'Gemeinwohl" (Common Good) galt über lange Zeit als eine Schlüsselkategorie christlicher Sozialethik. Diese Selbstverständlichkeit ist einem selbstkritischen Sozialkatholizismus sowohl in der Theorie als auch im politisch-ethischen Praxisbezug abhandengekommen. Ist der Appell an die Gemeinwohlverpflichtung mehr als ein diffuses und hilfloses Postulat? Lässt sich, zumal unter den Bedingungen globaler Verflechtungen und Abhängigkeiten, mit dieser Kategorie sozial-ethische Relevanz erzeugen? Wie verhält sich die Vorstellung einer sozialen Ganzheit zu der Pluralität von Vorstellungen des guten Lebens und zu der Vielheit von Interessen? Was legitimiert (...) und welche Akteure tragen eine soziale Ordnung? Wie verhält sich eine Theorie des Gemeinwohls zu Theorien öffentlicher Güter (Commons),,angesichts internationaler Herausforderungen wie Migration, Klimapolitik, Welthandel oder Finanzmarktregulierung'' Die Beiträge des Bandes gehen zurück auf die Jahrestagung 2019 der,,Arbeitsgemeinschaft Christliche Sozialethik'', die der Frage nach dem,,globalen Gemeinwohl" gewidmet war."-- Back cover. (shrink)

While Kantian constructivism has become one of the most influential and systematic schools of thought in analytic moral and political philosophy, Hegelian approaches to practical normativity hold out the promise of building upon Kantian insights into individual self-determination while avoiding their dualistic tendencies. James Gledhill and Sebastian Stein unite distinguished scholars of German idealism and contemporary Anglophone practical philosophy with rising stars in the field, to explore whether Hegelian idealist philosophy can offer the categories that analytic practical philosophy (...) requires to overcome the contradictions that have so far plagued Kantian constructivism. The volume organizes the contributions into three parts. The first of these engages debates in metaethics regarding the relationship between realism and constructivism. The second part sees contributors draw on debates about the nature of political normativity, focusing primarily on the problems of historical contextualism, relativism, and critical reflection. The concluding part considers the application of the Hegelian framework to contemporary debates about specific ethical issues, including multiculturalism, democracy, and human rights. Hegel and Contemporary Practical Philosophycontributes to the on-going debate about the importance of systematic philosophy in the context of practical philosophy, engages with contemporary discussions about the shape of a rational social order, and gauges the timeliness of Hegelian philosophy. This book is a must read for scholars interested in Hegel and in the contemporary tradition of Kantian constructivism in moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

Readers of the Phenomenology face an abundance of different philosophical presuppositions, research strategies and hermeneutic efforts.To enable better orientation within the interpretative landscape, this volume summarizes, contextualizes and critically comments on contemporary Phenomenology scholarship.

Hegel's account of ethical life can be shown to contradict Aristotle's in two main ways: first, Hegel follows Kant in emancipating virtue/duty from the particularity associated with the content of motivational drives and with Aristotle's eudaimonia. Hegel thus rejects Aristotelian happiness as the final end of rational action and prioritizes duty. However, against Kant, Hegel unites abstract duty and determined drives within a speculative notion of ethical duty: rational agents find happiness in heeding duty's call. Second, Hegel follows Kant in (...) emancipating agency's subjective dimension from the all-encompassing determinacy of Aristotelian substance metaphysics. At the same time and against Kant, Hegel unifies agency's undetermined, subjective dimension with the determinacy of objective norms and habitual praxis: ethical praxis must be animated by undetermined subjectivity whilst being determined. In both cases, Hegel goes beyond Aristotle by resting his argument on the speculative structure of ‘the concept of the will’. (shrink)

Hegel's absolute idealism has proven to be one of the most controversial philosophical positions to characterize. The most abstract categories of essence are what Hegel calls the determinations of reflection, i.e. identity, difference and ground. Continuing his analysis of the determinations of essence, Hegel then discusses the notions of subsistence, relation and the whole and its parts and arrives at essence's determinations of “inner” and outer: the “inner” functions as ground of appearance and opposes the externality of reflection‐into‐other. In actuality, (...) there is no difference between ground and existence, between existence and essence: actuality is what it is, its existence is its essence, its essence its existence. Hegel sets out to show that the ultimate description of truth ‐ i.e. the concept ‐ creates, undermines, incorporates, and improves on any other relevant definition of truth. To achieve this, Hegel divides the Logic's description of metaphysical truth into three parts: Being, Essence, and the Concept. (shrink)

Despite his commitment to universal explicability, a case can be made that Hegel is better labelled an idealist than a naturalist. As an analysis of his three syllogisms of philosophy reveals, he strictly differentiates between the domains of nature and Geist, suggesting in sequence that Geist replaces nature, Geist comprehends nature and that Geist and nature are comprehended as forms of the metaphysical idea and determine and mediate each other. Since Hegel grounds his accounts of the metaphysical idea and its (...) forms nature and Geist in concept-metaphysics and these include a supernatural notion of undetermined, self-positing universality, Hegel’s entire ontological edifice is ultimately supernatural. This stands in stark contrast to the metaphysics of naturalism, which are based on categories Hegel associates with the logics of being and essence or which fail to sufficiently emancipate universality from its immediate connection to particularity. (shrink)

Hegel’s account of rational willing has recently been misrepresented by both critics and supporters who argue that the content of willing is externally received from history, social context, practices of recognition, etc. This contradicts the conceptual structure of Hegel’s notion of rational action as free individuality, according to which the difference between the willing subject and the content of willing is an internal relation of identity. Since this ‘difference within identity’ can only be grasped by speculative thinking and not through (...) understanding and reflection, the interpreters can be charged with employing the wrong method. Although reliance on the speculative method opens Hegel to the charge of unintelligibility, it helps explain the frequent misrepresentations of his account of freedom and why methodologically uninformed comparisons between Hegel and other thinkers run the risk of being counterproductive. (shrink)

This book discusses the most comprehensive of Hegel's works: his long-neglected Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline. It contains original essays by internationally renowned and emerging voices in Hegel scholarship. Their contributions elucidate fundamental aspects of Hegel's encyclopedic system with an eye to its contemporary relevance. The book thus addresses system-level claims about Hegel's unique conceptions of philosophy, philosophical "science" and its method, dialectic, speculative thinking, and the way they relate to both Hegelian and contemporary notions of nature, history, (...) religion, freedom, and cultural praxis. (shrink)

Hegel regarded his Enyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences as the work which most fully presented the scope of his philosophical system and its method. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that scholars regularly accord it only a secondary status. This Critical Guide seeks to change that, with sixteen newly-written essays from an international group of leading Hegel scholars that shed much-needed light on both the whole and the parts of the Encyclopedia system. Topics include the structure and aim of the Encyclopedia (...) system as a whole, the differences between the greater and lesser Logics, the role of nature in Hegel's thinking, and the shapes of absolute spirit as art, religion, and philosophy. This book will be invaluable to students and scholars with an interest in Hegel and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Ensuring the trustworthiness of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence is an important interdisciplinary endeavour. In this position paper, we argue that this endeavour will benefit from technical advancements in capturing various forms of responsibility, and we present a comprehensive research agenda to achieve this. In particular, we argue that ensuring the reliability of autonomous system can take advantage of technical approaches for quantifying degrees of responsibility and for coordinating tasks based on that. Moreover, we deem that, in certifying the legality (...) of an AI system, formal and computationally implementable notions of _responsibility_, _blame_, _accountability_, and _liability_ are applicable for addressing potential responsibility gaps (i.e. situations in which a group is responsible, but individuals’ responsibility may be unclear). This is a call to enable AI systems themselves, as well as those involved in the design, monitoring, and governance of AI systems, to represent and reason about who can be seen as responsible in prospect (e.g. for completing a task in future) and who can be seen as responsible retrospectively (e.g. for a failure that has already occurred). To that end, in this work, we show that across all stages of the design, development, and deployment of trustworthy autonomous systems (TAS), responsibility reasoning should play a key role. This position paper is the first step towards establishing a road map and research agenda on how the notion of responsibility can provide novel solution concepts for ensuring the _reliability_ and _legality_ of TAS and, as a result, enables an effective embedding of AI technologies into society. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Die Naturphilosophie und die Politische Philosophie werden gemeinhin als Disziplinen aufgefasst, die grundlegend verschiedene Problembereiche zum Gegenstand haben. Die Aporien zu überwinden, welche daraus resultieren, ist die Pointe von Plessners Philosophischer Anthropologie. In dieser Studie wird gezeigt, wie Plessner in der Aneignung elementarer Topoi der klassischen Ontologie eine strukturell neuartige "Ontologie des Organischen" entwickelt. Dieser von Plessner beiläufig verwendete Ausdruck wird in dieser Studie systematisch entwickelt. Was dabei elaboriert wird, ist eine komplexe naturphilosophische "Ontologie des Ausgleichs". In dieser Ontologie des (...) Ausgleichs werden elementare naturphilosophische Ausgleichsleistungen expliziert, die als solche einen Doppelsinn haben: was auf der organismischen Ebene strukturell als Ausgleich des organischen Körpers mit sich selbst und der Umwelt expliziert wird, nimmt im menschlichen Bereich die Gestalt einer Ontologie der Personen an, wo die strukturell identische Ausgleichsleistung als das Spiel der Personalisierung zu vollziehen ist. Plessners Ansatz wird hier als ein auf diese Fragen neuartig antwortender, gleichberechtigt als ontologischer und sozialphilosophischer Ansatz expliziert. (shrink)

This edited volume examines women's voices in phenomenology, many of which had a formative impact on the movement but have be kept relatively silent for many years. It features papers that truly extend the canonical scope of phenomenological research. Readers will discover the rich philosophical output of such scholars as Edith Stein, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and Gerda Walther. They will also come to see how the phenomenological movement allowed its female proponents to achieve a position in the academic world few (...) women could enjoy at the time. The book explores the intersection of social ontology, phenomenology, and women scholars in phenomenology. The papers offer a fresh look at such topics as the nature of communities, shared values, feelings, and other mental content. In addition, coverage examines the contributions of Jewish women to the science, who were present at the beginning of the phenomenological movement. This remarkable anthology also features a paper on Gerda Walther written by Linda Lopez McAlister, former editor of the feminist journal Hypatia, who had met Walther in 1976. This book features work from the conference “Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology,” held at the University of Paderborn. Overall, it collects profiles and analysis that unveil a hidden history of phenomenology. (shrink)

Review of Ivan Boldyrev and Sebastian Stein (eds). Interpreting Hegel's Phenomenology: Expositions and Critique of Contemporary Readings.

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 862-865, June 2022.

Originally published: New York: Random House, 1972.

'Everyone knows what attention is’ according to William James. Much work on attention in psychology and neuroscience cites this famous phrase only to quickly dismiss it. But James is right about this: ‘attention’ was not introduced into psychology and neuroscience as a theoretical concept. I argue that we should therefore study attention with broadly the same methodology that David Marr has applied to the study of perception. By focusing more on Marr's Computational Level of analysis, we arrive at a unified (...) answer to the question of what attention is, what role it plays in the mind, and why organisms like us have that capacity. I propose a methodology for studying attention at Marr's Computational Level that optimizes in a three-dimensional space: it should capture core aspects of our first-person experience of attention, be explanatorily powerful in psychology and neuroscience, and fertile in an interdisciplinary context. I show how this methodology leads to what I call the priority structure account of attention. Attention is what organizes current information to make it more useful for the organism. We can identify it by four features. Attention, in this way, helps a cognitive system to integrate its informational state with its current motivational state. I describe how this account improves on alternatives and shows why attention is a useful concept in many disciplines and for connecting them. -/- This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science. (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...) to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states ; or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons. I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go. (shrink)

One objection that has been raised for meta-ethical expressivism is that expressivists must give an account of the nature of the attitude which constitutes moral thinking, but that any expressivist account that attempts to do seems to fail. Call this objection the “moral attitude problem.” In this article I suggest a strategy for expressivists to escape this problem: I argue that the moral attitude problem is a problem that arises not only for expressivists but also for meta-ethical cognitivists, and that (...) expressivists can use the same resources used by cognitivists to escape this problem. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

According to ordinary language philosophy (OLP), philosophical problems can be solved by investigating ordinary language, often because the problems stem from its misuse. According to ideal language philosophy (ILP), on the other hand, philosophical problems exist because ordinary language is flawed and has to be improved or replaced by constructed languages that do not exhibit these flaws. OLP and ILP together make up linguistic philosophy, the view that philosophical problems are problems of language. Linguistic philosophy is opposed to what may (...) be called, for lack of a better word, ‘traditional philosophy’ (TP), the view that philosophical problems can be solved by discovering non-linguistic facts. In the following, OLP, ILP, and TP are taken to be methodologies, that is, frameworks in which to interpret and evaluate different philosophical methods (i.e., argumentative strategies). The two linguistic methodologies are discussed separately with TP as a foil, and then used to interpret the status of different philosophical methods. While each of the methods discussed here finds a plausible interpretation in each methodology, there are other arguments for and against linguistic philosophy in general, and for and against ILP and OLP in particular. As none of these arguments is decisive, I conclude with a superficial moral about peaceful co-existence. (shrink)