We analyse Kreisel’s notion of human-effective computability. Like Kreisel, we relate this notion to a concept of informal provability, but we disagree with Kreisel about the precise way in which this is best done. The resulting two different ways of analysing human-effective computability give rise to two different variants of Church’s thesis. These are both investigated by relating them to transfinite progressions of formal theories in the sense of Feferman.

Freivalds defined an acceptable programming system independent criterion for learning programs for functions in which the final programs were required to be both correct and "nearly" minimal size, i.e., within a computable function of being purely minimal size. Kinber showed that this parsimony requirement on final programs limits learning power. However, in scientific inference, parsimony is considered highly desirable. A lim-computablefunction is (by definition) one calculable by a total procedure allowed to change its mind finitely many times about its output. (...) Investigated is the possibility of assuaging somewhat the limitation on learning power resulting from requiring parsimonious final programs by use of criteria which require the final, correct programs to be "not-so-nearly" minimal size, e.g., to be within a lim-computable function of actual minimal size. It is shown that some parsimony in the final program is thereby retained, yet learning power strictly increases. Considered, then, are lim-computable functions as above but for which notations for constructive ordinals are used to bound the number of mind changes allowed regarding the output. This is a variant of an idea introduced by Freivalds and Smith. For this ordinal notation complexity bounded version of lim-computability, the power of the resultant learning criteria form finely graded, infinitely ramifying, infinite hierarchies intermediate between the computable and the lim-computable cases. Some of these hierarchies, for the natural notations determining them, are shown to be optimally tight. (shrink)

Linguistic representations are taken by some to be representations of something, specifically of Standard Linguistic Entities, such as phonemes, clauses, noun phrases etc. This perspective takes them to be intentional. Rey (2021) further argues that the SLEs themselves are inexistent. Here I argue that linguistic representations are simply structures, abstractions of brain states, and hence not intentional, and show how they nevertheless connect to the systems that use them.

We show that there is a computable Boolean algebra $\mathscr{B}$ and a computably enumerable ideal I of $\mathscr{B}$ such that the quotient algebra $\mathscr{B}/I$ is of Cantor-Bendixson rank 1 and is not isomorphic to any computable Boolean algebra. This extends a result of L. Feiner and is deduced from Feiner's result even though Feiner's construction yields a Boolean algebra of infinite Cantor-Bendixson rank.

Turing computation over a non-linguistic domain presupposes a notation for the domain. Accordingly, computability theory studies notations for various non-linguistic domains. It illuminates how different ways of representing a domain support different finite mechanical procedures over that domain. Formal definitions and theorems yield a principled classification of notations based upon their computational properties. To understand computability theory, we must recognize that representation is a key target of mathematical inquiry. We must also recognize that computability theory is an intensional enterprise: it (...) studies entities as represented in certain ways, rather than entities detached from any means of representing them. (shrink)

Ranging from Alan Turing’s seminal 1936 paper to the latest work on Kolmogorov complexity and linear logic, this comprehensive new work clarifies the relationship between computability on the one hand and constructivity on the other. The authors argue that even though constructivists have largely shed Brouwer’s solipsistic attitude to logic, there remain points of disagreement to this day. Focusing on the growing pains computability experienced as it was forced to address the demands of rapidly expanding applications, the content maps the (...) developments following Turing’s ground-breaking linkage of computation and the machine, the resulting birth of complexity theory, the innovations of Kolmogorov complexity and resolving the dissonances between proof theoretical semantics and canonical proof feasibility. Finally, it explores one of the most fundamental questions concerning the interface between constructivity and computability: whether the theory of recursive functions is needed for a rigorous development of constructive mathematics. This volume contributes to the unity of science by overcoming disunities rather than offering an overarching framework. It posits that computability’s adoption of a classical, ontological point of view kept these imperatives separated. In studying the relationship between the two, it is a vital step forward in overcoming the disagreements and misunderstandings which stand in the way of a unifying view of logic. (shrink)

In this thesis I investigate the theoretical possibility of a universal method of prediction. A prediction method is universal if it is always able to learn from data: if it is always able to extrapolate given data about past observations to maximally successful predictions about future observations. The context of this investigation is the broader philosophical question into the possibility of a formal specification of inductive or scientific reasoning, a question that also relates to modern-day speculation about a fully automatized (...) data-driven science. I investigate, in particular, a proposed definition of a universal prediction method that goes back to Solomonoff and Levin. This definition marks the birth of the theory of Kolmogorov complexity, and has a direct line to the information-theoretic approach in modern machine learning. Solomonoff's work was inspired by Carnap's program of inductive logic, and the more precise definition due to Levin can be seen as an explicit attempt to escape the diagonal argument that Putnam famously launched against the feasibility of Carnap's program. The Solomonoff-Levin definition essentially aims at a mixture of all possible prediction algorithms. An alternative interpretation is that the definition formalizes the idea that learning from data is equivalent to compressing data. In this guise, the definition is often presented as an implementation and even as a justification of Occam's razor, the principle that we should look for simple explanations. The conclusions of my investigation are negative. I show that the Solomonoff-Levin definition fails to unite two necessary conditions to count as a universal prediction method, as turns out be entailed by Putnam's original argument after all; and I argue that this indeed shows that no definition can. Moreover, I show that the suggested justification of Occam's razor does not work, and I argue that the relevant notion of simplicity as compressibility is already problematic itself. (shrink)

In the past four decades, the notion of quantum polynomial-time computability has been mathematically modeled by quantum Turing machines as well as quantum circuits. This paper seeks the third model, which is a quantum analogue of the schematic definition of recursive functions. For quantum functions mapping finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces to themselves, we present such a schematic definition, composed of a small set of initial quantum functions and a few construction rules that dictate how to build a new quantum function from (...) the existing ones. We prove that our schematic definition precisely characterizes all functions that can be computable with high success probabilities on well-formed quantum Turing machines in polynomial time, or equivalently uniform families of polynomial-size quantum circuits. Our new, schematic definition is quite simple and intuitive and, more importantly, it avoids the cumbersome introduction of the well-formedness condition imposed on a quantum Turing machine model as well as of the uniformity condition necessary for a quantum circuit model. Our new approach can further open a door to the descriptional complexity of quantum functions, to the theory of higher-type quantum functionals, to the development of new first-order theories for quantum computing, and to the designing of programming languages for real-life quantum computer. (shrink)

The Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) is often paraphrased as ``every computable function is computable by means of a Turing machine.'' The author has constructed a family of equational theories that are not Turing-decidable, that is, given one of the theories, no Turing machine can recognize whether an arbitrary equation is in the theory or not. But the theory is called pseudorecursive because it has the additional property that when attention is limited to equations with a bounded number of variables, one obtains, (...) for each number of variables, a fragment of the theory that is indeed Turing-decidable. In a 1982 conversation, Alfred Tarski announced that he believed the theory to be decidable, despite this contradicting CTT. The article gives the background for this proclamation, considers alternate interpretations, and sets the stage for further research. (shrink)

Olszewski claims that the Church-Turing thesis can be used in an argument against platonism in philosophy of mathematics. The key step of his argument employs an example of a supposedly effectively computable but not Turing-computable function. I argue that the process he describes is not an effective computation, and that the argument relies on the illegitimate conflation of effective computability with there being a way to find out . ‘Ah, but,’ you say, ‘what’s the use of its being right twice (...) a day, if I can’t tell when the time comes?’ Why, suppose the clock points to eight o’clock, don’t you see that the clock is right at eight o’clock? Consequently, when eight o’clock comes round your clock is right. Lewis Carroll. (shrink)

Taking Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures as a starting point, this paper explores the use of recursive techniques in contemporary linguistic theory. Specifically, it is shown that there were profound ambiguities surrounding the notion of recursion in the 1950s, and that this was partly due to the fact that influential texts such as Syntactic Structures neglected to define what exactly constituted a recursive device. As a result, uncertainties concerning the role of recursion in linguistic theory have prevailed until the present day, and (...) some of the most common misunderstandings that have appeared in recent discussions are examined at some length. This article shows that debates about such topics are frequently undermined by fundamental misunderstandings concerning core terminology, and the full extent of the prevailing haziness is revealed. An attempt is made, for instance, to distinguish between such things as iterative constructional devices and self-similar syntactic embedding, despite the fact that these are usually both unhelpfully classified as examples of recursion. Consequently, this article effectively constitutes a plea for much greater accuracy and clarity when such important issues are addressed from a linguistic perspective. (shrink)

We begin with the history of the discovery of computability in the 1930’s, the roles of Gödel, Church, and Turing, and the formalisms of recursive functions and Turing automatic machines . To whom did Gödel credit the definition of a computable function? We present Turing’s notion [1939, §4] of an oracle machine and Post’s development of it in [1944, §11], [1948], and finally Kleene-Post [1954] into its present form. A number of topics arose from Turing functionals including continuous functionals on (...) Cantor space and online computations. Almost all the results in theoretical computability use relative reducibility and o-machines rather than a-machines and most computing processes in the real world are potentially online or interactive. Therefore, we argue that Turing o-machines, relative computability, and online computing are the most important concepts in the subject, more so than Turing a-machines and standard computable functions since they are special cases of the former and are presented first only for pedagogical clarity to beginning students. At the end in §10–§13 we consider three displacements in computability theory, and the historical reasons they occurred. Several brief conclusions are drawn in §14. (shrink)

We examine notions of genericity intermediate between 1-genericity and 2-genericity, especially in relation to the Δ20 degrees. We define a new kind of genericity, dynamic genericity, and prove that it is stronger than pb-genericity. Specifically, we show there is a Δ20 pb-generic degree below which the pb-generic degrees fail to be downward dense and that pb-generic degrees are downward dense below every dynamically generic degree. To do so, we examine the relation between genericity and array noncomputability, deriving some structural information (...) about the Δ20 degrees in the process. (shrink)

We show how Abstract Complexity Theory is related to the degrees of unsolvability and develop machinery by which computability theoretic hierarchies with a complexity theoretic flavor can be defined and investigated. This machinery is used to prove results both on hierarchies of Δ 2 0 sets and hierarchies of Δ 2 0 degrees. We prove a near-optimal lower bound on the effectivity of the Low Basis Theorem and a result showing that array computable c.e. degrees are, in some sense, the (...) simplest possible Δ 2 0 degrees. We also examine the growth rates of iterates of m K . Finally, we indicate how complexity theory can be used to analyze notions of genericity intermediate between 1 -genericity and 2 -genericity, and produce a hierarchy of such notions. (shrink)

Church's thesis asserts that a number-theoretic function is intuitively computable if and only if it is recursive. A related thesis asserts that Turing's work yields a conceptual analysis of the intuitive notion of numerical computability. I endorse Church's thesis, but I argue against the related thesis. I argue that purported conceptual analyses based upon Turing's work involve a subtle but persistent circularity. Turing machines manipulate syntactic entities. To specify which number-theoretic function a Turing machine computes, we must correlate these syntactic (...) entities with numbers. I argue that, in providing this correlation, we must demand that the correlation itself be computable. Otherwise, the Turing machine will compute uncomputable functions. But if we presuppose the intuitive notion of a computable relation between syntactic entities and numbers, then our analysis of computability is circular. (shrink)

There are many branches of philosophy called “the philosophy of X,” where X = disciplines ranging from history to physics. The philosophy of artificial intelligence has a long history, and there are many courses and texts with that title. Surprisingly, the philosophy of computer science is not nearly as well-developed. This article proposes topics that might constitute the philosophy of computer science and describes a course covering those topics, along with suggested readings and assignments.

The core of the problem discussed in this paper is the following: the Church-Turing Thesis states that Turing Machines formally explicate the intuitive concept of computability. The description of Turing Machines requires description of the notation used for theinputand for theoutput. Providing a general definition of notations acceptable in the process of computations causes problems. This is because a notation, or an encoding suitable for a computation, has to be computable. Yet, using the concept of computation, in a definition of (...) a notation, which will be further used in a definition of the concept of computation yields an obvious vicious circle. The circularity of this definition causes trouble in distinguishing on the theoretical level, what is an acceptable notation from what is not an acceptable notation, or as it is usually referred to in the literature, “deviant encodings”.Deviant encodings appearexplicitlyin discussions about what is an adequate or correct conceptual analysis of the concept of computation. In this paper, I focus on philosophical examples where the phenomenon appearsimplicitly, in a “disguised” version. In particular, I present its use in the analysis of the concept of natural number. I also point at additional phenomena related to deviant encodings: conceptual fixed points and apparent “computability” of uncomputable functions. In parallel, I develop the idea that Carnapian explications provide a much more adequate framework for understanding the concept of computation, than the classical philosophical analysis. (shrink)

Turing and Church formulated two different formal accounts of computability that turned out to be extensionally equivalent. Since the accounts refer to different properties they cannot both be adequate conceptual analyses of the concept of computability. This insight has led to a discussion concerning which account is adequate. Some authors have suggested that this philosophical debate—which shows few signs of converging on one view—can be circumvented by regarding Church’s and Turing’s theses as explications. This move opens up the possibility that (...) both accounts could be adequate, albeit in their own different ways. In this paper, I focus on the question of whether Church’s thesis can be seen as an explication in the precise Carnapian sense. Most importantly, I address an additional constraint that Carnap puts on the explicative power of axiomatic systems—an axiomatisation explicates when it is clear which mathematical entities form the theory’s intended model—and that implicitly applies to axiomatisations of recursion theory used in Church’s account of computability. To overcome this difficulty, I propose two possible clarifications of the pre-systematic concept of “computability” that can both be captured in recursion theory, and I show how both clarifications avoid an objection arising from Carnap’s constraint. (shrink)

For over a decade, the hypercomputation movement has produced computational models that in theory solve the algorithmically unsolvable, but they are not physically realizable according to currently accepted physical theories. While opponents to the hypercomputation movement provide arguments against the physical realizability of specific models in order to demonstrate this, these arguments lack the generality to be a satisfactory justification against the construction of any information-processing machine that computes beyond the universal Turing machine. To this end, I present a more (...) mathematically concrete challenge to hypercomputability, and will show that one is immediately led into physical impossibilities, thereby demonstrating the infeasibility of hypercomputers more generally. This gives impetus to propose and justify a more plausible starting point for an extension to the classical paradigm that is physically possible, at least in principle. Instead of attempting to rely on infinities such as idealized limits of infinite time or numerical precision, or some other physically unattainable source, one should focus on extending the classical paradigm to better encapsulate modern computational problems that are not well-expressed/modeled by the closed-system paradigm of the Turing machine. I present the first steps toward this goal by considering contemporary computational problems dealing with intractability and issues surrounding cyber-physical systems, and argue that a reasonable extension to the classical paradigm should focus on these issues in order to be practically viable. (shrink)

Traces the development of recursive functions from their origins in the late nineteenth century to the mid-1930s, with particular emphasis on the work and influence of Kurt Gödel.

An incomplete degree is cuppable if it can be joined by an incomplete degree to a complete degree. For sets fulfilling some type of simplicity property one can now ask whether these sets are cuppable with respect to a certain type of reducibilities. Several such results are known. In this paper we settle all the remaining cases for the standard notions of simplicity and all the main strong reducibilities.

A familiar argument goes as follows: natural languages have infinitely many sentences, finite representation of infinite sets requires recursion; therefore any adequate account of linguistic competence will require some kind of recursive device. The first part of this paper argues that this argument is not convincing. The second part argues that it was not the original reason recursive devices were introduced into generative linguistics. The real basis for the use of recursive devices stems from a deeper philosophical concern; a grammar (...) that functions merely as a metalanguage would not be explanatorily adequate as it would merely push the problem of explaining linguistic competence back to another level. The paper traces this concern from Zellig Harris and Chomsky’s early work in generative linguistics and presents some implications. (shrink)

I develop a theory of counterfactuals about relative computability, i.e. counterfactuals such as 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then the halting problem would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is true, and 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then arithmetical truth would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is false. These counterfactuals are counterpossibles, i.e. they have metaphysically impossible antecedents. They thus pose a challenge to the orthodoxy about counterfactuals, which would treat them as uniformly true. What’s more, I (...) argue that these counterpossibles don’t just appear in the periphery of relative computability theory but instead they play an ineliminable role in the development of the theory. Finally, I present and discuss a model theory for these counterfactuals that is a straightforward extension of the familiar comparative similarity models. (shrink)

We study some generalized notions of cohesiveness which arise naturally in connection with effective versions of Ramsey's Theorem. An infinite set A of natural numbers is n-cohesive (respectively, n-r-cohesive) if A is almost homogeneous for every computably enumerable (respectively, computable) 2-coloring of the n-element sets of natural numbers. (Thus the 1-cohesive and 1-r-cohesive sets coincide with the cohesive and r-cohesive sets, respectively.) We consider the degrees of unsolvability and arithmetical definability levels of n-cohesive and n-r-cohesive sets. For example, we show (...) that for all n ≥ 2, there exists a Δ 0 n+1 n-cohesive set. We improve this result for n = 2 by showing that there is a Π 0 2 2-cohesive set. We show that the n-cohesive and n-r-cohesive degrees together form a linear, non-collapsing hierarchy of degrees for n ≥ 2. In addition, for n ≥ 2 we characterize the jumps of n-cohesive degrees as exactly the degrees ≥ 0 (n+1) and also characterize the jumps of the n-r-cohesive degrees. (shrink)

This paper sketches an answer to the question how we, in our arithmetical practice, succeed in singling out the natural-number structure as our intended interpretation. It is argued that we bring this about by a combination of what we assert about the natural-number structure on the one hand, and our computational capacities on the other hand.

The present paper discusses a proposal which says,roughly and with several qualifications, that thecollection of mathematical truths is identical withthe set of theorems of ZFC. It is argued that thisproposal is not as easily dismissed as outright falseor philosophically incoherent as one might think. Some morals of this are drawn for the concept ofmathematical knowledge.

Post in 1944 began studying properties of a computably enumerable set A such as simple, h-simple, and hh-simple, with the intent of finding a property guaranteeing incompleteness of A . From the observations of Post and Myhill , attention focused by the 1950s on properties definable in the inclusion ordering of c.e. subsets of ω, namely E = . In the 1950s and 1960s Tennenbaum, Martin, Yates, Sacks, Lachlan, Shoenfield and others produced a number of elegant results relating ∄-definable properties (...) of A , like maximal, hh-simple, atomless, to the information content of A . Harrington and Soare gave an answer to Post's program for definable properties by producing an ∄-definable property Q which guarantees that A is incomplete and noncomputable, but developed a new Δ 3 0 -automorphism method to prove certain other properties are not ∄-definable. In this paper we introduce new ∄-definable properties relating the ∄-structure of A to deg, which answer some open questions. In contrast to Q we exhibit here an ∄-definable property T which allows such a rapid flow of elements into A that A must be complete even though A may possess many other properties such as being promptly simple. We also present a related property NL which has a slower flow but fast enough to guarantee that A is not low, even though A may possess virtually all other related lowness properties and A may simultaneously be promptly simple. (shrink)

We announce and explain recent results on the computably enumerable (c.e.) sets, especially their definability properties (as sets in the spirit of Cantor), their automorphisms (in the spirit of Felix Klein's Erlanger Programm), their dynamic properties, expressed in terms of how quickly elements enter them relative to elements entering other sets, and the Martin Invariance Conjecture on their Turing degrees, i.e., their information content with respect to relative computability (Turing reducibility).

We announce and explain recent results on the computably enumerable sets, especially their definability properties, their automorphisms, their dynamic properties, expressed in terms of how quickly elements enter them relative to elements entering other sets, and the Martin Invariance Conjecture on their Turing degrees, i.e., their information content with respect to relative computability.

A set X of nonnegative integers is computably enumerable (c.e.), also called recursively enumerable (r.e.), if there is a computable method to list its elements. Let ε denote the structure of the computably enumerable sets under inclusion, $\varepsilon = (\{W_e\}_{e\in \omega}, \subseteq)$ . We previously exhibited a first order ε-definable property Q(X) such that Q(X) guarantees that X is not Turing complete (i.e., does not code complete information about c.e. sets). Here we show first that Q(X) implies that X has (...) a certain "slowness" property whereby the elements must enter X slowly (under a certain precise complexity measure of speed of computation) even though X may have high information content. Second we prove that every X with this slowness property is computable in some member of any nontrivial orbit, namely for any noncomputable A ∈ ε there exists B in the orbit of A such that X ≤ T B under relative Turing computability (≤ T ). We produce B using the Δ 0 3 -automorphism method we introduced earlier. (shrink)

This paper deals with the question: what are the key requirements for a physical system to perform digital computation? Time and again cognitive scientists are quick to employ the notion of computation simpliciter when asserting basically that cognitive activities are computational. They employ this notion as if there was or is a consensus on just what it takes for a physical system to perform computation, and in particular digital computation. Some cognitive scientists in referring to digital computation simply adhere to (...) Turing’s notion of computability . Classical computability theory studies what functions on the natural numbers are computable and what mathematical problems are undecidable. Whilst a mathematical formalism of computability may perform a methodological function of evaluating computational theories of certain cognitive capacities, concrete computation in physical systems seems to be required for explaining cognition as an embodied phenomenon . There are many non-equivalent accounts of digital computation in physical systems. I examine only a handful of those in this paper: (1) Turing’s account ; (2) The triviality “account”; (3) Reconstructing Smith’s account of participatory computation ; (4) The Algorithm Execution account . My goal in this paper is twofold. First, it is to identify and clarify some of the underlying key requirements mandated by these accounts. I argue that these differing requirements justify a demand that one commits to a particular account when employing the notion of computation in regard to physical systems. Second, it is to argue that despite the informative role that mathematical formalisms of computability may play in cognitive science, they do not specify the relationship between abstract and concrete computation. (shrink)

We define and study a new notion called k-immunity that lies between immunity and hyperimmunity in strength. Our interest in k-immunity is justified by the result that θ does not k-tt reduce to a k-immune set, which improves a previous result by Kobzev [7]. We apply the result to show that Φ′ does not btt-reduce to MIN, the set of minimal programs. Other applications include the set of Kolmogorov random strings, and retraceable and regressive sets. We also give a new (...) characterization of effectively simple sets and show that simple sets are not btt-cuppable. (shrink)

For a set A of non-negative integers, let D be the set of non-negative differences of elements of A. Clearly, if A is computable, then D is computably enumerable. We show that every simple set which contains 0 is the difference set of some computable set and that every computably enumerable set is computably isomorphic to the difference set of some computable set. Also, we prove that there is a computable set which is the difference set of the complement of (...) some computably enumerable set but not of any computably enumerable set. Finally, we show that every arithmetic set is in the Boolean algebra generated from the computable sets by the difference operator D and the Boolean operations. (shrink)

The existence of non-standard numbers in first-order arithmetics is a semantic obstacle for modelling our arithmetical skills. This article argues that so far there is no adequate approach to overcome such a semantic obstacle, because we can also find out, and deal with, non-standard elements in Turing machines.

A version of the Church-Turing Thesis states that every effectively realizable physical system can be simulated by Turing Machines (‘Thesis P’). In this formulation the Thesis appears to be an empirical hypothesis, subject to physical falsification. We review the main approaches to computation beyond Turing definability (‘hypercomputation’): supertask, non-well-founded, analog, quantum, and retrocausal computation. The conclusions are that these models reduce to supertasks, i.e. infinite computation, and that even supertasks are no solution for recursive incomputability. This yields that the realization (...) of hypercomputing devices is implausible, and that Thesis P is not essentially different from the standard Church-Turing Thesis. (shrink)

We use certain strong Q-reducibilities, and their corresponding strong positive reducibilities, to characterize the hyperimmune sets and the hyperhyperimmune sets: if A is any infinite set then A is hyperimmune (respectively, hyperhyperimmune) if and only if for every infinite subset B of A, one has \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\overline{K}\not\le_{\rm ss} B}$$\end{document} (respectively, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\overline{K}\not\le_{\overline{\rm s}} B}$$\end{document}): here \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\le_{\overline{\rm (...) s}}}$$\end{document} is the finite-branch version of s-reducibility, ≤ss is the computably bounded version of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\le_{\overline{\rm s}}}$$\end{document}, and \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\overline{K}}$$\end{document} is the complement of the halting set. Restriction to \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Sigma^0_2}$$\end{document} sets provides a similar characterization of the \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Sigma^0_2}$$\end{document} hyperhyperimmune sets in terms of s-reducibility. We also show that no \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A \geq_{\overline{\rm s}}\overline{K}}$$\end{document} is hyperhyperimmune. As a consequence, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\deg_{\rm s}(\overline{K})}$$\end{document} is hyperhyperimmune-free, showing that the hyperhyperimmune s-degrees are not upwards closed. (shrink)

This introduction begins by posing the question that this Special Issue addresses and briefly considers historical precedents and why the issue is important. The discussion then moves on to the consideration of important milestones in the history of computing, up until the present time. A brief specification of the essential components of computational systems is then offered. The final section introduces the papers that are included in this volume.

Christopher G. Timpson provides the first full-length philosophical treatment of quantum information theory and the questions it raises for our understanding of the quantum world. He argues for an ontologically deflationary account of the nature of quantum information, which is grounded in a revisionary analysis of the concepts of information.

Quantum Information Theory and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics is a conceptual analysis of one of the most prominent and exciting new areas of physics, providing the first full-length philosophical treatment of quantum information theory and the questions it raises for our understanding of the quantum world. -/- Beginning from a careful, revisionary, analysis of the concepts of information in the everyday and classical information-theory settings, Christopher G. Timpson argues for an ontologically deflationary account of the nature of quantum information. (...) Against what many have supposed, quantum information can be clearly defined (it is not a primitive or vague notion) but it is not part of the material contents of the world. Timpson's account sheds light on the nature of nonlocality and information flow in the presence of entanglement and, in particular, dissolves puzzles surrounding the remarkable process of quantum teleportation. In addition it permits a clear view of what the ontological and methodological lessons provided by quantum information theory are; lessons which bear on the gripping question of what role a concept like information has to play in fundamental physics. Topics discussed include the slogan 'Information is Physical', the prospects for an informational immaterialism (the view that information rather than matter might fundamentally constitute the world), and the status of the Church-Turing hypothesis in light of quantum computation. -/- With a clear grasp of the concept of information in hand, Timpson turns his attention to the pressing question of whether advances in quantum information theory pave the way for the resolution of the traditional conceptual problems of quantum mechanics: the deep problems which loom over measurement, nonlocality and the general nature of quantum ontology. He marks out a number of common pitfalls to be avoided before analysing in detail some concrete proposals, including the radical quantum Bayesian programme of Caves, Fuchs, and Schack. One central moral which is drawn is that, for all the interest that the quantum information-inspired approaches hold, no cheap resolutions to the traditional problems of quantum mechanics are to be had. (shrink)

This paper seeks to recover the function of universal history, which was to place particulars into relation with universals. By the 20th century universal history was largely discredited because of an idealism that served to lend epistemic coherence to the overwhelming complexity arising from universal history's comprehensive scope. Idealism also attempted to account for history's being "open"--for the human ability to transcend circumstance. The paper attempts to recover these virtues without the idealism by defining universal history not by its scope (...) but rather as a scientific method that provides an understanding of any kind of historical process, be it physical, biological or human. While this method is not new, it is in need of a development that offers a more robust historiography and warrant as a liberating historical consciousness. The first section constructs an ontology of process by defining matter as ontic probabilities rather than as closed entities. This is lent warrant in the next section through an appeal to contemporary physical science. The resulting conceptual frame and method is applied to the physical domain of existents, to the biological domain of social being and finally to the human domain of species being. It is then used to account for the emergence of human history's initial stage--the Archaic Socio-Economic Formation and for history' stadial trajectory--its alternation of evolution and revolution. (shrink)

The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, namely, that Turing-Test± passing artifacts are persons, it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably (...) be persons. (shrink)

This study provides a basic introduction to agent-based modeling (ABM) as a powerful blend of classical and constructive mathematics, with a primary focus on its applicability for social science research. The typical goals of ABM social science researchers are discussed along with the culture-dish nature of their computer experiments. The applicability of ABM for science more generally is also considered, with special attention to physics. Finally, two distinct types of ABM applications are summarized in order to illustrate concretely the duality (...) of ABM: Real-world systems can not only be simulated with verisimilitude using ABM; they can also be efficiently and robustly designed and constructed on the basis of ABM principles. (shrink)