This paper challenges the first Gettier counterexample to the tripartite account of knowledge. Noting that 'the man who will get the job' is a description and invoking Donnellan's distinction between their 'referential' and 'attributive' uses, I argue that Smith does not actually believe that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's ignorance about who will get the job shows that the belief cannot be understood referentially, his ignorance of the coins in his pocket (...) shows that it cannot be understood attributively. An explanation for why Smith appeared to have justified true belief is given by distinguishing between 'belief' and 'belief in truth'. Smith believes the sentence 'the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket' to be true (he mistakenly believes that Jones will get the job, of whom he knows that he has ten coins in his pocket) (hence his 'belief'), the sentence is true (hence 'truth'), and he has sufficient reason to assent to it (hence his 'justification'). But he does not believe the proposition expressed. Hence he does not know it either. (shrink)

This article revisits the "harmony doctrine" school of economics and its distinctive understanding of how ethics and economics intersect. Harmony doctrine thinkers staked out a “natural” understanding of economic phenomena that in many ways fused the classical political economy of Adam Smith with the earlier French Physiocratic School. Their metaphysically grounded interpretation was largely eclipsed by the developments of utilitarian and marginalist schools by the end of the nineteenth century. Yet harmony doctrine thinking adhered to (...) a distinct understanding of how ethical processes and outcomes play out within the economic sphere that has to date gone under examined by business ethicists. This paper outlines three characteristics of harmony doctrine views: the belief in curative forces empowered to "heal" the economic order, a dichotomous interpretation of the economic realm that distinguishes the “natural” from the “artificial,” and an overarching belief in a harmonious social order actualized by cooperative interdependencies within economic enterprises. Despite falling into obscurity in the economic discipline, all these ideas found new life in intellectual currents of organizational and political thought at the turn of the twentieth century. After surveying these historical developments, this article concludes by demonstrating how harmony doctrine thinking helpfully illuminates persisting metaphysical dimensions of contemporary business ethics. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Apart from the classics, most of the selections in the third edition are new, as are the introduction and bibliography. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.

Now in its seventh edition, Ingrid Rima's classic textbook charts the development of the discipline from the classical age of Plato and Aristotle, through the middle ages to the first flowering of economics as a distinct discipline - the age of Petty, Quesnay and Smith - to the era of classical economics and the marginalist revolution. The book then goes on to offer extensive coverage of the twentieth century - the rise of Keynesianism, econometrics, the Chicago (...) School and the neoclassical paradigm. The concluding chapters analyze the birth of late twentieth century developments such as game theory, experimental economics and competing schools of economic thought. This text includes a number of practical features: a "family tree" at the beginning of each section, illustrating how the different developments within economics are interlinked the inclusion of readings from the original key texts a summary and questions to discuss, along with glossaries and suggestions for further reading This book provides the clearest, most readable guide to economic thought that exists and encourages students to examine the relevance of the discipline's history to contemporary theory. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Apart from the classics, most of the selections in the third edition are new, as are the introduction and bibliography. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.

An anthology of works on the philosophy of economics, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Completely revamped, this edition contains new selections, a revised introduction and a bibliography. The volume contains 26 chapters organized into five parts: Classic Discussions, Positivist and Popperian Views, Ideology and Normative Economics, Branches and Schools of Economics and Their Methodological Problems and New Directions in Economic Methodology. It includes crucial historical contributions by figures such as (...) Mill, Marx, Weber, Robbins, Knight, and Veblen and works by most of the leading contemporary figures writing on economic methodology, including five Nobel Laureates in Economics. (shrink)

This book is about the conceptual foundations of an intermediate way between liberalism and socialism: a synthesis of classical and Keynesian political economy. Classical theory deals with proportions between individuals or collectives and society in tackling problems of distribution and value. Keynesian theory is concerned with the scale of economic activity as explained by effective demand. The economy considered is primarily a monetary production economy, not a market or a planned economy. The author sets up a system linking (...) political economy with other social sciences, i.e. sociology, law and politics in the traditional sense, thus establishing the unity of the social sciences. To complete the picture, issues of method associated with the theory of knowledge in the social sciences and the problem of linking theory with historical reality are also covered. (shrink)

The first decades of the twentieth century saw the emergence of Calvinist economics in the Netherlands. This clearly normative approach to economics was inspired by Abraham Kuyper and was criticized by mainstream economists from the outset. It would eventually disappear under pressure of positive economics, but survived until at least the middle of the century. Calvinist economics itself was highly critical of classical economics and, unlike the neo-classical school, strove after an entire (...) reformation of economic thought. Calvinists writers like T. de Vries, P. A. Diepenhorst, J. A. Nederbragt and J. Ridder did not constitute a school of economic thought, but nevertheless shared some fundamental ideas such as the influence of world views on economics, the existence of divine ordinances for the economic domain, and the central place of man in God’s plan for the economy. In this article, I describe the rise, sources of inspiration, fundamentals, aim and methodology of Calvinist economics. Although the perspective of this article is historical, this episode from the history of economic thought may inform us about the relationship between Christianity and the science of economics as well as that between economics and the economic crisis. (shrink)

Economics has become a monolithic science, variously described as formalistic and autistic with neoclassical orthodoxy reigning supreme. So argue Dimitris Milonakis and Ben Fine in this new major work of critical recollection. The authors show how economics was once rich, diverse, multidimensional and pluralistic, and unravel the processes that lead to orthodoxy’s current predicament. The book details how political economy became economics through the desocialisation and the dehistoricisation of the dismal science, accompanied by the separation of (...) class='Hi'>economics from the other social sciences, especially economic history and sociology. It is argued that recent attempts from within economics to address the social and the historical have failed to acknowledge long standing debates amongst economists, historians and other social scientists. This has resulted in an impoverished historical and social content within mainstream economics. The book ranges over the shifting role of the historical and the social in economic theory, the shifting boundaries between the economic and the non-economic, all within a methodological context. Schools of thought and individuals, that have been neglected or marginalised, are treated in full, including classical political economy and Marx, the German and British historical schools, American institutionalism, Weber and Schumpeter and their programme of Socialökonomik, and the Austrian school. At the same time, developments within the mainstream tradition from marginalism through Marshall and Keynes to general equilibrium theory are also scrutinised, and the clashes between the various camps from the famous Methodenstreit to the fierce debates of the 1930s and beyond brought to the fore. The prime rationale underpinning this account drawn from the past is to put the case for political economy back on the agenda. This is done by treating economics as a social science once again, rather than as a positive science, as has been the inclination since the time of Jevons and Walras. It involves transcending the boundaries of the social sciences, but in a particular way that is in exactly the opposite direction now being taken by "economics imperialism". Drawing on the rich traditions of the past, the reintroduction and full incorporation of the social and the historical into the main corpus of political economy will be possible in the future. (shrink)

Ars cogitandi is not the monopoly of a school, a people or an age, but it has crossed over the centuries and cardinal points, from the Platonic Academy of Athens to the Finnish University set up at Turku in 1640 and set down for good and for all at Helsingfors (the ancient name for Helsinki) in the year 1828. Ars cogitandi asphilosophy got here as a distinct brilliance following the classical Anglo-Saxon tradition of empiricism, represented at that time (...) by Edward Westermarck (1862–1939), who was professor of practical philosophy in Helsinki and professor of sociology at London School of Economics from 1907 until 19301. The Finnish School of Philosophy acquired its decisive acknowledgement by Eino Kaila, great scholar and chief of the school, who brought over to Finland the modern logic and the philosophy of the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

1. The Real Claim of the Chicago School If anything dramatic has happened in economic theory over the last one hundred years – namely, since the advent of marginalism – then, everyone agrees, it was not the rise of the Chicago neo -classical school which, after all, only synthesized the various versions of marginalism, but the Keynesian Revolution. Assessments of this revolution were repeatedly invited, particularly by opponent, chiefly from Chicago. F. A. von Hayek has explicitly and (...) bitterly blames Keynes for all our economic troubles; Harry Johnson has repeatedly declared the most revolutionary work of Keynes, his General Theory of 1936, so poor that but for its author's name on its title page it would have totally flopped. Can such a flop cause so much damage? Are these two assessments – of Hayek and of Johnson – in conflict or no t? Don Patinkin has raised a different question: how different is Keynes from his Chicago opponents, say, Milton Friedman? How many heads need roll, to use his metaphor, before a revolution may be declared? Patinkin sees Keynes as slightly deviant but stil l a member of the mainstream – the mainstream of the mainstream being Friedman and his Chicago followers, of course. Now, can a minor deviant be a flop? Can minor deviations from the true blue doctrine be to blame for all of our economic woes? I do not kno w. Joan Robinson sees in Keynes a minor deviation from classical theory because he said once his correction of classical theory is implemented, that theory takes over once again. Moreover, Samuelson and Friedman have endorsed a (poor) version of Keynes' theory of shortterm relative price and ignored his general theory of price and money. (shrink)

Until the end of the early 1970s, from a history of economic thought perspective, the mainstream in economics was pluralist, but once neoclassical economics became totally dominant it claimed the mainstream as its own. Since then, alternative views and schools of economics increasingly became minorities in the discipline and were considered heterodox. This book is in honour of John Edward King who has an impressive publication record in the area of economic theory with specific interest in how (...) economic thought in the past shapes current economic theory and enforces certain paths of economic policy and economic development. This book is divided into five themes based on King s interests. The first theme looks at the challenge in trying to reclaim pluralism in economics. The second faces head-on the direct collision of mainstream economics with history of economic thought and heterodox economics. The third addresses classical economic ideas, their central influence in the past and how they can still primarily guide modern pluralist economics. The fourth examines Post Keynesian and Kaleckian economics with a view to providing a more coherent and extensive branch of heterodox economics. The final theme critiques the policy of neoliberalism that has entrenched itself in capitalist economies which have led to financial, industrial, labour, and behavioural/consumerist crises. This text aims to provide a clear path for pluralism to serve the economics discipline as its standard bearer, and to no longer be merely a heterodox challenge to the mainstream. This book is of interest to those who study history of economic thought, political economy and heterodox economics. ". (shrink)

The scientific aim of the paper is to juxtapose the views on economic order developed by the leading representatives of two schools of liberal thinking – German ordoliberal Walter Eucken and the Austrian economist Friedrich August von Hayek. The first scholar opted for deliberately constructed competitive economic order, the second one advocates for allowing the social institutions to emerge and evolve spontaneously. The analysis proves the similarity of both theories in regard to the significance of principles of an economic order (...) and the importance of competition for maintaining individual freedom. On the other hand some differences in the areas of sources of rules, institutional change, and the role of the state, induce their complementarity. Developing an intellectual basis for economic policy requires an eclectic approach combining two analysed perspectives. (shrink)

This volume includes the complete texts of two of John Stuart Mill's most important works, Utilitarianism and On Liberty, and selections from his other writings, including the complete text of his Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy. The selection from Mill's A System of Logic is of special relevance to the debate between those who read Mill as an Act-Utilitarian and those who interpret him as a Rule-Utilitarian. Also included are selections from the writings of Jeremy Bentham, founder of modern Utilitarianism and (...) mentor of John Stuart Mill. Bentham's _Principles of Morals and Legislation_ had important effects on political and legal reform in his own time and continues to provide insights for political theorists and philosophers of law. Seven chapters of Bentham's _Principles_ are here in their entirety, together with a number of shorter selections, including one in which Bentham repudiates the slogan often used to characterize his philosophy: The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number. John Troyer's Introduction presents the central themes and arguments of Bentham and Mill and assesses their relevance to current discussions of Utilitarianism. The volume also provides indexes, a glossary, and notes. (shrink)

Stakeholder theorists have traditionally objected to the neoclassical conception of the firm as a vehicle for maximizing profit or shareholder wealth, thus opening up space for controversial engagement with neoclassical economics. The present paper fills some of this space by elaborating the parallels between stakeholder theory and classical institutional economics, a heterodox school of economic thought that has long been critical of a broad range of neoclassical ideas. Rooted in the writings of Veblen and Commons, (...) class='Hi'>classical institutional economics explores how the social provisioning process is coordinated or hindered by real-world business institutions. From this standpoint, stakeholder theory highlights the possibility of overcoming the institutionally ingrained conflicts and trade-offs for the sake of realizing common human interests in organizing the social provisioning process in an orderly and reasonable way. This argument not only illuminates the relationship of stakeholder theory to the wider societal context of modern capitalist economies but also elaborates novel aspects of the moral nature of stakeholder management. (shrink)

This book presents a concise introduction to the epistemology and methodology of the Austrian School of economics as defended by Ludwig von Mises. The author provides an innovative interpretation of Mises’ arguments in favour of the a priori truth of praxeology, the received view of which contributed to the academic marginalisation of the Austrian School. The study puts forward a unique argument that Mises – perhaps unintentionally – defends a form of conventionalism. Chapters in the book include (...) detailed discussions of individualism, historicism, epistemological positions, and essentialism. The author goes on to discuss Mises’ justification of the fundamental axiom and proposes a conventionalist interpretation. By presenting praxeology as a conventionalist research programme, the author aims to reinvigorate the interaction between the Austrian School, mainstream economics, and the philosophy of science. This comprehensive reconstruction is suitable for economists interested in the history and philosophy of their discipline, as well as for philosophers of science. (shrink)

Places have very different faces. My place can be the home where I live, the country where I was born, the town where I work, the garden I cultivate, the continent of our shared past or even the cosmos as a whole. If we look at the history of modern economic thought, land as a scarce resource has played an important role. For the school of Physiocrats in the eighteenth century, land was the main if not the only source (...) of value creation. With modern industrialization and the rise of classical economics labor became the creator and measure of monetary worth. Later on, neoclassical economists considered utility (pleasure, happiness) as the measure of value creation and price formation.In today’s economics ‘place’ only becomes relevant when it is perceived as a scarce good. An economist is not interested in the uniqueness of a specific locale, nor in its memories and stories. The laws of economics apply to every place and hence to no specific place. Space and place are considered factors in a production function or elements of consumption and entertainment. From the moment scarcity arises, opportunity cost, competition and price formation and regulation become part of the game. When, e.g., the oceans become the subject of intensive human exploitation and competition, they need political and economic regulation. All these features can be subsumed under the umbrella of ‘economics of place’. However, by place-based economics we mean something altogether different. While the economics of place primarily envisage place as an instrumental good used for the maximization of human utility, the proposed alternative views place as an existential good that creates meaning and identity for people.In a first section I will now explore the existential meaning of ‘place’ starting from Martin Heidegger’s definition of the human being as Da-sein which means literally being-there, being rooted in a specific place. In the second section I will reconstruct a well-known theorem in economics called the tragedy of the commons. It explains how places can be degraded from communal property where relations matter to instrumental goods for individual profit maximization. The third section revisits the first theoretical model of place-based economics in Western philosophy developed by Aristotle in the fourth century BC. It is fascinating to see how this Aristotelian model of oiko-nomia gradually lost its grip in subsequent centuries. In the last section I reflect on some proposals of E.F. Schumacher to recontextualize the Aristotelian model of place-based economics. (shrink)

In this volume leading scholars look at the heritage and impact of the important work done by the Stockholm School from the 1920s to the present. The first part of The Stockholm School of Economics Revisited covers the early years and is followed by an extensive review of the approaches to economics adopted by the school. A number of contributors investigate the Stockholm School's relation to and impact on their own work, the work of (...) other economists, and the approaches pursued by other schools. A final round-table discussion delves into the question 'What remains of the Stockholm School?' A readable collection for anyone interested in economic history, history of economic thought, or the ideas lying behind Swedish economic policy. (shrink)

The article investigates the significance of time, the nature of capital, and the role of technological progress in economic processes. The presented analysis of the three economic categories makes use of the theoretical achievements of notable representatives of the Austrian School of Economics, for whom a creative entrepreneur was the main protagonist of the interactions taking place in the economy. The above-mentioned economic categories, taken together, are for him the foundation of human activity. The time factor is of (...) great importance for man – individuals constantly analyse historical events so as to attain success in contemporary economic reality, and in the future. Capital is the basis for economic calculation, which underpins all entrepreneurial activity. Technological progress, which happens in time and requires considerable capital outlay, is the driving force of economic growth. (shrink)

An intuitively appealing argument for pluralism in economics can be made on the grounds that schools of economic thought complement one another. Let us call this the complementarity-based argument for pluralism (CAP). The concepts of complementarity, pluralism, and school of thought are scrutinized in this paper to evaluate this argument. I argue that the complementarity of schools is relative to scientific goals, which implies that discussing complementarity of schools of economic thought requires discussing the goals of economic research. (...) I also distinguish weak from strong complementarity and show that some alleged complementarity relations between schools are weak and thus provide little support for CAP. However, if strong complementarity relations, relative to a valuable goal, can be demonstrated to exist between specific schools, this is a strong reason for pluralism about those schools. Finally, I provide suggestions on how to distinguish strong from weak complementarity. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to describe possible e-learning activities that a university can develop. Examples of projects carried out in Warsaw School of Economics have been presented with conclusions and experience gathered during their implementation. In the last part, trends for the future of academic e-learning have been discussed.

Much has been written about the relationship between biology and social science during the early twentieth century. However, discussion is often drawn toward a particular conception of eugenics, which tends to obscure our understanding of not only the wide range of intersections between biology and social science during the period but also their impact on subsequent developments. This paper draws attention to one of those intersections: the British economist and social reformer William Beveridge’s controversial efforts to establish a Department of (...) Social Biology at London School of Economics during the 1920s and 1930s. Featuring a fully equipped laboratory headed by a leading geneticist, the Department of Social Biology was Beveridge’s attempt to “cross-fertilise” biology and social science and, in so doing, take the ideological heat out of social scientific, in particular economic, methods of investigation. Exploring why Beveridge’s project failed and throwing light on its long-term legacies, this paper considers what we can learn from the short-lived Department of Social Biology. (shrink)

Why would anyone want there to be natural foundations for the social sciences? In a provocative essay exploring precisely that question, historian Chris Renwick uses an interwar debate featuring William Beveridge, Lancelot Hogben, and Friedrich Hayek to begin to imagine what might have been had such a program calling for biological knowledge to form the natural bases of the social sciences been realized at the London School of Economics. Yet perhaps Renwick grants too much attention to differences and (...) “what-ifs” and not enough to the historical question of “what happened” afterward. “Chickens and Eggs” offers an alternative view of this rather vexed question—one grounded in what happened, which suggests that Renwick’s concerns may be somewhat misplaced. (shrink)

Does the concept of “race” find support in contemporary science, particularly in biology? No, says Naomi Zack, together with so many others who nowadays argue that human races lack biological reality. This claim is widely accepted in a number of fields (philosophy, biology, anthropology, and psychology), and Zack’s book represents only the latest defense of social constructivism in this context. There are several reasons why she fails to make a convincing case. Zack starts by arbitrarily ascribing an anachronistically essentialist connotation (...) to the concept of race. After having made that everyday notion semantically so crude and outdated there is no wonder that she finds it quite easy to conclude that such an awkward category has no place in science. Her main rationale for seeing our race distinctions as being poorly matched to biological characteristics (e.g., population differences in gene frequencies) is that these biological characteristics do not fall into discrete and mutually exclusive categories as “required” by the common-sense taxonomy. This opposition between the continuity of variation found in biology and the alleged discreteness of common-sense “races” is repeated throughout the book, and it is presented as creating an unbridgeable gap between biology and the colloquial concept of race. Contrary to what Zack says, however, today’s common-sense ideas about race are not so radically disconnected from contemporary science. Rather, “race” in ordinary usage is informed by biological knowledge to a considerable extent. Most people no longer think about race in terms of pre-Darwinian racial “essences” and “mutually exclusive” ideal types. In fact, as pointed out by Anthony Appiah (whom Zack quotes on this matter but without taking him seriously enough), the discourse on race has long been characterized by a practice of “semantic deference,” according to which people tend to use the word “race” assuming that the biologists could say more precisely than they could what it meant.. (shrink)

Why would anyone want there to be natural foundations for the social sciences? In a provocative essay exploring precisely that question, historian Chris Renwick uses an interwar debate featuring William Beveridge, Lancelot Hogben, and Friedrich Hayek to begin to imagine what might have been had such a program calling for biological knowledge to form the natural bases of the social sciences been realized at the London School of Economics. Yet perhaps Renwick grants too much attention to differences and (...) “what-ifs” and not enough to the historical question of “what happened” afterward. “Chickens and Eggs” offers an alternative view of this rather vexed question—one grounded in what happened, which suggests that Renwick’s concerns may be somewhat misplaced. (shrink)

We study a case that applies hermeneutics to social sciences, in particular to the Austrian School of economics. We argue that an inaccurate treatment of hermeneutics contributed to an epistemological downgrade of the Austrian School in the economic scientific community. We discuss hoe this shortcoming can be fixed and how a proper hermeneutic application to the Austrian school explains why this school of thought is neither positivist nor postmodern.

We propose Edgar Morin’s notion of transdisciplinarity as a complementary educational perspective for preparing business school students in addressing the complex global socio-economic and environmental challenges that our planet has been facing for some time. Morin’s notion of transdisciplinarity spans various disciplines, both within disciplines and beyond individual disciplines. Morin’s transdisciplinary approach is inquiry driven and presents a systemic/humanistic vision and form of awareness that challenges habitually dualistic and simplistic thinking. Morin’s transdisciplinarity is based on a dialogical and translogical (...) principle that extends classical and rigid logic and that helps students to explore and unify concepts of a simultaneous complementary and contradictory nature. Confronting students with different modes of thinking, imagining and feeling can help them to develop greater self-awareness, critical reflection, and creativity; with various frames of reference; and with an openness toward and confidence in engaging in changes needed to address global challenges in a sustainable and responsible way. (shrink)

Economics has long been the ‘dismal science’. The crisis in classical political economy at the end of the nineteenth century produced radically differing intellectual responses: Marx’s reconstitution of value theory on the basis of his dialectical method, the marginalists’ development of subjective value theory, and the historical school’s advocacy of inductive and historical reasoning. It is against this background that economics was established as a discrete academic discipline, consciously modelling itself on maths and physics and developing (...) its focus on theorising exchange. This entailed extraordinary reductionism, with humans regarded as rational, self-interested actors, and class, society, history and ‘the social’ being excised from economic analysis. On the basis of this narrowing of its concerns, particularly from the 1980s onwards, economics has sought to expand its sphere of influence through a form of imperialism which seeks to apply mainstream economic approaches to other social sciences and sees economics as ‘the universal grammar of social science’. The implications of this shift are discussed in Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis’s two volumes, where they analyse the fate of the social, the political and the historical in economic thought, and assess the future for an inter-disciplinary critique of economic reason. (shrink)

One cannot really speak of a school of personalistic economists. Moreover, there is a wide gulf between the economic philosophy of the personalists and the mathematical context of economic science. Since the thirties, philosophers such as Alexandre Marc, Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Mounier and many others have been searching, on the basis of a personalistic view of man, for a `third way' between individualistic capitalism and statist socialism , but there was seldom interest from the side of the scientific economists.Fortunately, (...) there are some notable exceptions. François Perroux, Kenneth Boulding, Ernst Schumacher, Serge Christophe Kolm, and Amartya Sen are economists who, in various ways, have attempted to bridge the gulf between the personalistic view of man and economic rationality. By carrying out an immanent critique of some of the standard economic assumptions, they opened a path for a normative economics that was clearly distinct from a purely positive economics as well as from Pareto's welfare economics. One can affix various labels to these attempts: humanistic economics , socio-economics , moral economics . In what follows, I shall interpret these attempts as initiatives in the direction of a personalistic economics. I would also situate the current research in `economics and ethics', which is becoming part of the mainstream of economic thought, and which has received official recognition with the recent Nobel prize award to Sen, within this tendency towards a more personalistic economics.Attention to moral feelings, human rights, altruistic motives, justice and solidarity, non-profit organizations, etc., contribute to situating the economic problem in a field where economics, politics and ethics no longer function as three distinct domains but where their interaction is central.Yet does this interactive economics fit into a personalistic way of thinking? Is a generalized system theory not more attractive? System theory has a different focus than personalistic economics. System theory considers the axioms of system equilibrium and sustainable growth as the ultimate horizon, whereas a personalist sees them as merely important conditions for a good society and economy. However refined it may be, system theory views the person from an external point of view, while the personalist refers to the internal experience of human freedom and meaning as something that transcends and regulates the system's functionality.One could object that neo-classical economists do not use system theory as their point of departure. In their eyes, system equilibrium is the result of the utility-maximizing behaviour of individuals. These individuals subjectively determine what their preferences are and then act accordingly. Is this openness for a free, utility-maximizing actor — where there is room for both material and immaterial, egoistic and altruistic preferences — not sufficient to speak of a personalistic economics ? If this were true, then the discourse of personalism would be more or less superfluous.I take the term `personalistic economics' to refer to a normative economics that does not simply reconstruct the problem of efficient allocation as an individual or social problem of utility, but in the first instance as a problem of human dignity and social justice. To reduce the problem of human choice to a problem of subjective utility is in itself a far-reaching normative standpoint. As soon as one realizes this, there is no reason to exclude other normative assumptions, such as personalistic ones. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive overview of the influence of Platonism on the English literary tradition, showing how English writers, including Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, Blake, Wordsworth, Yeats, Pound and Iris Murdoch, used Platonic themes and images within their own imaginative work.

In this paper I analyse the problem of free will and determinism as it pertains to the Austrian School of Economics. I demonstrate that despite the fact they subscribe to the concept of causality,...

Joan Robinson was one of the greatest economists of the twentieth century and a fearless critic of free-market capitalism. A major figure in the controversial 'Cambridge School' of economics in the post-war period, she made fundamental contributions to the economics of international trade and development. In Economic Philosophy Robinson looks behind the curtain of economics to reveal a constant battle between economics as a science and economics as ideology, which she argued was integral to (...) economics. In her customary vivid and pellucid style, she criticizes early economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and neo-classical economists Alfred Marshall, Stanley Jevons and Leon Walras, over the question of value. She shows that what they respectively considered to be the generators of value - labour-time, marginal utility or preferences - are not scientific but 'metaphysical', and that it is frequently in ideology, not science, that we find the reason for the rejection of economic theories. She also weighs up the implications of the Keynesian revolution in economics, particularly whether Keynes's theories are applicable to developing economies. Robinson concludes with a prophetic lesson that resonates in today's turbulent and unequal economy: that the task of the economist is to combat the idea that the only values that count are those that can be measured in terms of money. This Routledge Classics edition includes a new foreword by Sheila Dow. (shrink)