What is recognition and why is it so important? This book develops a synoptic conception of the significance of recognition in its many forms for human persons by means of a rational reconstruction and internal critique of classical and contemporary accounts. The book begins with a clarification of several fundamental questions concerning recognition. It then reconstructs the core ideas of Fichte, Hegel, Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth and utilizes the insights and conceptual tools developed across these chapters for (...) developing a case for the universal importance of recognition for humans. It argues in favour of a universalist anthropological position, unusual in the literature on recognition, that aims to construe a philosophically sound basis for a discourse of common humanity, or of a shared human life-form for which moral relations of recognition are essential. This synthetic conception of the importance of recognition provides tools for articulating deep intuitions shared across cultures about what makes human life and forms of human co-existence better or worse, and thus tools for mutual understanding about the deepest shared concerns of humanity, or of what makes us all human persons despite our differences. -/- Recognition and the Human Life-Form will appeal to readers interested in philosophical anthropology, social and political philosophy, critical theory, and the history of philosophy. It also provides ideas and conceptual tools for fields such as anthropology, education, disability studies, international relations, law, politics, religious studies, sociology, and social research. (shrink)

La presente investigación trata de los conceptos de reflexión entre Kant y Hegel, y sobre cómo su tratamiento hegeliano conduce sus teorías del concepto y de la subjetividad. Partiendo de la diferencia entre inicio y principio de la filosofía propuesta por Hegel, trata de exponer su continuación y crítica del proyecto kantiano. Hegel delimitará, denunciará y expondrá las carencias teoréticas kantianas y, simultáneamente, propondrá la superación de estas mediante el movimiento inmanente de los objetos, aprehensible mediante la reflexión inmanente, que (...) termina por diluir la distinción kantiana entre razón y sujeto, y su escisión entre pensar y ser. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band vereinigt die Akten des internationalen Schleiermacher-Kongresses 2021 und nimmt den Philosophen, Theologen, Pädagogen und Übersetzer Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) als Kommunikationstheoretiker in den Blick. Ob als Universitätslehrer, Kanzelredner, als politischer Reformer, Publizist, Salongänger oder Briefeschreiber – Schleiermacher war selbst ein begnadeter Kommunikator und im Begriff der Kommunikation bündeln sich wie in einem Brennglas viele zentrale Aspekte seines Denkens. Seine Philosophie, Theologie und philologische Praxis zeichnen sich durch ihre emphatische Prozesshaftigkeit jenseits starrer Systeme aus. Sich in Sprache manifestierendes Wissen, (...) moralisches Handeln, religiöses Erleben und der Entwurf gemeinschaftlicher Institutionen sind im beständigen Werden und nur im Austausch der miteinander streitenden, sich liebenden und hassenden, Ideen und Sinn entwerfenden und um Gemeinschaft und Individualität ringenden Menschen wirklich. Die Beiträge dieses Bandes gehen Schleiermachers Werk ebenso wie seiner gesellschaftlichen, kirchlichen und philologischen Praxis vor dem Hintergrund ihrer ideengeschichtlichen Verflechtung nach und aktualisieren sein Denken in Auseinandersetzung mit unterschiedlichen Positionen der Gegenwart. (shrink)

In this article I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of “second nature” and “recognition”. To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper to the theory of Hegelian and post- Hegelian Anerkennung. The solution strategy I propose is signifi cant also in terms of bringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of “space of reasons” that stems from the Hegelian concept of “Spirit”. I thus broach the notion of “second nature” as a bridgeconcept (...) that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Anerkennung and for a rethinking of the “space of reasons” within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the novelties introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between fi rst and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levels. I then return to the question of the space of reasons to show the contribution the renewed conception of recognition as second nature makes to the definition of its intrinsic sociality as something that is not in principle opposed to a sense of naturalness. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to analyse Hegel’s theory of cognitive reference to the world and, in particular, Hegel’s theory of sensation, in order to verify whether it implies metaphysical commitments. I will pursue my goal by investigating the problem of sensation in Hegel’s philosophy starting from McDowell’s conception of the relation between mind and world and from his theory of perception. In my view, this strategy offers a threefold advantage that will enable us to do the following: (...) i) persuasively interpret the Hegelian theory of sensation; ii) better understand the authenticity and the limits of McDowell’s ‘Hegelianism’; iii) place the Hegelian theory of sensation within the complex contemporary debate on the status of sensible experience. (shrink)

El último Schelling desarrolla un aristotelismo anti-hegeliano cuyo mejor ejemplo es su interpretación de la “pura actualidad” en el libro Lambda de la Metafísica. Contra la lectura “entelequial” de Hegel, Schelling subraya que dicha actualidad es pura ἐνέργεια, libre de toda potencialidad, es decir, de todo contenido y sin relación a movimiento alguno o su culminación. En este artículo, analizo las diferencias entre ambas interpretaciones desde la perspectiva de Schelling. Finalmente, discuto cuál es la ventaja que gana la propia filosofía (...) tardía de Schelling al distinguir tan nítidamente entre ἐνέργεια y ἐντελέχεια. (shrink)

Discussions of habit in Hegel’s thought usually focus on his subjective spirit since this is where the most extended discussion of this issue takes place. This paper argues that habit is also important for understanding Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The discussion of habit and second nature occur at a critical juncture in the text. This discussion is important for understanding his notion of ethical life and his account of freedom.

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of methodology in action research. It begins by showing how action research is nothing other than a modern 20th century manifestation of the pre-modern tradition of practical philosophy. It then gives an explanation of Aristotelian Tradition and draws on Gadamer's powerful vindication in order to show how action research functions to sustain a distorted understanding of what practice is. The paper concludes by outlining a non-methodological view of action research whose (...) chief task is to promote the kind of historical self-consciousness that the development of practice presupposes and requires. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se examina la relación de la Filosofía del derecho de Hegel con la filosofía práctica aristotélica. Con ello se pretende mostrar, por una parte, que algunas de las tesis y motivos centrales de la filosofía del derecho hegeliana se entienden de mejor forma trayendo a primer plano ciertos planteamientos aristotélicos y, por otro lado, que dichos planteamientos son objeto de una reinterpretación y reelaboración por parte de Hegel ante ciertas exigencias históricas y losó cas del contexto (...) moderno. En particular, se examina la relación entre estos dos autores atendiendo a dos puntos concretos: la metodología holística de una losofía práctica –entendida de modo amplio– y la teoría de la motivación ética. (shrink)

One of Heidegger’s enduring concerns was to develop an original meditation on the meaning of the present. Integral to this attempt is his critique of the understanding of the bein...

El presente artículo aborda el debate filosófico entre el idealismo hegeliano y el vitalismo nietzscheano que surge en el marco de la filosofía moderna. Se trata de una transición en la que la concepción y el uso del lenguaje y la gramática pasan a tener connotaciones ontológicas fundamentales, las cuales se pueden apreciar muy bien en la contraposición de los textos principales de cada autor: Fenomenología del espíritu y Así habló Zaratustra, los cuales han conformado el corpus del presente estudio. (...) Para observar sus estructuras gramaticales, se ha visto oportuno un análisis mediante las nuevas herramientas y enfoques computacionales sugeridos desde los enfoques más recientes de las Humanidades digitales. Se trata de una aproximación cuantitativa intenta complementar la lectura cercana que un especialista puede realizar. Concretamente, se ha aplicado procesamiento del lenguaje natural, a través de un modelo preentrenado y mediante programación en R. Se ha podido detectar el tipo de términos empleados en ambos textos, distinguiendo sus diferentes funciones gramaticales, las dependencias entre términos y los tiempos verbales. El artículo muestra, cuantitativamente, cuán distante están ambos filósofos y cómo emplean de manera igualmente tenaz la gramática para dar a expresar y entender sus ideas. De sus filosofías se puede afirmar que gramática y ontología forman una unidad: la gramática se utiliza para reforzar las ideas filosóficas tanto como estas ideas están ya derivadas, conformadas, en las propias estructuras gramaticales. Finalmente, las herramientas computacionales demuestran ser, a través del presente artículo, un complemento pertinente para el análisis filosófico. (shrink)

This article is aimed at highlighting some possible contributions of Hegel’s philosophy to the contemporary debate around process metaphysics. In the contemporary metaphysical debate, process metaphysics represent an attempt to highlight the limits of the traditional philosophical paradigm, which is based on the notion of substance, and to work within an alternative paradigm, which is based on the notion of process. What exists, then, are not substances, substrates, fixed and stable objects characterized by certain properties, but processes, events, occurrences. The (...) main idea of ​​process metaphysics is that being is dynamic and that this dynamic nature must be the main focus of any comprehensive philosophical explanation of reality. Looking at this revolution, it is necessary to define the very notion of process. In fact, this work of conceptual clarification of the fundamental notion of this new philosophical paradigm is still ongoing. My idea is that Hegelian philosophy can offer some relevant indications to do the job. In this sense, the article will be divided into two parts: on the basis of the analysis of some definitions of the notion of process in the contemporary debate around process metaphysics, I will show 1) the need to determine the minimal ontological structure of the notion of process; 2) the possibility of determining this structure through some conceptual tools provided by Hegel’s logic and in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the first part of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics A-33, 88b30-89a10. I claim that Aristotle is not concerned with an epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief in general. He is rather making a contrast between scientific knowledge (which is equivalent to explanation by the primarily appropriate cause) and some explanatory beliefs that falls short of capturing the primarily appropriate cause.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was one of the philosophic giants of the nineteenth century. Well versed in both ancient and more recent philosophical tracts, he rejected the individualism of Hobbes and Locke, as well as their notion that the state was an agency set up in the first place to protect life and property, and, drawing inspiration from Aristotle, outlined a vision of the state as an agency bound, in the first place, to protect the weak and the powerless. Hegel (...) further rejected Kant’s individualistic ethics and counseled that ethical behavior had to be understood as taking place in a social context, with real duties toward other people. For Hegel, an individual had rights and duties within the context of the family, in the community, and, as a citizen, vis-à-vis the state. He emphasized the network of duties in which each individual finds himself, urging political moderation and concern for the good of the entire community. He has been condemned as a proto-totalitarian, lauded as a democrat of sorts, and described variously as liberal, anti-liberal, authoritarian, conservative-monarchist, and constitutionalist. This essay will argue that Hegel came to champion a constitutional-legal order under an autocratic monarch, with protection for liberal values. The absolute authority of the monarch, thus, was limited to those powers which he needed in order to advance and protect the interests of the citizens of the realm. (shrink)

While the Hegelian struggle for recognition is often taken to be the systematic point at which rational humanity differentiates itself from mere animality, Hegel more thoroughly expounds on the relationship between rational and nonrational animals in his Encyclopedia: humans diverge from nonrational animals through a process of habituation. While one might assume that Hegel takes this power of habituation to be sufficient for rationality, this assumption is complicated by Hegel’s attribution of habituation to non-human animals as well. Against readings of (...) the Encyclopedia that separate human and non-human animal habituation, I argue that a coherent interpretation must treat habituation as the same power in human and non-human animal life. My interpretation demonstrates Hegel’s proximity to Matthew Boyle’s transformative conception of rationality, which portrays rationality as a unique realization of animality. Hegel takes the realization of rational animal life to be thoroughly habitual, contra the instinctual basis of nonrational animal life. (shrink)