A good argument can be made for the view that the single most crucial concept in all continental philosophy is “recognition.” To defend such a view, first of all, would be one way to emphasize how indifferent analytic philosophy has been to the web of issues which recognition denotes - such as self-knowledge, alterity, intersubjectivity, and communitarianism. Indeed, the comparable analytic issues like “personal identity” and “other minds” hardly begin to address the complexity of what is at stake in recognition. (...) More significantly, recognition is important because it divides continental philosophy between those who believe that a unified self exists, and that human relations can achieve mutuality and equality, and those who are inclined to doubt the possibility of both of these things. Philosophers of the latter variety challenge the plausibility of the Hegelian subject and argue that human relations are defined by the master/slave paradigm or at least by persistent struggles for power. (shrink)

A good argument can be made for the view that the single most crucial concept in all continental philosophy is “recognition.” To defend such a view, first of all, would be one way to emphasize how indifferent analytic philosophy has been to the web of issues which recognition denotes - such as self-knowledge, alterity, intersubjectivity, and communitarianism. Indeed, the comparable analytic issues like “personal identity” and “other minds” hardly begin to address the complexity of what is at stake in recognition. (...) More significantly, recognition is important because it divides continental philosophy between those who believe that a unified self exists, and that human relations can achieve mutuality and equality, and those who are inclined to doubt the possibility of both of these things. Philosophers of the latter variety challenge the plausibility of the Hegelian subject and argue that human relations are defined by the master/slave paradigm or at least by persistent struggles for power. (shrink)

Among the Muslims the most common sect is Ḥanafī. It is mentioned in the Ḥanafī sect that there are a line of students who transfer the principles of the sect from generation to generation. In order for the Islamic conquests that started simultaneously in the Eastern and Western lands to be permanent, people were sent to teach Islamic morality, worship and fiqh that encompass daily life. From the 2nd century (A.H.) the sectarianization process that started in the centers such as (...) Kufa, Medina and Damascus has naturally spread to the geography of the West. Many jurists who were educated in the madrasas in the East transferred this education to the newly conquered lands in the West, thus contributing to the fact that sectarianization began in the East and West at the same time. During this period, the views of many mujtahids, including Abū Ḥanīfa and his students, began to enter this geography again through his students. In this article, the most important person who introduced the Ḥanafī sect in the Andalusian region and transferred Abu Ḥanifa's ijtihads, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Farrūkh's life, his scientific personality, his contributions to the spread of the sect and the reasons for the Ḥanafī sect to find supporters in the region will be followed by a short course and the history of the sect will be tried to uncover in the history of Andalusia.Summary: Among the Muslims the most common sect is Ḥanafī. It is not a coincidence that the Ḥanafī sect spread more than other sects and found supporters. Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) is the most senior among the imams of four leading sects. He experienced about commercial and everyday life, had loyal students. This is because he discussed with his students before deciding on a ruling.Islamic conquests in the east and west started at the same time. Experts teaching Islamic morality were sent to conquered places. In this way, both morality and Islamic law, which encompasses worship and daily life, were also taught. Since the implementation of justice was considered as the main duty of the state, legal affairs were dynamic and systematically organized. For this purpose, both in the Medina and the newly conquered lands, various issues such as, management, use, distribution, non-muslim marriage, trade and so on emerged. These issues were carried out with the "kadi" establishment, which is like today's ministry of justice.In the Hijri 2nd century, Fiqh schools produced practical solutions to matters of process and worship in centers such as, Iraq, Medina and Damascus. These schools completed the sectarianization process after a century. Many Islamic jurists who took madrasah education in the east taught these training in the west. They pioneered the development of this sectarianization process both in the east and the west at the same time.The Islamic jurisprudence solved the problems that emerged with the conquest process that began in Andalusia, primarily through the independent jurisprudence, kadi and muftis in the region. After 710 A.C., the Ḥanafī sect reached Andalusia. After the death of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abu Yusuf became the chief justice. Later, the views of Abū Ḥanīfa gained importance. Abu Yusuf appointed the judges who knew the Ḥanafī sect. Abū Ḥanīfa's students, like a gold mine, embraced the views of their teachers. These jurisprudences were adopted by the supporters. Imam Muhammad was the first to write the case law of Abū Ḥanīfa. The views and thoughts of Abū Ḥanīfa, which were published by Imam Muhammad, spread throughout Iraq, Damascus, Iran and Khorasan. Later these thoughts reached North Africa that was under the control of Aghlabid (A.C. 800-909).In the same era, ʿAbdallāh b. Farrūkh passed to the way 6500 km to learn western sciences. The purpose of Farrūkh is to write the views of his teacher, Abū Ḥanīfa. In this way, he returned to Andalusia by writing ten thousand subjects. Beginning from 767 A.C., Ḥanafī sect gradually began to form in this region. He served as a judge voluntarily, although he did not serve as the official judge. Therefore, it contributed greatly to the spread of this sect in the west. The Mālikī sect, which due to from the animosity of Umayyad (A.C. 661-750) and Abbasids (A.C. 750-1258), came to the forefront. Abdullah b. Ferrûh was not as famous as the other disciples of Abū Ḥanīfa.Although Ḥanafīism spread in the west, it was in the foreground in the eastern geographies. Scholars such as Qadi Ayyad (d. 544/1149), Ibn Farḥūn (d. 799/1397), Muhammad Abū Zahra (d. 1974) and Hintātī state that this sect was effective for a short time in the west. On the other hand, Maqdisī (d. 380/999) states that Ḥanafī existed in Andalusia until the second half of the third century A.C. and was at least as widespread as Mālikīism. Orientalist Lévi Provençal (d. 1956) says that Ḥanafī sect did not reach to Andalusia. However, it can be understood from the above statements that this view is not real. In addition, according to the student hierarchy described in the article, it is understood that the Ḥanafī sect maintained its existence in this region for a while. In Andalusia, the views of the sect from the 8th to the 13th centuries known, recognized and followed by experts and the public. Because this sect was not official, its books were not in demand. For this reason, the basic works belonging to the sect were not reproduced.It is not true that the Ḥanafī sect never came to Andalusia or did not stay for a long time. ʿAbdallāh b. Farrūkh, who studied at Abū Ḥanīfa for 5 years, introduced Ḥanafī sect in Andalusia. Then his students continued this teaching. In this study, the life, mastery and students of ʿAbdallāh b. Farrūkh, who made important contributions for the first time in teaching Ḥanafīsm's to Andalusia, have been brought together. This information is summarized in terms of Ḥanafīsm's entry into Andalusia, the reasons for acceptance in social life and the duration of the sect in the region. (shrink)

The perennial question posed by the philosophically-inclined lawyer is 'What is law?' or perhaps 'What is the nature of law?' This book poses an associated, but no less fundamental, question about law which has received much less attention in the legal literature. It is: 'Who is law for?' Whenever people go to law, they are judged for their suitability as legal persons. They are given or refused rights and duties on the basis of ideas about who matters. These ideas (...) are basic to legal-decision making; they form the intellectual and moral underpinning of legal thought. They help to determine whether law is essentially for rational human beings or whether it also speaks to and for human infants, adults with impaired reasoning, the comotose, foetuses and even animals. Are these the right kind of beings to enter legal relationships and so become legal persons. Are they, for example, sufficiently rational, or sacred or simply human? Is law meant for them? This book reveals and evaluates the type of thinking that goes into these fundamental legal and metaphysical determinations about who should be capable of bearing legal rights and duties. It identifies and analyses four influential ways of thinking about law's person, each with its own metaphysical suppositions. One approach derives from rationalist philosophy, a second from religion, a third from evolutionary biology while the fourth is strictly legalistic and so endeavours to eschew metaphysics altogether. The book offers a clear, coherent and critical account of these complex moral and intellectual processes entailed in the making of legal persons. (shrink)

I ARGUE IN THIS PAPER that there are profound and legitimate worries concerning the application of organic and personal criteria to groups. I try to specify the reasons why we object to such ideas, while contending that some of these objections are misguided. Primarily, to refer to a group as a person is not necessarily the same as referring to it as either organic or as an individual. Further, each term--organic, individual, and person--must be carefully unpacked and analyzed. One conclusion (...) of this analysis is that there are important senses in which these concepts both overlap and also diverge. One should not therefore automatically conflate them. Another conclusion is that there are senses of these terms which are perfectly innocuous. Finally, there are clearly ways in which we can sensibly use the notion of personality to apply to groups. The groups in question are usually diverse, and do not have to include the state. In fact, despite the absence of such "group person" usage from mainstream political theory, such language is more of a commonplace in international politics and legal discourse and practice. I attempt, in the final part of the paper, to schematize the various uses of personality. I conclude by suggesting the fruitfulness of one particular sense of juristic personality. (shrink)

Imāmiyya holds that the theory of imāmate must rely on scriptural evidence and designation and that the Imām, the successor to Muḥammad, is in charge of all political and religious issues. The authority of the Imām includes some religious and social duties such as executing the legal punishments, collecting almsgiving, sustaining social order and declaring holy war. The fulfillment of these duties requires actual leadership of the Imām or his deputy. With the beginning of the great occultation in 329/941, there (...) was an uncertainty among the Imāmiyya followers about who would uphold these responsibilities. In this period, Shīʿī ʿulamā began to undertake the duties of the Imām in order to overcome this uncertainty and to avoid the possible schism. In the beginning, this delegation of authority was limited to the religious sphere; but, later, its scope gradually became wider. This process of delegation of power, which covers a long process, needs to be examined in its various periods. In this study, this subject will be considered with special reference to the scholars of the fifth century of hijra (hijrī). An effort is made in this article to reveal how the issues of the Imām’s powers are discussed in the context of the problem of expanding or narrowing the authority of the scholars who played significant roles in systemization of Uṣūlī (rationalist) thought in the period after Shaykh al-Mufīd.Summary: In the issues of Imām/Caliphate which led to political division among Muslims after the Prophet Muḥammad, Imāmī Shīʿa opines that the Imāmate theory relies on scriptural evidence and designation. According to this theory, apart from scriptural evidence and designation, personal qualities such as immaculacy, knowledge, bravery, and vantage are found in Ali, Ḥasan, Ḥusayn and nine people from the lineage of Ḥusayn. The Imām as a successor to the Prophet Muḥammad is a person who has both religious and political power which includes implementation of punishments, collecting alms, ensuring justice, declaring holy war. For the Imāmī Shīʿa, there is a need for imām or his deputy who has absolute power to fulfill these duties.Imāmī Shīʿa, who held that the disappeared twelfth Imām would return back to restore justice in the world, had to confront various problems in finding solutions to some issues related to the existence of Imām himself, as well as theological issues during the period of great occultation. Particularly, the period of great occultation (329/941), in which the link with the Imām was severed completely, the Shīʿī community were uncertain on how to fulfill the responsibilities of the Imām probably due to the lack of religious sources. Shaykh al-Mufīd draws attention to the issue of khums (a one-fifth share of the spoils of war and of other specified forms of income). In this period of uncertainty, the Shiite scholars came into prominence in order to fill the gap and to prevent the social disorder. Referring to a tawqī‘ (rescript) from the Twelfth Imām, they claimed that they would take responsibility for the Twelfth Imām on his behalf. In the beginning, the delegation of the power was limited to the religious sphere. It was gradually extended to other spheres by the contribution of some scholars. It reached the largest dimension with the implementation of “wilāyat al-faqīh” theory.From that period until our times, the era when Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples lived can be considered as the beginning of this period. In the fifth century when Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples lived the delegation of power was limited to the religious sphere. In this article, how the scholars who played a role in the systematization of Uṣūlī thought dealt with the issue of the limits of the authority of Imām and how they defined the role of the Imāmī jurists (faqīh) will be examined.Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples were sometimes cautious on the issue of the delegation of the power of Imām. They, however, pointed out the role of the faqīh in the occultation period in order to overcome the uncertainty. As a matter of fact, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and al-Qādī Ibn al-Barrāj made significant contributions to the issues of collection and distribution of khums. However, Sallār al-Daylamī’s contribution to the subject is more crucial. He considered khums as the grace of God and believed that it can be allocated by taking into account the share of the Imām. They put forward the views that explained in details the role of the faqīh in the collection and distribution of alms. Even Ibn al-Barrāj opined that in the absence of Imām and his deputy alms are to be allocated to the Faqihs on the ground that they know better how to distribute it. Therefore, in the absence of Imām and his deputy, by suggesting that faqīh must be in charge of collecting and distributing alms, they proposed a remedy in an early period.On the issue of leading the Friday prayer (ṣalāt al-jum‘a), which is one of the social duties of Imām, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples considered the presence of the Imām or his deputy as a condition for a valid Friday prayer. In addition to this condition, Al-Ḥalabī, also added that a person who meets the necessary conditions can be also considered in leading Friday prayer. This addition by Ḥalabī was an important contribution to the solution of the problems encountered during the period of great occultation on both Friday prayer and delegation of Imām religious and political authorities to faqīh. On the other hand, Sallār, another disciple of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, opposed the idea of the faqīh leading the Friday prayer in the absence of the Imām even when the necessary conditions are met. It can be said that this approach of Sallār led to the opinion of some Imāmis which considered Friday prayer unlawful in the absence of Imām. In the occultation period, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples showed a cautious attitude about the implementation of the punishments. They argued that only Imām could implement the punishments. However, the major step was taken by Shaykh Ṭūsī on the issue of who implements the punishments in the occultation period. He argued that the Imām’s designated the faqihs to implement the punishments. In addition to this subject, Shiite scholars discussed the issue of whether a Shiite officer under the reigning rule in the occultation period implemented the punishments. On this issue, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā compiled a treaty untitled Mas’ala fi’l-‘amal ma‘a’al-sulṭan. For him, the main criteria are whether such person has necessary responsibilities and qualifications. Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples also continued their master’s conciliatory attitude. In the final analysis, the contribution of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples on the issue of who will undertake the duties and responsibilities of the Imām is crucial in the systematization of the idea of transferal of the power of the Imām to faqīh including political one. In fact, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s advice to take part in the existing administrations has been considered a way out for the scholars who want to establish relations with the authorities in the later periods. (shrink)

Al-Shāfi’ī has been unreservedly credited as one of the designers, if not the “master architect,” of uṣūl al-fiqh. His most important scholarly work, Al-Risālah, clearly demonstrates his cognitive creativity in this field. One of the methodologies for the decision of cases under Islamic law that Al-Shāfi’ī championed is qiyās, which he equated with ijtihād. His balanced approach invites further enquiry into the extensive use of qiyās in general and in criminal law in particular. The extent to which qiyās can be (...) applied to Islamic criminal law depends upon the degree or typology of qiyās being used, taking into account the Islamic theory of criminology. This article will analyse the position of al-Shāfi’ī in this regard. It will critically examine al-Shāfi’ī’s complex views on the use of qiyās as a method for establishing culpability under Islamic criminal law. It will then explore how his position corresponds to the human rights paradigm in the contemporary age. This article concludes that, while the use of qiyās in criminal law, especially in law of retaliation and predetermined punishments in accordance with al-Shāfi’ī’s approach is tantamount to incriminating a person based on less than certainty, it also represents the most promising way of protecting the right of victim. (shrink)

Hujjat al-Islam Imam al-Ghazali is a thinker, mystic, jurist, and theologian who has still influenced today since his time. In his al-Munqidh min ad-Dalal, he writes about how he survived the crisis that his inquiries about life had driven him to depression. Due to the distress caused by the crisis in him, he left the place where he lived and moved away from people. During this abandonment, he confesses his experiences, inquiries, introspection, and ways of getting to know himself in (...) al-Munqidh. In this article, I will try to understand how he reached guidance from this crisis, what his method was, and how he gained personal religious experience. I will examine the differences and similarities of the way of Sufism from the clergy, where the concept of rational theosophy corresponds in al-Ghazali’s thought. He shows us the limits of reason on the way to reach precise information. He talks about realities that cannot be explained within these limits, what he has learned in the uzlat, and why the love for the world is dangerous. The reason why al-Ghazali returned to social life is explained with the idea of 'fiqh of priorities' in Islam. Al-Ghazali attributes the "nour" that descends to his heart to the will of God in explaining his salvation from the turning point in his life. (shrink)

The validity of the prayer which is accepted as the most basic worship of Islam has been tied to a set of rules. These rules which must be followed before and during the prayer are called conditions and pillars in the fiqh language. The recitation performed while standing during the prayer is one of the most significant of these rules and is accepted one of the pillars of the prayer. Therefore, in order for the prayer to be valid, it is (...) required to make enough recitations. If it is not done, the prayer is considered invalid. For this reason, the topic of recitation in prayer has been discussed in detail by the jurists, and different opinions have been submitted what, when and how much to recite. The jurists have suggested three basic views on this issue. Ḥanafīs have stated that a person who follows the imām in prayer should not recite, and they have accepted the recitation of ma’mūm as makruh regardless of whether the recitation is loud or silent. The Shāfiʿīs who uphold the opposite view of the Ḥanafīs have said that the ma’mūm have to recite in all the prayers in which the qirā'āt is loud and silent, and that it is obligatory for the ma’mūm to recite. According to Shāfiʿīs the prayer of a ma’mūm without recitation is not valid. Malikīs and Ḥanbalīs who have explained their opinions by taking into account that the recitation is loud and silent have stated that the ma’mūm should recite during prayers in which the recitation is silent. In the prayers where the recitation is loud the Ḥanbalīs have said that the ma’mūm should recite when the imām takes a break from recitation, while the Malikīs have said that the recitation is not required for the ma’mūm. However the jurists of both sects have not considered that the recitation is obligatory to ma’mūm. And they have acknowledged that the prayer of the ma’mūm was valid even if he has not recite. There is intra-sectarian disagreement in all of these three basic views which are presented as the general opinion of the sects. Although we are talking about the intra-sectarian disagreement, it is understood that the jurists except the Ḥanafīs have determined their views on the recitation of the ma’mūm within the context of whether the ma’mūm hear or do not hear the recitation of the imām. It can be said that this understanding is at the basis of the views put forward by the Shāfiʿīs who take into account that the recitation is loud and silent about the ma’mūm’s recitation of the sūrat after the Fātiḥa. Likewise it is possible to say that this understanding is at the basis of the perceptives brought forward by the Malikī and Ḥanbalī jurists about the prayers in which the recitation is sound. The jurists who expressed different opinions about the recitation of the ma’mūm similarly brought evidence from the Qurʾān, the Sunnah, opinions of the Companions and qiyās to justify their views. Although the jurists have grounded their views on similar evidence, they have reached different conclusions. The reason for this difference it can be shown that the direction of the verse (āyat) to be taken as evidence, their different approaches when evaluating the narrations transmitted from the Prophet (pbuh) and the fact that the arguments of qiyās are different. (shrink)

The philosophical past, once a thing of the past, is with us again. I examine three recent positions about how to understand the philosophical past: the presentism of Richard Rorty, the traditionalism of Alasdair MacIntyre, and the interpretism of Charles Taylor. Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor all acknowledge a Hegelian influence upon their views; thus, I also explore Hegel's own view of the history of philosophy. Finally, I offer my own view that our relation to the past ought to be guided (...) by "recognizing" it. Although the concept of recognition is found in Hegel, I argue that Hegel as well as Rorty and MacIntyre end up conceiving of our relation to the past as one of appropriation. Recognition as I define it eschews such appropriation; rather, it consists in a "working through" of the past in a sense the paper specifies. (shrink)

The chapter argues that the traditional theories of legal personhood, which associate legal personhood with the holding of rights, are outdated and should be reassessed. Many modern theories of rights come into conflict with our convictions regarding who or what is a legal person. For instance, most jurists would agree that foetuses are not natural persons but new-born children are. However, if we apply the so-called interest theory of rights, we will note that foetuses hold various rights, such as (...) rights against certain forms of abortion. If right-holding entails legal personality, then foetuses are already legal persons. On the other hand, if we apply the will theory, which associates right-holding with the power to control others’ duties, then infants do not hold any rights at all – and are consequently not legal persons. This is why the chapter outlines an alternative theory of legal personhood. The main tenets of the theory are: (1) legal personality is not binary but rather a matter of degree, and (2) X’s legal personality involves primarily the endowment of X with incidents of legal personhood, much like ownership can be understood as consisting of separate but interconnected incidents. Rather than being a “solved” theoretical issue, the definition of legal personhood should occupy theorists more in the future. (shrink)

The concept of recognition has been thrust into the center of Hegel scholarship in the last fifty years for two main reasons. First, the publication of the Jena manuscripts showed recognition to be a fundamental and pervasive theme in Hegel’s early systematic efforts. It is in fact possible to distinguish and evaluate these works according to the role that recognition plays within them. Second, the master-slave section of the Phenomenology of Spirit, in which the concept of recognition is introduced, has (...) been often treated as the most crucial part of the PhG. (shrink)

This article explores the diminished role of the superego in contemporary psychoanalysis, and it focuses on Loewald’s perspective on the superego as original and as a possible way to rethink the meaning of the concept. Loewald saw the superego as representing the modality of the future; so, it beckons us forward and ought not be construed as merely critical. I also argue that Loewald’s perspective on the superego anticipates the emerging literatures on mentalization (especially mentalized affectivity) and autobiographical memory. (PsycINFO (...) Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Are Hegel and Nietzsche philosophical opposites? Can twentieth-century Continental philosophers be categorized as either Hegelians or Nietzscheans? In this book Elliot Jurist places Hegel and Nietzsche in conversation with each other, reassessing their relationship in a way that affirms its complexity. Jurist examines Hegel's and Nietzsche's claim that philosophy and culture are linked and explicates the various meanings of "culture" in their work--in particular, the contrast both thinkers draw between ancient and modern culture. He evaluates their positions on the failure (...) of modern culture and on the need to develop conceptions of satisfied agency. It is Jurist's original contribution to focus on the psychological sensibility that informs the project of both philosophers. Writing in an admirably clear style, he traces the ongoing legacy of Hegel's and Nietzsche's thought in Adorno, Habermas, Honneth, Jessica Benjamin, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, and Butler. (shrink)

Are Hegel and Nietzsche philosophical opposites? Can twentieth-century Continental philosophers be categorized as either Hegelians or Nietzscheans? In this book Elliot Jurist places Hegel and Nietzsche in conversation with each other, reassessing their relationship in a way that affirms its complexity. Jurist examines Hegel's and Nietzsche's claim that philosophy and culture are linked and explicates the various meanings of "culture" in their work--in particular, the contrast both thinkers draw between ancient and modern culture. He evaluates their positions on the failure (...) of modern culture and on the need to develop conceptions of satisfied agency. It is Jurist's original contribution to focus on the psychological sensibility that informs the project of both philosophers. Writing in an admirably clear style, he traces the ongoing legacy of Hegel's and Nietzsche's thought in Adorno, Habermas, Honneth, Jessica Benjamin, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, and Butler. (shrink)

There is currently a burgeoning interest in affects across a number of disciplines--philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and psychoanalysis. Yet, it remains unclear to what extent one can infer that a common set of problems and concerns exists. In this project, therefore, I undertake an interdisciplinary inquiry with the aim of providing conceptual clarity about the meaning and function of affects. In particular, I begin with the history of philosophy; then I turn to focus upon psychology--exploring the notion of "basic emotions" as (...) well as the question of whether affects can exist without cognition. This leads to an examination of recent work in neuroscience. My conclusion is that the perspectives of psychologists and neuroscientists are a necessary, but insufficient way to conceive of affects, and that to understand affects fully, one must consider the theme of agency. ;The capacity for regulation is a rich area in which to investigate how affects and agency are connected. I synthesize literature about regulation from developmental psychology, infant research and psychoanalysis, delineating three stages of development: pre-agency, agency proper, and self-conscious agency. More specifically, I propose that agency comes into being through "affect regulation." In enabling an infant to identify and modulate his/her affect states, affect regulation fosters the unfolding of a sense of agency. Affects are not simply found states in the mind; it is possible for them to be crafted and refined. Thus, I suggest that a new term, "affectivity," is required to characterize the ability that adults have to self-regulate affects. Clinical material is introduced to illustrate the concept of affectivity. ;My view supports the psychoanalytic assumption that affects contribute to the emergence of a sense of agency and that a sense of agency allows us to experience new and more differentiated affects. The claim that there is an integral relation between affects and agency depends upon a range of perspectives--about the brain and behavior, but also about subjective experience, which is both influenced by culture and is radically unique. In my conclusion, I stress the importance of preserving the scientific and hermeneutic aspects of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

The fundamental aim of this study will be to offer a precise account of the meaning of Hegel's concept of recognition as it is found in the early Jena-Schriften and the Phenomenology of Spirit . However, in locating the origins of the concept in Greek tragedy, we will also be led beyond the meaning of the concept to its significance. Its significance is established most clearly insofar as the concept can be used to form the basis of an overall interpretation (...) of the PhG as resembling a tragedy. The contemporary influence and relevance of the concept is presented in the Introduction. ;Part I traces the emergence of the concept of recognition out of the concept of love in the Frankfurt-Schriften; it then treats the subsequent development of the concept in the early systematic efforts of the Jena era. Part II focuses upon the distinctive and detailed treatment of the concept as it is portrayed in the PhG. Part III locates the origins of Hegel's concept in Greek tragedy, i.e., tragic recognition, and moves on to consider recognition within the structure of the wholes in the PhG and Greek tragedy. ;The concept of recognition has been seen as Hegel's attempt to come to terms with the individual's lack of integration in modern society. It is employed as a critique of social contract theory in the sense that recognition demands more from individuals in a society than the "merely external bonding" of a contract. The self-knowledge sense of recognition, as opposed to the social and interpersonal senses, has not been given sufficient attention. This can be explained somewhat by the fact that this sense is not featured in the early Jena-Schriften. The relation between knowledge and recognition becomes a pressing issue in the PhG. The self-knowledge sense does not supplant the other senses; rather, it supplements them and thus enriches the concept. The self-knowledge sense of recognition, and even the relation between the different senses is best explicated by reference to tragic recognition. (shrink)

Hegel scholars will be pleased to discover Miller’s new translation of Hegel’s Philosophical Propaedeutic, which is a revised and completed version of W.T. Harris’ partial translation which appeared in the 1860s. PPr, discovered by Karl Rosenkranz in 1838 and published in 1840, is based upon lectures given when Hegel was Rector of the Gymnasium in Nuremberg between 1808 and 1811. Rosenkranz’s ordering of the lectures according to age levels has been preserved by the editors of the new translation, Michael George (...) and Andrew Vincent. In their introduction, they explain that the Rosenkranz ordering was unfortunately disregarded in the Theorie Werkausgabe, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, brought out in the 1970s by the Suhrkamp Verlag of Frankfurt. In the fourth volume of this edition, the lectures were ordered according to chronology. It will be interesting, no doubt, to see how the Hegel-Archiv scholars will handle this when their edition of PPr is published. The Hegel-Archiv edition will not be finished for years or possibly decades. Helmut Schneider is the editor. (shrink)

The 2008 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) provides a landmark articulation of the universality of human rights. It affirms in strong terms that all human beings have a claim to full inclusion and equal participation in society, something denied to many because of disability. The CRPD is an ambitious document with far-reaching and fundamental implications. This interdisciplinary collection of essays takes up pressing philosophical, legal, and practical issues raised by the CRPD and the ongoing (...) process of its implementation. Combining clear legal and philosophical overviews with ground-breaking conceptual analyses, the collection aims to advance the academic debate about human rights and disability and to serve as a useful resource for policymakers, ethicists, disability activists, jurists, and all those interested in the human rights of persons with disabilities. With contributions by Jackie Leach Scully, Marcus Düwell, Jenny Goldschmidt, Sigrid Graumann, Caroline Harnacke, Jan Vorstenbosch, Esther van Weele, Joel Anderson, Jos Philips. (shrink)

Avineri’s book offers a genuinely integrated portrait of Hess. It departs from Isaiah Berlin’s influential reading of Hess as a youthful socialist who, owing to the failure of revolution in 1848, matured as a Zionist. Rather, Avineri highlights both the proto-Zionist elements in Hess’ earliest works and the enduring socialist element in his most important book, Rome and Jerusalem. Hess’ distinctive contribution as a thinker is located in his resolute interest in both socialism and nationalism.

Avineri’s book offers a genuinely integrated portrait of Hess. It departs from Isaiah Berlin’s influential reading of Hess as a youthful socialist who, owing to the failure of revolution in 1848, matured as a Zionist. Rather, Avineri highlights both the proto-Zionist elements in Hess’ earliest works and the enduring socialist element in his most important book, Rome and Jerusalem. Hess’ distinctive contribution as a thinker is located in his resolute interest in both socialism and nationalism.

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than (...) that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards. (shrink)

The theory of evolution: The rise and impact of evolutionary ideas, by R. Scoon. Evolution in its relation to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of culture, by F.S.C. Northrop. The genetic nature of differences among men, by T. Dobzhansky. Evolutionary thought in America: Evolution and American sociology by R.E.L. Faris. The impact of the idea of evolution on the American political and constitutional tradition, by E.S. Corwin. Evolutionism in American economics, 1800-1946, by J.J. Spengler. The influence of evolutionary (...) theory upon American psychological thought, by E.G. Boring. Naturalism in American literature, by M. Cowley. The idea of organic expression and American architecture, by D.D. Egbert. Evolution and moral theory in America, W.F. Quillian, Jr. Evolution and theology in America, by S. Persons. (shrink)

This book is designed to provide an introduction to the history of American thought. It does not attempt to be encyclopedia in its coverage of the subject; many familiar names of names of men and books are absent.

Book reviewed in this article: Philosophy in Medicine: Conceptual and Ethical Problems in Medicine and Psychiatry. By Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert. Psychiatric Ethics. Edited by Sidney Block and Paul Chodoff. Man, Mind, and Morality: The Ethics of Behavior Control. By Ruth Macklin.

Book reviewed in this article: Philosophy in Medicine: Conceptual and Ethical Problems in Medicine and Psychiatry. By Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert. Psychiatric Ethics. Edited by Sidney Block and Paul Chodoff. Man, Mind, and Morality: The Ethics of Behavior Control. By Ruth Macklin.