In this paper, we analyse the Wittgensteinian critique of the orthodoxy in animal ethics that has been championed by Cora Diamond and Alice Crary. While Crary frames it as a critique of “moral individualism”, we show that their criticism applies most prominently to certain forms of moral individualism (namely, those that follow hedonistic or preference-satisfaction axiologies), and not to moral individualism in itself. Indeed, there is a concrete sense in which the moral individualistic stance cannot be escaped, and we believe (...) that it is this particular limitation that justified Crary’s later move to a qualified version of moral individualism. At the same time, we also argue that there are significant merits to the Wittgensteinian critique of moral individualism, which pertain to its attack on the rationalism, naturalism, and reductionism that characterise orthodox approaches to animal ethics. We show that there is much of value in the Wittgensteinians’ call for an ethics that is more human; an ethics that fully embraces the capacities we are endowed with and one that pays heed to the richness and complexity of our moral lives. (shrink)

In this paper, we tackle the widely held view that practice-oriented approaches to ethics are conservative, preserving the moral status quo, and, in particular, that they do not promote any change in our dealings with animals or formulate clear principles that help us to achieve such change. We shall challenge this view with reference to Wittgensteinian ethics. As a first step, we show that moral thought and action rest on basic moral certainties like: equals are to be treated equally and (...) unequals unequally. We then explore the relations between this insight and the notion of the difficulty of reality elaborated by Cora Diamond. Our goal is to show that a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian approach to animal ethics is not necessarily morally conservative. Indeed, it offers a profound practice-oriented approach to animal ethics that is capable of promoting change in human dealings with animals because it is compatible with radical critique. (shrink)

If we are to better understand and negotiate current and future problems in the food supply chain, it will be essential to pay more attention to the role and position of professionals involved. 'Professionals in food chains' addresses questions as: What are the main ethical challenges for professionals in the food supply chain? Who within this complex field holds responsibility for what? What does it mean for the food-related professions to operate in an atmosphere of immense social tension and high (...) expectations? Which virtues are required to do a 'good' job? In brief: What can be said about the roles, responsibilities, and ethics of professionals across this dynamic field? Topics covered include general issues on professional roles and responsibility, sustainable food supply chains, novel approaches in food production systems, current food politics, the ethics of consumption, veterinary ethics, pedagogical/educational and research ethics, as well as aquacultural, agricultural, animal, and food ethics. (shrink)

The “One Health” initiative promises to combine different health-related issues concerning humans and animals in an overarching concept and in related practices to the benefit of both humans and animals. Far from dismissing One Health, this paper nevertheless argues that different veterinary interventions are determined by social practices and connected expectations and are, thus, hardly compliant with only one single conceptualization of health, as the One Health concept suggests. One Health relies on a naturalistic understanding of health focusing on similar (...) bodies that show a similar etiology. However, logics, normativity, and practices exhibit differences when it comes to combatting infectious diseases, maintaining productivity of livestock animals or preventing companion animals from suffering. Therefore, drawing from Charles Rosenberg’s groundbreaking texts on framing disease, we suggest to conceive of health as dispersed in different frames. Thus, this paper proposes to interpret health as complex and multi-layered concept. We distinguish and introduce an objectivist, a functional, and a sentientistic frame of health. Instead of reducing the differential veterinary practices to one paradigmatic understanding, health is seen as a model case of Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance. Different and distinct perspectives on veterinary medicine show sufficient overlapping that allows for a common conceptualization, but there is not one single underlying logic suitable to understand and ethically reflect all veterinary interventions. This differentiability promises to reduce moral stress in veterinary professionals since it allows the interpretation of various, seemingly contradicting practices as dependent on multi-layered and socially determined scopes of responsibility. (shrink)

Tierschutz neu denken: Würde – nicht nur Leid vermeiden.

Die angewandte Ethik hat nicht nur eine überaus erfolgreiche Geschichte hinter sich, sondern auch eine für philosophische Disziplinen beispiellos breite Öffentlichkeitswirksamkeit entfaltet. Der Verzicht auf starke Theorien, die Orientierung an der Praxis, die Ausdifferenzierung nach Problemfeldern und die Bereitschaft, als eine Stimme unter anderen in Kommissionen und Institutionen gesellschaftlicher Steuerung mitzuwirken, hat Ethiker in die Lage versetzt, praktikable Lösungen für reale Probleme zu generieren. Seither ist ethische Reflexion gefragt, wenn es im säkularen, pluralistischen Staat um gesellschaftliche Orientierungen und politische Weichenstellungen (...) geht. Doch die praktische Nützlichkeit und Nutzbarkeit der angewandten Ethik, der sie ihre Karriere verdankt, bleibt nicht ohne Auswirkungen auf ihr theoretisches Fundament. Was bedeutet es für die Ethik als wissenschaftliche Disziplin, wenn sie den Elfenbeinturm verlässt und sich so den Ansprüchen der Praxis aussetzt. Welche methodisch-theoretischen Implikationen hat ihre Anwendungs- und Erfolgsorientierung? Zu den vielfältigen Fragen, die die Anwendung ethischer Theorien für dieselben aufwirft, legen in diesem Buch renommierte Ethiker ihre Reflexionen und Antworten dar. (shrink)

Der Begriff ›Tierversuch‹ kann in einem engen und in einem weiten Sinne verwendet werden. Im weiten Sinne kann man unter ›Tierversuch‹ jede wissenschaftliche oder experimentelle Verwendung von Tieren verstehen. Im engeren Sinn, der auch dem Tierversuchsrecht der Europäischen Union oder dem deutschen Tierschutz-Gesetz zugrunde liegt, bezeichnet der Begriff ›Tierversuch‹ solche wissenschaftlichen Verfahren mit lebenden Tieren, die mit Schmerzen, Belastungen oder Schäden der Tiere verbunden sein können. Artikel 3 der einschlägigen Richtlinie 2010/63/EU beispielsweise definiert den Tierversuch als »jede invasive oder nicht (...) invasive Verwendung eines Tieres zu Versuchszwecken oder anderen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken mit bekanntem oder unbekanntem Ausgang, oder zu Ausbildungszwecken, die bei dem Tier Schmerzen, Leiden, Ängste oder dauerhafte Schäden in einem Ausmaß verursachen kann, das dem eines Kanüleneinstichs gemäß guter tierärztlicher Praxis gleichkommt oder darüber hinaus geht«. Der Geltungsbereich der Richtlinie umfasst neben lebenden, nichtmenschlichen Wirbeltieren auch selbständig Nahrung aufnehmende Larven, Säugetierföten ab dem letzten Drittel ihrer normalen Entwicklung und lebende Kopffüßer. Ähnliche Bestimmungen finden sich auch im deutschen Tierschutz-Gesetz. (shrink)

:In a recent paper in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics on the necessary conditions for morally responsible animal research David DeGrazia and Jeff Sebo claim that the key requirements for morally responsible animal research are an assertion of sufficient net benefit, a worthwhile-life condition, and a no-unnecessary-harm condition. With regards to the assertion of sufficient net benefit, the authors claim that morally responsible research offers unique benefits to humans that outweigh the costs and harms to humans and animals. In this (...) commentary we will raise epistemic, practical, and ethical challenges to DeGrazia and Sebo’s emphasis on benefits in the prospective assessment of research studies involving animals. We do not disagree with DeGrazia and Sebo that, at the theoretical level, the benefits of research justify our using animals. Our contribution intends to clarify, at the practical level, how we should understand benefits in the prospective assessment and moral justification of animal research. We argue that ASNB should be understood as an assessment of Expectation of Knowledge Production in the prospective assessment and justification of animal research. EKP breaks down into two further claims: that morally responsible research generates knowledge worth having and that morally responsible research is designed and executed to produce generalizable knowledge. We understand the condition called knowledge worth having as scientists’ testing a hypothesis that, whether verified or falsified, advances an important interest, and production of generalizable knowledge in terms of scientific integrity. Generalizable knowledge refers to experimental results that generalize to a larger population beyond the animals studied. Generalizable scientific knowledge is reliable, replicable, and accurately descriptive. In sum, morally responsible research will be designed and carefully executed to successfully test a hypothesis that, whether verified or falsified, advances important interests. Our formulation of EKP, crucially, does not require further showing that an experiment involving animals will produce societal benefits. (shrink)

The portrayal of animals in the media is often criticised for instrumentalising, objectifying and anthropomorphising animals :53–79, 1997; Lerner and Kalof in Sociol Q 40:565–586, 1999; Stewart and Cole in Int J Multidiscip Res 12:457–476, 2009). Although we agree with this criticism, we also identify the need for a more substantiated approach to the moral significance of instrumentalisation, objectification and anthropomorphism. Thus, we propose a new framework which is able to address the morally relevant aspects of animal portrayal in the (...) media. We closely examine the normative messages communicated by an unusual TV commercial in which an anthropomorphised piglet advertises organic beef. This serves as a case example to relate the philosophical and ethical concepts of objectification and anthropomorphism to each other and show how they can be applied. We conclude that the commercial conveys a message of animal instrumentalisation as being normatively correct within the constraint of good animal welfare. The depicted form of instrumentalisation is, nonetheless, associated with harm for the animals and thus, needs to overcome cognitive dissonance. To achieve this, animals are directly objectified by a trivialised and de-individualised portrayal. Moreover, animals are indirectly objectified even when they are anthropomorphised as they are granted significance only through being human-like. Thus, objectification and anthropomorphism are not opposing terms in our proposed framework. In addition, objectification, together with the reference to the dominant ideology, and combined with humorous anthropomorphism weakens scrutiny of these normative messages by the viewers. This eventually augments a decrease of moral concern for farmed animals in advertisement employing such portrayals. (shrink)

This entry offers a critical overview of the contemporary literature on understanding, especially in epistemology and the philosophy of science.

This paper applies insights from behavioral economics and nudge theory to foster sustainable and responsible investment. SRI provides an opportunity to express and promote ethical values via choice of financial instruments. While policy-makers have tried to encourage greater participation in SRI, the majority of retail investors retain a conventional approach to investment. I develop a conceptual framework to improve the effectiveness of SRI policy-making. The first part of the framework comprises a transmission mechanism which emphasizes the role of SRI as (...) a driver for sustainable development. The second part is a model of the individual decision for or against SRI. The framework suggests that low SRI demand is a case of behavioral market failure, and that nudging is a suitable tool for dismantling behavioral barriers to SRI. A specific example of smart choice architecture is used to illustrate the framework’s potential in the design of an SRI nudge. Assuming the nudge stands up to the rigors of empirical testing, it may well provide a feasible alternative for policy-makers. (shrink)

Over the last several years a number of leading philosophers – including Catherine Elgin, Linda Zagzebski, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Duncan Pritchard – have grown increasingly dissatisfied with the contemporary focus on knowledge in epistemology and have attempted to “recover” the notion of understanding. According to some of these philosophers, in fact, understanding deserves not just to be recovered, but to supplant knowledge as the focus of epistemological inquiry. This entry considers some of the main reasons why philosophers have taken understanding (...) to be more valuable than knowledge, focusing on claims that it is more transparent, that it better reflects or mirrors the world, and that it is a greater intellectual achievement. (shrink)

In this article, from the 2009 Oxford University Press collection Epistemic Value, I criticize existing accounts of epistemic normativity by Alston, Goldman, and Sosa, and then offer a new view.

A preeminent scholar of American studies explores the American literary and philosophical traditions, and the connections between them, by investigating, first, Emerson's thought and its influence on American writing and, second, the pluralistic and radical ways in which American modernists engaged the world.

During the Third Reich, state‐sponsored violence was linked to scientific research on many levels. Prisoners were used as involuntary subjects for medical experiments, and body parts from victims were used in anatomy and neuropathology on a massive scale. In many cases, such specimens remained in scientific collections and were used until long after the war. International bioethics, for a long time, had little to say on the issue. Since the late 1980s, with a renewed interest in the Holocaust and other (...) Nazi crimes, a consensus has increasingly taken hold that research on human tissues and body parts from the Nazi era is inadmissible, and that such specimens should be removed from scientific collections and buried. The question of what to do with scientific data obtained from these sources has not received adequate attention, however, and remains unsolved. This paper traces the history of debates about the ethical implications of using human tissue or body parts from the Nazi period for scientific purposes, primarily in the fields of anatomy and neuropathology. It also examines how this issue, from after the war until today, influenced the establishment of legal and bioethical norms on the use of human remains from morally tainted sources, with a particular emphasis on Germany and Austria. It is argued that the use of such specimens and of data derived from them is unethical not only because of potential harms to posthumous rights of the victims, but also because such use constitutes a moral harm to society at large. (shrink)

Five symposia from the 25th annual Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy focus on cognitive suicide, the explanatory role of content, Cartesian error and the objectivity of perception, social content and psychological content, and belief attribution and context.

I explore the extent to which the epistemic state of understanding is transparent to the one who understands. Against several contemporary epistemologists, I argue that it is not transparent in the way that many have claimed, drawing on results from developmental psychology, animal cognition, and other fields.

We examine the conditions under which we can keep simplicity or categoricity after adding a Skolem function to the theory.

For each k > 0 we construct an algebraic structure over which the polynomial hierarchy collapses at level k. We also find an algebraic structure over which the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse.

From the analysis of the local and provincial elected people in the province of East-Flanders during the period 1946-1991 one can conclude that there are barriers for women, lower social classes and certain age categories preventing them from moving up the local and provincial political! elites.Clear differences between local and provincial elected people are present when comparing professional backgrounds with the composition of the total working population in East-Flanders. Workers are neither on the local, nor on the provincial level very (...) numerous. However the large absence with the provincial elected people bhs to be emphazised. Secondly farmers, intellectual and free professions, employees, self-employed and employers are on both levels constantly overrepresented. However the overrepresentation of farmers can mainly be situated on the local level until the mergers of 1976. For intellectual and free professions, till the mid-sixties the overrepresentation can mainly be situated on the provincial level, from then onwards on the local level. The employees' overrepresentation has always been most important on the provincial level white the self-employed and employers are mainly overrepresented on the local level from 1970 onwards. Finally till about 1970 teaching personnel was underrepresented on both levels white from then onwards there is an overrepresentation. (shrink)

From the analysis of the social background of the local elected people in Flanders during the period 1946-1988 one can conclude that there are barriers for women, lower social classes and certain age categories preventing them from moving up the local political elite. The democratization process of the Flemish local political elite bas not yet made much progress. It appears from the fact that men are more numerous in political fonctions, that the distribution among the various professional categories strongly deviates (...) from the general social stratification and from the conclusion that certain age categories are clearly dominant. It is however clear that the composition of the elites neverfully reflect society as a whole. On the other hand, the important fact is that the differences cannot be reduced to smaller variances which inevitably go together with any representative system. (shrink)

Among epistemologists and philosophers of science, one often hears that someone with understanding is able to “see” or “grasp” how the elements of a subject “cohere” or “fit together”—but just what is involved in the seeing or the grasping is usually left to the imagination. I argue that the most productive way to make progress on this issue is by first identifying the kind of explanation-seeking why-questions that drive the search for understanding in the first place. In particular, I suggest (...) that if we can get a good grip on why a situation stands in need of explanation for us in the first place, then we will in turn be in a good position to determine how we might satisfy that need. In this respect, I argue that a situation stands in need of explanation for us, and therefore inspires our why-questions, in virtue of our sense that there are various ways that we think the situation might have been. If a situation stands in need of explanation for this reason, moreover, then in order to satisfy the need for explanation our objective will be to identify what the difference between these alternatives depends on. To say only this much still leaves a great deal underdetermined, however, for we might “identify” what the difference depends on in a number of different ways: for example, by having a true belief about what the difference depends on, by knowing this on the basis of testimony, and so on. What is distinctive about the state of understanding, I suggest, is the particular way in which we identify what the difference depends on: namely, by grasping what the difference depends on. I explore at length what exactly this grasping amounts to. (shrink)

The paper is replaced by a new version (12-2019): DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3572846 -/- Physical phenomena emerge from the quantum fields everywhere in space. However, not only the phenomena emerge from the quantum fields, the law of the conservation of energy must have its origin from the same spatial structure. This paper describes the relations between the main law of physics and the mathematical structure of the “aggregated” quantum fields.

Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed is that accuracy is (...) a genus with several species. Believing truly is a prominent species, but it is not the only one. Finally, it is argued that accuracy monism is equally good or better than both traditional truth monism and its main dialectical rival, value pluralism, when it comes to satisfying three important axiological desiderata. (shrink)