A framework for the mind-matter problem in a holistic universe which has no parts is outlined. The conceptual structure of modern quantum theory suggests to use complementary Boolean descriptions as elements for a more comprehensive non-Boolean description of a world without an a priori mind-matter distinction. Such a description in terms of a locally Boolean but globally non-Boolean structure makes allowance for the fact that Boolean descriptions play a privileged role in science. If we accept the insight that there are (...) no ultimate building blocks, the existence of holistic correlations between contextually chosen parts is a natural consequence. The main problem of a genuinely non-Boolean description is to find an appropriate partition of the universe of discourse. If we adopt the idea that all fundamental laws of physics are invariant under time translations, then we can consider a partition of the world into a tenseless and a tensed domain.In the sense of a regulative principle, the material domain is defined as the tenseless domain with its homogeneous time. The tensed domain contains the mental domain with a tensed time characterized by a privileged position, the Now. Since this partition refers to two complementary descriptions which are not given a priori we have to expect correlations between these two domains. In physics it corresponds to Newton 's separation of universal laws of nature and contingent initial conditions Both descriptions have a non-Boolean structure and can be encompassed into a single non-Boolean description. Tensed and tenseless time can be synchronized by holistic correlations. (shrink)

This is a unique volume by a unique scientist, which combines conceptual, formal, and engineering approaches in a way that is rarely seen. Its core is the relation between ways of learning and knowing on the one hand and different modes of time on the other. Partial Boolean logic and the associated notion of complementarity are used to express this relation, and mathematical tools of fundamental physics are used to formalize it. Along the way many central philosophical problems are touched (...) and addressed, above all the mind-body problem. Completed only shortly before the death of the author, the text has been edited and annotated by the author's close collaborator Harald Atmanspacher. (shrink)

This contribution explores Wolfgang Pauli's idea that mind and matter are complementary aspects of the same reality. We adopt the working hypothesis that there is an undivided timeless primordial reality (the primordial 'one world'). Breaking its symmetry, we obtain a contextual description of the holistic reality in terms of two categorically different domains, one tensed and the other tenseless. The tensed domain includes, in addition to tensed time, nonmaterial processes and mental events. The tenseless domain refers to matter and physical (...) energy. This concept implies that mind cannot be reduced to matter, and that matter cannot be reduced to mind. The non-Boolean logical framework of modern quantum theory is general enough to implement this idea. Time is not taken to be an a priori concept, but an archetypal acausal order is assumed which can be represented by a one-parameter group of automorphisms, generating a time operator which parametrizes all processes, whether material or nonmaterial. The time-reversal symmetry is broken in the nonmaterial domain, resulting in a universal direction of time for the material domain as well. (shrink)

Wolfgang Pauli (1900-1958) was one of the greatest physicists of the past century. He played a leading role in the development of modern physics and was known for his ruthless intellectual integrity. Pauli first became famed through the publication of his encyclopaedia article on the theory of relativity (Pauli, 1921) when he was still a student of Sommerfeld's. Einstein much admired this article, which remained a classic.

Quantum theory has provoked intense discussions about its interpretation since its pioneer days. One of the few scientists who have been continuously engaged in this development from both physical and philosophical perspectives is Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker. The questions he posed were and are inspiring for many, including the authors of this contribution. Weizsaecker developed Bohr's view of quantum theory as a theory of knowledge. We show that such an epistemic perspective can be consistently complemented by Einstein's ontically oriented position.

Der vorliegende Band enthält eine Sammlung von Beiträgen zum Problem der Wechselwirkung zwischen Geist und Materie, einem der zentralen Probleme europäischer Geistesgeschichte. Die Blickwinkel, die dabei eingenommen werden, sind vorrangig die der Physik und der Psychologie. Die Wechselwirkung dieser Gebiete wird so deutlich wie nie zuvor im Dialog zwischen zwei Forscherpersön lichkeiten dieses Jahrhunderts sichtbar: dem Physiker Wolfgang Pauli (1900- 1958) und dem Psychologen Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961). In zahlreichen Brie fen und Manuskripten Paulis, die erst in den letzten Jahren (...) allgemein zugänglich wurden, finden sich bemerkenswerte und wichtige Beiträge zu diesem Dialog, die das Verständnis des Zusammenhanges von Geist und Materie in einem neuen Licht erscheinen lassen. Um den durch Pauli und Jung begonnenen Dialog fortzusetzen und weiter fruchtbar zu machen, ist das interdisziplinäre Gespräch zwischen Physikern und Psychologen nötig. Diesem Zweck diente eine von der Eidgenössischen Techni sehen Hochschule Zürich (der Hochschule, an der Pauli tätig war) und dem C.G.Jung-Institut Zürich (das Jung gegründet hat) gemeinsam veranstaltete Tagung im Centro Stefano Franscini (Monte Verita, Ascona) vom 13. bis 18. Juni 1993. Sie stand unter dem Thema Das Irrationale in den Naturwissenschaften: Wolf gang Paulis Begegnung mit dem Geist der Materie und wurde von Pier Luigi Luisi initiiert und organisiert. Als Berater fungierten Paul Brutsehe, Hans Primas und Eva Wertenschlag-Birkhäuser. Berichte und Kommentare zu dieser Tagung wurden in Heft 4/1993 der Zeitschrift Gaia veröffentlicht. (shrink)

Review of "The Collected Works of Eugene Paul Wigner", Volume I, III, and VI. Excerpt from the Conclusions: Many of Wigner’s papers on mathematical physics are great classics. Most famous is his work on group representations which is of lasting value for a proper mathematical foundation of quantum theory. The modern development of quantum theory (which is not reflected in Wigner’s work) is in an essential way a representation theory (e.g. representations of kinematical groups, or representations of C*-algebras). This view (...) owes very much to Wigner’s seminal papers on the unitary representations of compact and noncompact groups. Wigner showed much courage in relating the then unresolved questions of the measurement problem to the much deeper problem of consciousness. In view of this very unorthodox proposal it is astonishing that Wigner was very reactionary with respect of the dogmas of orthodox quantum mechanics. In contrast to von Neumann himself, he took the old von-Neumann codification of quantum mechanics as authoritative and not to be questioned. Much of the efforts to interpret the meaning of this codification and to prove no-go theorems, such as the insolubility of the measurement problem or the impossibility of a quantum theory of individual objects, are physically irrelevant since they are based on a codification of quantum mechanics that is valid only for strictly closed systems with finitely many degrees of freedom. However, in nature there are no such systems. Every material system is coupled to the gravitational and to the electromagnetic field – systems which require in a Hamiltonian description infinitely many degrees of freedom. A deeper insight into the conceptual problems of quantum theory is possible only if the modern development of a quantum theory of infinite systems is taken into account. (shrink)

Wolfgang Pauli is well recognized as an outstanding theoretical physicist, famous for his formulation of the two-valuedness of the electron spin, for the exclusion principle, and for his prediction of the neutrino. Less well known is the fact that Pauli spent a lot of time in different avenues of human experience and scholarship, ranging over fields such as the history of ideas, philosophy, religion, alchemy, and Jung's psychology. Pauli's philosophical and particularly his psychological background is not overt in his scientific (...) papers and was unknown even to many specialist scholars until a number of enthralling and perplexing documents of a close interaction between Wolfgang Pauli and the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung became publicly available in recent years. Both scholars stressed the inseparability of the physical and the psychical and called upon a sense of more openness toward the unconscious. Decades after his death, Pauli's innovative perspective and his vision of a wholeness of psyche and matter are more than ever before of great relevance. (shrink)

Wolfgang Pauli is well recognized as an outstanding theoretical physicist, famous for his formulation of the two-valuedness of the electron spin, for the exclusion principle, and for his prediction of the neutrino. Less well known is the fact that Pauli spent a lot of time in different avenues of human experience and scholarship, ranging over fields such as the history of ideas, philosophy, religion, alchemy and Jung's psychology. Pauli's philosophical and particularly his psychological background is not overt in his scientific (...) papers and was unknown even to many specialist scholars until a number of enthralling and perplexing documents of a close interaction between Wolfgang Pauli and the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung became publicly available in recent years. Both scholars stressed the inseparability of the physical and the psychical and called upon a sense of more openness toward the unconscious. Decades after his death, Pauli's innovative perspective and his vision of a wholeness of psyche and matter are more than ever before of great relevance. (shrink)

WHEN MAN FIRST BEGAN to interpret the nature of things—and this he did when he began to be man—life was to him everywhere, and being the same as being alive. Animism was the widespread expression of this stage, "hylozoism" one of its later conceptual forms. Soul flooded the whole of existence and encountered itself in all things. Bare matter, that is, truly inanimate, "dead" matter, was yet to be discovered—as indeed its concept, so familiar to us, is anything but obvious. (...) That the world is alive is really the most natural view, and largely supported by prima facie evi dence. On the terrestrial scene, in which experience is reared and contained, life abounds and occupies the whole foreground exposed to man's immediate view. The proportion of manifestly lifeless matter encountered in this primordial field is small, since most of what we now know to be inanimate is so intimately intertwined with the dynamics of life that it seems to share its nature. Earth, wind, and water—begetting, teeming, nurturing, destroying—are anything but models of "mere matter." Thus primitive panpsychism, in addition to answering powerful needs of the soul, was justified by rules of inference and verification within the available range of experience, continually confirmed as it was by the actual preponderance of life in the horizon of its earthly home. Indeed not before the Copernican revolution widened this horizon into the vastness of cosmic space was the proportional place of life in the scheme of things sufficiently dwarfed so that it became possible to disregard it for most of what henceforth was to be the content of the term "nature." But to early man, standing on his earth arched by the dome of its sky, it could never occur that life might be a side-issue in the universe, and not its pervading rule. His panvitalism was a perspective truth which only a change of perspective could eventually displace. Unquestioned and convincing at the beginning stands the experience of the omnipresence of life. (shrink)

Qual è il valore pratico della filosofia? La tradizione tramanda un verdetto duplice. Da una parte, il sapiente è colui che sa vivere, poiché conosce cosa è bene e come realizzarlo; dall’altra, il filosofo è inesperto del mondo ed esibisce in prima persona l’inutilità del suo sapere. Ma come si misura l’utilità del sapere filosofico? In questi scritti inediti risalenti agli anni canadesi (1949-1956), tradotti per la prima volta, Hans Jonas si interroga sul significato vitale e umano dell’esperienza filosofica, (...) intrecciando un vivace dialogo con gli autori antichi e lasciando emergere, nel confronto con essi, i lineamenti della sua filosofia dell’organico. (shrink)

There is a growing feeling that analytic philosophy is in crisis. At the same time there is a widespread and prima facie attractive conception of analytic philosophy which implies that it equates to good philosophy. In recognition of these conflicting tendencies, my paper raises the question of whether anything could be wrong with analytic philosophy. In section 1 I indicate why analytic philosophy cannot be defined by reference to geography, topics, doctrines or even methods. This leaves open the possibility that (...) analytic philosophy is a style of philosophizing. According to what I call a rationalist conception, the distinguishing feature of analytic philosophy is that it is guided by the ideal of rational argument. This conception implies that ' analytic philosophy' is an honorific title. In section 3 I point out that the rationalist definition yields a different extension for ' analytic philosophy' than commonly recognized. Section 4 defends the appeal to ordinary use in debates about the nature of analytic philosophy. Section 5 grants that there is an honorific use of the label, while also pointing out that the rationalist-cum-honorific conception is at odds with a more wide-spread and entrenched taxonomic practice. Section 6 alleges that the rationalist conception boils down to a 'persuasive definition' of analytic philosophy, and argues in favour of a more neutral philosophical taxonomy. Section 7 argues that analytic philosophy is an intellectual tradition held together both by lines of influence and by family-resemblances. The consequences for my topic are two-fold. First, there could obviously be something wrong with this intellectual tradition; secondly, the question whether there is something wrong needs to be raised separately with respect to individual phases or sections of that tradition. (shrink)

Th ere is a growing feeling that analytic philosophy is in crisis. At the same time there is a widespread and prima facie attractive conception of analytic philosophy which implies that it equates to good philosophy. In recognition of these confl icting tendencies, my paper raises the question of whether anything could be wrong with analytic philosophy. In section 1 I indicate why analytic philosophy cannot be defi ned by reference to geography, topics, doctrines or even methods. Th is leaves (...) open the possibility that analytic philosophy is a style of philosophizing. According to what I call a rationalist conception, the distinguishing feature of analytic philosophy is that it is guided by the ideal of rational argument. Th is conception implies that ‘analytic philosophy’ is an honorifi c title. In section 3 I point out that the rationalist defi nition yields a diff erent extension for ‘analytic philosophy’ than commonly recognized. Section 4 defends the appeal to ordinary use in debates about the nature of analytic philosophy. Section 5 grants that there is an honorifi c use of the label, while also pointing out that the rationalist-cum-honorifi c conception is at odds with a more wide-spread and entrenched taxonomic practice. Section 6 alleges that the rationalist conception boils down to a ‘persuasive definition’ of analytic philosophy, and argues in favour of a more neutral philosophical taxonomy. Section 7 argues that analytic philosophy is an intellectual tradition held together both by lines of infl uence and by family-resemblances. Th e consequences for my topic are two-fold. First, there could obviously be something wrong with this intellectual tradition; secondly, the question whether there is something wrong needs to be raised separately with respect to individual phases or sections of that tradition. (shrink)

There is a growing feeling that analytic philosophy is in crisis. At the same time there is a widespread and prima facie attractive conception of analytic philosophy which implies that it equates to good philosophy. In recognition of these conflicting tendencies, my paper raises the question of whether anything could be wrong with analytic philosophy. In section 1 I indicate why analytic philosophy cannot be defined by reference to geography, topics, doctrines or even methods. This leaves open the possibility that (...) analytic philosophy is a style of philosophizing (section 2). According to what I call a rationalist conception, the distinguishing feature of analytic philosophy is that it is guided by the ideal of rational argument. This conception implies that ‘analytic philosophy’ is an honorific title. In section 3 I point out that the rationalist definition yields a different extension for ‘analytic philosophy’ than commonly recognized. Section 4 defends the appeal to ordinary use in debates about the nature of analytic philosophy. Section 5 grants that there is an honorific use of the label, while also pointing out that the rationalist-cum-honorific conception is at odds with a more wide-spread and entrenched taxonomic practice. Section 6 alleges that the rationalist conception boils down to a ‘persuasive definition’ of analytic philosophy, and argues in favour of a more neutral philosophical taxonomy. Section 7 argues that analytic philosophy is an intellectual tradition held together both by lines of influence and by family-resemblances. The consequences for my topic are two-fold. First, there could obviously be something wrong with this intellectual tradition; secondly, the question whether there is something wrong needs to be raised separately with respect to individual phases or sections of that tradition. (shrink)

Emmanuel Lévinas (1906-1995) zählt nicht nur zu den wichtigsten Ethikern im 20. Jahrhundert. Vor allem entwirft er einen anderen Anfang der Ethik, die nicht auf der gesellschaftlichen Ebene oder als grosse Idee und Erzählung entsteht. Ethik entspringt vielmehr in der konkreten Zwischenmenschlichkeit, wenn man vom Anderen in die Verantwortung gerufen wird - und zwar durch die Verletzlichkeit seines nackten Gesichtes wie durch die Anrede. Die ethische Beziehung verdankt sich dabei nicht etwa der Gleichheit, der Nähe oder der Geschwisterlichkeit, sondern der (...) Andersheit des Anderen, seiner Ferne und vor allem seiner Fremdheit, die sich nicht hintergehen lassen. Damit gründet Lévinas die Gesellschaft nicht nur auf die Zwischenmenschlichkeit, sondern auch auf die Pluralität. So wenig wie die Ethik universelle Ansprüche erheben kann, lässt sich Gerechtigkeit als ein allgemeines Prinzip entwerfen. Vielmehr muss sie den Individuen in deren unendlicher Andersheit gerecht werden. In dieser Unendlichkeit blitzt im nackten Gesicht das Antlitz Gottes auf, denkt Lévinas aus der jüdischen Tradition heraus. Das lässt sich auch rein säkular verstehen, dass alle Menschen anders sind. Sie als Gleiche zu behandeln, unterwirft sie totalen politischen Ansprüchen, macht sie zu gehorsamen Untertanen. In Auseinandersetzung mit Sartre entwickelt Lévinas eine individualistische Ethik der Verantwortung, die jeden Menschen betrifft, indem sie aus der Zwischenmenschlichkeit heraus die Mündigkeit konstituiert. So verfolgt der Einzelne nicht primär seine Interessen, sondern übernimmt Verantwortung für den Anderen: Die Wende der Ethik im 20. Jahrhundert - von Sartre, de Beauvoir und Lacan inspiriert, von Derrida und Butler fortgeschrieben, bestehen zudem Parallelen zu Arendt und Foucault. (shrink)

This book reflects on the significant and highly original scientific contributions of Hans Primas. A professor of chemistry at ETH Zurich from 1962 to 1995, Primas continued his research activities until his death in 2014. Over these 50 years and more, he worked on the foundations of nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, contributed to a number of significant issues in theoretical chemistry, helped to clarify central topics in quantum theory and the philosophy of physics, suggested innovative ways of (...) addressing interlevel relations in the philosophy of science, and introduced cutting-edge approaches in the flourishing young field of scientific studies of consciousness. His work in these areas of research and its continuing impact is described by noted experts, colleagues, and collaborators of Primas. All authors contextualize their contributions to facilitate the mutual dialog between these fields. (shrink)

Written in the 1960s, TRUTH AND METHOD is Gadamer's magnum opus.

Dedicata a interrogare le categorie di metafora, mito e modernità, la riflessione di Hans Blumenberg (1920-1996) è senz'altro una delle più inquiete, profonde e decisive del secondo Novecento. Il presente volume ne offre una serrata ricostruzione evolutiva, partendo da un'analisi della prima, inedita fase del suo pensiero, e descrivendone la trasformazione nel corso del primo ventennio (1946-1966). Mostrando come la sua indagine si sia sistematicamente nutrita di un confronto "corpo a corpo" con la storia del pensiero cristiano - Agostino, (...) Pascal, Kierkegaard -, vengono allora esplorate le radici teoriche profonde della tesi della legittimità dell'età moderna, quale contraccolpo conseguente all'entrata in crisi dell'assolutismo teologico di matrice agostiniana. Ne emerge così un'immagine nuova della proposta filosofica e antropologica di Blumenberg, in costante debito critico nei confronti della memoria cristiana della cultura occidentale, seppure ritrattata in prospettiva nietzschiana. (shrink)

Una primera recomendación para arrancar la lectura de cualquier obra de Byung-Chul Han es saber que no hay ahí, metodológicamente hablando, principio o final alguno. No existe eso de “léete tal libro suyo que de ahí en adelante entenderás todo con mucha más claridad”, o aquel otro consejo de “a partir de tal idea puedes conectar las partes con el todo”. No. En la acaparadora obra de Han no hay nada de eso. Por el contrario, toda su producción intelectual parece (...) estar guiada más por un ánimo apocalíptico de anunciaciones fatalistas que por un sistema lógico de relaciones de ideas. La palabra, como medio para comunicar y enunciar ideas con cierta claridad, es (re)emplazada en su obra por un discurso emotivo donde prima la cicatriz sobre la herida, el moretón sobre el golpe, el efecto sobre la causa. (shrink)

Émile Durkheim remains one of the most controversial, and deeply misunderstood, classics of social theory. His work differs from the dominant version of sociology that has essentially accepted the modernist self-description of contemporary societies; and it contradicts the individualism that has come to dominate the social sciences. For everybody who is interested in constructing theoretical alternatives to this individualism, Durkheim's sociology can be a useful inspiration - not only because of the solutions it suggests, but already because of the questions (...) it asks. Making use of the theoretical possibilities offered by the Durkheimian tradition, however, requires going beyond the familiar appropriations. The Oxford Handbook of Émile Durkheim takes stock of the different recent debates on Durkheimian sociology, and makes them accessible to a wide audience spanning various disciplines; this includes crucial debates that, due to language barriers, are not easily accessible for an English-reading public. The handbook's chapters elucidate the controversial key concepts of Durkheimian sociology; situate them within the contemporary political and theoretical debates they were originally responding to; offer surveys of empirical research that uses Durkheimian concepts (on topics that were already central for Durkheim's own work as well as on topics that Durkheim hardly touched upon), thus demonstrating the possibilities of a Durkheimian sociology; bring out the divergent, and competing, ways in which Durkheim's ideas have been appropriated and reformulated within more recent theoretical developments in the social sciences. In doing so, this volume is an important resource for all scholars and students looking to understand Durkheimian sociology. (shrink)

In 1890 C. S. Peirce wrote a review of A. C. Fraser’s recent book on Locke, published to coincide with the bicentennial of Locke’s Essay. Peirce remarked that “Locke’s grand work was substantially this: Men must think for themselves, and genuine thought is an act of perception…. We cannot fail to acknowledge a superior element of truth in the practicality of Locke’s thought, which on the whole should place him nearly upon a level with Descartes.” This estimate of Locke was (...) not the common opinion in England during the nineteenth century. This opinion was reflected in Fraser’s book which, Peirce remarked, could not “be said to be a sympathetic account of [Locke]. The biographer seems to see no charm in his hero, and is perpetually speaking of his want of imagination; which only means he was not given to unpractical dreaming.” Locke had his knowledgeable critics and defenders—for instance Dugald Stewart and John Stuart Mill—but the common opinion ranged from extreme hostility and contempt to condescending criticism of isolated minor points. His style was deplored, his philosophy was called unoriginal and a mere unacknowledged plagiarism of Gassendi and Hobbes; he was said to have so thoroughly misunderstood Descartes that he had merely repeated him with new errors; he was said to owe his philosophical reputation entirely to his advocacy of the popular argument for political freedom or merely to the intellectual circumstances of his time; he was held accountable for Condillac’s rejection of reflection and reason; he was knocked down with a few bare sentences loosely drawn from Leibniz; he was said to have made the mind a puny, passive, mechanical thing. He was called a sensualist, a materialist, a sceptic, an atheist, and a utilitarian though at the same time—and not without contradiction—he was generally, especially by his critics, styled a “great lover of truth,” a plain and simple, well-meaning and religious man. To the nineteenth century Locke meant the Essay, and the history of the Essay was in large measure the history of modern thought, of the eighteenth century. Precisely for this reason there was something nearly sinister about him, in spite of his good personal character. “Locke, himself a clear, humble-minded, patient, reverent, nay, religious man,” said Carlyle, “had paved the way for banishing religion from the world.”. (shrink)

Written in the 1960s, TRUTH AND METHOD is Gadamer's magnum opus. Looking behind the self-consciousness of science, he discusses the tense relationship between truth and methodology. In examining the different experiences of truth, he aims to "present the hermeneutic phenomenon in its fullest extent.

This essay argues that Pufendorf conceived the principles of natural law against the rationalism and innatism of the 17th century, and that Condillac similarly formulated a conception of the human origin of language, both of them thus securing open and human foundations for the two primal institutions of law and language, and also making all citizens free agents in the ordering of communal living.

Reprinted 1999 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. LCCN 98-32334. ISBN 1-886363-74-9. Cloth. $95. * Reprint of the first edition.

Exploring all of the central themes of Wittgenstein's "oeuvre," this volume includes discussion of core topics such as meaning and use, rule following, the ...

What is justice? -- The idea of justice in the Holy Scriptures -- Platonic justice -- Aristotle's doctrine of justice -- The natural-law doctrine before the tribunal of science -- A "dynamic" theory of natural law -- Absolutism and relativism in philosophy and politics -- Value judgments in the science of law -- The law as a specific social technique -- Why should the law be obeyed? -- The pure theory of the law and analytical jurisprudence -- Law, state, and (...) justice in the pure theory of law -- Causality and retribution -- Causality and imputation -- Science and politics. (shrink)

In seinem 1960 erschienenen Hauptwerk "Wahrheit und Methode" nimmt Gadamer die bis in die Antike zuruckreichende hermeneutische Tradition auf, um vor allem im Anschluss an Hegel und Heidegger eine philosophische Hermeneutik zu begrunden. Das Buch brachte seinem Autor internationalen Ruhm, und die philosophische Hermeneutik ist eine der massgeblichen Konzeptionen der neueren Philosophie geworden. Nach wie vor bildet "Wahrheit und Methode" den Ausgangspunkt fur eine philosophische Klarung des Verstehens und seiner von Gadamer behandelten Auspragungen in Kunst, Geschichte und Sprache. Der vorliegende (...) Band rekonstruiert und diskutiert in Form eines kooperativen Kommentars, der Gliederung des Werkes folgend, Gadamers Gedankengang, zeigt aber auch die Perspektiven einer Philosophie auf, die sich gegenuber ihrem eigenen hermeneutischen Charakter nicht verschliesst.". (shrink)

One of the leading legal philosophers of this century, Kelsen published this short treatise in 1934, when the neo-Kantian influence on his work was at its zenith. An earlier, "constructivist" phase had been displaced by his effort to provide something approximating a neo-Kantian foundation for his theory. If this second phase represents the Pure Theory of Law in its most characteristic form, then the present treatise may well be its central text. And of Kelsen's many statements of the Pure Theory, (...) this one is surely the most accessible. Topics covered include the legal norm and Kelsen's normativity thesis, law and morality, the role of ideology, the concept of the legal person, legal interpretation, the identity of law and state, and the theory of international law. Among the appendices is an annotated bibliography of secondary literature on Kelsen. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the 20th century, philosophers of science have asked, "what kind of thing is a scientific theory?" The logical positivists answered: a scientific theory is a mathematical theory, plus an empirical interpretation of that theory. Moreover, they assumed that a mathematical theory is specified by a set of axioms in a formal language. Later 20th century philosophers questioned this account, arguing instead that a scientific theory need not include a mathematical component; or that the mathematical component need (...) not be specified by a set of axioms in a formal language. We survey various accounts of scientific theories entertained in the 20th century -- removing some misconceptions, and clearing a path for future research. (shrink)

In this book, Hans Joas interweaves Mead's political and intellectual biography with the development of his theories.

This book both consummates and demonstrates the basic thrust of Jonas's thought: the inseparability of ethics and metaphysics, the reality of values at the ...

Dass Edmund Husserl am Problem der Intersubjektivität gescheitert ist, gilt als ausgemacht - und ebenso, welche Konsequenzen daraus zu ziehen sind. Entgegen dem allenthalben pauschal erklärten `Abschied vom Subjekt' spricht aber vieles dafür, dass es in der gegenwärtigen Sozialtheorie eher um eine Reformulierung transzendentaler Subjektivität geht. Diese Interpretationsthese wirft ein neues Licht auf den sozialtheoretischen Diskurs, der im deutschen Sprachraum in den vergangenen dreissig Jahren vom Gegensatz von Jürgen Habermas' und Niklas Luhmanns Theorien bestimmt war: `Diskurs' und `System' erscheinen als (...) gegensätzliche Versuche, `Subjektivität' und `Interität' in ein theoretisch befriedigendes Verhältnis zu setzen. Wenn aber - so die kritische These dieses Buches - weder die Reformulierung von Subjektivität als `Interität' noch die Reformulierung von Subjektivität ohne `Interität' das Problem der Intersubjektivität überzeugend löst, ist dies ein Grund, neuerlich in eine direkte Auseinandersetzung mit Husserls Theorie transzendentaler Subjektivität einzutreten. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass Husserls vielkritisierter und -skandalisierter Versuch, den Sinn `Anderer' im `Eigenen' zu fundieren, in der transzendentalphänomenologischen Subjekttheorie durch ein umgekehrtes Begründungsverhältnis konterkariert wird. Bei aller Problematik dieser Theorieanlage - welche nur in Gegenwendung zu den Gewohnheiten der Husserl-Interpretation, vor allem aber auch zu Husserls Selbstinterpretation in den Blick kommt - zeigt sich, dass der phänomenologische Begriff des transzendentalen Subjekts seinen Reformulierungen als Diskurs und als System in mancher Hinsicht überlegen ist. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the idea of collective epistemic commonality suggested by Charles Taylor's example, and contrasts it with a distributive notion of epistemic commonality. It describes a number of accounts of collective epistemic commonality, and then argues that, contrary to what Taylor suggests, conversation is not constitutive of collective epistemic commonality as such, but rather presupposes basic forms of collective epistemic commonality. Taylor's remarks indicate that understanding the consensus is insufficient as whatever proposition people rationally and openly accept in conversation. (...) It is suggested that joint attitudes are irreducible, relational, and pre-reflective, and that such attitudes are joint, in the respect that the participants are aware of themselves as a ‘we’. Highly inferential beliefs need some form of communication, and are probably really some form of joint commitment. (shrink)

Authority qua empowerment is the weak reading of authority in Hans Kelsen's writings. On the one hand, this reading appears to be unresponsive to the problem of authority as we know it from the tradition. On the other hand, it squares with legal positivism. Is Kelsen a legal positivist?Not without qualification. For he defends a normativity thesis along with the separation thesis, and it is at any rate arguable that the normativity thesis mandates a stronger reading of authority than (...) that modelled on empowerment. I offer, in the paper, a prima facie case on behalf of a stronger reading of authority in Kelsen. I go on to argue, however, that the textual evidence weighs heavily in favour of the weak reading. Both nomostatics and nomodynamics are pervasive points of view in the Pure Theory of Law, and both reflect species of empowerment as the endpoint of Kelsen's reconstructions. (shrink)

Albert approaches critical rationalism as an alternative to other philosophical standpoints dominant in Germany: the conceptions of the Frankfurt School, hermeneutical thinking as represented by Gadamer, analytic philosophy, and logical empiricism. The author's purpose is to find a way out of the foundationalism of classical philosophy without falling back on the skeptical views so prevalent in today's philosophical thinking. Originally published in 1985. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the (...) distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Introduces contemporary American philosophy of technology through six of its leading figures. The six American philosophers of technology whose work is profiled in this clear and concise introduction to the field—Albert Borgmann, Hubert Dreyfus, Andrew Feenberg, Donna Haraway, Don Ihde, and Langdon Winner—represent a new, empirical direction in the philosophical study of technology that has developed mainly in North America. In place of the grand philosophical schemes of the classical generation of European philosophers of technology, the contemporary American generation addresses (...) concrete technological practices and the co-evolution of technology and society in modern culture. Six Dutch philosophers associated with Twente University survey and critique the full scope and development of their American colleagues’ work, often illustrating shifts from earlier to more recent interests. Individual chapters focus on Borgmann’s engagement with technology and everyday life; Dreyfus’s work on the limits of artificial intelligence; Feenberg’s perspectives on the cultural and social possibilities opened by technologies; Haraway’s conception of the cyborg and its attendant blurring of boundaries; Ihde’s explorations of the place of technology in the lifeworld; and Winner’s fascination with the moral and political implications of modern technologies. American Philosophy of Technology offers an insightful and readable introduction to this new and distinctly American philosophical turn. Contributors are Hans Achterhuis, Philip Brey, René Munnik, Martijntje Smits, Pieter Tijmes, and Peter-Paul Verbeek. (shrink)