We study 944 shareholder proposals submitted to 343 U.S. firms on climate change issues during 2009–2022. We use logistic and two-stage regression to estimate the propensity for a firm to be targeted or subjected to a vote at the annual general meeting and, for voted proposals, the determinants of that vote. We also examine whether climate-related proposals affect investor returns and how they relate to firms’ future environmental performance and greenhouse gas emissions. Compared to a matched sample, we first find (...) that activists target larger, more carbon-intensive, and less R&D-active firms. Second, voting likelihood is higher for firms with repeated and operations-related proposals and lower pre-proposal environmental ratings. By contrast, disclosure-related proposals are likelier to be negotiated and withdrawn. Third, repeated and operations-related proposals receive higher votes in favor, whereas votes on carbon-intensive firms do not. Fourth, building on the theory that investors act as if they distinguish among the different shareholder proposals based on the expected cost to the firm, we find evidence to support this idea. We find that investors respond negatively to ex-ante costlier proposals, such as those that relate to emissions reduction and target carbon-intensive firms. Fifth, targets’ future environmental performance rating is almost twenty percent higher after a proposal than before compared to the matched sample, whereas emissions do not budge appreciably. (shrink)

O artigo tentar mostrar três coisas: primeiro que, embora Nietzsche rejeite alguns dos aspectos mais importantes da famosa metafísica da vontade que se encontra no centro de toda a filosofia de Schopenhauer, tal metafísica não deixa por isso de ser o ponto de partida da sua análise do “facto fundamental da vontade humana” na Genealogia da Moral ; depois, que o modo como Schopenhauer entende o ascetismo e a “negação da vontade” tem uma importância crucial para a compreensão da concepção (...) nietzschiana do “ideal ascético” e de uma “vontade do nada” como vontade ascética; por fim, que a interpretação daquilo a que Nietzsche chama “niilismo” na Genealogia e, em geral, na sua obra não pode dispensar a reflexão sobre o modo como Nietzsche e Schopenhauer pensam o ascetismo e a ideia de uma “vontade do nada”. Este último ponto implica a revisão crítica de importantes interpretações do niilismo em Nietzsche, como a de Stegmaier e a de van Tongeren. (shrink)

O artigo é uma reflexão sobre o modo como, na "Genealogia da Moral", Nietzsche repensa "o problema estético" a partir da oposição entre a concepção kantiana do belo como predicado de um juízo "desinteressado" e a concepção stendhaliana do belo como efeito de uma "cristalização" e uma "promessa de felicidade". A chave do pensamento de Nietzsche neste contexto está no conceito de "embriaguez" , por um lado, como termo-chave para designar a "pré-condição fisiológica" da arte, mas, por outro, como um (...) processo de espiritualização dos instintos ou das pulsões que as interioriza e intensifica. Esta espiritualização distingue-se da contemplação desinteressada porque não nos des-afecta e porque é, em grande medida, uma espiritualização da sexualidade, mas não deixa, por isso, de implicar uma reavaliação dos valores e uma ampliação do horizonte do humano. É por isso que a arte pode ser pensada como um "contra-movimento" que afirma a vida e combate o "ideal ascético" e o "niilismo europeu". The present article is a reflection on the way how, in "Genealogy of Morals", Nietzsche rethinks "the aesthetic issue" based on the opposition between Kant's conception of beauty as a predicate of a "disinterested" judgment and the stendhaliana conception of beauty as the effect of a "crystallization" and a "promise of happiness". The key to the thought of Nietzsche's in this context resides on the concept of "intoxication" on the one hand, as a key-term to designate the "pre-physiological condition" of art, but on the other hand, as a process of spiritualisation of the instincts or of the drives, which internalizes and intensifies them. This spiritualization is distinguished from disinterested contemplation for it does not dis-affects us, and because it is by large a spiritualization of sexuality, without renouncing to imply a revaluation of the values and a widening on the horizon of the human. That is why art can be thought of as a "counter-movement" that affirms life and fights the "ascetic ideal" and the "European nihilism". (shrink)

O perspectivismo de Nietzsche defende que o mundo como um todo é “absurdo”, não tem uma meta, um valor, uma finalidade, um sentido, mas não defende que a condução de uma vida humana possa ser outra coisa que não um reger-se por metas, valores, fins, sentidos. Esta distinção é fundamental para que se compreenda que, por um lado, Nietzsche aceita a “verdade do niilismo” — aceita que o mundo é em si mesmo “absurdo”, o mundo não pode ser racionalmente justificado (...) —, mas, por outro, entende que, num determinado tipo de cultura humana, o mundo pode ser justificado “enquanto fenómeno estético”. É esta possibilidade de uma justificação estética do mundo que faz do pensamento de Nietzsche uma “luta contra o niilismo”, na qual não se trata de reduzir todas as metas, valores, fins e sentidos a ilusões subjectivas, mas sim de ousar pensar uma “transvaloração de todos os valores”. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 43 Heft: 1 Seiten: 298-305.

Nietzsche's critique of the modern subject is often presented as a radical break with modern philosophy and associated with the so-called ‘death of the subject’ in 20th century philosophy. But Nietzsche claimed to be a ‘psychologist’ who was trying to open up the path for ‘new versions and sophistications of the soul hypothesis.’ Although there is no doubt that Nietzsche gave expression to a fundamental crisis of the modern conception of subjectivity, it is open to debate whether he wanted to (...) abandon the very idea of subjectivity or only to pose the problem of subjectivity in new terms. The volume includes 26 articles by top Nietzsche scholars. The chapters in Part I, “Tradition and Context”, deal with the relationship between Nietzsche's views on subjectivity and modern philosophy, as well as with the late 19th century context in which his thought emerged; Part II, “The Crisis of the Subject”, examines the impact of Nietzsche's critique of the subject on 20th century philosophy, from Freud to Heidegger to Dennett, but also in such authors as Deleuze, Foucault, Derrida, or Luhmann; Part III, “Current Debates - From Embodiment and Consciousness to Agency”, shows that the way in which Nietzsche engaged with such themes as the self, agency, consciousness, embodiment and self-knowledge makes his thought highly relevant for philosophy today, especially for philosophy of mind and ethics. (shrink)

There is a credibility decay on positive knowledge among the social scientists and particularly among the psychologists. Certainly different prejudices dwell upon this phenomenon. First and principal the usually made identity of positive and natural knowledge. This belief is also fed by many others such as that one which assumes that every quantification, which is a consequence of positive knowledge,follows the model of the Physical Sciences. We consider that all these prejudices do not keep in mind the work done in (...) the last decades on the Theories of Measure. We consider also that psychophysical methods which have been introduced by Stevens present a stimulating program for the behavioral sciences and they open a new frontiere to the positive knowledge. (shrink)

There is a credibility decay on positive knowledge among the social scientists and particularly among the psychologists. Certainly different prejudices dwell upon this phenomenon. First and principal the usually made identity of positive and natural knowledge. This belief is also fed by many others such as that one which assumes that every quantification, which is a consequence of positive knowledge,follows the model of the Physical Sciences. We consider that all these prejudices do not keep in mind the work done in (...) the last decades on the Theories of Measure. We consider also that psychophysical methods which have been introduced by Stevens present a stimulating program for the behavioral sciences and they open a new frontiere to the positive knowledge. (shrink)

Nietzsche's metaphor of the spider that spins its cobweb expresses his critique of the metaphysical use of language - but it also suggests that ‟we, spiders‟, are able to spin different, life-affirming, healthier, non-metaphysical cobwebs. This book is a collection of 12 essays that focus not only on Nietzsche's critique of the metaphysical assumptions of language, but also on his effort to use language in a different way, i.e., to create a ‟new language‟. It is from this viewpoint that the (...) book considers such themes as consciousness, the self, metaphor, instinct, affectivity, style, morality, truth, and knowledge. The authors invited to contribute to this volume are Nietzsche scholars who belong to some of the most important research centers of the European Nietzsche-Research: Centro Colli-Montinari (Italy), GIRN (Europhilosphie), SEDEN (Spain), Greifswald Research Group (Germany), NIL (Portugal). In 2011 João Constâncio and Maria João Mayer Branco edited Nietzsche on Instinct and Language, also published by Walter de Gruyter. The two books complement each other. (shrink)

The article is divided in three main parts. The first part shows that the first three chapters of the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morality give a genealogical account of the emergence of reason in human history, and that this account involves the claim that reason is a development of human engagement with social rules: Nietzsche understands the emergence of reason as the emergence of a normative space of reasons. The second part interrogates Nietzsche’s conception of value, purpose, (...) and meaning in order to show that he is not a proponent of any version of “bald naturalism”: he does not equate what is “really real” with a natural world of causation devoid of value, purpose, and meaning. The third part of the article shows that, although Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not assign to the space of reasons the status of a purely autonomous realm of justification, he does not dismiss rational normativity, or the space of reasons, as merely illusory. Nietzschean genealogy is shown to be a reflective questioning of our values that investigates the reasons behind our deeper normative commitments. (shrink)

Resumo O artigo é uma tentativa de explorar a hipótese controversa de que possa haver uma profunda afinidade - até agora não identificada - entre a concepção de "luta por reconhecimento" [Kampf um Anerkennung] em Hegel e a concepção da dinâmica da "vontade de poder" [Wille zur Macht] em Nietzsche. Esta hipótese diz respeito ao modo como a luta e a dominação estão implícitas na noção hegeliana de reconhecimento, isto é: diz respeito à dinâmica intersubjetiva das formas falhadas de reconhecimento. (...) A luta e a dominação são conceitos fundamentais na concepção do reconhecimento em Hegel - mas, ainda assim, conceitos meramente operacionais na obra de Hegel, enquanto em Nietzsche se tornam temáticos, porque o conceito de "poder" se torna temático. O que o artigo procura mostrar é que a hipótese nietzschiana da "vontade de poder" é relevante no debate contemporâneo sobre "reconhecimento e poder" porque permite uma descrição adequada das dinâmicas intersubjetivas em que o reconhecimento recíproco não é alcançado e o que subsiste nelas são relações de luta e dominação, ou seja, vontade de poder qua vontade de dominação. Mas isso só é assim porque a hipótese nietzschiana da "vontade de poder" implica uma "doutrina dos afetos" e, por isso, uma concepção de "poder" [Macht] em termos de "ação à distância", i.e. de influência intersubjetiva mediada por percepções, interpretações e perspectivas. Esta concepção de "poder" implica atribuir ao desejo e à vontade humanas uma natureza "recognitiva", e está longe de implicar a dissolução das relações de poder em processos transsubjetivos de dominação. Daí a afinidade entre Hegel e Nietzsche que o artigo procura evidenciar.The article is an attempt to explore a controversial hypothesis, which can be stated like this: there is a deep affinity - hitherto largely unnoticed - between Hegel's conception of struggles for "recognition" [Anerkennung] and Nietzsche's conception of the dynamics of "will to power" [Wille zur Macht]. This hypothesis concerns the ways in which struggle and domination are implicitly involved in the Hegelian notion of recognition, that is: it concerns the intersubjective dynamics of failed-recognition. Struggle and domination are crucial concepts in Hegel's whole conception of recognition - but they are for him operative concepts, whereas in Nietzsche they become thematic, because the concept of "power" becomes thematic. What the article tries to show is that the Nietzschean hypothesis of "will to power" is relevant for the contemporary debate on "recognition and power" because it enables an adequate description of the intersubjective dynamics in which reciprocal recognition is not achieved and relationships of struggle and domination persist, i.e., what persists is "will to power" qua will to domination. However, this is only so because the Nietzschean hypothesis of "will to power" entails a "doctrine of the affects", and hence a conception of "power" [Macht] in terms of "action at a distance", i.e., in terms of intersubjective influence mediated by perceptions, interpretations, and perspectives. This conception of "power" entails a "recognitive" conception of human desire and human will, and, therefore, it would be wrong to claim that Nietzsche's "will to power" involves the dissolution of power-relations in trans-subjective processes of domination. Hence the affinity between Hegel and Nietzsche which the article tries to evince. (shrink)

The volume offers various considerations of Nietzsche s attempt to connect language to the instinctive activity of the human body. In focusing on how Nietzsche tries to dissolve the traditional opposition between instinct and language, as well as between instinct and consciousness and instinct and reason, the different papers address a great variety of topics, e.g. morality, value, the concept of philosophy, dogmatism, naturalization, metaphor, affectivity and emotion, health and sickness, tragedy, and laughter. Among the authors: Scarlett Marton, Werner Stegmaier, (...) Patrick Wotling, and many others.". (shrink)

Recent studies indicate that mammalian chromosomes contain discretecis‐acting loci that control replication timing, mitotic condensation, and stability of entire chromosomes. Disruption of the large non‐coding RNA gene ASAR6 results in late replication, an under‐condensed appearance during mitosis, and structural instability of human chromosome 6. Similarly, disruption of the mouse Xist gene in adult somatic cells results in a late replication and instability phenotype on the X chromosome. ASAR6 shares many characteristics with Xist, including random mono‐allelic expression and asynchronous replication timing. (...) Additional “chromosome engineering” studies indicate that certain chromosome rearrangements affecting many different chromosomes display this abnormal replication and instability phenotype. These observations suggest that all mammalian chromosomes contain “inactivation/stability centers” that control proper replication, condensation, and stability of individual chromosomes. Therefore, mammalian chromosomes contain four types ofcis‐acting elements, origins, telomeres, centromeres, and “inactivation/stability centers”, all functioning to ensure proper replication, condensation, segregation, and stability of individual chromosomes. (shrink)

A historical investigation of the exclusion of Africa and Asia from modern histories of philosophy.

Vaesen infers unique properties of mind from the appearance of specific cultural innovation – a correlation without causal direction. Shifts in habitat, population density, and group dynamics are the only independently verifiable incentives for changes in cultural practices. The transition from Acheulean to Late Stone Age technologies requires that we consider how population and social dynamics affect cultural innovation and mental function.

The first English translation of Fichte’s second set of 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre.

v. 1. Nicomachean ethics. Politics. The Athenian Constitution. Rhetoric. On Poetics.--v. 2. Logic.--v. 3. Physics. Metaphysics. On the soul. Short physical treaties.--v. 4. On the heavens. On generation and corruption. Meteorology. Biological treatises.

The posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is the most likely site where egocentric spatial relationships are represented in the brain. PPC cells receive visual, auditory, somaesthetic, and vestibular sensory inputs; oculomotor, head, limb, and body motor signals; and strong motivational projections from the limbic system. Their discharge increases not only when an animal moves towards a sensory target, but also when it directs its attention to it. PPC lesions have the opposite effect: sensory inattention and neglect. The PPC does not seem (...) to contain a “map” of the location of objects in space but a distributed neural network for transforming one set of sensory vectors into other sensory reference frames or into various motor coordinate systems. Which set of transformation rules is used probably depends on attention, which selectively enhances the synapses needed for making a particular sensory comparison or aiming a particular movement. (shrink)

Orthologic is defined by weakening the axioms and rules of inference of the classical propositional calculus. The resulting Lindenbaum-Tarski quotient algebra is an orthoimplication algebra which generalizes the author's implication algebra. The associated order structure is a semi-orthomodular lattice. The theory of orthomodular lattices is obtained by adjoining a falsity symbol to the underlying orthologic or a least element to the orthoimplication algebra.

Providing an original and systematic treatment of foundational issues in philosophy of religion, J. L. Schellenberg's new book addresses the structure of..

There is a frequent attitude of scholars against the quantification of Social Sciences. Our purpose here consists of describing the central topic of quantification, namely the measure ment topic by the axiomatic method. We emphasize the significance of measurement axioms for building the laws of experimental knowledge. The first step which seems unavoidable for every measuring process, thus the order structure, is presented as the initial topic which must be followed up by the more sophisticated topics in the future. The (...) above mentioned attitude against the quantification is disclosed as a prejudice without any rational support given the actual scientific development of measurement. (shrink)

There is a credibility decay on positive knowledge among the social scientists and particularly among the psychologists. Certainly different prejudices dwell upon this phenomenon. First and principal the usually made identity of positive and natural knowledge. This belief is also fed by many others such as that one which assumes that every quantification, which is a consequence of positive knowledge,follows the model of the Physical Sciences. We consider that all these prejudices do not keep in mind the work done in (...) the last decades on the Theories of Measure. We consider also that psychophysical methods which have been introduced by Stevens present a stimulating program for the behavioral sciences and they open a new frontiere to the positive knowledge. (shrink)

According to realist structuralism, mathematical objects are places in abstract structures. We argue that in spite of its many attractions, realist structuralism must be rejected. For, first, mathematical structures typically contain intra-structurally indiscernible places. Second, any account of place-identity available to the realist structuralist entails that intra-structurally indiscernible places are identical. Since for her mathematical singular terms denote places in structures, she would have to say, for example, that 1 = − 1 in the group (Z, +). We call this (...) the identity problem and conclude that nominalism is presently the safest route for the structuralist. (shrink)

Ned Block argues that the higher-order (HO) approach to explaining consciousness is ‘defunct’ because a prominent objection (the ‘misrepresentation objection’) exposes the view as ‘incoherent’. What’s more, a response to this objection that I’ve offered elsewhere (Weisberg 2010) fails because it ‘amounts to abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness’ (xxx).1 In this response, I wish to plead guilty as charged. Indeed, I will continue herein to abuse Block’s notion of what-it’s-like-ness. After doing so, I will argue that the HO approach accounts (...) for the sense of what-it’s-like-ness that matters in a theory of consciousness. I will also argue that the only incoherence present in the HO theory is that generated by embracing Block’s controversial notion of what-it’s-like-ness, something no theorist of any stripe ought to do. Block is famous for (among other things) having introduced the notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ into contemporary philosophy of mind (Block 1995). This term is widely employed in the philosophical literature and it even appears in the empirical literature. But wide-speared usage has brought about divergent interpretations of the term. We can distinguish a ‘moderate’ and a ‘zealous’ reading of ‘phenomenal consciousness’. On the moderate reading, ‘phenomenal consciousness’ just means ‘experience’. Many people have embraced this sense of the term and use it to roughly pick out conscious experience involving sensory quality (states like conscious visual experiences or conscious pains, for example).2 On the zealous reading, however, phenomenal consciousness is held to be ‘distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property’ (Block 1995: 234). That is, any explanation of phenomenal consciousness in exclusively cognitive, intentional, or functional terms will fail to capture, without remainder, what is really distinctive about phenomenal consciousness. Block, of course, is fully clear about embracing the zealous reading; indeed, his initial introduction of the notion is in those terms. The same ambiguity occurs with the much-used (and abused) idea of ‘what-it’s-like-ness’.. (shrink)

Prologue: Toward a new Enlightenment -- From bounded to relational being -- Bounded being -- In the beginning is the relationship -- The relational self -- The body as relationship : emotion, pleasure and pain -- Relational being in everyday life -- Multi-being and the adventure of everyday life -- Bonds, barricades, and beyond -- Relational being in practice -- Knowledge as co-creation -- Education in a relational key -- Therapy as relational recovery -- Organizing : the precarious balance -- (...) From the moral to the sacred -- Beyond moral pluralism -- All our relations, approaching the sacred -- Epilogue: The coming of relational consciousness. (shrink)