The paper first analyzes some relevant passages from Kant’s essay On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns and his understanding of the right of necessity in the Metaphysics of Morals and in the essay On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory But It Won’t Work in Practice, in order to reflect on the more general question of whether it is possible from the Kantian point of view to allow legitimate exceptions to the moral principle. (...) It then focuses on some aspects of Hegel’s theory of action in the Outlines of the Philosophy of Right to emphasize his attention to the context and consequences of action and then show how Hegel addresses or would address the same problems related to responsibility in cases of exception from the commonly valid and accepted moral and legal norm. This will bring to light two different perspectives with respect to how to ground responsibility, which still provide important insights today. (shrink)

Vittorio Hösle is internationally highly regarded for his attempt to revive objective idealism – the philosophical line along which he situates the positions of Plato, Aristotle, most medieval philosophers, Spinoza, Leibniz, Schelling, Hegel, but also Peirce and Whitehead – as a philosophical system capable of holding together the transcendental dimension of synthetic a priori judgments with the intelligibility and objectivity of being. In this interview, he discusses his work over the past decades, starting from the “Philosophische Lehrjahre” (“years of philosophical (...) apprenticeship”) between Regensburg, Tübingen, Bochum and Freiburg and from the meetings with masters and significant interlocutors (such as Tóth, Thieme, Wandschneider, Beierwaldes, Lohr, Böckenförde, without forgetting Apel and Jonas). Multiple themes dot the path of thought retraced in this dialogue: from the rethematization of Hegel’s (and Vico’s) objective idealism through transcendental pragmatics to the delineation of the relationship between ethics and politics via a theory of the social and the intent of a normative foundation; from the need for a thought that faces the ecological crisis to the reinterpretation of sociobiology; and finally, from the project of an intersubjectively valid understanding to the importance of a theory of comedy. What emerges is the philosophical self-portrait of a cosmopolitan intellectual who was able to grasp the best from inherited and acquired cultural traditions: German culture, inherited from his father; Italian culture, inherited from his mother; and American culture, acquired by moving to the USA. The interview was realised on 17 April 2024 at the University of Trento, as part of the second series of lectures “Voices from Contemporary Philosophy”. (shrink)

Karl Heinrich Gros nunca ha sido considerado hasta ahora como una posible fuente en el desarrollo de la teoría de la imputación y la acción de Hegel. Este trabajo demuestra la influencia de su ensayo Über die Ideen der Alten vom Schicksal (1795) en la comprensión de Hegel de la dialéctica entre imputación, destino y castigo con especial referencia a la historia de Edipo. Tras presentar a Gros y su papel en el siglo XVIII en Alemania y después de reconstruir (...) los principales argumentos de su ensayo (1.), la segunda parte del trabajo se centra en la comprensión de Hegel del Edipo Rey, subrayando las diferencias y similitudes con la lectura de Gros (2). Esto mostrará su relevancia dentro del proyecto más amplio de la teoría de la imputación de Hegel en su Filosofía del Derecho. (shrink)

Responsibility is a central juridical, moral and social concept that calls on individuals to act in ways that are necessary and morally right. It represents a fundamental normative relationship that bridges abstract philosophical ideas with empirical social realities. Despite its everyday importance, the derivation and application of responsibility are complex and often contested. This article explores the meaning and conditions under which responsibility can be justifiably demanded, as well as its practical enforceability. Responsibility is understood as a normative relationship with (...) both moral and legal dimensions, constructed through social interactions. A responsible practice requires intersubjective agreement on the reasons and motives for actions, enabling the formulation and implementation of ethical justifications. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 862-865, June 2022.