Edith Stein (1891-1942), a philosopher, an author and a Catholic feminist wrote on spirituality and philosophical writings which hold spiritual treasures and mystery of Christianity while others are more directly related to the humanity, hermeneutics, philosophical anthropology and Christian vocation, sensation and inner events such as theological anthropology.

This paper examines Edith Stein’s phenomenological analysis of society—a neglected side of her thought—and situates it in a two-fold context: (a) philosophical studies of society undertaken in German-speaking lands in the aftermath of the First World War, and (b) Christian concepts of surrogacy and responsibility for the other.

This paper examines Edith Stein’s phenomenological analysis of society—a neglected side of her thought—and situates it in a two-fold context: (a) philosophical studies of society undertaken in German-speaking lands in the aftermath of the First World War, and (b) Christian concepts of surrogacy and responsibility for the other.

This article presents Edith Stein's vision of womanhood, from the point of view of theology, pedagogy, and psychology. Edith Stein means to offer the most complete vision possible on the question of womanhood, one that will be faithful to the scope of its dimensions: social, political, anthropological, philosophical, ecclesiastic, canonical, and even theological.

Gott denken: Diese Aufgabe zielt in die Mitte der Philosophie – und eben dieser Aufgabe widmet sich dieses Buch: einem Kompendium der europäischen Religionsphilosophie und ihrer wichtigsten Fragestellungen unter historischen wie systematischen Aspekten. Am Beginn des Bandes findet sich der hier erstmals veröffentlichte Habilitationsvortrag des bedeutenden deutschen Religionsphilosophen Richard Schaeffler – dem dieses Buch gewidmet ist – über Anselm von Canterbury und seinen Widersacher Gaunilo von Marmoutiers. Schaeffler geht der Frage nach, die vor und nach Anselm der Philosophie keine Ruhe (...) gelassen hat: Können wir in unserem Denken zu einer Vergewisserung des Daseins Gottes finden? Wie ein roter Faden zieht sich das Ringen mit dieser Ungewissheit, ob und wie im Denken eine Vergewisserung Gottes möglich ist, durch die Geschichte der europäischen Philosophie. Eben das ist die Leitfrage auch dieses Buches: Welche Bedeutung hat Gott für unser Denken und in unserem Denken? Ist das möglich: zu denken, ohne Gott zu denken? Der InhaltDie Kontroverse zwischen Anselm von Canterbury und Gaunilo von Marmoutiers: zur Frage nach der Vertretbarkeit des Daseins Gottes im Denken • Geschichtliche Bezüge • Gott erkennen und erfahren? • Gott: effabile et ineffabile – sagbar und doch unsagbar • Zur programmatischen Idee einer rationalen Theologie • Etsi Deus daretur – aut non daretur Die HerausgeberChristoph Böhr ist Professor für Philosophie an der Hochschule Heiligenkreuz/Wien. Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz ist Professorin em. für Religionsphilosophie an der TU Dresden sowie Vorstand des Europäischen Instituts für Philosophie und Religion an der Hochschule Heiligenkreuz/Wien. (shrink)

Im Anschluss an die Edith Stein-Gesamtausgabe (ESGA) erschliesst das Edith Stein-Lexikon das denkerische Erbe, die philosophiegeschichtliche wie phanomenologische Bedeutung Edith Steins (1891-1942) weiter und macht es im problemgeschichtlichen und systematischen Sinn sichtbar. Die von uber 40 Stein-Forschern aus verschiedenen Landern und Generationen verfassten uber 250 Artikel informieren uber Bedeutung und Genese der fur Edith Stein zentralen Begriffe und Termini. Das Lexikon wendet sich an alle am Denken Edith Steins Interessierte, an Dozierende, Studierende und an alle neugierigen Leser, die ermutigt und (...) angeregt werden, sich den Originaltexten Edith Steins zum ersten Mal zuzuwenden. (shrink)

Gott denken: Diese Aufgabe zielt in die Mitte der Philosophie – und eben dieser Aufgabe widmet sich dieses Buch: einem Kompendium der europäischen Religionsphilosophie und ihrer wichtigsten Fragestellungen unter historischen wie systematischen Aspekten. Am Beginn des Bandes findet sich der hier erstmals veröffentlichte Habilitationsvortrag des bedeutenden deutschen Religionsphilosophen Richard Schaeffler – dem dieses Buch gewidmet ist – über Anselm von Canterbury und seinen Widersacher Gaunilo von Marmoutiers. Schaeffler geht der Frage nach, die vor und nach Anselm der Philosophie keine Ruhe (...) gelassen hat: Können wir in unserem Denken zu einer Vergewisserung des Daseins Gottes finden? Wie ein roter Faden zieht sich das Ringen mit dieser Ungewissheit, ob und wie im Denken eine Vergewisserung Gottes möglich ist, durch die Geschichte der europäischen Philosophie. Eben das ist die Leitfrage auch dieses Buches: Welche Bedeutung hat Gott für unser Denken und in unserem Denken? Ist das möglich: zu denken, ohne Gott zu denken? Der InhaltDie Kontroverse zwischen Anselm von Canterbury und Gaunilo von Marmoutiers: zur Frage nach der Vertretbarkeit des Daseins Gottes im Denken • Geschichtliche Bezüge • Gott erkennen und erfahren? • Gott: effabile et ineffabile – sagbar und doch unsagbar • Zur programmatischen Idee einer rationalen Theologie • Etsi Deus daretur – aut non daretur Die HerausgeberChristoph Böhr ist Professor für Philosophie an der Hochschule Heiligenkreuz/Wien. Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz ist Professorin em. für Religionsphilosophie an der TU Dresden sowie Vorstand des Europäischen Instituts für Philosophie und Religion an der Hochschule Heiligenkreuz/Wien. (shrink)

Fließende Identität ist zum Wunschtraum einer ‚androgyn-multiplen‘ Kultur geworden. Utopien im Sinne des totalen Selbstentwurfs verwischen bisherigen Grenzen zwischen Fleisch und Plastik, Körper und Computer. Im postmodernen Plural gilt das Subjekt nur als Momentaufnahme im Fluss weiterer Verwandlungen. Es bedarf mehr denn je eines sinnvollen Durchdenkens: Was ist der Mensch? Edith Steins Denken legt frei, dass es eine Entfaltung gibt vom Unbelebten zum Belebten, über Pflanze und Tier bis zu jenem Wesen, das über Freiheit und Selbstbewusstsein verfügt: dem Menschen. Und (...) zugleich gelangt er aus sich selbst in einem Überstieg, ja, in eine lösende Beziehung: ‚In der Vereinigung mit der Göttlichen Liebe umfasst der geschaffene Geist auch erkennend, selig und frei bejahend sich selbst.‘ Das ist die Identität, um die es dem Menschen in seiner Sinnsuche geht. (shrink)

Unter allen Lebewesen ist der Mensch etwas Besonderes. Als Abbild Gottes sei der Mensch geschaffen, so die Bibel. Wem sie nichts sagt, auch der erfährt sich als bewusstes Ich, das zu sich selbst, zu anderen und zur Welt Stellung nehmen kann. Er ist vernünftig und frei: Person. Dem Wesen nach ist jeder Mensch Person und hat deshalb Würde. Auch, wenn Machtinteressen diese missachten. Personen sind einzig, unaustauschbar und zugleich immer schon eingebunden in ein Wir: biologisch, kulturell, rechtlich. Bevor der Mensch (...) "ich" sagen kann, steht ihm ein Du gegenüber. Als einmaliges Freiheitswesen ist er Person nur im Miteinander. Mit Beiträgen von Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz, Johannes Hattler, Theo Kobusch, Robert Spaemann, Jakob Fortunat Stagl u. Hans Thomas. (shrink)

Romano Guardini gilt als einer der massgeblichen christlichen Denker des 20. Jahrhunderts. Seine Schriften, philosophische und theologische Abhandlungen, aber auch zahlreiche meditative und spirituelle Texte, haben eine weltweite Verbreitung gefunden und pragen ungebrochen bis heute Generationen von Leserinnen und Lesern. Der vorliegende Band, der aus Anlass des 50. Todestages Romano Guardinis am 1. Oktober 2018 sowie zur Eroffnung des Seligsprechungsprozesses erscheint, versammelt Beitrage namhafter Autorinnen und Autoren. Aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven widmen sie sich insbesondere Guardinis Buch "Der Herr" uber Person und (...) Botschaft Jesu Christi, aber beispielsweise auch Aspekten der Gottesfrage, der Ethik oder des Gebets. Eine Fundgrube fur alle, die sich der Person und dem Denken Guardinis neu nahern mochten. Mit Beitragen von Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz, Jean Greisch, Karl Kardinal Lehmann (+), Peter Reifenberg, Marius Reiser, Peter Schallenberg, P. Kosmas Lars Thielmann OCist, Karl-Heinz Wiesemann. (shrink)

Es gibt ein Ziel, auf das alle philosophische Einzelforschungen hinarbeiten und zu dessen Erreichung sie zusammenwirken: das Ziel, die Welt zu verstehen. (Edith Stein) Edith Stein ist eine Philosophin, die auf Grund der Weite des Horizonts, in dem sie denkt, in kein Raster passt. Die Beitrage dieses Bandes, die auf eine Tagung anlasslich der Prasentation des Edith Stein-Lexikons an der FernUniversitat in Hagen im November 2017 zuruckgehen, machen das systematische und ideengeschichtliche Profil in Steins Denken transparent. Die versammelten namhaften Stein-Forscherinnen (...) und -forscher aus verschiedenen europaischen Landern zeigen die immer wieder uberraschende Aktualitat von Steins phanomenologischem Ansatz, der bis in Grundfragen der Anthropologie und Bioethik auch heute fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. "Verschiedene Grundbegriffe und -phanomene Edith Steins werden im Rahmen des vorliegenden Tagungsbandes vorgestellt und diskutiert. Dabei entsteht eine Synopse ihres Denkens und zugleich wird dessen Kern immer genauer sichtbar. Es gibt Beitrage zur Phanomenologie, zur Anthropologie, zur Religionsphilosophie und zur Frage, wie wir heute Stein lesen konnen." (Aus dem Vorwort) Mit Beitragen von Beate Beckmann-Zoller, Angela Ales Bello, Christof Betschart, Tonke Dennebaum, Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz, Martin Hahnel, Marcus Knaup, Ugo Perone, Harald Seubert, Claudia Mariele Wulf. (shrink)

Many philosophers think that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to morally justify. Explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the moral significance of the intent to harm. I argue that there’s a better way to explain this intuition.

Many philosophers claim that it is always intrinsically good when people get what they deserve and that there is always at least some reason to give people what they deserve. I highlight problems with this view and defend an alternative. I have two aims. First, I want to expose a gap in certain desert-based justifications of punishment. Second, I want to show that those of us who have intuitions at odds with these justifications have an alternative account of desert at (...) our disposal – one that may lend our intuitions more credibility. (shrink)

Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the connections between them. But this is not just a study in the history of philosophy, for out of this emerges Hanna's original approach to two much-contested theories that remain at the heart of contemporary philosophy. Hanna puts forward a new 'cognitive-semantic' interpretation of transcendental idealism, and a vigorous defense of (...) Kant's theory of analytic and synthetic necessary truth, making this compelling reading for all who are interested in these fundamental philosophical issues. (shrink)

More than a decade ago, Nobel Prize-winning atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen first suggested that we were now living in the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch in which human dominance of biological, chemical and geological processes on Earth was already an undeniable reality. Crutzen's ideas inspired Christian Schwagerl to do further documentation and to write this stimulating book. Well-equipped to take on such a task, Schwagerl has been a political, science and environmental journalist for more than 20 years. He first studied (...) biology at the University of Berlin, completing his Master of Science degree at the University of Reading (UK). He is a past winner of the Georg von Holtzbrinck Prize for Science Journalism, the IUCN-Reuters Media Awards for excellence in Environmental Reporting (Category Europe, together with Philip Bethge and Rafaela von Bredow) and the Econsense Journalism Award for sustainability. (shrink)

An observation of Hume’s has received a lot of attention over the last decade and a half: Although we can standardly imagine the most implausible scenarios, we encounter resistance when imagining propositions at odds with established moral (or perhaps more generally evaluative) convictions. The literature is ripe with ‘solutions’ to this so-called ‘Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance’. Few, however, question the plausibility of the empirical assumption at the heart of the puzzle. In this paper, we explore empirically whether the difficulty we (...) witness in imagining certain propositions is indeed due to claim type (evaluative v. non-evaluative) or whether it is much rather driven by mundane features of content. Our findings suggest that claim type plays but a marginal role, and that there might hence not be much of a ‘puzzle’ to be solved. (shrink)

My first experience as a clinician was in a Therapeutic Community for service users with personality disorder. As well as having personality disorder, many of the Community members also suffered from related conditions, such as addiction and eating disorders. Broadly speaking, these conditions are what we might call ‘disorders of agency’. Core diagnostic symptoms or maintaining factors of disorders of agency are actions and omissions: patterns of behaviour central to the nature or maintenance of the condition. For instance, borderline personality (...) disorder is diagnosed in part via deliberate self-harm and attempted suicide, reckless and impulsive behaviour, substance use, violence, and outbursts of anger; addiction is diagnosed via maladaptive patterns of drug consumption; eating disorders involve eating too much or too little. If a service user is to improve let alone recover from these disorders, they must change the diagnostic or maintaining pattern of behaviour (cf. Pearce and Pickard, 2010). For instance, service users with borderline personality disorder must stop self-harming; addicts need to quit using drugs or alcohol; anorexics must eat. (shrink)

I argue that legal punishment is morally wrong because it’s too morally risky. I first briefly explain how my argument differs from similar ones in the philosophical literature on legal punishment. Then I explain why legal punishment is morally risky, argue that it’s too morally risky, and discuss objections. In a nutshell, my argument goes as follows. Legal punishment is wrong because we can never sufficiently reduce the risk of doing wrong when we legally punish people. We can never sufficiently (...) reduce this risk because wrongful punishment is much worse than wrongful non-punishment and because punishment’s permissibility depends on the answers to a variety of difficult philosophical questions about which we’re fallible. (shrink)

Variation in addiction suggests that a good definition will be précising: it should serve a purpose. The authors canvass the various purposes served by a definition of addiction in psychiatric, social, legal, economic, interpersonal and scientific contexts. They argue that addiction is a strong and habitual want that significantly reduces control and leads to significant harm. What counts as significant varies relative to purpose and context. The authors offer a basic account of the nature of control and how and why (...) it can be reduced. The chapter explores the nature of harm and why it is part of the definition. And it concludes by suggesting that progress in understanding addiction depends on bearing in mind the various purposes and contexts of enquiry, together with the common-sense but often neglected point that both control and harm come in degrees. (shrink)

Effective treatment of disorders of agency presents a clinical conundrum. Many of the core symptoms or maintaining factors are actions and omissions that cause harm to self and others. Encouraging service users to take responsibility for this behavior is central to treatment. Blame, in contrast, is detrimental. How is it possible to hold service users responsible for actions and omissions that cause harm without blaming them? A solution to this problem is part conceptual, part practical. This chapter offers a conceptual (...) framework that clearly distinguishes between ideas of responsibility, blameworthiness, and "detached" and "affective" blame. It argues that affective blame is detrimental to effective treatment. And it suggests that affective blame can be avoided by attention to service users' past history, which directly evokes compassion and empathy. Finally, the chapter briefly considers whether the clinical stance of responsibility without blame should be adopted in non-clinical interpersonal and social contexts. (shrink)

This important book proposes a new account of the nature of language, founded upon an original interpretation of Wittgenstein. The authors deny the existence of a direct referential relationship between words and things. Rather, the link between language and world is a two-stage one, in which meaning is used and in which a natural language should be understood as fundamentally a collection of socially devised and maintained practices. Arguing against the philosophical mainstream descending from Frege and Russell to Quine, Davidson, (...) Dummett, McDowell, Evans, Putnam, Kripke and others, the authors demonstrate that discarding the notion of reference does not entail relativism or semantic nihilism. A provocative re-examination of the interrelations of language and social practice, this book will interest not only philosophers of language but also linguists, psycholinguists, students of communication and all those concerned with the nature and acquisition of human linguistic capacities. (shrink)

The financial sector has seen a transformation towards ‘sustainable’ finance particularly in Europe, driven also by unprecedented regulatory reforms. At the same time, many are sceptical about the real impact of these reforms, fearing that they are triggering a paradoxical financialisation of sustainability. Building on recent research on institutional logics and institutional fields formation, we examine changes in the EU regulatory dynamics as characterised by shifts in framing the relationship between sustainability and finance. Deploying a longitudinal approach, consisting of archival (...) data and semi-structured interviews, we explore the development of EU sustainable finance regulation as an extended, interactive and contested process. Specifically, we suggest that regulatory dynamics depend on the hybrid configuration of the social constituencies supporting sustainable finance reforms and on shifts in the overall prevalence of the financial logic in society. Our paper sheds light on the inherent contradictions and limitations of sustainable finance as a means for transformative sustainability reforms. (shrink)

The study aims to lay the groundwork for systematically investigating children’s peer discourse at different age levels with a view to delimiting the role of peer talk for pragmatic development. An interdisciplinary stance to the study of children’s peer talk is argued for, considering it simultaneously as the arena for the co-construction of childhood cultures as well as an arena for development. We propose a four-dimensional model of discursive events, meant to capture both dimensions simultaneously. The model takes into account (...) the dynamic interplay among the type of activity children are engaged in, the overall thematic frame of the event, its internal framing by the children themselves and the genre used. The model is applied to the analysis of natural peer talk at two age levels, preschoolers and fourth graders, focusing mainly on variation along the dimension of keying. The two age groups studied are shown to share a rich repertoire of keyings and genres, but to differ in their relative salience and modes of realization by age. Our analysis suggests that peer talk offers children ample opportunities to listen in, practice and display conversational as well as academic discursive skills, and hence may very well prove a crucial site for pragmatic development. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDespite advances in the conceptualisation of facial mimicry, its role in the processing of social information is a matter of debate. In the present study, we investigated the relationship b...

Our aim was to study how nurses interpret patient autonomy in end-of-life decision making. This study built on our previous quantitative study, which evaluated the experiences of and views on end-of-life decision making of a representative sample of Finnish nurses taken from the whole country. We performed qualitative interviews with 17 nurses and analysed these using discourse analysis. In their talk, the nurses demonstrated three different discourses, namely, the ‘supporter’, the ‘analyst’ and the ‘practical’ discourses, each of which outlined a (...) certain position for patients and relatives, and a certain identity for the nurses in end-of-life decision making. The nurses’ talk showed notable differences when compared with that of physicians, highlighting the differences that take place in respect of the image of a person’s work, professional culture, professional identification and responsibilities. An important finding was that the nurses often described their participation in end-of-life decision making in terms of indirect influence. (shrink)

In a recent New Yorker cartoon, a man is fixing a sink. His partner, standing nearby skeptically asks, “Do you really know what you are doing, or do you only google-​know?” This cartoon perfectly captures the mixed relationship we have with googling, or knowing via digital interface, particularly via search engines. On the one hand, googling is now the dominant source of socially useful knowledge. The use of search engines for this purpose is almost completely integrated into many of our (...) lives. On the other, the point the cartoon is making resonates with nearly all of us: users often recognize that there are risks and trade-​offs associated with gaining certain kinds of information via online search. These facts about googling make it particularly interesting to the applied epistemologist. Our practices involving search engines not only have a distinctive character, that character puts some traditional epistemic questions in a new light. This chapter will examine two of those questions. The first concerns the extent to which googling raises problems similar to familiar quandaries surrounding testimonial knowledge. The second –​and more radical –​concerns whether googling is a type of distributed or extended knowledge. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. This article reveals the understanding of the concept of nature in the works of the American philosopher Henry David Thoreau. Henry David Thoreau is an American philosopher, poet, essayist, naturalist and political activist. Together with Ralph Waldo Emerson, his friend and mentor, he is considered one of the founders of the transcendentalist movement. Transcendentalism was a powerful movement of American philosophy of the 19th century. It was characterized by focusing on (...) the problem of human self-knowledge, human's returning to own essence, living in harmony with nature, as well as criticism of modern society and active abolitionism. M e t h o d s. The article uses both general scientific methods and special methods, such as – the method of historical-philosophical reconstruction, which made it possible to reproduce the ideas of the American thinker, the hermeneutic method – for explaining individual positions of the philosopher. In addition, literary-critical methods were used, for the possibility of using various primary sources, and systematic method – to identify a systematized structure in the philosophical work of H. D. Thoreau. R e s u l t s. One of the main features of transcendentalism is a special interest in reflection on nature and a special approach to it. Thus, the concept of nature is present in most of H. D. Thoreau's works, and it is the central topic of his philosophical searches. The concept of nature in his works appears in different contexts, acquires different meanings. Thus, H. D. Thoreau talks about nature in the context of nature, in the context of poetic creativity, in his philosophical searches, in his vision of man and in his argumentation of his own political position. However, the different meanings that H. D. Thoreau attaches to the concept of nature do not contradict each other, but, on the contrary, complement and clarify his understanding of nature. C o n c l u s i o n s. This article proposes to consider the use of the concept of nature by H. D. Thoreau in the following aspects: Nature and Peculiarities of nature as a subject of scientific knowledge. Nature and The relationship between nature and culture through the relationship between "the wild" and society. Nature and From naturalism to humanism. Nature as an inner essence of man and solitude with nature as a return to this essence. (shrink)