The philosophical past, once a thing of the past, is with us again. I examine three recent positions about how to understand the philosophical past: the presentism of Richard Rorty, the traditionalism of Alasdair MacIntyre, and the interpretism of Charles Taylor. Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor all acknowledge a Hegelian influence upon their views; thus, I also explore Hegel's own view of the history of philosophy. Finally, I offer my own view that our relation to the past ought to be guided (...) by "recognizing" it. Although the concept of recognition is found in Hegel, I argue that Hegel as well as Rorty and MacIntyre end up conceiving of our relation to the past as one of appropriation. Recognition as I define it eschews such appropriation; rather, it consists in a "working through" of the past in a sense the paper specifies. (shrink)

The concept of recognition has been thrust into the center of Hegel scholarship in the last fifty years for two main reasons. First, the publication of the Jena manuscripts showed recognition to be a fundamental and pervasive theme in Hegel’s early systematic efforts. It is in fact possible to distinguish and evaluate these works according to the role that recognition plays within them. Second, the master-slave section of the Phenomenology of Spirit, in which the concept of recognition is introduced, has (...) been often treated as the most crucial part of the PhG. (shrink)

This article explores the diminished role of the superego in contemporary psychoanalysis, and it focuses on Loewald’s perspective on the superego as original and as a possible way to rethink the meaning of the concept. Loewald saw the superego as representing the modality of the future; so, it beckons us forward and ought not be construed as merely critical. I also argue that Loewald’s perspective on the superego anticipates the emerging literatures on mentalization (especially mentalized affectivity) and autobiographical memory. (PsycINFO (...) Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

There is currently a burgeoning interest in affects across a number of disciplines--philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and psychoanalysis. Yet, it remains unclear to what extent one can infer that a common set of problems and concerns exists. In this project, therefore, I undertake an interdisciplinary inquiry with the aim of providing conceptual clarity about the meaning and function of affects. In particular, I begin with the history of philosophy; then I turn to focus upon psychology--exploring the notion of "basic emotions" as (...) well as the question of whether affects can exist without cognition. This leads to an examination of recent work in neuroscience. My conclusion is that the perspectives of psychologists and neuroscientists are a necessary, but insufficient way to conceive of affects, and that to understand affects fully, one must consider the theme of agency. ;The capacity for regulation is a rich area in which to investigate how affects and agency are connected. I synthesize literature about regulation from developmental psychology, infant research and psychoanalysis, delineating three stages of development: pre-agency, agency proper, and self-conscious agency. More specifically, I propose that agency comes into being through "affect regulation." In enabling an infant to identify and modulate his/her affect states, affect regulation fosters the unfolding of a sense of agency. Affects are not simply found states in the mind; it is possible for them to be crafted and refined. Thus, I suggest that a new term, "affectivity," is required to characterize the ability that adults have to self-regulate affects. Clinical material is introduced to illustrate the concept of affectivity. ;My view supports the psychoanalytic assumption that affects contribute to the emergence of a sense of agency and that a sense of agency allows us to experience new and more differentiated affects. The claim that there is an integral relation between affects and agency depends upon a range of perspectives--about the brain and behavior, but also about subjective experience, which is both influenced by culture and is radically unique. In my conclusion, I stress the importance of preserving the scientific and hermeneutic aspects of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

Are Hegel and Nietzsche philosophical opposites? Can twentieth-century Continental philosophers be categorized as either Hegelians or Nietzscheans? In this book Elliot Jurist places Hegel and Nietzsche in conversation with each other, reassessing their relationship in a way that affirms its complexity. Jurist examines Hegel's and Nietzsche's claim that philosophy and culture are linked and explicates the various meanings of "culture" in their work--in particular, the contrast both thinkers draw between ancient and modern culture. He evaluates their positions on the failure (...) of modern culture and on the need to develop conceptions of satisfied agency. It is Jurist's original contribution to focus on the psychological sensibility that informs the project of both philosophers. Writing in an admirably clear style, he traces the ongoing legacy of Hegel's and Nietzsche's thought in Adorno, Habermas, Honneth, Jessica Benjamin, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, and Butler. (shrink)

Are Hegel and Nietzsche philosophical opposites? Can twentieth-century Continental philosophers be categorized as either Hegelians or Nietzscheans? In this book Elliot Jurist places Hegel and Nietzsche in conversation with each other, reassessing their relationship in a way that affirms its complexity. Jurist examines Hegel's and Nietzsche's claim that philosophy and culture are linked and explicates the various meanings of "culture" in their work--in particular, the contrast both thinkers draw between ancient and modern culture. He evaluates their positions on the failure (...) of modern culture and on the need to develop conceptions of satisfied agency. It is Jurist's original contribution to focus on the psychological sensibility that informs the project of both philosophers. Writing in an admirably clear style, he traces the ongoing legacy of Hegel's and Nietzsche's thought in Adorno, Habermas, Honneth, Jessica Benjamin, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, and Butler. (shrink)

The fundamental aim of this study will be to offer a precise account of the meaning of Hegel's concept of recognition as it is found in the early Jena-Schriften and the Phenomenology of Spirit . However, in locating the origins of the concept in Greek tragedy, we will also be led beyond the meaning of the concept to its significance. Its significance is established most clearly insofar as the concept can be used to form the basis of an overall interpretation (...) of the PhG as resembling a tragedy. The contemporary influence and relevance of the concept is presented in the Introduction. ;Part I traces the emergence of the concept of recognition out of the concept of love in the Frankfurt-Schriften; it then treats the subsequent development of the concept in the early systematic efforts of the Jena era. Part II focuses upon the distinctive and detailed treatment of the concept as it is portrayed in the PhG. Part III locates the origins of Hegel's concept in Greek tragedy, i.e., tragic recognition, and moves on to consider recognition within the structure of the wholes in the PhG and Greek tragedy. ;The concept of recognition has been seen as Hegel's attempt to come to terms with the individual's lack of integration in modern society. It is employed as a critique of social contract theory in the sense that recognition demands more from individuals in a society than the "merely external bonding" of a contract. The self-knowledge sense of recognition, as opposed to the social and interpersonal senses, has not been given sufficient attention. This can be explained somewhat by the fact that this sense is not featured in the early Jena-Schriften. The relation between knowledge and recognition becomes a pressing issue in the PhG. The self-knowledge sense does not supplant the other senses; rather, it supplements them and thus enriches the concept. The self-knowledge sense of recognition, and even the relation between the different senses is best explicated by reference to tragic recognition. (shrink)

Hegel scholars will be pleased to discover Miller’s new translation of Hegel’s Philosophical Propaedeutic, which is a revised and completed version of W.T. Harris’ partial translation which appeared in the 1860s. PPr, discovered by Karl Rosenkranz in 1838 and published in 1840, is based upon lectures given when Hegel was Rector of the Gymnasium in Nuremberg between 1808 and 1811. Rosenkranz’s ordering of the lectures according to age levels has been preserved by the editors of the new translation, Michael George (...) and Andrew Vincent. In their introduction, they explain that the Rosenkranz ordering was unfortunately disregarded in the Theorie Werkausgabe, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, brought out in the 1970s by the Suhrkamp Verlag of Frankfurt. In the fourth volume of this edition, the lectures were ordered according to chronology. It will be interesting, no doubt, to see how the Hegel-Archiv scholars will handle this when their edition of PPr is published. The Hegel-Archiv edition will not be finished for years or possibly decades. Helmut Schneider is the editor. (shrink)

Avineri’s book offers a genuinely integrated portrait of Hess. It departs from Isaiah Berlin’s influential reading of Hess as a youthful socialist who, owing to the failure of revolution in 1848, matured as a Zionist. Rather, Avineri highlights both the proto-Zionist elements in Hess’ earliest works and the enduring socialist element in his most important book, Rome and Jerusalem. Hess’ distinctive contribution as a thinker is located in his resolute interest in both socialism and nationalism.

Avineri’s book offers a genuinely integrated portrait of Hess. It departs from Isaiah Berlin’s influential reading of Hess as a youthful socialist who, owing to the failure of revolution in 1848, matured as a Zionist. Rather, Avineri highlights both the proto-Zionist elements in Hess’ earliest works and the enduring socialist element in his most important book, Rome and Jerusalem. Hess’ distinctive contribution as a thinker is located in his resolute interest in both socialism and nationalism.

A good argument can be made for the view that the single most crucial concept in all continental philosophy is “recognition.” To defend such a view, first of all, would be one way to emphasize how indifferent analytic philosophy has been to the web of issues which recognition denotes - such as self-knowledge, alterity, intersubjectivity, and communitarianism. Indeed, the comparable analytic issues like “personal identity” and “other minds” hardly begin to address the complexity of what is at stake in recognition. (...) More significantly, recognition is important because it divides continental philosophy between those who believe that a unified self exists, and that human relations can achieve mutuality and equality, and those who are inclined to doubt the possibility of both of these things. Philosophers of the latter variety challenge the plausibility of the Hegelian subject and argue that human relations are defined by the master/slave paradigm or at least by persistent struggles for power. (shrink)

A good argument can be made for the view that the single most crucial concept in all continental philosophy is “recognition.” To defend such a view, first of all, would be one way to emphasize how indifferent analytic philosophy has been to the web of issues which recognition denotes - such as self-knowledge, alterity, intersubjectivity, and communitarianism. Indeed, the comparable analytic issues like “personal identity” and “other minds” hardly begin to address the complexity of what is at stake in recognition. (...) More significantly, recognition is important because it divides continental philosophy between those who believe that a unified self exists, and that human relations can achieve mutuality and equality, and those who are inclined to doubt the possibility of both of these things. Philosophers of the latter variety challenge the plausibility of the Hegelian subject and argue that human relations are defined by the master/slave paradigm or at least by persistent struggles for power. (shrink)