"Une expérience qui réussit dans l'air ne réussit pas toujours dans le vide. C'est ainsi que s'achève le dialogue qui clôt l'Enquête sur les principes de la morale (1751). Dans cette oeuvre que Hume jugeait être le meilleur de tous ses écrits, le philosophe écossais. fidèle à sa méthode empirique et à son "scepticisme mitigé", part en quête des indices susceptibles de révéler L'origine de la morale. N'agissons-nous que par intérêt? L'approbation morale peut-elle faire abstraction de nos préférences? À suivre (...) les hommes dans leurs choix pour en dégager la constance, on ne peut qu'être frappé par la diversité des moeurs et des coutumes. La conclusion alors révèle la subtilité du détective: la morale de Hume joint l'utile à l'agréable et l'Enquête ne se fait pas faute de rappeler, dans sa forme même, que l'exercice philosophique doit lui aussi être un plaisir. (shrink)

Le rôle de David Hume dans la philosophie moderne, par A. L. Leroy.--The enlightenment of David Hume, by E. C. Mossner.--Hume and Jurieu: possible Calvinist origins of Hume's theory of belief, by R. H. Popkin.--Hume: philosopher or psychologist? A problem of exegesis, by T. E. Jessop.--L'astrazione nella filosofia di Hume, di M. Dal Pra.--Infinite divisibility in Hume's "Treatise," by A. Flew.--Note a "La rgola del gusto," di E. Migliorini.--Kant, Hamann-Jacobi and Schelling on Hume, by P. Merlan.--Bibliografia humiana dal 1937 (...) al 1966, di E. Ronchetti. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 269 severally through hearing, tasting, and smelling, so that we should have on our hands five spatially unrelated spaces. He can find no reason for abandoning the spontaneous commonsense conviction that the puffing I hear is that of the locomotive I am looking at, that the chocolate I am tasting is the one I have put in my mouth, that what I am smelling is the rose (...) I am seeing and also perhaps holding; and, to return to Berkeley, that I perceive the surface I am seeing to be the very one that I am touching with my finger. Mr. Armstrong seems to be laying down the basis of a general theory of perception, that no given perception can be reduced to the datum proper to the sense-organ used plus an associate, a guess, or an inference. To turn this negative statement into a positive one, to say what the activity is that grasps more than the presumed datum, and what makes it reliable, is, as the history of the theory of perception makes plain, desperately hard. Far from grumbling at Mr. Armstrong for not having gone forward to this task, I am grateful for his having given us a book that is so intelligent, acute, clear, stimulating, and blessedly concise--one that deserves to be read by anyone interested in Berkeley, or the theory of vision, or the theory of perception generally. T. E. Jzssov Hull, England Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume. A new edition. By Charles W. Hendel. (Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963. 14 x 21. Pp. li + 516.) Cette nouvelle 6dition des Studies a subi d'importants changements non seulement dans sa pr6sentation, mais aussi dans son esprit. Elle nous prouve combien la pens6e d'un homme se d6veloppe sans cesse et s'enrichit. L'interpr&ation d'un philosophe et la pens& m~me du philosophe ont connu et connaissent encore ces transformations. La pens& humaine ne consid~re jamais sa t$che comme achev&. C'est pourquoi nous ne devons jamais cesser d'ftendre le champ de nos &udes philosophiques pour provoquer la naissance de nouvelles comparaisons f&ondes. Nous y passons certes beaucoup de temps, en retour, nous discernons mieux les complexit6s de la nature humaine. Nous savions d6jh qu'il y avait plusieurs Platon, car le progr& de l'homme se poursuivait de dialogue en dialogue; nous savons maintenant qu'il y a plusieurs David Hume, et que le Hume de Kant ou le Hume du dernier siecle, ne peuvent plus 6tre les n6tres. Comme le remarque Charles Hendel, dans son introduction, vingt-cinq annfes ont suffi h renouveler l'interpr&ation que nous donnions de Hume. Aujourd'hui c'est l'imagination qui se forme l'habitude de repr&enter par un seul mot une collection d'id&s semblables et qui nous sugg~re d'user de l'id& de causalit~ pour interpr&er le retour de cons&utions analogues. C'est aussi l'imagination, plus que la raison, qui nous r&~le la probabilit~ d'un &6nement donn6. Hendel nous rapelle aussi que Buder pourrait bien avoir inspir6 ~t Hume l'importance morale de la sympathie, et que l'Alciphron de Berkeley aurait sugg6r6 le Cl~anthe des Dialogues sur la Religion Naturelle. Hendel a 6galement raison d'insister sur l'importance des interpr&ations de Norman Kemp Smith. Cette nouvelle et si 6rudite &ude de Hendel nous fait mieux comprendre ~ la fois les variations des pens6es de Hume, de Kemp Smith et de Hendel lui-m~me. Nous sommes ainsi mieux avertis des difficult6s de l'histoire de la philosophie, dues non seulement au d6veloppement des sciences, mais aussi du progr&s moral et spirituel, sujet h tant de fluctuations dans l'histoire et m~me, ~t une m~me epoque, d'homme h homme. Aussi cette nouvelle ~dition ne manquera pas d'apporter de nouvelles dart& h nombre de ses lecteurs. ANDV.a~ Lotas LEROY Sorbonne... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:136 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY man felt two needs :"the theoretical need for guaranteeing a priori the subsistence of an ethical sphere against the Enlightenment's emphasis on happiness, and the political and practical need for guaranteeing individual freedom against an enlightened absolutism" (p. 71). Owing to this double need, Kant seems to be against himself and consequently the most critical and dialectical interpretation of Kant's thought is opposed to the (...) formalistic absolutism used by the Kantian jurists, who reject the most vital and profound critical philosophy for a metaphysical framework which confuses everything as though all were homogeneous. In fact, what appears more valid in Kant's philosophy is the continuous tension between formalism and dialectics, a tension which, even though it is never definitively overcome in a dialectical sense by Kant himself, nevertheless reveals the need for a legal dialectic rather than a formalism. It shows "the destiny of legal right to cease being a coercive apparatus, and of being transformed into rules for human society taken from civil society" (p. 390). Of course, this dialectical perspective suggests new horizons and also new problems and a wide plan of work. However, I agree with the author that the uncertainties which will inevitably emerge in this work must be met urgently and radically. For we know that "on the other scale-pan there are in fact the raw metaphysics of legal positivism, the conservatism of the jurists, and at best the formalistic, paralyzing ascetics" (p. 390). The merit of Negri's book seems to me to lie above all in the lively problematical tension with which he examines the Kantian thought. Following in the paths of G. Gurwitch, Metzger and Goldmann, as well as of Luk~s' History and Class Consciousness, he appreciates and understands the interpenetration of ethical motivations with the social and cultural environment. This historical and philosophical awareness of problems is particularly lively in the pages where the author notices the begging of principle in Kantian thought; a begging of principle consisting in the fact that "the definition of limit presupposes a limit to the principle itself, but the examination of this presupposition is neglected" (p. 77 ft.). Because of this critical and historical tension, Negri's book can be of great interest to the jurist, the philosopher and the historian. And if this ensues, it is because the conception of legal right which the author seeks to assert throughout his theoretical tension is deep-rooted humanly, dialectically, concretely. It is most needed by those who really want to make of law and right not a formal science but a human science. ANTONELLA GUARALDI Bari, Italy The Narrow Pass: Kierkegaard's Concept of Man. By George Price. (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963. Pp. 5-218.) Selon hombre de ses commentateurs, Kierkegaard seralt un ehrdtien passionnd; pour d'autres, il serait une sorte d'incroyant; pour George Price, nous devrions lui accorder une unitd complexe, unitd de production, qui s'exprime directement par la suite de ses oeuvres, unitd d'intention, une vue religicuse qui repose sur une certaine conception de l'homme, un th~me fondamental aussi qui est au centre des diverses discussions sur le pdchd, la foi, la raison, la morale, la subjectivitd et le "paradoxe", tous ces probl~mes qui paraissent se poser et se reposer sans cesse pour Kierkegaard, toujours de mani~re assez nouvelle. L'homme est i~la fois une synth~se de son corps et de son moi, des causes qui ont d'abord faeonnd son ~tre, et de qu'il y a en lui d'original et qui ne sera jamais rdpdtd, ce que son esprit a fait par un effort crdateur. Et d'abord une premiere remarque pour simplifier les vues de Kierkegaard. II n'y a pas ici de substances conjointes, il n'y a que des dvdnements corporels et spirituels. L'influence de Fichte apparait par l'importance accordde au devenir, un devenir qui se poursuit selon un module et qui reste fragile, si la volontd de se rdaliser ne se maintient pas. L'homme dolt se passionner pour son existence, it dolt devenir lui-m~me. La chute de l... (shrink)

Presenting a fascinating analysis of the idea of what can't be said, this book ascertains whether the notion of there being a truth, or a state of affairs, or knowledge that can't be expressed linguistically is a coherent notion. The author distinguishes different senses in which it might be said that something can't be said. The first part looks at the question of whether ineffability is a coherent idea. Part two evaluates two families of arguments regarding whether ineffable states of (...) affairs actually exist: the argument from mysticism and the argument from epistemic boundedness. Part three looks more closely at the relation between mystic and non-mystic stances. In the fourth and final part the author distinguishes five qualitatively different types of ineffability. _Ineffability and Philosophy_ is a significant contribution to this area of research and will be essential reading for philosophers and those researching and studying the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked (...) by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence. (shrink)

Aboriginal peoples are forever explaining themselves to non-Aboriginal people: telling their stories, explaining their beliefs and ceremonies, and introducing ideas that have never crossed the non-Aboriginal mind. Western knowledge operates from a linear, singular view; it views the world from order beneath chaos; it is very noun oriented; knowledge is about oneself in relation to everything else in a relativistic sense. Aboriginal knowledge has a very different “coming to know.” It is holistic and cyclical; it views the world from chaos (...) underneath order; its languages are process and action oriented. Knowledge is about participation in and with the natural world. (shrink)

An empirical exploration of the effects on legislative structure, distribution of influence, power, and decision outcomes, of recent changes in the Congress and state legislatures. The book focuses on changes in rules, parties, and committees and the impact or lack of impact of these changes on subsequent activity. Originally published in 1978 by D.C. Heath and Company. Co-published with the Policy Studies Organization.