Although law is established on a strong presumption that persons younger than a certain age are not competent to consent, statutory age limits for asking children’s consent to clinical research differ widely internationally. From a clinical perspective, competence is assumed to involve many factors including the developmental stage, the influence of parents and peers, and life experience. We examined potential determining factors for children’s competence to consent to clinical research and to what extent they explain the variation in competence judgments.

‘GRONDSLAGEN christelijke ethiek’ van de theoloog-ethicus J. Douma geeft een goede gelegenheid de ‘Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte’, speciaal die van H. Dooyeweerd, en haar toepassing op een vakwetenschap, te vergelijken met traditioneel-theologische c.q. klassiek-gereformeerde opvattingen over de grondslagen van de ethiek. Die vergelijking ligt voor de hand omdat het hoofdonderwerp van dit tamelijk omvangrijke boek van 413 pagina’s een filosofisch onderwerp is, geen theologie, zelfs geen theologische ethiek, maar een vakfilosofisch onderwerp. We zullen dus niet discussiëren met de schrijver over allerlei onderwerpen (...) die men gewoonlijk als ethische problemen beschouwt, want daarover zal een geplande reeks van vijf andere boeken gaan. Bovengenoemd boek echter gaat niet over een of ander ethisch vraagstuk, maar over wat de titel alleen al door de gebruikte hoofdletters, met veel nadruk stelt: grondslagen van de eigenlijke ethiek. (shrink)

In het eerste deel van deze studie zagen we dat de levensbeschouwelijke idee van een normatieve kosmische wereldorde oorspronkelijk een mythische geloofsidee was, die in vrijwel alle grote godsdiensten voorkwam. In de joodse en christelijke tradities werd deze idee in niet-wetenschappelijke zin geloofsmatig, vanuit het Oude Testament verstaan. Temeer omdat de Schrift op dit punt bepaald niet haaks stond op de algemeen gangbare, religieus-heidense publieke opinie, noch in de tijd van Homerus en Hesiodus, noch in de begintijd van het christendom.89 (...) Vervolgens werden de beide genoemde geloofstradities levensbeschouwelijk, theologisch en wijsgerig verwerkt met hantering van uit het heidendom, voornamelijk uit de Stoa, overgenomen gedachten en denkpatronen. (shrink)

Behalve onze volledige erkenning dat in het Stoïcisme een duidelijke herinnering ligt aan Gods overmachtige openbaring van zijn scheppingsorde, is ook met waardering te melden dat de Stoa een sterk besef heeft gehad van een onder de oppervlakte van het actieve leven gelegen diepere dimensie van de zogenaamde zedelijke deugden. Zelf spreek ik liever van ‘disposities’, de eerste onderlaag in de structuur van de concrete menselijke activiteiten.De genoemde stoïsche gedachte is van belang in het licht van de latere ontwikkelingen van (...) de praxeologie, met name in de zogenaamde goederenethiek, plichtenethiek of verantwoordingsethiek. ‘Gezindheidsethiek’ in diverse wijsgerige stromingen kon daarbij aanknopen. Dit was inderdaad een bij de Stoa positief te waarderen voortzetting van een reeds bestaande Sokratische, Platonische en Aristotelische traditie. Het is een goede weerstand tegenover elke tot de oppervlakte van het handelen beperkte visie, die dit oppervlakte-niveau, deze boven- of buitenkant, abstraheert, verzelfstandigt en overschat. Een denken in deze trant van wetticisme en activisme, van formalisme, legalisme en verjuridisering van de moraal, is met de reformatorische wijsbegeerte te weerstaan vanuit haar analyse van de dieptedimensies in de actstructuur: acten, disposities, ethos en centraal-religieuze worteldimensie in het menselijk hart. (shrink)

For decades, the discussion on children’s competence to consent to medical issues has concentrated around normative concerns, with little progress in clinical practices. Decision-making competence is an important condition in the informed consent model. In pediatrics, clinicians need to strike a proper balance in order to both protect children’s interests when they are not fully able to do so themselves and to respect their autonomy when they are. Children’s competence to consent, however, is currently not assessed in a standardized way. (...) Moreover, the correlation between competence to give informed consent and age in children has never been systematically investigated, nor do we know which factors exactly contribute to children’s competence. (shrink)

During the past 25 years, the words “theory of action” and “agency theory” have become key-terms in a new branch of philosophy. The themes appear to gain a centrality and influence such that one is led to think that they should cover most of philosophy, including the foundation for all of the human sciences. The number of treatises on human action and on philosophical and special-scientific theories of action is staggering. For the most part inspired by analytic philosophy, the new (...) approach threatens to take over that school’s central place on the stage of international philosophical concern. Having ousted theory of science from that position with an avalanche of analytic studies, analytic philosophy, in turn, is now being overrun by philosophy of action as supposedly suitable basis for the sciences. (shrink)

BackgroundFor many decades, the debate on children’s competence to give informed consent in medical settings concentrated on ethical and legal aspects, with little empirical underpinnings. Recently, data from empirical research became available to advance the discussion. It was shown that children’s competence to consent to clinical research could be accurately assessed by the modified MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research. Age limits for children to be deemed competent to decide on research participation have been studied: generally children of 11.2 (...) years and above were decision-making competent, while children of 9.6 years and younger were not. Age was pointed out to be the key determining factor in children’s competence. In this article we reflect on policy implications of these findings, considering legal, ethical, developmental and clinical perspectives.DiscussionAlthough assessment of children’s competence has a normative character, ethics, law and clinical practice can benefit from research data. The findings may help to do justice to the capacities children possess and challenges they may face when deciding about treatment and research options. We discuss advantages and drawbacks of standardized competence assessment in children on a case-by-case basis compared to application of a fixed age limit, and conclude that a selective implementation of case-by-case competence assessment in specific populations is preferable. We recommend the implementation of age limits based on empirical evidence. Furthermore, we elaborate on a suitable model for informed consent involving children and parents that would do justice to developmental aspects of children and the specific characteristics of the parent-child dyad.SummaryPrevious research outcomes showed that children’s medical decision-making capacities could be operationalized into a standardized assessment instrument. Recommendations for policies include a dual consent procedure, including both child as well as parents, for children from the age of 12 until they reach majority. For children between 10 and 12 years of age, and in case of children older than 12 years in special research populations of mentally compromised patients, we suggest a case-by-case assessment of children’s competence to consent. Since such a dual consent procedure is fundamentally different from a procedure of parental permission and child assent, and would imply a considerable shift regarding some current legislations, practical implications are elaborated. (shrink)

The article attempts to put the undervalued cultural phenomenon of offering comfort by means of persuasive speech acts (‘arguments’) on the research agenda of the human¬ities. The article proceeds in four steps. First, it defines ‘argumentative consolation’. Second, it argues that there has been a broad overlap of ancient philosophical and Christian modes of argumentative consolation. Third, it would be misguided to attribute today’s uneasiness with argumentative consolation to a process of ‘secularization’; the uneasiness stems from a radicalized intensification of (...) life that is played out against the possibility of consolation in the face of death. Fourth, the ensuing emphasis on the notions of desires, plans and projects to measure the completeness of a life is self-defeating. The article argues the continued relevance of pre-modern argumentative consolation that identified virtue as the key factor in the completeness of a biography. (shrink)

Comment devient-on philosophe? Par quel sursaut un Aristoclès se fait-il Platon, jusqu'à s'imposer dans la liste des " auteurs philo " Il faut enquêter, non pas sur la vie privée, mais sur la vie intime : rumination intellectuelle, ton sur lequel on parle, motivations amoureuses... Ce qui fait un philosophe, c'est un immense travail sur soi, et la rencontre d'autres philosophes, vivants, de leurs problématiques. Mémoire sémantique + obsession métaphysique, voilà le code génétique du philosophe. Il débute par un attentat (...) religieux, puisqu'il commence sa carrière en niant tel ou tel sacré. Bien sûr, il vaut mieux être mâle, communiquer par les livres adopter la langue dominante, écrire quand on est célibataire. Comment gagner sa vie? Pas forcément en étant enseignant, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui. Le profil du philosophe nous le révèle orphelin, vivant à l'étranger, souvent laid, jamais fou, et serial thinker, prêt à changer de philosophie pourvu qu'il reste, lui, à menacer le monde donnera ou donnera pas du sens à notre vie? Le philosophe est l'être inquiet qui pense inquiéter l'Être par deux trois mots bien aiguisés. (shrink)

This article highlights two possible unnoticed acrostics in Ovid's Metamorphoses concerning the predictions of Calchas and Helenus.

While there are numerous doubts, controversies and lack of consensus on alternative definitions of human death, it is argued that it is more ethical to allow people to choose either cessation of cardio-respiratory function or loss of entire brain function as the definition of death based on their own views. This paper presents the law of organ transplantation in Japan, which allows people to decide whether brain death can be used to determine their death in agreement with their family. Arguably, (...) Japan could become a unique example of individual choice in the definition of death if the law is revised to allow individuals choose definition of death independently of their family. It suggests that such an approach is one of the reasonable policy options a country can adopt for legislation on issues related to the definition of death. (shrink)

Extraterrestrial Altruism examines a basic assumption of the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI): that extraterrestrials will be transmitting messages to us for our benefit. This question of whether extraterrestrials will be altruistic has become increasingly important in recent years as SETI scientists have begun contemplating transmissions from Earth to make contact. Technological civilizations that transmit signals for the benefit of others, but with no immediate gain for themselves, certainly seem to be altruistic. But does this make biological sense? Should we (...) expect altruism to evolve throughout the cosmos, or is this only wishful thinking? Is it dangerous to send messages to other worlds, as Stephen Hawking has suggested, or might humankind benefit from an exchange with intelligence elsewhere in the galaxy? Would extraterrestrial societies be based on different ethical principles, or would we see commonalities with Earthly notions of morality? Extraterrestrial Altruism explores these and related questions about the motivations of civilizations beyond Earth, providing new insights that are critical for SETI. Chapters are authored by leading scholars from diverse disciplines—anthropology, astronomy, biology, chemistry, computer science, cosmology, engineering, history of science, law, philosophy, psychology, public policy, and sociology. The book is carefully edited by Douglas Vakoch, Director of Interstellar Message Composition at the SETI Institute and professor of clinical psychology at the California Institute of Integral Studies. The Foreword is by Frank Drake. This interdisciplinary book will benefit everybody trying to understand whether evolution and ethics are unique to Earth, or whether they are built into the fabric of the universe. (shrink)

How (Not) to Be Secular is what Jamie Smith calls "your hitchhiker's guide to the present" -- it is both a reading guide to Charles Taylor's monumental work A Secular Age and philosophical guidance on how we might learn to live in our times. Taylor's landmark book A Secular Age (2007) provides a monumental, incisive analysis of what it means to live in the post-Christian present -- a pluralist world of competing beliefs and growing unbelief. Jamie Smith's book is a (...) compact field guide to Taylor's insightful study of the secular, making that very significant but daunting work accessible to a wide array of readers. Even more, though, Smith's How (Not) to Be Secular is a practical philosophical guidebook, a kind of how-to manual on how to live in our secular age. It ultimately offers us an adventure in self-understanding and maps out a way to get our bearings in today's secular culture, no matter who "we" are -- whether believers or skeptics, devout or doubting, self-assured or puzzled and confused. This is a book for any thinking person to chew on. (shrink)