In this book, F.M. Cornford explains why the life and work of Socrates stand out as marking a turning-point in the history of thought. He shows how Socrates revolutionized the concept of philosophy, converting it from the study of Nature to the study of the human soul, the meaning of right and wrong, and the ends for which we ought to live. This is, in fact, the story of the whole creative period of Greek philosophy - the Ionian nature of (...) science before Socrates, Socrates himself, and his chief followers, Plato and his pupil Aristotle. It tells of the different contributions each made, and shows how within three centuries the Greek tradition grew to maturity and the fullness of intellectual power. (shrink)

A reprint of the Routledge edition of 1935.

As new information and communication technologies (ICTs) are being applied in healthcare, the most obvious and seemingly the only questions to ask would be if they are clinically effective and if they deliver positive outcomes for patients. In the medical tradition, outcomes are usually assessed in randomized controlled trials (RCTs) through clear and well-understood criteria of safety and clinical effectiveness. These seem to be suitable and fully adequate for evaluating drugs. (Although, of course, drug prescribing is more complex and includes, (...) among others, economic considerations.) But are these criteria useful or sufficient when applied to the evaluation of ICTs in healthcare? In this paper we argue that they are not. ICT-related applications are complex and diverse and require a different and more encompassing approach to evaluation. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Original and engaging, this exploration of early Western philosophy traces the religious roots of science and systematic speculation. Author F. M. Cornford, a distinguished historian of ancient philosophy, combines deep classical scholarship with anthropological and sociological insights to examine the mythic precursors of enduring metaphysical concepts--such as destiny, God, the soul, substance, nature, and immortality. Cornford illustrates the rise of a new spirit of rational inquiry from traditional beliefs, demonstrating that philosophy’s modes of clear definition and explicit statement were already (...) implicit in the unreasoned intuitions of mythology. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Combining profound classical scholarship with striking anthropological and sociological insight, Cornford rejected the post-Darwinian rationalist assumption ...

“Principium Sapientiae. Los orígenes del pensamiento filosófico griego” fue publicado póstumamente en 1952 y estaba prácticamente acabado, a salvo de algunos aspectos de los capítulos finales, cuando a Cornford le sobrevino la muerte. La edición ha sido preparada por W. K. C. Guthrie, que ha añadido una breve introducción y un apéndice. “Principium Sapientiae” ofrece una perspectiva general sobre el pensamiento de su autor a la vez que añade material nuevo a los trabajos anteriores. Hoy es ya una obra clásica.

Orthodox thought holds that criminalisation should be subject to a wrongness constraint: that is, that conduct may be criminalised only if it is wrongful. This article argues that this principle is false, at least as it is usually understood. On the one hand, the wrongness constraint seems to rest on solid foundations. To criminalise conduct is to facilitate its condemnation and punishment; to coerce citizens against it; and to portray it as wrongful. All of these actions are presumptively impermissible when (...) the conduct that they target is not wrongful. On the other hand, the article argues that the wrongness constraint is nevertheless unsound. Although it is presumptively impermissible to criminalise non-wrongful conduct, this might yet be permissible, given sufficient countervailing reasons. Moreover, there are realistic cases – specifically, some cases of over-inclusive criminalisation – in which such countervailing reasons exist. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The object of this paper is to show that, in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., two different and radically opposed systems of thought were elaborated within the Pythagorean school. They may be called respectively the mystical system and the scientific. All current accounts of Pythagoreanism known to me attempt to combine the traits of both systems in one composite picture, which naturally fails to hold together. The confusion goes back to Aristotle, who usually speaks indiscriminately of ‘the Pythagoreans,’ though (...) now and then the phrase ‘some Pythagoreans’ indicates that he was aware of different currents within the school. (shrink)

Zeller argued that the ‘innumerable worlds’ mentioned in accounts of Anaximander's system must be an endless succession of single worlds, not an unlimited number of coexistent worlds scattered through infinite space, some always coming into being while others are passing away. Zeller pointed out that a succession of single worlds is grounded in the principles of the system. ‘Things perish into that from which they had their birth… according to the order of Time,’ a cycle of birth, existence, and destruction. (...) A world ends, and the living divine stuff begets a new world to take its place. On the other hand, there is much in the system to contradict the idea of coexistent worlds. Anaximander's successors, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes, show that this idea is not a necessary consequence of the unlimitedness of the original world-stuff. Nothing in the appearances of Nature suggests it. Anaximander is a monistic hylozoist, whereas Democritus is a pluralist with his innumerable independent atoms producing, by similar processes, independent world-systems in different parts of an infinite void. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to show that, in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., two different and radically opposed systems of thought were elaborated within the Pythagorean school. They may be called respectively the mystical system and the scientific. All current accounts of Pythagoreanism known to me attempt to combine the traits of both systems in one composite picture, which naturally fails to hold together. The confusion goes back to Aristotle, who usually speaks indiscriminately of ‘the Pythagoreans,’ though (...) now and then the phrase ‘some Pythagoreans’ indicates that he was aware of different currents within the school. (shrink)

Zeller argued that the ‘innumerable worlds’ mentioned in accounts of Anaximander's system must be an endless succession of single worlds, not an unlimited number of coexistent worlds scattered through infinite space, some always coming into being while others are passing away. Zeller pointed out that a succession of single worlds is grounded in the principles of the system. ‘Things perish into that from which they had their birth… according to the order of Time,’ a cycle of birth, existence, and destruction. (...) A world ends, and the living divine stuff begets a new world to take its place. On the other hand, there is much in the system to contradict the idea of coexistent worlds. Anaximander's successors, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes, show that this idea is not a necessary consequence of the unlimitedness of the original world-stuff. Nothing in the appearances of Nature suggests it. Anaximander is a monistic hylozoist, whereas Democritus is a pluralist with his innumerable independent atoms producing, by similar processes, independent world-systems in different parts of an infinite void. (shrink)

We can now approach the interpretation of the famous symbol called the Tetractys or Tetrad, which is a compendium of Pythagorean mysticism. The tetractys is itself a system of numbers. It symbolizes the ‘elements of number,’ which are the elements of all things. It contains the concordant ratios of the musical harmony. It might well be described in the Pythagorean oath as ‘containing the root and fountain of everflowing Nature.’ In one of the acousmata preserved in Iamblichus it is identified (...) with the cosmic harmony. It was also called κσμος, ορανς, πν. Theon says it was held in honour because it contained the nature of the universe. (shrink)

Anaxagoras’ theory of matter offers a problem which, in bald outline, may be stated as follows. The theory rests on two propositions which seem flatly to contradict one another. One is the principle of Homoeomereity: A natural substance such as a piece of gold, consists solely of parts which are like the whole and like one another—every one of them gold and nothing else. The other is: ‘There is a portion of everything in everything’, understood to mean that a piece (...) of gold , so far from containing nothing but gold, contains portions of every other substance in the world. Unless Anaxagoras was extremely muddleheaded, he cannot have propounded a theory which simply consists of this contradiction. One or the other proposition must be reinterpreted so as to bring them into harmony. Some critics attack one, some the other; some try to modify both. Mr. C. Bailey has recently published a fresh attempt to reconstruct the theory in a form consistent with itself. But the result, as he admits, is arbitrary and uneconomical. These defects, like all the contradictions and obscurities found in other accounts of the system, can be traced to the second proposition: ‘There is a portion of everything in everything’, or rather to the construction put upon it. The language is crude, vague, and ambiguous. What does ‘everything’ mean? Has the first ‘everything’ the same sense as the second ? If taken to mean that there is a portion of every material substance in every material substance, the proposition leads to a result for which ‘uneconomical’ is an indulgent epithet. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to determine the relations between the two parts of Parmenides' poem: the Way of Truth, which deduces the necessary properties of a One Being, and the False Way, which contains a cosmogony based on ‘what seems to mortals, in which there is no true belief.’.

This paper considers the justifiability of criminalising anti-social behaviour through two-step prohibitions such as the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO). The UK government has recently proposed to abolish and replace the ASBO; however, the proposed new orders would retain many of its most controversial features. The paper begins by criticising the definition of anti-social behaviour employed in both the current legislation and the new proposals. This definition is objectionable because it makes criminalisation contingent upon the irrational judgements of (putative) victims, and (...) its often modest preventive benefits come at a high cost to citizens’ liberty and autonomy. The paper then goes on to propose a new definition of anti-social behaviour that would meet these objections: that is, as a course of conduct that causes others to experience serious and justifiable anxiety about the safety of their local community. Whilst this definition identifies a serious form of wrongdoing, its precise scope is inevitably uncertain. The paper thus concludes that we have good reason to use two-step prohibitions such as the ASBO to regulate such conduct, so as to enable the use of the criminal law against it whilst minimising possible concerns of legality arising from the proposed definition’s uncertain scope. (shrink)

The earlier part of this paper yielded the result that the assertion ‘A portion of everything in everything’ has no place or function in the explanation of any sort of apparent ‘becoming’ or change. This conclusion is important because, ever since Aristotle, it has been assumed that the assertion was made in order to explain away becoming and change. But if , according to the best evidence, becoming and such sorts of change as Anaxagoras considered can be explained away without (...) using the assertion at all, it follows that the motive for it must be sought, not in the processes of apparent becoming and change, but in the permanent constitution of the ungenerated and unchanging things which figure as elements in the system. A visible mass of gold or of flesh is formed by the aggregation of smaller particles of gold or of flesh, and it is infinitely divisible into parts, every one of which is gold or flesh. But what is the constitution of a piece of gold of whatever size, and how does it differ from the constitution of a piece of flesh? The proposition we have so far successfully excluded comes in here as part of the answer to this question. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to determine the relations between the two parts of Parmenides' poem: the Way of Truth, which deduces the necessary properties of a One Being, and the False Way, which contains a cosmogony based on ‘what seems to mortals, in which there is no true belief.’.

An Inaugural Lecture Francis Macdonald Cornford. LAWS of MOTION in ANCIENT THOUGHT AN INAUGURAL LECTURE BY F. M. CORNFORD ' Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy in the University of Cambridge CAMBRIDGE ...

Originally published in 1931, this volume contains the text of an inaugural lecture by Francis Cornford upon his accession to the Laurence Professorship of Ancient Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in ancient philosophy or the history and philosophy of science.