portrayed and listed in personal development literature (1). We suggest that, in the contemporary Western democratic context, hygge touches on both a part of Danish cultural heritage and a sphere of concerns typical of Western democratic hypermodernity (2). A concluding section (...) will allow us to make some generalizations about the stakes of intellectual work in our societies in the XXIst century and the contributions that philosophers can make (3). Keywords: hygge, individualism, democracy, well-being, personal development. (shrink)

Thomas Pogge has been challenging liberal thinking on global politics, often through critical engagement with John Rawls’ work. Pogge presents both normative and empirical arguments against Rawls: normatively, Rawls’ domestic Theory of Justice and global Law of Peoples are incompatible ideal theories; empirically, LP is too removed from the actual world to guide the foreign policy of liberal societies. My main purpose here is to contest the first, ideal theory criticism in order to direct more attention to the second, non-ideal (...) objection. I argue against Pogge that TJ and LP can be read as coherent, once one employs a Rousseauian rather than Pogge’s economic Kantian reading of TJ. The first two sections present Pogge’s view of TJ and contrast it with a Rousseauian alternative that is less cosmopolitan and economic and much more focused on the democratic and sovereign context of justice as fairness. The third section seeks to refute Pogge’s incoherence arguments, which encompass the identity of the parties to the international original position, their motivations and their decisions. Instead of a conclusion, the last section emphasizes LP’s non-ideal problems, and suggests that insofar as LP is the most robust liberal ideal theory of global politics, its empirical failure indicates the need to shift global justice theorizing even more to the non-ideal realm.Keywords: Rawls; Pogge; global justice; ideal theory; non-ideal theory; cosmopolitanism; statism; Rousseau; Kant; democracy. (shrink)

This article discusses the problem of global democracy, and why democratic legitimacy seems so difficult to attain at the global level. I start by arguing that the difficulties we experience when we try to widen the scope of democratic governance beyond the boundaries of individual states have nothing to do with the characteristics of global society, but result from the underlying assumption that a political community has to be bounded and based on consent in order for democratic legitimacy to (...) be possible. I then explore how this view came into being, arguing that the perennial paradoxes of democratic legitimacy are little but results of earlier and successful attempts to make the concept of political community coextensive with that of the nation. Finally, I argue that once we let go of the idea that political communities have to be bounded and based on consent in order to qualify as democratic ones, the paradox of democratic legitimacy will look like a category mistake rather than an inescapable obstacle to global democracy. Keywords : cosmopolitanism, democratic paradox, legitimacy, global governance (Published online: 7 November 2008) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics. Vol. 1, No. 4, 2008, pp. 159-174. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v1i4.1858. (shrink)

Based on Hannah Arendt’s distinction between the public and the private, the paper argues that it is possible to reconcile her seemingly elite democracy with the political ideals upon which the polis is constructed, namely, plurality, freedom and action. Such reconciliation is possible when the political is understood as the space between people, rather than as a carefully constructed physical space that excludes all aspects of privacy. Likewise, the paper argues that the rise of the social represents not only (...) the colonialization of the political, but also a democratic expansion of those, who like Arendt herself might have been formerly excluded from political participation in our common world. keywords: Arendt, world, politics, freedom, public, private, social. (shrink)

The main purpose of the study is to analyze the feasibility and necessity of an EU Constitution. Briefly, the history of the draft constitution is as follows: The draft treaty aims to codify the two main treaties of the European Union - the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001). The debate on the future of Europe is believed to have begun (...) with a speech by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in Berlin in 2000. The process began after the Laeken Declaration, when the European Convention was set up, chaired by former French President Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, with the aim of drafting a constitution. The draft contract was published in July 2003. After lengthy discussions and debates over the proposal for qualified majority voting, the final text was approved in June 2004 and signed by representatives of the Member States on 29 October 2004. The failure of the treaty in France and the Netherlands is a serious blow to the European Union because these two countries are considered to be loyal supporters of the European project. The text of the treaty was subsequently rewritten by the Amato Group, officially the Active Committee on European Democracy (ACED), a group of high-ranking European politicians. During the German presidency of the Union, a new treaty was proposed - the Treaty of Lisbon - to replace the original draft of the Constitution. On 12 June 2008, the Lisbon Treaty was also rejected in a referendum in Ireland. But if we want to look beyond history, we can ask - Why does the EU need a Constitution and how can the Constitution be the roadmap to an advanced future for the EU? The answers to this question can be found by analyzing several directions (these are the main points of the article): historical reflexivity; socio-cultural analysis of the philosophical concepts of well-known political and social philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, John Locke; the modern constellation through the prism of Jürgen Habermas and the decision to make a text as a Constitution which its aim is to reach the starting point of an entire community like the EU. Keywords: constitution, EU, philosophy, law, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Jurgen Habermas. (shrink)