Motivational enhancement in sport – a form of ‘neuro-doping’ – can help athletes attain greater achievements in sport. A key question is whether or not that athlete deserves that achievement. We distinguish three concepts – praiseworthiness, prizeworthiness, and admiration – which are closely related. However, in sport, they can come apart. The most praiseworthy athlete may not be the most prizeworthy, and so on. Using a model of praiseworthiness as costly commitment to a valuable end, and situating prizeworthiness within the (...) boundaries of the sport, we argue that motivational enhancement in some cases can be compatible with desert. (shrink)

This paper investigates the impacts of emotion enhancement on self-identity and assesses possible ethical consequences of these changes. It introduces the crucial dimensions related to the self which emotion enhancement may endanger—emotion standards, narrative identity, self-objectification, and freedom of hope and pursuit. I argue that the ethically salient issue with emotion enhancement is its impact on autonomous agency—whether one’s actions and beliefs are one’s own, and how the relational autonomy may be hindered or fostered. The changes arising from emotion enhancement (...) may be considered to belong to the same self as long as such changes do not alter the individual’s internal value system and the individual identifies with such changes. That being said, emotion enhancement remains unjustified in terms of freedom. Even if the emotional enhancement is performed out of free will, it does not bring freedom in the true sense, and thus threatens the subject’s special kind of being as the same rational agent. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the claim that, as new types of neurointervention get developed allowing us to enhance various aspects of our mental functioning, we should work to prevent the use of such interventions from ever becoming the “new normal,” that is, a practice expected—even if not directly required—by employers. The author’s response to that claim is that, unlike compulsion or most cases of direct coercion, indirect coercion to use such neurointerventions is, per se, no more problematic than the pressure people (...) all find themselves under to use modern technological devices like computers or mobile phones. Few people seem to believe that special protections should be introduced to protect contemporary Neo-Luddites from such pressures. That being said, the author acknowledges that separate factors, when present, can indeed render indirect coercion to enhance problematic. The factors in question include lack of safety, fostering adaptation to oppressive circumstances, and having negative side effects that go beyond health. Nonetheless, the chapter stresses that these factors do not seem to be necessary correlates of neuroenhancement. (shrink)

There are a number of premises underlying much of the vigorous debate on pharmacological cognitive enhancement. Among these are claims in the enhancement literature that such drugs exist and are effective among the cognitively normal. These drugs are deemed to enhance cognition specifically, as opposed to other non-cognitive facets of our psychology, such as mood and motivation. The focus on these drugs as cognitive enhancers also suggests that they raise particular ethical questions, or perhaps more pressing ones, compared to those (...) raised by other kinds of neuroenhancement. Finally, the use of these drugs is often claimed to be significant and increasing. Taken together, these premises are at the heart of the flurry of debate on pharmacological cognitive enhancement. In this article, it is argued that these are presumptions for which the evidence does not hold up. Respectively, the evidence for the efficacy of these drugs is inconsistent; neurologically it makes little sense to distinguish the cognitive from non-cognitive as separate targets of pharmacological intervention; ethically, the questions raised by cognitive enhancement are in fact no different from those raised by other kinds of neuroenhancement; and finally the prevalence rates of these drugs are far from clear, with the bulk of the claims resting on poor or misrepresented data. Greater conceptual clarity along with a more tempered appreciation of the evidence can serve to deflate some of the hype in the associated literature, leading to a more realistic and sober assessment of these prospective technologies. (shrink)

An argument in the cognitive enhancement literature is that using stimulants in populations of healthy but socially disadvantaged individuals mistakenly attributes pathology to nonpathological individuals who experience social inequalities. As the argument goes, using stimulants as cognitive-enhancing drugs to solve the social problem of poorly educated students in inadequate schools misattributes the problem as an individual medical problem, when it is really a collective sociopolitical problem. I challenge this argument on the grounds that not all types of enhancement have to (...) be explained in medical terms, but rather at least one conception of enhancement can be explained in social terms—opportunity maintenance. Therefore, I propose that as a moral requirement we ought to explore whether stimulants could be a means of remedying underprivileged children's experiences of social inequalities that are borne from inadequate schools for the sake of increasing their chances for opportunities and well-being. (shrink)

Drugs used to provide improvement of cognitive functioning have been shown to be effective in healthy individuals. It is sometimes assumed that the use of these drugs constitutes cheating in an academic context. We examine whether this assumption is ethically sound. Beyond providing the most up-to-date discussion of modafinil use in an academic context, this contribution includes an overview of the safety of modafinil use in greater depth than previous studies addressing the issue of cheating. Secondly, we emphasize two crucial, (...) but hitherto nearly overlooked, nuances to the issues: the potential for modafinil to decrease inequality and disadvantage in academic settings, and the fact that how modafinil is used dramatically impacts its effects on health, coercion, fairness, authenticity and effort. Finally, we explicitly defend the position that there are no qualitatively morally relevant differences between modafinil use and other enhancement modalities; any such differences are in degree,... (shrink)

Irrespective of the presence of formal norms, behaviours such as plagiarism, data fabrication and falsification are commonly regarded as unethical and unfair. Almost unanimously, they are considered forms of academic misconduct. Is this the case also for newer behaviours that technology is making possible and are now entering the academic scenario?

Recent research suggests that “smart drugs” don’t make healthy individuals who use them smarter. The main effects are instead on levels of motivation and interest. So the main ethical question here is not whether there is anything wrong or regrettable about healthy individuals’ using these drugs to make themselves smarter. It is rather whether there is anything problematic about their using these drugs to control or modulate their levels of motivation and interest. This question can either be discussed on a (...) wholly general level or be related to the values and goals characteristic of specific domains of human activity. This essay considers the use of motivation-modulators within the academic domain, and suggests two ways in which such enhancements might conflict with the values distinctive of this domain. (shrink)

ABSTRACTResearch shows that various pharmaceuticals can offer modest cognition enhancing effects for healthy individuals. These finding have caused some academics to support liberal use of pharmacological cognitive enhancement in schools and universities. This approach partially arises from arguments implying there is little moral justification for regulating such drugs. In this paper, I argue against the liberal use of PCE on epistemic grounds. According to Charles Taylor, emotions and behaviour are epistemically valuable because they tell us meaningful things about reality. Hence, (...) an accurate interpretation of students’ emotions and behaviour in context is crucial to support an effective and ethical educational process. This paper supports the assertion that PCE might alter emotions and behaviour, and thereby distort the interpretation of the educational situation by students, educators and policy makers. Therefore, when discussing whether or not to regulate PCE we should be mindful of these epistemic concerns. (shrink)

The view that acting morally is ultimately a question of treating others with respect has had a profound influence on moral and legal philosophy. Not surprisingly, then, some scholars forcefully argue that the modes of punishment that the states mete out to offenders should not be disrespectful, and, furthermore, it has been argued that obliging offenders to receive neurological treatment is incompatible with showing them their due respect. In this paper, I examine three contemporary accounts of what showing respect for (...) offenders in our sentencing practices would amount to: that it involves not interfering with offenders’ capacities for rationality and autonomy, that it should not undermine offenders’ prospect of reform, and that it amounts to treating offenders as if opaque. I then critically discuss whether any of these accounts plausibly imply that mandating neurointerventions to some offenders is necessarily morally wrong. I argue that they do not. (shrink)

Academic performance enhancement or cognitive enhancement (CE) via stimulant drug use has received increasing attention. The question remains, however, whether CE solely represents the use of drugs for achieving better academic or workplace results or whether CE also serves various other purposes. The aim of this study was to put the phenomenon of pharmacological academic performance enhancement via prescription and illicit (psycho-) stimulant use (Amphetamines, Methylphenidate) among university students into a broader context. Specifically, we wanted to further understand students’ experiences, (...) the effects of use on students and other factors, such as pressure to perform in their academic and private lives. (shrink)

BackgroundAlthough some of the most radical hypothesis related to the practical implementations of human enhancement have yet to become even close to reality, the use of cognitive enhancers is a very tangible phenomenon occurring with increasing popularity in university campuses as well as in other contexts. It is now well documented that the use of cognitive enhancers is not only increasingly common in Western countries, but also gradually accepted as a normal procedure by the media as well. In fact, its (...) implementation is not unusual in various professional contexts and it has its peak in colleges. Even when certain restrictions in the legislation of a country are indeed in place, they are without doubts easy to overcome. The legitimacy and appropriateness of such restrictions will not be the focus of our investigation.DiscussionOur concern is instead related to the moral and social reasons to publicly acknowledge the use of cognitive enhancers in competitive-selective contexts. These reasons are linked to a more neutral analysis of contemporary Western society: it is a fact that an increasing number of competitive-selective contexts have a substantial number of contenders using cognitive enhancers.SummaryThrough the use of five explicative examples, in this paper we want to analyse the problems related to its use. In particular, it will be our aim to show the tension between one of the main argument used by bio-liberals and the actual implementation of the drugs in competitive, or semi-competitive contexts. (shrink)

I argue that young patients should be able to access neuroenhancing drugs without a diagnosis of ADHD. The current framework of consent for pediatric patients can be adapted to accommodate neuroenhancement. After a brief overview of pediatric neuroenhancement, I develop three arguments in favor of greater acceptance of neuroenhancement for young patients. First, ADHD is not relevantly different from other disadvantages that could be treated with stimulant medication. Second, establishing a legitimate framework for pediatric neuroenhancement would mitigate the bad effects (...) of diversion and improve research on neuroenhancement and ADHD. Third, some pediatric patients have rights to access neuroenhancements. I then consider several objections to pediatric neuroenhancement. I address concerns about addiction, advertising, authentic development, the parent–child relationship and equal opportunity and conclude that these concerns may inform a framework for prescribing neuroenhancement but they do not justify limits on prescribing. (shrink)

The author examines whether Kantian ethics would condone the use of pharmaceutical drugs to enhance one’s moods and cognitive abilities. If key assumptions concerning safety and efficacy, non-addictiveness, non-coercion, and accessibility are not met, Kantian ethics would consider mood and cognitive enhancement to be impermissible. But what if these assumptions are granted? The arguments for the permissibility of neuroenhancement are stronger than those against it. After giving a general account of Kantian ethical principles, the author argues that, when these assumptions (...) are granted, Kantian ethics no longer justifies the prohibition of neuroenhancement, and responds to two objections. (shrink)

Riassunto: L’impianto cocleare è una neuroprotesi che consente un recupero parziale dell’udito nella persona sorda. Nonostante la sua generale efficacia nel contrastare alcuni dei problemi legati alla sordità, il suo utilizzo è stato fortemente osteggiato da quella parte della comunità sorda che vede nella sordità una forma di identità culturale e non una patologia. Questo articolo inquadra in una prospettiva neuroetica le preoccupazioni della comunità sorda – difficilmente comprensibili agli udenti – esaminando le analogie fra il rifiuto dell’IC e il (...) disagio che si osserva nella popolazione generale relativamente al Potenziamento Cognitivo. Nel PCog, individui sani insoddisfatti delle proprie prestazioni, o comunque desiderosi di migliorarle, ricorrono ad interventi artificiali per potenziare le proprie funzioni cognitive. L’analisi evidenzia come, nel rifiutare l’IC, la comunità sorda possa voler tutelare un insieme di valori non così diverso da quello che la comunità generale richiama spesso nelle sue preoccupazioni rispetto alla diffusione dei PCog. Parole chiave : Impianto cocleare; Potenziamento cognitivo; Sordità; Cultura sorda The cochlear implant as cognitive enhancement? A neuroethical perspective on some issues raised by the deaf community: The cochlear implant is a neuroprosthesis that allows for partial recovery of auditory function in individuals who are deaf. Despite its general efficacy, its use has been strongly opposed by a part of the deaf community that perceives deafness as a form of cultural identity, rather than a pathology. This article considers the concerns of the deaf community – which are often difficult for hearing people to understand – from a neuroethics perspective, proposing that such opposition to CI is analogous to the general population’s unease with regard to Cognitive Enhancement. CE allows healthy individuals who are unsatisfied with – or would like to improve – their performance to use artificial interventions that enhance cognitive functions. The analysis reveals that, when opposing CIs, the deaf community may be protecting a set of values similar to those that the general community often evokes when voicing concerns about CE diffusion. Keywords: Cochlear Implant; Cognitive Enhancement; Deafness; Deaf Culture. (shrink)