Waal shows how ethical behavior is as much a matter of evolution as any other trait.

"It's the animal in us," we often hear when we've been bad. But why not when we're good? Primates and Philosophers tackles this question by exploring the biological foundations of one of humanity's most valued traits: morality. In this provocative book, primatologist Frans de Waal argues that modern-day evolutionary biology takes far too dim a view of the natural world, emphasizing our "selfish" genes. Science has thus exacerbated our reciprocal habits of blaming nature when we act badly and (...) labeling the good things we do as "humane." Seeking the origin of human morality not in evolution but in human culture, science insists that we are moral by choice, not by nature. Citing remarkable evidence based on his extensive research of primate behavior, de Waal attacks "Veneer Theory," which posits morality as a thin overlay on an otherwise nasty nature. He explains how we evolved from a long line of animals that care for the weak and build cooperation with reciprocal transactions. Drawing on both Darwin and recent scientific advances, de Waal demonstrates a strong continuity between human and animal behavior. In the process, he also probes issues such as anthropomorphism and human responsibilities toward animals. Based on the Tanner Lectures de Waal delivered at Princeton University's Center for Human Values in 2004, Primates and Philosophers includes responses by the philosophers Peter Singer, Christine M. Korsgaard, and Philip Kitcher and the science writer Robert Wright. They press de Waal to clarify the differences between humans and other animals, yielding a lively debate that will fascinate all those who wonder about the origins and reach of human goodness. (shrink)

There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model, (...) together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature. It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations. Key Words: altruism; cognitive empathy ; comparative; emotion; emotional contagion; empathy ; evolution; human; perception-action; perspective taking. (shrink)

The study of reciprocal altruism, or the exchange of goods and services between individuals, requires attention to both evolutionary explanations and proximate mechanisms. Evolutionary explanations have been debated at length, but far less is known about the proximate mechanisms of reciprocity. Our own research has focused on the immediate causes and contingencies underlying services such as food sharing, grooming, and cooperation in brown capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees. Employing both observational and experimental techniques, we have come to distinguish three types of (...) reciprocity. Symmetry-based reciprocity is cognitively the least complex form, based on symmetries inherent in dyadic relationships (e.g., mutual association, kinship). Attitudinal reciprocity, which is more cognitively complex, is based on the mirroring of social attitudes between partners and is exhibited by both capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees. Finally, calculated reciprocity, the most cognitively advanced form, is based on mental scorekeeping and is found only in humans and possibly chimpanzees. (shrink)

To what degree has biology influenced and shaped the development of moral systems? One way to determine the extent to which human moral systems might be the product of natural selection is to explore behaviour in other species that is analogous and perhaps homologous to our own. Many non-human primates, for example, have similar methods to humans for resolving, managing, and preventing conflicts of interests within their groups. Such methods, which include reciprocity and food sharing, reconciliation, consolation, conflict intervention, and (...) mediation, are the very building blocks of moral systems in that they are based on and facilitate cohesion among individuals and reflect a concerted effort by community members to find shared solutions to social conflict. Furthermore, these methods of resource distribution and conflict resolution often require or make use of capacities for empathy, sympathy, and sometimes even community concern. Non-human primates in societies in which such mechanisms are present may not be exactly moral beings, but they do show signs of a sense of social regularity that -- just like the norms and rules underlying human moral conduct -- promotes a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi. (shrink)

Morality is often defined in opposition to the natural "instincts," or as a tool to keep those instincts in check. New findings in neuroscience, social psychology, animal behaviour, and anthropology have brought us back to the original Darwinian position that moral behaviour is continuous with the social behavior of animals, and most likely evolved to enhance the cooperativeness of society. In this view, morality is part of human nature rather than its opposite. This interdisciplinary volume debates the origin and working (...) of human morality within the context of science as well as religion and philosophy. Experts from widely different backgrounds speculate how morality may have evolved, how it develops in the child, and what science can tell us about its working and origin. They also discuss how to deal with the age-old facts-versus-values debate, also known as the naturalistic fallacy. The implications of this exchange are enormous, as they may transform cherished views on if and why we are the only moral species. (shrink)

Cooperative animals often find themselves in situations in which they need to monitor and compare pay-offs received from joint ventures. They can compare their pay-offs with a) the history of giving to and receiving from the same partner , b) the effort they put into the venture , or c) what others are getting . There is ample observational evidence that monkeys and apes follow rules of social reciprocity. There is also evidence for market effects of supply and demand . (...) In a series of experiments we have further shown that monkeys show payment for labor and reject income inequality. The latter finding, first reported by Brosnan & de Waal , is directly relevant to the origin of the human sense of fairness. I will discuss how the two relate. (shrink)

Cooperative animals often find themselves in situations in which they need to monitor and compare pay-offs received from joint ventures. They can compare their pay-offs with a) the history of giving to and receiving from the same partner, b) the effort they put into the venture, or c) what others are getting. There is ample observational evidence that monkeys and apes follow rules of social reciprocity. There is also evidence for market effects of supply and demand. In a series of (...) experiments we have further shown that monkeys show payment for labor and reject income inequality. The latter finding, first reported by Brosnan & de Waal, is directly relevant to the origin of the human sense of fairness. I will discuss how the two relate. (shrink)

Henrich et al. describe an innovative research program investigating cross-cultural differences in the selfishness axiom (in economic games) in humans, yet humans are not the only species to show such variation. Chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys show signs of deviating from the standard self-interest paradigm in experimental settings by refusing to take foods that are less valuable than those earned by conspecifics, indicating that they, too, may pay attention to relative gains. However, it is less clear whether these species also show (...) the other-regarding preferences seen in humans. (shrink)

This paper is unusual for this journal because most readers do not deal professionally with animals. Information from primatology, however, is relevant to consideration of violence between people. I will focus mainly on aggression and peacemaking among nonhuman primates, but will address related topics as well. I do not use the term “aggression” to refer only to violent behavior, but to any overt conflict between individuals. Although I am a professor of psychology, I am a biologist by training. When I (...) was a student many years ago, the major scholarly work on this topic was Konrad Lorenz’s On Aggression. It set into motion contemporary research on aggression from a biological perspective by making the controversial claim that aggression is an instinct not only in animals, but also in human beings. My own research and that of others suggests a slightly different view, namely, that aggression between individuals is a last resort when conflict resolution fails. (shrink)

We cannot solve questions about imitative learning without knowing what motivates animals to copy others. Imitative capacities can be expected to be most pronounced in relation to situations and models of great social significance. Experimental research on nonhuman primates has thus far made little effort to present such situations and models.

Only a broad theory that looks across levels of analysis can encompass the many perspectives on the phenomenon of empathy. We address the major points of our commentators by emphasizing that the basic perception-action process, while automatic, is subject to control and modulation, and is greatly affected by experience and context because of the role of representations. The model can explain why empathy seems phenomenologically more effortful than reflexive, and why there are different levels of empathy across individuals, ages, and (...) species. (shrink)

To what degree has biology influenced and shaped the development of moral systems? One way to determine the extent to which human moral systems might be the product of natural selection is to explore behaviour in other species that is analogous and perhaps homologous to our own. Many non-human primates, for example, have similar methods to humans for resolving, managing, and preventing conflicts of interests within their groups. Such methods, which include reciprocity and food sharing, reconciliation, consolation, conflict intervention, and (...) mediation, are the very building blocks of moral systems in that they are based on and facilitate cohesion among individuals and reflect a concerted effort by community members to find shared solutions to social conflict. Furthermore, these methods of resource distribution and conflict resolution often require or make use of capacities for empathy, sympathy, and sometimes even community concern. Non-human primates in societies in which such mechanisms are present may not be exactly moral beings, but they do show signs of a sense of social regularity that—just like the norms and rules underlying human moral conduct—promotes a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi. (shrink)

Tomasello et al. propose that shared intentionality is a uniquely human ability. In light of this, we discuss several cultural behaviors that seem to result from a motivation to share experiences with others, suggest evidence for coordination and collaboration among chimpanzees, and cite recent findings that counter the argument that the predominance of emulation in chimpanzees reflects a deficit in intention reading.

A dicussion between Frans de Waal and Evan Thompson with Jim Proctor as interviewer.

Resenha de Frans de Waal. The Age of Empathy: Nature's Lessons for a Kinder Society. London: Souvenir Press, Paperback Edition, 2011.

Locke's, Berkeley's and Peirce's conceptions of reality are analyzed, using Peirce's distinction between nominalism and realism as a guideline. These three authors are chosen, first, because Peirce declares for realism in his 1871 review of Berkeley, and does so in opposition to both Berkeley and Locke, and, second, because Peirce's criticism of nominalism runs roughly parallel to Berkeley's criticism of Locke. It is shown that all three conceptions of reality are hypotheses, which provides the criteria to compare and evaluate them: (...) the hypothesis must be either required, or at least valuable, for explaining the origin and regularities of those ideas that are not of our own making. This leads to the following result: Locke's conception of reality also fails on both counts. Berkeley's alternative, though also not required, is explanatorily valuable, but as it appears, this results entirely from a strong presupposition that does all the explaining for him. It is further shown that his approach is based on a denial of matter that is untenable, and that it ultimately fails for the same reasons as Locke's. Peirce' s view of reality as the object of a final opinion, though not required either, can be defended as being explanatorily valuable, but needs some modification, since some things will be real but not part of the final opinion. This leads to a new conception of reality, called the hypothesis of hypothetical realism, by way of a conclusion. This hypothesis has the desired explanatory value, and is safe from the criticisms raised against the previous conceptions. (shrink)

This paper explores Berkeley's denial of matter in the light of criticisms voiced by Charles S. Peirce, who wrote two extensive review essays, one in 1871 and one in 1901, on the Fraser editions of Berkeley's Works. Elaborating upon Peirce's criticisms and utilizing Peirce's semiotics and pragmatism (two doctrines for which Peirce gives partial credit to Berkeley), it is shown that Berkeley's argument against matter is inconclusive, that the hypothesis of matter can be made to fit within Berkeley's thought, and (...) that doing so need not undermine the latter's esse is percipi doctrine. (shrink)

In this article I trace some of the main tenets of the struggle between nominalism and realism as identified by John Deely in his Four ages of understanding. The aim is to assess Deely’s claim that the Age of Modernity was nominalist and that the coming age, the Age of Postmodernism — which he portrays as a renaissance of the late middle ages and as starting with Peirce — is realist. After a general overview of how Peirce interpreted the nominalist-realist (...) controversy, Deely gives special attention to Thomas Aquinas’s On being and essence and the realism it entails. A subsequent discussion of the Modern Period shows that the issue of nominalism and realism is very much tied up with di¤erent conceptions of the intellect. Deely credits the theory of evolution with bringing us a conception of the intellect that is closer to that of the Middle Ages and that opens the way for a truly realistic ‘‘fourth age’’ of the understanding. (shrink)

Não obstante as críticas de Giambattista Vico ao pensamento de Espinosa, é possível estabelecer uma relação de proximidade entre os dois. Se as críticas distanciam, o interesse histórico-filológico aproxima. Com efeito, para o estabelecimento de certa convergência entre os propósitos filosóficos dos dois autores, elencam-se os seguintes pressupostos: _i)_ tanto na _Ciência Nova_, quanto no _Tratado Teológico-Político_, a _filologia_ não é apenas conhecimento textual das línguas, porém via de acesso à história de um povo, pois guarda as mutações temporais da (...) vida civil e a memória do mundo de sentido no qual se gesta; _ii)_ a língua não é uma criação do rigor do entendimento, isto é, não é criação dos filósofos, mas da imaginação, portanto do _vulgo_. Desse modo, toda via de acesso ao conhecimento do passado passa inevitavelmente pela potência da _imaginação-fantasia_: questão que interpela Espinosa na _história dos hebreus_ e Vico na _natureza comum das nações_. (shrink)

As a continuation of our studies regarding the use of rhetoric in the thought of Thomas Hobbes, the present study deals with the relation between eloquence, passions and rebellion in The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic. Thus, it is explained how the leaders of sedition and rebellion are necessarily, according to Hobbes, “eloquent men”. The aim is not only to separate the rhetorical tradition from the foundation of political sciences, but also to point out the supposed damages caused by (...) orators in civil life. Therefore, the conflicting and often contradictory relation between demonstration and persuasion in the politics of the 17th century is questioned, as well as the binding and constitutive role of passions. (shrink)

The first part of this work starts with a passage of Machiavelli to show that the defense of a certain“realism” in the constitution of political philosophy does not excludeimagination. The defense of the efective truth of things against the imaginedrepublics has as an effect the affirmation that politics cannot operatewithout images: either the politician or the political thinker should notdisregard the imagination. Therefore, the importance of an attentivelook on what is inherent to imagination: the ability to create images. Inthis sense, (...) Hobbes appears as the heir of a tradition that unfolds in twothemes: his relation with the rhetorical tradition; the readers of Machiavelli. (shrink)

This essay draws on Adam Smith’s moral sentimentalism to critique primatologist Frans de Waal’s gradualist theory of human morality. De Waal has spent his career arguing for continuity between primate behavior and human morality, proposing that empathy is a primary moral building block evident in primate behavior. Smith’s moral sentimentalism—with its emphasis on the role of sympathy in moral virtue—provides the philosophical framework for de Waal’s understanding of morality. Smith’s notion of sympathy and the imagination involved (...) in sympathy is qualitatively different from animal sympathy. I argue that Smithian sympathy includes the ability to represent propositional attitudes and take into account multiple perspectives which are then synthesized into a singular impartial perspective. Furthermore, Smithian moral judgment requires the capacity for emotion regulation and moral self-cultivation, or the ability to shape and control one’s reactive attitudes. Taken together, these capacities far outstrip the capacities of animals, disrupting de Waal’s gradualism. (shrink)

Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, is a hugely important and influential thinker in the history of American philosophy. His philosophical interests were broad and he made significant contributions in several different areas of thought. Moreover, his contributions are intimately connected and his philosophy designed to form a coherent and systematic whole. Contents: 1: Life and Work; Chapter 2: Logic; Chapter 3: The Doctrine of the Categories; Chapter 4: Semiotics; Chapter 5: Philosophy of Science; Chapter 6: Pragmatism but Not (...) Practicalism; Chapter 7: A Pragmatist Theory of Truth; Chapter 8: The Perpetual Fight against Nominalism; Chapter 9: The Impact of Darwin; Chapter 10: Mathematics; Chapter 11: Mind and Self; Chapter 12 (Conclusion): The Architectonic Philosopher; Bibliography; Notes; Index. (shrink)

Charles Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science is an early work in the philosophy of science and the official birthplace of pragmatism. It contains Peirce’s two most influential papers: “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” as well as discussions on the theory of probability, the ground of induction, the relation between science and religion, and the logic of abduction. Unsatisfied with the result and driven by a constant, almost feverish urge to improve his work, (...) Peirce spent considerable time and effort revising these papers. After the turn of the century these efforts gained significant momentum when Peirce sought to establish his role in the development of pragmatism while distancing himself from the more popular versions that had become current. The present edition brings together the original series as it appeared in Popular Science Monthly and a selection of Peirce’s later revisions, many of which remained hidden in the mass of messy manuscripts that were left behind after his death in 1914. (shrink)

This brief text assists students in understanding Peirce's philosophy and thinking so they can more fully engage in useful, intelligent class dialogue and improve their understanding of course content. Part of the Wadsworth Notes Series, (which will eventually consist of approximately 100 titles, each focusing on a single "thinker" from ancient times to the present), On Peirce is written by a philosopher deeply versed in the philosophy of this key thinker. Like other books in the series, this concise book offers (...) sufficient insight into the thinking of a notable philosopher, better enabling students to engage in reading and to discuss the material in class and on paper. (shrink)

Medical research involving human subjects can be risky and burdensome. Therefore, such research must be reviewed and approved by a Research Ethics Committee (REC). To guarantee the safety of the subjects, it is very important that these studies be conducted in accordance with the approved protocol. An important issue in this respect is whether studies include the requisite number of subjects based on the research question. The research question is unlikely to be answered reliably if the requisite number of subjects (...) is not met. In such cases, subjects are exposed to unnecessary risks and burdens. In this descriptive study, the authors evaluated how frequently studies are completed with the required number of subjects. Moreover, the authors identified the characteristics of research that does and does not include the required number of subjects. The results of this study show that a considerable proportion of studies (41/107) were terminated although they failed to recruit a sufficient number of subjects. Furthermore, the authors found that investigator-initiated studies have significantly (p=0.028) more problems in recruiting the requisite number of subjects than studies initiated by pharmaceutical companies. Potential solutions are discussed to reduce the number of studies that do not include a sufficient number of subjects. (shrink)