The 'Metaphysics of Dasein ' is the name which Heidegger gave to a new philosophical project developed immediately after the partial publication of his masterwork Being and Time. As Heidegger was later to recall, an 'overturning' took place at that moment, more precisely right in the middle of the 1929 treatise On the Essence of Ground. Between the fundamental-ontological formulation of the question of being and its metaphysical rephrasing, Heidegger discovered that a 'metaphysical freedom' stood at the root of Dasein (...) 's relation to his world and, thus, at the basis of his whole ontological questioning. This article will show how the very structure of the 1929 essay clearly illustrates the path Heidegger followed between Being and Time and the new philosophical beginning of the mid 1930s. It will conclude with a few critical remarks concerning Heidegger 's attempt to free his thinking from traditional philosophy and to overcome metaphysics. (shrink)

The relationship between present-day philosophy and philosophy of the past is a fundamental issue for understanding today’s philosophical division between “analytical” and “continental” philosophy. However, the opposition doesn’t lie in the mere rejection or acceptation of philosophy’s history. In fact, both philosophical traditions conceive the possibility of a dialog with the great philosophers of the past. This paper first characterizes the relationships with past philosophy in both traditions and arguments in favor of the relevancy of philosophy’s history for philosophy.

Phenomenology was born as an attack against the false constructions of traditional philosophy. Nevertheless, it soon discovered that it had an important bond to Plato’s, Descartes’ or Kant’s philosophical systems. As I show in this paper, both in Heidegger and in Husserl’s last writings, the philosophical endeavor is interpreted as a retrieval of earlier philosophical intentions. However, this does not lead them to a common interpretation of the meaning of philosophy’s history.

When Heidegger takes the decision at the end of the 1920’s to « risk again the step into an authentic metaphysics », a very strong solidarity is already established between his philosophical project and that of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. This solidarity is testified in the recuperation Heidegger does of the idea – proper to Kant and Baumgarten – of a metaphysica naturalis. The « Metaphysics of Dasein » constitutes the last attempt – after the hermeneutics of facticity and (...) the fundamental ontology – to define philosophy starting from « human nature ». After this « step into metaphysics », Heidegger’s thought will dedicate its efforts to the well-known « Overtaking of metaphysics ». (shrink)

L’histoire et l’historicité constituent deux éléments d’une importance inestimable dans la construction de la phénoménologie heideggérienne. Le caractère historique de l’existence humaine, d’une part, représente incontestablement le point d’achoppement central de sa reprise de la méthode husserlienne et définit la teneur de cette phénoménologie aux accents herméneutiques. D’un autre côté, l’histoire pensée comme région ontologique et comme thème d’une science possible – cette question si se...

La publication d'Etre et temps en 1927 a fait de Martin Heidegger une figure d'importance dans le panorama philosophique allemand des annees 1920. Au cours des annees suivantes, il voyage pour donner des conferences qui attirent tant les philosophes que les curieux captives par la reputation du penseur de la Foret Noire. Or, plutot que de se contenter de presenter le projet de 1927, ces conferences ont deja l'ambition de le depasser. Ce livre examine le contenu de quatre conferences inedites (...) (L'anthropologie philosophique et la metaphysique du Dasein, Hegel et le probleme de la metaphysique, La consideration sur le temps de Saint Augustin, Philosopher et croire) tout en retracant les evenements importants qui ont marque la vie de Heidegger durant ces annees de transition que furent 1929 et 1930. (shrink)

During the decade of the 1920s, Martin Heidegger tried to show that a series of unsolved problems was to be found in Aristotle. Besides the problem of being, Heidegger also highlighted the traditional misinterpretations of Aristotle’s problem of the world, which had always understood it as an antecedent of a religious question. Heidegger believed it was still possible to ‘retrieve’ this basic metaphysical problem and sought help from Kant’s concept of a ‘transcendental ideal’ to show that Aristotle’s concept of the (...) divine was the basis of a reflection on the world and not of a theological science. Interpreting Aristotle’s Metaphysics from this Kantian perspective, Heidegger brought new insights into the history of metaphysics and revealed an untapped field of questions for contemporary metaphysics. (shrink)

La lección de metafísica que imparte Heidegger durante el invierno de 1929/30 caracteriza el pensamiento metafísico como un pensamiento comprensivo, es decir, un pensamiento que “entiende” y que “incluye”. En este contexto, Heidegger busca definir con mayor precisión el vínculo que une su propia metafísica con la tradición moderna criticada unos años antes por “incluir”, precisamente, al sujeto humano en su propia elaboración. Es la ocasión para Heidegger de presentar un retrato mucho más matizado de su vinculación con la filosofía (...) moderna, retrato que pone de manifiesto lo que el Dasein ha heredado del sujeto moderno. (shrink)

Heidegger’s critique addressed to philosophical anthropology often leads readers to forget the importance of the question of human beings in his writings. The recent publication of the Black Notebooks and some unpublished lectures shed new light on these philosophical problems and help us define more clearly what it would mean to develop the foundation of anthropological knowledge ontologically. This paper argues that while dealing with mythical existence and with the difference between animals and human beings, Heidegger seized the opportunity to (...) speculate on the ontological origins of ethical life. The paper concludes by showing how Sloterdijk’s attempt to “anthropologize” Heidegger fails to follow the demands of fundamental ontology. (shrink)

Este texto consiste en un primer momento en una presentación general de la obra del Profesor Ramón Rodríguez García. Se presenta después el concepto de “interpretación fenomenológica” como problema central de la “hermenéutica fenomenológica” tal y como la entiende el Profesor Ramón Rodríguez García. Para terminar, se comenta una intervención del Profesor en el Congreso de los Diputados y los vínculos de los temas abordados con la hermenéutica fenomenológica.

Resumen En el presente trabajo se investigan los alcances y las consecuencias que se desprenden de utilizar a Heidegger en el campo de la filosofía de la medicina. Con este fin, la investigación se divide en los siguientes puntos: 1) se explicitará en qué puede consistir una “antropologización” del pensamiento heideggeriano; 2) se ofrecerá una descripción general respecto de las teorías de la salud y enfermedad más significativas y actuales en el campo de la teoría de la medicina; 3) nos (...) detendremos en el análisis relacionado con el problema de la enfermedad desde una perspectiva heideggeriana, para finalmente, 4) ofrecer algunas reflexiones críticas en relación con el análisis ofrecido.In this contribution we investigate the scope and consequences that arise from applying Heidegger in the field of philosophy of medicine. For this purpose, the paper is divided in the following points: First, we will make explicit the meaning of an “anthropologization” of Heidegger's thought. Second, an overview of the most significant contemporary theories of health and disease in the field of theory of medicine will be offered. Third, we will interpret the meaning of disease from a Heideggerian perspective. Finally, 4) we will offer some critical reflections offered in relation to the analysis. (shrink)

English summary: Each of the great philosophical movements of the twentieth century had to reflect on their place in the history of philosophy. This is true even of phenomenology, despite its early desire to shed the weight of encumbering tradition. This study examines the complex relationship that brings together with the history of philosophy the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger. French description: Tous les grands mouvements philosophiques du XXe siecle ont ete tenus de mediter les (...) consequences de leur inscription dans l'histoire de la philosophie. La phenomenologie n'a pas escamote cette tyche, elle qui, nee d'une volonte de se defaire d'une tradition trop encombrante, a fini par chercher... s'expliquer avec elle. Chez Heidegger tout d'abord, chez Husserl ensuite, l'histoire de la philosophie est devenu l'une des problematiques essentielles de la recherche sur les fondements de la methode phenomenologique. Cette etude interroge la relation complexe qui unit... l'histoire de la philosophie la phenomenologie transcendantale de Husserl et la phenomenologie hermeneutique de Heidegger. Plutot que d'opposer ces deux phenomenologies et chercher... en souligner les differences, l'ouvrage fait plutot le pari de montrer qu'elles finirent toutes deux par reconnaOEtre la necessite pour la philosophie de comprendre sa propre histoire et par accepter de se convertir en une phenomenologie historiste, voire meme en une phenomenologie de l'histoire. Chez le jeune Heidegger et le dernier Husserl, la phenomenologie se sera comprise comme une maniere de philosopher qui, tout en reconnaissant sa propre historicite, n'abandonne pas son ambition de parler des choses elles-memes. Docteur en philosophie de l'Universite de Montreal et boursier de la Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, Francois Jaran est presentement professeur... l'Universite de Valence (Espagne). Il est l'auteur de La metaphysique du Dasein (Zeta Books, 2010), Heidegger inedit 1929-1930. L'inachevable Etre et temps (Vrin, 2012) et The Heidegger Concordance (Continuum, 2013). (shrink)

In May 1968, Gilles Deleuze was an established philosopher teaching at the innovative Vincennes University, just outside of Paris. Félix Guattari was a political militant and the director of an unusual psychiatric clinic at La Borde. Their meeting was quite unlikely, yet the two were introduced in an arranged encounter of epic consequence. From that moment on, Deleuze and Guattari engaged in a surprising, productive partnership, collaborating on several groundbreaking works, including _Anti-Oedipus_, _What Is Philosophy?_ and _A Thousand Plateaus_. (...) class='Hi'>François Dosse, a prominent French intellectual known for his work on the Annales School, structuralism, and biographies of the pivotal intellectuals Paul Ricoeur, Pierre Chaunu, and Michel de Certeau, examines the prolific if improbable relationship between two men of distinct and differing sensibilities. Drawing on unpublished archives and hundreds of personal interviews, Dosse elucidates a collaboration that lasted more than two decades, underscoring the role that family and history—particularly the turbulent time of May 1968—play in their monumental work. He also takes the measure of Deleuze and Guattari's posthumous fortunes and the impact of their thought on intellectual, academic, and professional circles. (shrink)

A defence of the 'pragmatic' theory of anaphora (which stresses the analogy between anaphora and deixis) against an argument put forward by Gareth Evans.

Il est assez rare qu’un concept philosophique s’échappe de l’arène académique. C’est pourtant le cas du concept de spécisme, qui a fait une entrée remarquée dans la sphère publique au cours de la dernière décennie. Il est désormais au cœur du débat de société sur nos devoirs envers les animaux non humains. Hélas, ce concept et les enjeux qu’il soulève sont souvent mal compris. Nombreux sont les auteurs qui contestent sa légitimité alors qu’ils le maitrisent mal. D’autres l’utilisent plus volontiers (...) sans toutefois mieux le comprendre. Les confusions qui entourent cette notion l’empêche de contribuer à la discussion autant qu’elle le pourrait. Le présent ouvrage entend remédier à cet état de faits en donnant de la notion de spécisme une présentation à la fois assez précise pour rendre justice aux discussions philosophiques dont elle fait l’objet et suffisamment claire pour être accessible à quiconque s’intéresse au statut moral des animaux. Il se divise en deux parties. La première aborde des questions ontologiques : Qu’est-ce exactement que le spécisme ? À quelles conditions existe-t-il ? Ces conditions sont-elles remplies dans les faits ? Quant à la seconde, elle porte sur des questions éthiques : Le spécisme peut-il être justifié ? Faut-il au contraire le condamner au même titre que le racisme et le sexisme ? (shrink)

Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed (...) to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not thesufficient and necessaryconditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy. (shrink)

Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on (...) the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand. (shrink)

Plato’s works have been the object of countless interpretations and recuperations ever since Greek antiquity. In the context of prenazi Germany, the writer Hans F.K. Günther published a work in defence of eugenic theories (aiming to improve man through authoritarian laws), allegedly based on the work of the Athenian philosopher and entitled Platon als Hüter des Lebens (“Plato as Protector of Life”). The present article tries to set forth what is at stake in that propaganda piece, its historical context, as (...) well as the disquieting implications of such an “appropriation” of classical philosophy to purely political ends. (shrink)

Phenomenal consciousness appears to be particularly normatively significant. For this reason, sentience-based conceptions of ethics are widespread. In the field of animal ethics, knowing which animals are sentient appears to be essential to decide the moral status of these animals. I argue that, given that materialism is true of the mind, phenomenal consciousness is probably not particularly normatively significant. We should face up to this probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness and move towards an ethic without sentience.

Diversity of evidence is widely claimed to be crucial for evidence amalgamation to have distinctive epistemic merits. Bayesian epistemologists capture this idea in the variety-of-evidence thesis: ceteris paribus, the strength of confirmation of a hypothesis by an evidential set increases with the diversity of the evidential elements in that set. Yet, formal exploration of this thesis has shown that it fails to be generally true. This article demonstrates that the thesis fails in even more circumstances than recent results would lead (...) us to expect. Most importantly, it can fail whatever the chance that the evidential sources are unreliable. Our results hold for two types of degrees of variety: reliability independence and testable aspect independence. We conclude that the variety-of-evidence thesis can, at best, be interpreted as an exception-prone rule of thumb. (shrink)