Minds and Machines 24 (3):275-305 (2014)
Abstract |
For over a decade, the hypercomputation movement has produced computational models that in theory solve the algorithmically unsolvable, but they are not physically realizable according to currently accepted physical theories. While opponents to the hypercomputation movement provide arguments against the physical realizability of specific models in order to demonstrate this, these arguments lack the generality to be a satisfactory justification against the construction of any information-processing machine that computes beyond the universal Turing machine. To this end, I present a more mathematically concrete challenge to hypercomputability, and will show that one is immediately led into physical impossibilities, thereby demonstrating the infeasibility of hypercomputers more generally. This gives impetus to propose and justify a more plausible starting point for an extension to the classical paradigm that is physically possible, at least in principle. Instead of attempting to rely on infinities such as idealized limits of infinite time or numerical precision, or some other physically unattainable source, one should focus on extending the classical paradigm to better encapsulate modern computational problems that are not well-expressed/modeled by the closed-system paradigm of the Turing machine. I present the first steps toward this goal by considering contemporary computational problems dealing with intractability and issues surrounding cyber-physical systems, and argue that a reasonable extension to the classical paradigm should focus on these issues in order to be practically viable
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Keywords | Hypercomputation Physical computation Gandy Thesis M Church–Turing thesis Human computation Machine computation Quantum computing DNA computing Natural computing |
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ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1007/s11023-013-9317-3 |
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References found in this work BETA
On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the N Tscheidungsproblem.Alan Turing - 1936 - Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42 (1):230-265.
Quantum Computation and Quantum Information.Michael A. Nielsen, Isaac L. Chuang & Isaac L. Chuang - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals.Alan Mathison Turing - 1939 - London: Printed by C.F. Hodgson & Son.
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Citations of this work BETA
Rational Analysis, Intractability, and the Prospects of ‘as If’-Explanations.Iris van Rooij, Cory D. Wright, Johan Kwisthout & Todd Wareham - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):491-510.
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