This is a study of Blondel's philosophy of the supernatural as it appeared only in the dissertation on Action of 1893. First, it reviews how Blondel brought philosophy to focus concretely on human action and what he focuses on in this action as the principle for its dialectical unfolding. Second, it shows how this focus brings him to a radical critique of superstition and any idea of natural religion, since even the latter is viewed as a kind of superstition. Third, (...) it examines how he proceeds to the affirmation of God as the necessary being of action and how this affirmation places the human being in a position of having to choose between saying yes or no to God at the core of his action. Fourth, it shows how Blondel argues from this existential exigency that the thought of the supernatural necessarily arises with regard to the question of human destiny and that such a thought, if it actualized in human action through a gratuitous initiative on the part of God, necessarily entails a revelation, a mediation, and a religious practice on the part of man. In conclusion it reflects on how this science of practice remains a philosophy, as distinct from theology, even though it has to do with religious practice in the most supernatural sense. /// O presente artigo constitui urn estudo sobre o problema do sobrenatural, tal como Blondel comeca por o tratar em sua tese de doutoramento sobre a Ácção, publicada em 1893. Em primeiro lugar, passa-se em revista não só o modo concreto como Blondel fez do problema da acção assunto para a filosofia, mas também se procura discernir aquilo que, segundo ele, na acção mesma constitui o princípio do seu desdobramento dialéctico. Em segundo lugar, mostra-se como a partir deste ponto de focagem Blondel procede a uma critica radical da superstição bem como de toda e qualquer ideia de religião natural, por ele igualmente vista como uma espécie de superstição. Em terceiro lugar, examina-se o modo como Blondel avança em direcção a uma afirmação de Deus como o ser necessário da acção e como esta mesma afirmação coloca o ser humano numa posicjio de, no fulcro do seu agir, ter de optar entre o dizer sim ou não a Deus. Em quarto lugar, mostra-se o modo como Blondel, partindo desta exigência existencial, argumenta no sentido de que o pensamento do sobrenatural necessariamente se dá em conexão com a questão do destino humano e de como tal pensamento, actualizado na acção humana graças a uma iniciativa gratuita da parte de Deus, necessariamente implica a ideia de revelação, mediação, e prática religiosa da parte do homem. Finalmente, em conclusão, reflecte-se sobre o modo como esta ciência da prática permanece filosofia, distinta da teologia, mesmo quando, enquanto tal, ela tern a ver com uma prática religiosa no sentido mais sobrenatural do termo /// Ceci est une étude de la philosophie du surnaturel de Blondel telle qu'elle parut uniquement dans la thèse sur L'Action de 1893. Premièrement, elle revoit comment Blondel a amené la philosophie à réfléchir concrétement sur l'action humaine et ce sur quoi cette réflexion s'appuie comme principe du déploiement dialectique de cette action. Deuxièmement, elle montre comment ce déploiement amène Blondel à une critique radicale de la superstition et de toute idée de religion naturelle, puisque cette dernière est vue comme une sorte de superstition. Troisièmement, elle examine comment Blondel avance vers une affirmation de Dieu comme Fetre necessaire de l'action et comment cette affirmation amène l'être humain à devoir choisir entre dire oui ou non face à Dieu au plus profond de son action. Quatrièmement, elle montre comment Blondel, à partir de cette exigence existentielle, arrive à poser que la pensée du surnaturel surgit nécessairement par rapport à la question du destin de l'être humain et comment une telle pensée, si elle devient réalite dans l'action humaine par une initiative gratuite du côté de Dieu. entraine du côté de l'homme la nécessité d'une révélation, une médiation et une pratique religieuse. En conclusion, l'étude se demande comment cette science de la pratique reste une philosophie, distincte de toute théologie, même si elle traite de la pratique religieuse dans son sens le plus surnaturel. (shrink)

The Perfection of the Universe gives an account of the idea of the universe and its perfection in Aquinas's philosophy, but at the same time it provides an example of how a cosmology can be developed in a teleological framework. Although this is the cosmology of one who was first and foremost a theologian, the book tries to show how it was articulated philosophically and in relation to a particular model of the universe. As a contribution to the history of (...) philosophy, and Thomistic studies in particular, it seeks to draw more attention to Aquinas's view of the world, which has been relatively neglected in favor of emphasis on his theory of knowledge and theory of being, and at the same time to show how it is integral to his very understanding of being. The book thereby brings out a dimension of rationality in Aquinas's philosophy that is often ignored, especially as it concerns creation as a whole and what Aquinas refers to as convenientia in this whole. The systematic nature of Aquinas's conception of the universe is highlighted by the author's attempt to reconstruct the movement of his thought. Thus Oliva Blanchette focuses not just on the universe or on perfection but on the perfection of the universe as a unified idea that recurs frequently in both the philosophy and the theology of Aquinas and that has its own philosophical dynamic both as a logic and as an actuality. In doing so, he endeavors to correct misconceptions about Aquinas's idea of the universe, such as that found in Lovejoy's Great Chain of Being, and to show how the idea stands up philosophically even while being connected with a scientific model of the universe now viewed as obsolete. (shrink)

Pt. 1. The journey inward. Breaking into the intellectual scene -- Awakening to the divine light in human action -- The original philosophy of the supernatural -- The vocation to philosophy -- Discourse on method for philosophy of religion -- Crisis of modernity for Catholic apologetics -- The broader social involvement -- The philosopher of Aix -- The philosophical itinerary -- The question of a Catholic philosophy -- Pt. 2. The systematic summation. The question of thought -- The responsibilities of (...) thought -- Ontology of consolidation in being in, through, and of itself -- Action as cooperation with the first cause -- The original philosophy of action revisited -- The expanded philosophy of the supernatural -- Symbiosis of the human and the divine in history -- Christian spirit and historical civilization. (shrink)

Metaphysics is not often spoken of as a venue for dialogue about anything, let alone culture or religion, which are more readily associated with phenomenology or hermeneutics in contemporary thinking. This collection of essays, however, by the late Boston College philosopher Oliva Blanchette, maintains the absolute necessity of metaphysics as a prerequisite for examining any particular 'realm of being,' in all areas of human inquiry, from the particular sciences to historical cultures and religions. Blanchette proposes metaphysics as (...) a fundamental and necessary level of intelligence presupposed in any exercise of judgment, discourse, or dialogue, among rational beings. At the same time, he defends the idea that dialogue is the first and most fundamental form in which such reasoning takes place in human experience, on a radically intersubjective level through language. (shrink)

IN THE FOREWORD of Zur Seinsfrage Heidegger distinguishes two questions of being. One he speaks of in the form of the participle, die Frage nach dem Seiendem als Seiendem, the question about being as being. This he identifies with the tradition of metaphysics which he repudiates as forgetful of the real question of being. "The answering of this question," he adds, "refers at the same time to an interpretation of be [des Seins] which remains in what is unasked [im Fraglosen] (...) and provides the ground and the basis for metaphysics." What is unasked in this first question of metaphysics has to be thought of as a second question which is spoken of in the form of the infinitive: die Frage nach dem Sein als Sein, the question about be as be. This is the question which Heidegger tried to raise at the beginning of Sein und Zeit and which remains for him as the task of thinking at the end of philosophy. It is a question which Heidegger was ultimately unable to answer but which he was also unable to put to rest. It is a question in which we are still floundering, caught up in what remains for us the question of metaphysics. It is time perhaps to see if the question has been rightly framed. (shrink)

The author provides an original reflection on the notion of selfhood as intersubjective, taking the form of phenomenological reflections on the building blocks of the perennial philosophy, recasting Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics from the perspective of a phenomenology.

IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT SUÁREZ WAS THE WATERSHED for much of modern metaphysics understood as the science or the philosophy of being, or as ontology. Not only was he the first to write a systematic treatise in metaphysics that broke with the centuries-long tradition of commenting on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, but he also set metaphysics on a new course that was to define the parameters for ontology as the modern version of the ancient science of being as being. (...) Heidegger himself recognized this significance of Suárez for modern metaphysics, as he was beginning to work out his own reconstruction of a philosophy of being in terms of an ontological difference between be and being, when he wrote of Suárez as “putting the ontological problems into a systematic form for the first time, a form which determined a classification of metaphysics that lasted through subsequent centuries down to Hegel.” I would argue that Heidegger should have included himself in that classification, along with Wolff, Kant, and Hegel, even though he was trying to break out of it by positing the ontological difference as the basis for raising anew the modern question of being. (shrink)

This work aims to reopen the fundamental question of being. It raises the question of being after the natural sciences and phenomenology have run their course and pursues it according to a method that is properly metaphysical as well as critical.

This is another in the growing list of studies on Hegel’s Phenomenology. More specifically, it is designed for “the beginning student” and purports “to offer a reading which is less confusing than Hegel’s own text” and therefore uses “very little of Hegel’s terminology or style of writing”. After a brief introduction in which the general nature of Hegelian philosophy and some of its key ideas are presented, it goes on to discuss both the Preface and Hegel’s “Introduction” somewhat more critically (...) before going on to deal with the successive sections of the Phenomenology from “Sense Certainty” to “Absolute Knowledge” somewhat more exegetically, as the author herself puts it. After the section on Reason and before that on Spirit, a special chapter on “The State” is inserted, which discusses a number of topics from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right by way of introduction to subsequent parts of the Phenomenology. Three chapters are then devoted to the section on Spirit, followed by two relatively short chapters on “Religion in General” and “Absolute Knowledge.” A brief bibliography is added which includes only a few of the better known works on Hegel, but none of these sources seems to have influenced Dudeck much in her reading. This is very much her own work on the Phenomenology and it has to be viewed as such. Whether one likes it or not, agrees with it or not, will depend on one’s own reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology and one’s own interpretation of its method. (shrink)

This is another in the growing list of studies on Hegel’s Phenomenology. More specifically, it is designed for “the beginning student” and purports “to offer a reading which is less confusing than Hegel’s own text” and therefore uses “very little of Hegel’s terminology or style of writing”. After a brief introduction in which the general nature of Hegelian philosophy and some of its key ideas are presented, it goes on to discuss both the Preface and Hegel’s “Introduction” somewhat more critically (...) before going on to deal with the successive sections of the Phenomenology from “Sense Certainty” to “Absolute Knowledge” somewhat more exegetically, as the author herself puts it. After the section on Reason and before that on Spirit, a special chapter on “The State” is inserted, which discusses a number of topics from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right by way of introduction to subsequent parts of the Phenomenology. Three chapters are then devoted to the section on Spirit, followed by two relatively short chapters on “Religion in General” and “Absolute Knowledge.” A brief bibliography is added which includes only a few of the better known works on Hegel, but none of these sources seems to have influenced Dudeck much in her reading. This is very much her own work on the Phenomenology and it has to be viewed as such. Whether one likes it or not, agrees with it or not, will depend on one’s own reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology and one’s own interpretation of its method. (shrink)

Two kinds of remarks can be made on Kainz’s book on the Phenomenology of Spirit. First, there are those that pertain to it as an instrument to help in the reading of the Phenomenology itself and, second, there are those that pertain to the questions that Kainz’s interpretation of the Phenomenology raises. Both of these issues deserve some attention in approaching Kainz’s book and, in a sense, they cannot be separated, since any reading of a philosophical work is already an (...) interpretation and this is especially true of a work like Hegel’s Phenomenology. Indeed, the peculiarity of the Phenomenology as a philosophical work, which Kainz remarks upon along with many others, makes it very susceptible to a variety of interpretations, all of which could be called into question. In this regard the Phenomenology might be likened, not just to a novel, as Kainz suggests, but also to a poem, whose meaning cannot be strictly paraphrased but stands and falls with the language and structure of the work itself. This may be why, apart from the inherent difficulty and complexity of the Phenomenology, we have had so few commentaries on it, in comparison say to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which itself is surely not lacking in difficulty. But it is not to say that the Phenomenology should not be analysed and commented upon. We do that even with the best of poems. It is only to say that there is no substitute for reading the Phenomenology itself, for its meaning grows out of the very creation of language which it represents and, in a sense, there is no other way of getting at its meaning than through its very movement leading to Absolute Knowing. If an analysis or a commentary can help to enter into this movement, so much the better. If they stand in the way or impede the movement, they must be set aside. For I am convinced that Hegel himself knew better than anyone else what he was up to in the Phenomenology and the way that he did it may well be the only way of doing what he wanted to do. This being said, however, in what follows I shall try to make comments on both the issue of instrument and the issue of interpretation in succession. (shrink)

Two kinds of remarks can be made on Kainz’s book on the Phenomenology of Spirit. First, there are those that pertain to it as an instrument to help in the reading of the Phenomenology itself and, second, there are those that pertain to the questions that Kainz’s interpretation of the Phenomenology raises. Both of these issues deserve some attention in approaching Kainz’s book and, in a sense, they cannot be separated, since any reading of a philosophical work is already an (...) interpretation and this is especially true of a work like Hegel’s Phenomenology. Indeed, the peculiarity of the Phenomenology as a philosophical work, which Kainz remarks upon along with many others, makes it very susceptible to a variety of interpretations, all of which could be called into question. In this regard the Phenomenology might be likened, not just to a novel, as Kainz suggests, but also to a poem, whose meaning cannot be strictly paraphrased but stands and falls with the language and structure of the work itself. This may be why, apart from the inherent difficulty and complexity of the Phenomenology, we have had so few commentaries on it, in comparison say to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which itself is surely not lacking in difficulty. But it is not to say that the Phenomenology should not be analysed and commented upon. We do that even with the best of poems. It is only to say that there is no substitute for reading the Phenomenology itself, for its meaning grows out of the very creation of language which it represents and, in a sense, there is no other way of getting at its meaning than through its very movement leading to Absolute Knowing. If an analysis or a commentary can help to enter into this movement, so much the better. If they stand in the way or impede the movement, they must be set aside. For I am convinced that Hegel himself knew better than anyone else what he was up to in the Phenomenology and the way that he did it may well be the only way of doing what he wanted to do. This being said, however, in what follows I shall try to make comments on both the issue of instrument and the issue of interpretation in succession. (shrink)