Contemporary German anti-Americanism is not a continuation of earlier anticapitalist, antimodern, and often anti-Semitic anti-Americanism. Rather, since the late 1960s a political anti-Americanism, which accepts capitalism and the extensive Americanization of German society, has emerged. It is a response to specific American foreign policies, but its roots lie in the uneven Americanization of twentieth-century Germany. Anti-Americanism has been fostered by Germany’s nonliberal variety of capitalism, by its more egalitarian social policies, by its greater secularism, by its (...) more influential environmental movements, and by memories of World War II. Political anti-Americanism is likely to last beyond the current Iraq War crisis. (shrink)

In order to graduate, Florida's high school students by law must learn that Communism is evil, dangerous, and fallacious. All students must learn that the U.S. produces the highest standard of living and more freedom than any other economic system on earth. State universities in Florida are creating a curriculum to implement the Americanism versus Communism Act of 1961 and the Free Enterprise and Consumer Education Act of 1975. ;The Florida Department of Education says that ideology, noncritical thinking, is (...) superior to critical thinking and that the superiority of the U.S. political economy and the dignity of the individual rest in part on peoples' being able to express themselves freely. ;Florida's A.V.C. and F.E.C.E.A. proponents have a special way of convincing audiences that they will develop loyalty while at the same time imposing a set of ideas not open to question. ;This work argues that, intentionally or not, Florida's legislature and Department of Education have set up an official ideology and the mechanism to purvey it. This ideological approach defeats the aim of comparing systems objectively. While the stated aim is to promote critical thinking, the D.O.E.'s special philosophy underscoring words like "democracy" results in indoctrinating students with a questionable description of the U.S. system. (shrink)

The war against Iraq unleashed in March 2003 spawned an attempt to silence the protest movement by accusing it of anti‐Americanism. This essay argues that the theory according to which right‐wing anti‐Americanism and left‐wing anti‐Americanism coincide is a myth. A new issue appears now, a paradox that characterizes the United States, where democracy developed within the white community concomitantly with the enslavement of blacks and the deportation of American Indians. In the American “Herrenvolk democracy,” a line of (...) demarcation between whites and people of color fosters the development of relations based on equality within the white community. Furthermore, U.S. history is marked by the fundamentalist tendency to transform the Judeo‐Christian tradition into a sort of national religion that consecrates the exceptionalism of the American people and the sacred mission with which they are entrusted (“Manifest Destiny”). Europe is unable thoroughly to comprehend the American mixture of religious and moral fervor, on the one hand, and overt pursuit of political, economic, and military world domination, on the other. But it is this mixture, or rather this explosive combination, this peculiar fundamentalism, that constitutes the greatest threat to world peace today. (shrink)

The Meaning of Americanism won the $1000 prize in the 1956 Philosophical Library essay contest. The sub-title describes it as “An Essay on the Religious and Philosophical Basis of the American Mind”. The use of the cliché “American mind” must be regarded as less than felicitous since Dylan Thomas’s visit to America when “for the first time he gazed at the broad open spaces of the American mind”. The book is, however, a serious study of democracy in the United (...) States. It discusses the various influences—especially that of the philosophy of John Locke—which went to the formulation of the Declaration of Independence and the writing of the American Constitution. The author is of the opinion that if the values of American democracy are to be preserved the Lockeian approach is not sufficient; what is needed, he declares, is “democratic personalism”. (shrink)

The article examines Hannah Arendt’s analysis of ‘pan-nationalist Europeanism’ and anti-Americanism which may serve inherently problematic identity-generating functions for the European project. For Arendt, this specific form of Europeanism is often intimately linked to mobilizations of widely spread fears of global sociocultural and economic modernization, which is frequently perceived as ‘Americanization’. In addition, however, those fears may reflect self-referential politics of ‘Americanism’ abroad and also originate in ‘objective’ structural international imbalances. According to Arendt, then, Americanism on one (...) side and Europeanism on the other side of the Atlantic should be challenged as two ideologies facing, fighting and, above all, resembling each other as all seemingly opposed ideologies. In light of the current transatlantic cleavages, it is argued with Arendt that it is in the EU’s best interest to avoid binary, culturalized legitimizations of Europeanism and Americanism. Instead, it is the eminent political task to positively resignify the EU as a new, truly post-national project and polity in its own right. Adapting and expanding Arendt’s framework, conceptual and normative implications for a self-reflexive, unique and future-oriented EU political identity and response to globalization are indicated and discussed. (shrink)

A New Textbook of Americanism includes Ayn Rand's previously uncompleted question-and-answer Textbook of Americanism, answers to questions she left unanswered written by contemporary Objectivist thinkers, excerpts from Rand's previously unpublished “Workshop on Ethics and Politics,” and new and previously published essays by Objectivist writers. The book's most important section is the excerpt from her Workshop in which Rand discusses topics that were seldom or never addressed in her published works.

Heidegger's writings on this subject remain important for us. First, because Americanism would refer to what we now call "globalization," and second, because it addresses the very possibility of "philosophical" thinking. This paper tries to push Heidegger's criticism to the very extreme in order to discover where its logic begins to strain, and thereby to generate new insights concerning the relationship between technology and thinking. (edited).

Studies in the Philosophy of Michel Foucault : A French Alternative to Anglo-Americanism.

Lipset concludes with an assessment of the current global movement toward classical liberalism: "We are all liberals-even the socialists and communists, " he asserts. . . [and] predicts a return to the state-centric world in the not-so-near future.

El presente artículo se propone indagar el caso de Leopoldo Castedo dentro del más amplio contexto de la variada reflexión politológica del republicanismo español en el exilio que siguió a la derrota en la Guerra civil española. Castedo, exiliado en Chile tras el conflicto, desarrolló una intensa actividad cultural entre Chile y los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, uniendo en ella, en lo que fue siempre signo identitario de su quehacer intelectual, la reflexión teórica con la praxis, las ideas con su (...) traducción concreta en el mundo y en la sociedad de su tiempo. (shrink)

An essay which is occasionally provocative, though somewhat cursory, in its delineation of the American democratic ideal. The author reviews the intellectual contributions of the philosophers of the Enlightenment, the Puritan tradition, ethical idealism and pragmatism to the American political tradition. But these various contributions have provided only a partial expression of the ideal of Americanism. This, the author thinks, is a personalist ethic, issuing in a "democratic personalism." --J. F. D.

Brendan O'Connor and Martin Griffiths, The Rise of Anti-Americanism ; Dennis Altman, Gore Vidal's America.

Tamar Meisels responds to the preceding article.

Why Do They Hate Us? In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many Americans began to ask the question “Why do they hate us?” Today, those who hate us have greatly expanded in number. They range from Muslim fanatics who wish to kill Americans, to numerous citizens of France, Germany, Spain, South Korea, Canada, and elsewhere who see the United States as a bigger threat than the global terrorists that it seeks to eliminate. Americans continue to brood over the (...) fact that others hate us, but they seem no more prepared to understand or address the problem. At a…. (shrink)

The first of three articles discussing the Israel/Palestine conflict and the charge of anti-semitism. The second article is a response by Tamar Meisels, and the third a reply to Meisels by Klug.

After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, an attitude spread inside Marxist movements and parties, according to which every mass movement of the subaltern classes was celebrated as an ascetic redemption of the “last” and of the “poor” men, while every prosaic and “bourgeois” demand for a development of the productive forces was ignored, in a sort of messianic wait for a bourgeois society's palingenesis. Antonio Gramsci was reluctant towards this tendency. He was interested instead in building and defending the new (...) revolutionary State, being aware of the arduous and contradictory process of construction of the new social order. Hence it springs the concern of Italian historical materialism in phenomena such as Americanism and Fordism and towards the industrial production’s techniques of organization. A concern shared by Gramsci with Lenin, according to whom the revolutionary State needs to assimilate every scientific achievement as a useful tool to ensure the development of the Soviet country and to overcome a generalized misery and a backwardness that endangered its survival. (shrink)

Long before he became one of the leading voices in American sociology and letters, Daniel Bell had a tough early life. He experienced poverty and socialism early, in a life taking on the big themes of the 20th century: communism, capitalism, Marxism, Americanism, modernism. In this he was the beneficiary as well as the critic of modern Americanism, or American modernism. In this essay I focus on a relatively overlooked Bell classic, Marxian Socialism in the United States (1996 (...) [1952]). Here Bell works in an essentially Weberian optic, but one which takes Marx and Marxism very seriously. This is a major contribution to history of ideas and to labour studies, but also to cultural sociology. Some closing remarks connect Bell’s legacy and these frames to the much more influential, if also unread, collection The End of Ideology (1960). (shrink)

Condensed to bumper-sticker pith, What It Means to Be an American asks everyone to Honk If You Hate Us-Against-Them Thinking. Offering a fine antidote to exclusionist tripe about 'Americanism, ' Walzer grabs Pat Buchanan by the hyphens and doesn't let go.--The Philadelphia Inquirer. Lightning Print On Demand Title.

DIVA sophisticated theoretical reconsideration of Latin American studies, critiquing past work and proposing new frameworks for the discipline./div.

Reconstructing the evolution of Gramsci’s judgement about the Russian Revolution implies an overall rethinking of his own relation to Marx as well as to Kant. Already in the spring of 1917, Gramsci foresaw that the February Revolution could become a proletarian revolution and that this would realise in fact Kant’s moral: only a society completely freed from oppression and exploitation would allow people to be free and autonomous. After the fall of the Winter Palace, Gramsci wrote that the revolution happened (...) “against Marx’s Capital”, or better, against its literal interpretation as spread by the positivistic Marxism of the Second International. Between the end of the 1910s and the beginning of the 1920s, Gramsci thought it possible for Italy and the whole of Europe “to do as in Russia”; yet, from 1924, he started elaborating a different vision of the revolution in the Western World, which in the Prison Notebooks became a contraposition between a war of movement and a war of position. At the same time, he developed the concepts of caesarism/bonapartism and passive revolution which allowed the analysis of phenomena such as americanism and fascism from the perspective of a conservative modernisation, or revolution without a revolution. Still, and most of all, Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony, highlighting the importance of the moment of consensus in the fight for gaining and maintaining power. This drew Gramsci quite far from the marxism-leninism of his time, both from the political and theoretical point of view; for instance, he rejected the “ingenuous realism” of Lenin’s Materialism and Empiriocriticism in favour of a phenomenalism explicitly drawn by Kant. (shrink)

Over the past 50 years, Louis Hartz’s reinterpretation of American political thought has had considerable influence – both in shaping later studies and provoking rebuttals. Drawing on Tocqueville’s observation that Americans were fortunate in having been ‘born equal’ instead of having to become so by revolution, Hartz compared American political thought with that of Britain and France in order to show that America has been enthralled by an ‘irrational Lockianism’. Although criticisms need to be taken into account, and the thesis (...) modified to take account of subsequent developments, it remains an indispensable and illuminating frame of analysis. (shrink)

The debate over the influence of American culture upon Europe and the rest of the world is hardly new. Discussions about the cultural effects of video recorders, satellite broadcasting, cable television and their likely content are only the latest episode in a long-running drama in which the young and aggressive culture of America bludgeons the elderly culture of old Europe (or correspondingly overruns and wipes out the quaint but ill-armed ethnic cultures of the less-developed world, dragging the natives from coconuts (...) to Coca-Cola in a generation of identity crisis). But though there has been much written about some aspects of this issue, and most non-Americans who have come into contact with American culture have some awareness of its dimensions, there is also much which remains unclear, and ill- or misunderstood. In this essay two aspects of this large and complex problem will be examined. Firstly, the problem of how the “Americanisation of world culture” has been understood until now will be outlined, by looking at its background in the mass culture critique of the 19th and 20th centuries, with some current notions of what American culture is, and some accounts of how it has been internationalized. My aim in this first section is in particular to try to isolate “American culture” from commercial and industrial culture more generally, for a conflation of these phenomena is widespread and very misleading. Secondly, a normative argument will be outlined from the premises that a “superculture” is indeed developing and that, though it is less threatening than many suspect, it requires a vital measure of resistance if many valuable elements of human experience are not to be relegated to anthropology museums. The central value which will be defended here, however, is not “Europeanism” or “Americanism”, but rather the central liberal virtue of diversity, of which cultural expression is an extremely important form. My attempt to develop a politics of cultural protectionism, then, represents a wish to surpass simplistic rejections of American culture and to come to terms with the confrontation of culture with industrial society itself. This involves going beyond the traditional discussion of culture in one country, however, and trying to extend the mass culture debate to the international arena, where the present debate on this problem is far more complex but often less sophisticated. (shrink)

The Cuban Revolution in 1959 installed in the Caribbean island the ideology of the extreme left, the revolutionary government, the transition from populism to Marxism in broad sectors of Latin American intllectual youth. Such context produced the entry into the geopolitical and sociocultural scene of the boom era as a movement for the liberal emancipation of Latin America and postulated its protagonists as mobilizers and inspirers of the ideological conflict in the bosom of the Cold War. These are two unpublished (...) and critical realities due to their socio-historical particularity, because they produced the radical change in Marxist politics and the metamorphosis of the Latin writer. Under the Latin Americanist perspective and beyond regionalism, our analytical interpretation will focus on such a pragmatic duality, shedding more light on a hypothetical question: If the uprising in the South was the product of the Cuban Revolution or explicit opposition to the cultural project of Havana. (shrink)

L’article part de l’observation que la recherche sur les théories du complot est actuellement en plein développement, mais qu’elle est également fragmentée. En particulier, il y a une division croissante entre les disciplines aux approches culturelles et qualitatives, telles que l’histoire, les études culturelles et l’ethnologie, et les disciplines aux approches quantitatives et empiriques telles que la psychologie et la science politique. L’article affirme que ce « grand fossé » doit être comblé pour que la recherche arrive à une compréhension (...) authentique des théories du complot. Comme première étape dans ce processus de rapprochement, l’article examine, du point de vue des études américanistes, des recherches conduites de l’autre côté du « grand fossé », en psychologie et science politique. Il résume les travaux conduits dans ces domaines et en fait une évaluation critique, se centrant sur la méthodologie, les hypothèses considérant les croyances conspirationnistes comme dysfonctionnelles, les arguments parfois circulaires, le centrage sur les aspects individuels plutôt que sociaux et collectifs, l’indifférence quant à la définition du phénomène et l’ignorance des différences culturelles et historiques. L’article conclut en présentant des recommandations pour de futurs projets de recherches en collaboration. (shrink)

No reverberatory effect of the great war has caused American public opinion more solicitude than the failure of the “melting-pot.” The tendency... has been for the national clusters of immigrants, as they became more and more firmly established and more and more prosperous to cultivate more and more assiduously the literatures and cultural traditions of their homelands. Assimilation, in other words, instead of washing out the memories of Europe, made them more and more intensely real. Just as these clusters became (...) more and more objectively American, did they become more and more German or Scandinavian or Bohemian or Polish.... [This] is not, however, to admit the failure of Americanization. It is not to fear the failure of democracy. It is rather to urge us to an investigation of what Americanism may rightly mean. It is to ask ourselves whether our ideal has been broad or narrow—whether perhaps the time has not come to assert a higher ideal than the “melting pot.”... We act as if we wanted Americanization to take place only on our own terms, and not by the consent of the governed. All our elaborate machinery of settlement and school and union, of social and political naturalization, however, will move with friction just in so far as it neglects to take into account this strong and virile insistence that American shall be what the immigrant will have a hand in making it, and not what a ruling class, descendent of those British stocks which were the first permanent immigrants, decide that America shall be made. Randolph Bourne (1916/1977, 248ff). (shrink)