Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):153-179 (2010)
AbstractAfter resolving the dreaming doubt at the end of the Sixth Meditation, Descartes concedes to Hobbes that one could apply the criterion for waking experience in a dream and thus be deceived, but he no longer considers this possibility to have skeptical force. I argue that this is a legitimate response by Descartes since 1) the dreaming doubt in the Sixth Meditation is no longer a global skeptical hypothesis as it is in the First, and 2) the level of certainty that sensory experience must meet in the Sixth Meditation is lower than it must meet in the First
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References found in this work
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1.René Descartes - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry.Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (ed.) - 1978 - Hassocks: Harvester Press.