"In this paper I shall attempt to sketch a defense of the plain man's view that the job of the judge, qua judge is to apply the law." What seems to have lead to the other view is the pervasive role of policy and principle in the justification of judicial decisions. This is no argument, however, for the existence of discretion: "For while it must be admitted that judges are entitled to appeal to certain general policies and principles, this by (...) no means implies that they are entitled to exercise discretionary judgment in the formulation of such standards." With Dworkin, distinguishes weak and strong discretion: the former means merely final or controversial; the latter implying that judges are at some point free to reach decisions not controlled by authoritative standards. Agrees with Dworkin that non-rule standards are part of law. "Both Dworkin and I are in agreement that law is a system of entitlements, although, as we shall see, we differ as to what is their basis." "At any rate, we share the view that a litigant before a court of law is not in the position of one begging a favor from a potential benefactor, but rather in that of one demanding a particular decision as a matter of right, as something to which the law entitles him. Such a demand has two aspects: a claim that a right exists which the law recognizes; a claim that this right takes precedence over any competing legal rights or obligations involved. Let us refer to these two sorts of claims respectively as ones involving decisions as to recognition, and weight.:" Argues that we cannot distinguish between legal moral principles and non-legal moral principles without a rule of recognition. The same is true for the problem of establishing weight between various principles - here we have to consider how well a principle coheres with the institutional practice of a legal system. "[I]t is the distinctive feature of the institutionalized role of the judiciary, in contrast to the legislative, that it may not directly base decisions on substantive considerations of the value of competing social policies." "The theoretical possibility of the law being indeterminate with regard to what it requires...does not imply any correspondign indeterminacy with regard to what is required of the judge.". (shrink)

Pt. 1. The context -- pt. 2. Principles of ethics in psychiatry -- pt. 3. The applications of the ethical principles in psychiatric practice and research -- pt. 4. Non-medical uses of psychiatry -- pt. 5. Teaching ethics in psychiatry -- pt. 6. Conclusions and summary.

The publication of the DSM-5 awakened the interest in the classification of mental disorders and in factors which influence the production of a classification and its use. Among these are the debates about the limits between mental disorders and normality, the impact of vested interest in the publication of a revised version of a classification or its postponement, the problems of making those concerned use the classification and numerous others. The chapter discusses these issues and makes suggestions about the way (...) forward. (shrink)

The order in which Plato’s thoughts follow upon one another in the Republic is logical, but the dramatic or the picturesque medium through which he is constantly presenting his ideas disguises the logical structure of the work.

Hippocampal neurogenesis has been implicated in the pathogenesis of and recovery from depression. However, most of the underlying studies were endpoint investigations in experimental animals yielding conflicting results, and it has been under debate to which extent these results could be transferred to human patients. Now, researchers have developed a powerful new tool to address these questions by a non‐invasive method in humans and animals in vivo, using magnetic resonance spectroscopy to detect a biomarker for proliferating progenitor cells that give (...) rise to new neurons.1 This makes it possible to study the role of neural progenitor cells in a wide variety of human brain disorders. BioEssays 30:806–810, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

La democracia en el sentido contemporáneo del término, como autogobierno político de los seres humanos basado en la libertad y a igualdad, es de muy reciente implantación y cuenta con limitaciones geográficas y temáticas. Hoy, cuando la democracia representativa ha alcanzado nuevos espacios, en su marco tradicional del Estado-nación, las nuevas tecnologías y la globalización y la globalización de los procesos económicos la han puesto de nuevo en crisis. La expansión ilimitada del capital –semejante a la del universo- no ha (...) tenido un equivalente en el terreno de la política, en el mejor de los casos, democrática, que sigue encorsetada en los estrechos límites del Estado-nación. Límites que sólo serán sobrepasados cuando la democracia, también, se haga expansiva. El subsistema democrático español, dentro del sistema de democracias europeas, es reciente y se considera producto de una determinada relación de fuerzas en un proceso histórico convulso en el que se han conocido, sobre todo, dictaduras. A pesar de ser el actual régimen político una democracia normalizada, contiene insuficiencias o limitaciones que conviene concretar. Éstas se manifiestan en cuestiones geoestratégicas de cierta dependencia: un deficiente sistema productivo no incrustado en la ciencia ni en la innovación; una insuficiente cohesión social y un excesivo poder económico; un problema territorial no resuelto y un Estado que no acaba de ser laico. (shrink)

Study of concept of Brahman in Upanishads with special reference to the philosophy of Śāṇḍilya.

Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense (...) value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from counting towards a choice of a particular kind without being outweighed or undercut. (shrink)

Political legitimacy is best understood as one type of a broader notion, which I call institutional legitimacy. An institution is legitimate in my sense when it has the right to function. The right to function correlates to a duty of non-interference. Understanding legitimacy in this way favorably contrasts with legitimacy understood in the traditional way, as the right to rule correlating to a duty of obedience. It helps unify our discourses of legitimacy across a wider range of practices, especially including (...) the many evaluations we increasingly make of international institutions of various sorts, but also including domestic institutions. (shrink)

El libro se abre con una primera parte que pudiera ser calificada como inductoria de toda la obra, donde se considera a la bioética como punto de partida y al bioderecho como punto inicial de llegada y de posterior desarrollo. El derecho y la bioética se necesitan mutuamente y se complementan. El libro despliega sus afanes en tres partes, donde son abordadas las tres grandes cuestiones: libertad, vida y muerte.