This contribution is a criticism of some points David Carr brings forward both in his 1991 book (Educating the Virtues) but even more so in his 1996 article in this journal (After Kohlberg: Some Implications of an Ethics of Virtue for the Theory of Moral Education and Development). With the help of a virtue approach Carr tries to solve the moral objectivism-moral relativism dilemma and the deontologism-consequentialism dilemma in ethics. I will argue that his attempt, though very interesting, suffers from (...) some serious flaws and that, either, Carr's position is much closer to a Kantian approach than Carr thinks, or Carr's position needs a good deal of clarification. (shrink)

En este artículo pretendemos dar cuenta del desenvolvimiento que tuvo la filosofía moderno-contemporánea y el llamado pensamiento postmetafísico, a partir de Edmund Husserl. Alrededor las categorías fenomenológicas de método y de sentido enunciamos un gesto de apertura a la filosofía contemporánea la cual asume distintos matices que pretenden que la actividad filosófica vaya más allá de sí misma.

Empathy facilitates everyday social interactions and has often been linked in the literature to prosocial behavior. Robust evidence has been found for a positive relationship between experiencing empathy and behaving prosocially. However, empathy, and the empathy–prosocial behavior relationship in particular, has been studied mostly in combination with negative emotions. Less research has been conducted on empathy for positive emotions, and the link between positive empathy and displayed prosocial behavior has not been intensively investigated so far. The purpose of the present (...) article is thus twofold: first, we review and summarize research evidence on empathy for positive emotions, and second, we propose that people’s motivation to maintain an experienced positive affect is a viable mechanism linking positive empathy and prosocial behavior. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rhetoric and Power: An Inquiry into Foucault’s Critique of ConfessionDave TellOn October 10, 1979, Michel Foucault revised his thesis on confession. On that day, some three years after the publication of his magisterial treatment of confession in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault argued that the Pythagoreans, Stoics, and Epicureans had, before the advent of Christianity, their own practices of confession. Yet these practices, unlike their (...) Christian variants, were not complicit with practices of domination (OS 310, 312). In the context of Foucault’s thought theretofore, in which the confession consistently figured as an essential component in the exercise of modern power, this is a radical shift. In lectures given at both Berkeley and Dartmouth in the fall of 1980, Foucault made similar arguments. On these occasions he argued that Seneca’s De ira constituted a “stoic confession,” the object of which was to enable the subject to “live differently, better, more happily, than other people” (AB 210, 205). Judith Butler captures the gravity of the shift: “In the last years of his life, Foucault returned to the question of confession, reversing his earlier critique in the first volume of the History of Sexuality, where he indicts confession as a forcible extraction of sexual truth, a practice in the service of a regulatory power” (2005, 112).This reversal was short lived. Although Foucault would celebrate ancient Greek techniques of the self for the rest of his life, he would not [End Page 95] long refer to these techniques in terms of confession. Thus, in another reading of De ira, this one in March 1982, Foucault again noted that the Stoics have “confessional practices” that are “very close to what is found in Christianity” (Herm 482). This time, however, he insisted that the Stoic practices were fundamentally different: “However, all these elements seem to me to be profoundly different from what we should call ‘confession’ in the strict, or anyway, spiritual sense of the word” (Herm 365). In The Care of the Self, Foucault again conceded that De ira—what he now called “the most detailed description” of antique practices of the self—looked “at first glance” like a Christian confession, but he again maintained that it is something quite different: “The purpose of the examination is not therefore to discover one’s own guilt, down to its most trifling forms” (CS 61–62). Foucault concluded that the various “discourses of the self”—the confession and the Greek techniques of the self—could not be placed into a single category (see GE 250). Indeed, the “profound difference” (Herm 299) between these two discourses of the self was perhaps Foucault’s most repeated claim of the 1980s (see Herm 222, 237–44, 299, 308; GE 247–48; WS 237; AB 207–8; RFT 27; UP 89; CS 239; SS 5; FI 5, 12; FS 30, 35, 44, 87, 96, 97, 143–45, 147).It is worth asking why Foucault returned so consistently to the distinction between these two discursive forms. This question gains even more relevance for readers of this journal when we remember that, on at least two occasions, Foucault defined one of these forms, the ancient techniques of the self, in terms of its opposition to rhetoric: the techniques of the self, he claimed, are “nonrhetorical” (Herm 368; FS 20). Thus the question that drives this essay is not so much why Foucault attached such importance to the distinction but rather how rhetoric itself might differentiate the confession from the techniques of the self. Stated differently, Foucault’s work on the confession vis-à-vis the technologies of the self provides a valuable opportunity to study the role of rhetoric in Foucault’s thought—not because they are both rhetorical forms but, curiously, because Foucault insists that one is not.In order to foreground the work of rhetoric in Foucault’s thought, I situate his discourses of the self in the context of Nietzsche’s critique of metonymy. Although this may seem arbitrary, it gains initial plausibility from three facts. First, we know that Foucault understood rhetoric in terms of tropes (OT 84; Cooper 1988, 4). Second, we know too that Foucault had a deep... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rhetoric and Power: An Inquiry into Foucault’s Critique of ConfessionDave TellOn October 10, 1979, Michel Foucault revised his thesis on confession. On that day, some three years after the publication of his magisterial treatment of confession in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault argued that the Pythagoreans, Stoics, and Epicureans had, before the advent of Christianity, their own practices of confession. Yet these practices, unlike their (...) Christian variants, were not complicit with practices of domination (OS 310, 312). In the context of Foucault’s thought theretofore, in which the confession consistently figured as an essential component in the exercise of modern power, this is a radical shift. In lectures given at both Berkeley and Dartmouth in the fall of 1980, Foucault made similar arguments. On these occasions he argued that Seneca’s De ira constituted a “stoic confession,” the object of which was to enable the subject to “live differently, better, more happily, than other people” (AB 210, 205). Judith Butler captures the gravity of the shift: “In the last years of his life, Foucault returned to the question of confession, reversing his earlier critique in the first volume of the History of Sexuality, where he indicts confession as a forcible extraction of sexual truth, a practice in the service of a regulatory power” (2005, 112).This reversal was short lived. Although Foucault would celebrate ancient Greek techniques of the self for the rest of his life, he would not [End Page 95] long refer to these techniques in terms of confession. Thus, in another reading of De ira, this one in March 1982, Foucault again noted that the Stoics have “confessional practices” that are “very close to what is found in Christianity” (Herm 482). This time, however, he insisted that the Stoic practices were fundamentally different: “However, all these elements seem to me to be profoundly different from what we should call ‘confession’ in the strict, or anyway, spiritual sense of the word” (Herm 365). In The Care of the Self, Foucault again conceded that De ira—what he now called “the most detailed description” of antique practices of the self—looked “at first glance” like a Christian confession, but he again maintained that it is something quite different: “The purpose of the examination is not therefore to discover one’s own guilt, down to its most trifling forms” (CS 61–62). Foucault concluded that the various “discourses of the self”—the confession and the Greek techniques of the self—could not be placed into a single category (see GE 250). Indeed, the “profound difference” (Herm 299) between these two discourses of the self was perhaps Foucault’s most repeated claim of the 1980s (see Herm 222, 237–44, 299, 308; GE 247–48; WS 237; AB 207–8; RFT 27; UP 89; CS 239; SS 5; FI 5, 12; FS 30, 35, 44, 87, 96, 97, 143–45, 147).It is worth asking why Foucault returned so consistently to the distinction between these two discursive forms. This question gains even more relevance for readers of this journal when we remember that, on at least two occasions, Foucault defined one of these forms, the ancient techniques of the self, in terms of its opposition to rhetoric: the techniques of the self, he claimed, are “nonrhetorical” (Herm 368; FS 20). Thus the question that drives this essay is not so much why Foucault attached such importance to the distinction but rather how rhetoric itself might differentiate the confession from the techniques of the self. Stated differently, Foucault’s work on the confession vis-à-vis the technologies of the self provides a valuable opportunity to study the role of rhetoric in Foucault’s thought—not because they are both rhetorical forms but, curiously, because Foucault insists that one is not.In order to foreground the work of rhetoric in Foucault’s thought, I situate his discourses of the self in the context of Nietzsche’s critique of metonymy. Although this may seem arbitrary, it gains initial plausibility from three facts. First, we know that Foucault understood rhetoric in terms of tropes (OT 84; Cooper 1988, 4). Second, we know too that Foucault had a deep... (shrink)

Este artículo tiene por objetivo, por una parte, buscar y presentar un diálogo enriquecido entre los conceptos de atestación y sospecha provenientes de la hermenéutica desarrollada por el filósofo Paul Ricoeur, y, por otra parte, intentar mostrar que dicho modelo o paradigma dialógico es capaz de oficiar de fuente hermenéutica transversal a las humanidades, y en concreto a la literatura. Esto es así en la medida en que implicaría una herramienta gnoseo-epistemológica válida de análisis en la cual se asume la (...) duda y la sospecha, pero al mismo tiempo se las atraviesa y trasciende hacia una renovada afirmación ontológico-existencial decisiva y restaurada. (shrink)

This paper explores the role the Panhellenic centers played in facilitating the circulation of wisdom in ancient Greece. It argues that there are substantial thematic overlaps among practitioners of wisdom , who are typically understood as belonging to different categories . By focusing on the presence of σοφοί at the Panhellenic centers in general, and Delphi in particular, we can acquire a more accurate picture of the particular expertise they possessed, and of the range of meanings the Greeks attributed to (...) the word σοφία. This approach seeks to challenge the conventional categories of modern scholarship and to offer a broader and more inclusive interpretive framework in its stead. One such thematic overlap is the way in which many σοφοί are described as exerting an almost uncanny, yet highly conventional ability to attract listeners and enchant them with their verbal performances. There is plenty of material to support the view that σοφοό, through tapping into the repository of σοφία that Delphi constituted and by aligning themselves with its authority, were seen as themselves being a conduit for a similar type of charismatic speech. (shrink)

This paper addresses two central issues: the first one briefly presents two stages of anthropological development of Paul Ricoeur’s anthropologic deployment, as an effort to think human being with a renewed logic. The second one states that in such philosophical journey a plus of meaning is inserted into the language of faith which accompanies the anthropological development itself and, in turn, exceeds and contains the philosophical specific task, and also makes clear how such an assignment exceeds the explicit aims of (...) the French author. In other words, this paper only seeks to outline a ‘gesture of openness’ in contemporary philosophy, accepting its heritage, and assuming renewed hues, deeps and scopes, allowing the philosophical work and human being go beyond themselves. (shrink)

This article analyzes the moral reasoning implied in a very commonly used expression, namely, "What the eye doesn't see, the heart doesn't grieve over", or "What you don't know won't hurt you." It especially deals with situations in which it is used for trying to justify acts that are, in themselves, reprehensible. For instance, when a cheating husband tries to justify his adultery by appealing to the alleged fact that he does not tell his wife about it and thus she (...) is not harmed by it: "If you are not informed, you are not hurt" (NINH). The components of NINH reasoning are unfolded, as well as its grounds, starting from a consequentialistic, deontological, or virtue ethics perspective. Two special characteristics of NINH reasoning are discussed, namely, that it tries to bridge deontological and consequentialistic approaches of morality in a commonsense way and that it contains a special type of paternalism. Finally, some ethical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Objetivou-se discutir a comunicação silenciosa entre mãe e bebê, a partir do pensamento de Winnicott. Fez-se uma pesquisa qualitativa, baseada no método clínico e referencial psicanalítico, por meio do estudo de caso de uma criança, com 8 anos de idade e dificuldades no desenvolvimento da fala, sem ..

Tendo como pano de fundo a concepção de filosofia, explora-se os diferentes tratamentos do tema da subjetividade conferidos pelo Tractatus e pela obra do que se convencionou chamar de “II Wittgenstein”. A concepção prática do significado inaugurada por esta, a despeito de significar uma drástica ruptura com o espírito do Tractatus, funda-se na preservação do antipsicologismo. Tem-se, portanto, a conciliação entre a concepção prática de significado e o antipsicologismo característico da lógica sublime do Tractatus, da qual o II Wittgenstein se (...) desfaz.AbstractHaving a conception of philosophy in the backgound, I investigate different approaches concerning the topic of subjectivism in the Tractatus and thoughout the writings of what is commonly called as “II Wittgenstein”. The practical conception of meaning that steam from those writings, in spite of being a shift with regards to that of the Tractatus, is based on the preservation of the anti-psychologism. Therefore, there is a conciliation between the practical conception of meaning and the anti-psychologism, by means of which, in the Tractatus, logic is something sublime, which is discarded by the II Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This article examines the role played by US foundations in shaping the academic field of race relations and a black social movement in Brazil. It takes issue with Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant's assertion that US foundations use their power to impose a US model on understanding race in Brazil. Their analysis exaggerates the power of US foundations in Brazil, fails to understand how programming decisions are made within the foundations, greatly underestimates the intellectual agency of the Brazilian academy and (...) its black social movement, and reveals a rather dated understanding of the academic literature and public opinion on race in Brazil. The author relies on information gleaned from his former position as a Program Officer of the Ford Foundation in Rio de Janeiro and as a researcher of Brazilian race relations. (shrink)

O presente texto propõe uma leitura de diversas teorias do afeto pelo viés da semiótica. Partindo do preceito de que é impossível não afetar ou não ser afetado, estabelece alguns parâmetros para definir o que é afeto para dar conta das dimensões epistemo e ontológica da semiose. Com base em Espinosa, Deleuze e Guattari, ensaia dizer que há, para além de uma capacidade significante, também uma qualidade “sensacional” da semiose, aproximando a processualidade deste fenômeno às cadeias afetivas que devém de (...) toda afecção. Palavras-chave: Afeto. Semiótica. Teorias da Comunicação. Espinosa. (shrink)

It shall be examined how anti-physicalist arguments give rise to the tension between those aspects of our everyday life and the thesis of physicalism. The debate over the subjective character of consciousness, or as it is sometimes called: “the hard problem of consciousness”, is considered to be the greatest challenge to physicalism. Many philosophers posit this as a matter that cannot be solved, regardless of scientific progress, for it is beyond the scope of what science can find out about the (...) world. If they are correct, the consequence is that the idea of physicalism itself fails. The paper is divided in two parts. For the first part we will deal with Chalmers’ version of the conceivability argument as well as the semantic apparatus of the two-dimensional framework required to make the appropriate link between conceivability and possibility. At the end of this we shall take a look at Kripke’s version of the conceivability argument against physicalism. (shrink)

(2012). A Review of “Knowledge and Power in the Global Economy: The Effects of School Reform in a Neoliberal/Neoconservative Age”. Educational Studies: Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 400-404.

O presente artigo pretende apresentar e avaliar criticamente o projeto racionalista de David Chalmers e Frank Jackson na interpretação epistêmica da chamada semântica bidimensional. Diferentes versões do aparato formal da semântica bidimensional são lançadas para resolver certos problemas no âmbito da filosofia da linguagem, a saber, dar conta do conteúdo semântico de termos indexicais, produzir uma explicação para os híbridos modais como instâncias do necessário a posteriori e contribuir para o debate acerca da determinação do conteúdo mental. De um modo (...) geral, a semântica bidimensional estipula uma dupla dependência de expressões linguísticas frente a possibilidades ou cenários. Uma das noções centrais para a construção das possibilidades relevantes é a noção de “cenário”. O presente trabalho procura responder a duas objeções aa noção de cenário empregada por David Chalmers em sua interpretação do aparato bidimensional. AbstractThis paper aims at presenting and critically assessing the epistemic interpretation advanced by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson of the two-dimensional semantic framework. Different versions of the formal apparatus of the two-dimensional framework are used to account for philosophical phenomena such as the content of indexical terms, modal hybrids, such as posteriori necessities and the individuation of mental content. Generally, two-dimensional framework stipulates a double dependence of linguistic terms on possibilities or scenarios. One of the central notions for the construction of the relevant kind of possibility is the notion of “scenario”. The aim of the paper is to defend the two- dimensional framework from two objections regarding the notion of scenario. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper aims at exposing a strategy to organize the debate around physicalism. Our starting point is the pre-philosophical notion of physicalism, which is typically formulated in the form of slogans. Indeed, philosophers debating metaphysics have paradigmatically introduced the subject with aid of slogans such as “there is nothing over and above the physical”, “once every physical aspect of the world is settled, every other aspect will follow”, “physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical”. These ideas are very (...) intuitive but they are, of course, far from being a satisfactory metaphysical conception of Physicalism. For that end, we will begin with the definition of physicalism as the thesis that everything is physical, following Stoljar, we should be able to respond to one central question: how to interpret the physicalist claim that everything in physical. (shrink)

A ideia intuitivamente plausível de que pelo menos alguns de nossos estados mentais teriam aspectos fenomenais qualitativos aos quais nós teríamos um acesso cognitivo privilegiado é considerada por muitos filósofos como incompatível com a ontologia fisicista. Alguns defensores radicais do fisicismo preferem simplesmente negar a existência de aspectos qualitativos, ao passo que outros materialistas procuram reinterpretar a cognição do caráter fenomenal da nossa experiência do mundo como a aquisição de uma habilidade, isto é, como uma forma de know-how , em (...) oposição à aquisição de informação ( know-that ). O presente trabalho expõe e examina criticamente algumas tentativas recentes de compatibilização da natureza sui generis da apreensão cognitiva do caráter fenomenal da nossa experiência com a tese materialista de que o conteúdo proposicional dessa cognição é constituído exclusivamente por fatos físicos. doi: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5007 / 1808-1711.2011v15n3p415. (shrink)

The claim that at least some of our mental states have qualitative, phenomenal features to which we have privileged cognitive access is intuitively plausible. Nevertheless, the claim is considered by many philosophers to be incompatible with a physicalist ontology. Some radical physicalists prefer simply to deny the existence of the qualitative character of our mental states, whereas other physicalists try to reinterpret the knowledge of the phenomenal character of our experience as the acquisition of an ability, i.e., as a sort (...) of know-how in opposition to the acquisition of an information. The paper presents and examines critically some recent attempts to compatibilize the sui generis nature of phenomenal knowledge with the materialist claim that the content of this sort of knowledge is constituted entirely by physical facts. (shrink)

"A distinctive voice somewhere between Mark Twain and Michel Montaigne" is how Psychology Today described A.C. Grayling. In Life, Sex, and Ideas: The Good Life Without God, readers have the pleasure of hearing this distinctive voice address some of the most serious topics in philosophy--and in our daily lives--including reflections on guns, anger, conflict, war; monsters, madness, decay; liberty, justice, utopia; suicide, loss, and remembrance. A civilized society, says Grayling, is one which never ceases having a discussion with itself about (...) what human life should best be. In this book, Grayling adds to this discussion a series of short informal essays about ethics, ideas, and culture. A recurring theme is religion, of which he writes "there is no greater social evil." He argues, for instance, that liberal education is better than religion for inculcating moral values. "Education in literature, history, and appreciation of the arts," he says, "opens the possibility for us to live more reflectively and knowledgeably, especially about the nature and variety of human experience. That in turn increases our capacity for understanding others better, so that we can treat them with respect and sympathy, however different their outlook on life." Thought provoking rather than definitive, these essays don't tell readers what to think, but only note what has been thought about how it is best to live. A person who does not think about life, the author reminds us, is like a stranger mapless in a foreign land. These brief and suggestive essays offer us the outlines of a map, with avenues of thought that are a pleasure to wander down. (shrink)

Research in face recognition has tended to focus on discriminating between individuals, or “telling people apart.” It has recently become clear that it is also necessary to understand how images of the same person can vary, or “telling people together.” Learning a new face, and tracking its representation as it changes from unfamiliar to familiar, involves an abstraction of the variability in different images of that person's face. Here, we present an application of principal components analysis computed across different photos (...) of the same person. We demonstrate that people vary in systematic ways, and that this variability is idiosyncratic—the dimensions of variability in one face do not generalize well to another. Learning a new face therefore entails learning how that face varies. We present evidence for this proposal and suggest that it provides an explanation for various effects in face recognition. We conclude by making a number of testable predictions derived from this framework. (shrink)

The meta-problem of consciousness is framed as a route into investigating why there are problems in understanding consciousness by describing the mechanisms underpinning our tendency to describe consciousness as problematic, and the evolutionary origins of these mechanisms. This is framed as a means of uniting illusionists and realists toward a common goal, but this supposes that the only viable form of illusionism is what I call 'hard-wired' illusionism, under which phenomenal judgments are a direct product of natural selection. I argue (...) that, instead, 'soft-wired' illusionism is more plausible, where phenomenal judgments are seen to be cultural phenomena. Since the problem of consciousness arises from a flawed theory of consciousness, pointing out the mechanisms underlying expression of the theory and the historical origins of the theory will not suffice to tell us why the theory is problematic. As such, the meta-problem is exclusionary toward soft-wired illusionism. (shrink)

Objectives: To explore opinions and attitudes regarding the current information-giving practices in research involving adults with intellectual disabilities.Design: Qualitative focus group study with a purposive sample.Setting: An intellectual disabilities service within the NHSParticipants: A sample of 26 individuals including adults with mild intellectual disability, carers, clinicians, care managers and the charitable sector.Results: Three main themes were identified: process, format, and content. There was agreement that there is a need for improvement in the process and quality of information giving. With regard (...) to the content of information, there was little discrepancy between the study findings and existing guidance.Conclusions: Information should be presented in different formats and prepared with input from appropriate professions. Additionally the roles of peers, carers and other professionals in the process of information giving should be considered. (shrink)

In this paper we conduct an analysis of the critical narratives of Stardew Valley and compare them to other relevant videogames in order to develop new possibilities for an ecological critique of capitalist extractive econo­mies. Critical narratives of this game are aimed primarily at the alienating conditions of labour and deeply devastating modes of production under capitalism that impact and severely damage the environment. Analysing these narratives, we superimpose the immediate messages of the game with the procedural rhetoric and material (...) conditions of their existence. Over the course of our analysis, we highlight a material-narrative disso­nance which, in the case of Stardew Valley, fails to function as a commu­nicative strategy of the game and remains its mere external contradiction. Although the game’s critical narrative may seem overly utopian and its political imaginary a bit underdeveloped, the game elaborates on concrete ways to tackle the alienation of labour and resolve the ecological crisis. In addition to this, the paper covers the history of the interplay between the video game industry and the field of global ecological crisis research. We compare the attempts to raise awareness of the videogames’ own material­ity that preceded Stardew Valley. We conclude that Stardew Valley utilises the language of sustainable co-existence and wasteless local production, expanding this logic both to the sphere of labour and the spectrum of en­vironmental problems. In the case of ecological critique, some gameplay decisions in Stardew Valley enable us to come up with new strategies aimed at creating critical narratives about the environment in videogames. Thus supplementing Stardew Valley’s findings with critical tropes derived from other games (mainly, Rain World), we were able to gather a set of theoretical instruments that could facilitate the creation of games about ecosystems. Following Donna Haraway’s emphasis on the crucial role of narrative fram­ing (“it matters which stories tell stories”), we highlight new opportunities for the entire medium of videogames. (shrink)

argument fails, and the purpose of this note is to bring out that failure. The view in question which Heck calls the Hybrid Vie~istinguishes between the meanings of names and the contents of beliefs which are expressible using names. According to the Hybrid View the meaning of a name is its referent: names do not have senses. Thus (a) "George Orwell wrote 1984" means the same as (b) "Eric Blair wrote 1984". However, the Hybrid View tells a different story about (...) the beliefs one expresses when one utters (a) or (b). The content of a belief expressed using a sentence that contains a name has more to it than just the referent of the name and whatever properties the sentence ascribes to the name's referent. There is.. (shrink)

Everything is a sign. We can consider the words we use, the texts we write, the movies or TV series we watch, photos or any content used in social media as a 'sign'. These signs are constantly telling us something as a representation. When considered from this point of view, it is inevitable that cartoons prepared for children will also be an sign. Based on this, it has been thought that the cartoon called 'Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles', which has been (...) broadcast all over the world for more than thirty years, both on television and in cinemas without losing its currency, may also be signs. For this reason, the aim of the study is to analyze the narrative of the cartoons and animations called 'Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles' through the representations in this narrative, the characters and their names in the cartoons and animations, the weapons used by the characters, the food they eat, their clothes, the colors and places they use. In addition, what the subject discussed in Mutant Ninja Turtles in general represents was analyzed through the relevant characters. In the study, it has been seen that each sign examined semiotically is produced with a certain cultural meaning. The cultural heritage from the Renaissance to the present reflects the culture of a particular society. Therefore, the culture spread by mass media can influence different cultures from itself. (shrink)

Chalmers’s two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about (...) phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive. (shrink)

Telling the truth is one of the most respected virtues in medical history and one of the most emphasized in the code of medical ethics. Health care providers are frequently confronted with the dilemma as to whether or not to tell the truth. This dilemma deepens when both choices are critically vicious: The choice is no longer between “right and right” or “right and wrong,” it is between “wrong and wrong.” In the case presented and discussed in this paper, a (...) research team in Saudi Arabia unintentionally uncovered information regarding misattributed paternity. In such a situation and in the context of a tribal cultural system, what should the team do with this information? This case analysis demonstrates the joint application of ethical resources originating from within and outside the Saudi Arabian context. The article analyses the case based on the moral problems involved, relevant medical application, and the impact of such information in the Saudi tribal and Islamic domains. The most pertinent relevant values and secular debates on similar matters are discussed. Finally, the article aims to provide an Islamic dimension of family, fatherhood, and adultery. (shrink)

Objectives: to assess physicians’ and patients’ views in Saudi Arabia towards involving the patient versus the family in the process of diagnosis disclosure and decision-making, and to compare them with views from the USA and Japan.Design: A self-completion questionnaire was translated to Arabic and validated.Participants: Physicians from different specialties and ranks and patients in a hospital or attending outpatient clinics from 6 different regions in KSA.Results: In the case of a patient with incurable cancer, 67% of doctors and 51% of (...) patients indicated that they would inform the patient in preference to the family of the diagnosis . Assuming the family already knew, 56% of doctors and 49% of patients would tell the patient even if family objected . However, in the case of HIV infection, 59% of physicians and 81% of patients would inform the family about HIV status without the patient’s consent . With regards to withholding ventilatory support, about 50% of doctors and over 60% of patients supported the use of mechanical ventilation in a patient with advanced cancer, regardless of the wishes of the patient or the family. Finally, the majority of doctors and patients were against assisted suicide.Conclusions: Although there was more recognition for a patient’s autonomy amongst physicians, most patients preferred a family centred model of care. Views towards information disclosure were midway between those of the USA and Japan. Distinctively, however, decisions regarding life prolonging therapy and assisted suicide were not influenced to a great extent by wishes of the patient or family, but more likely by religious beliefs. (shrink)

For twenty years since the publication of his seminal paper 'The Market for "Lemons"', George A. Akerlof's work has changed the way we see economics, and the economics of information in particular. In abandoning the perfect-competition benchmarks of classical economics, the pragmatic modern economics championed by Akerlof has provided deep insights into markets, identity, discrimination, motivation, and work, and into behavioural economics in general.This collection of Akerlof's most important papers provide both an introduction to Akerlof's work and a grounding in (...) modern economics. Divided into two broad areas, micro- and macroeconomics, they cover the economics of information; the theory of unemployment; macroeconomic equilibria; the demand for money; psychology and economics; and the nature of discrimination and other social issues. The collection closes with Akerlof's 2001 Nobel Lecture, in which he argues that it is imperative that macroeconomics be considered inherently behavioural.Akerlof's substantial introduction to this volume tells the story of these papers, connecting them and showing how his later work has built upon his early contributions, in many cases improving their arguments, their subtlety, and their usefulness today. (shrink)

Tr.: If I were to tell of suffering and bad billets, of scanty provisions ill set-out—but what was there we did not complain of when we did not get the day's ration? But, as for the dry ground, there was an even greater abomination in that; for our beds were close to the enemy's walls—for from heaven and earth they drenched us with the moisture of meadows, a constant affliction, making the wool of our cloaks foul.

We can best begin from Wilson's "simple little puzzle" about Caesar and Antony: "What would the world be like if Julius Caesar had all the properties of Mark Antony and Mark Antony had all the properties of Julius Caesar?" Wilson's own approach to an answer is indirect--he begins by telling us not what such a world would be like but what it would look like. "Clearly the world would look exactly the same under our supposition." But this assumes that the (...) question "What would such a world look like?" is a proper one; which it surely is not. For his answer to it is meaningless until he specifies to whom this supposed world would look as he says it would. It would look exactly the same to him or to me; but would it have looked the same to Caesar or to Antony? In fact Julius Caesar had the experiences of being called "Julius Caesar," being murdered on the Ides of March, and so on, and these are very different experiences from being called "Mark Antony," dallying on the Nile with Cleopatra, and so on; so I don't see how this alternative course of events could possibly have looked the same to Julius Caesar; or--using a similar line of argument--to Mark Antony. So I cannot agree that, as Wilson goes on to say, "our attempt to describe a distinct possible world has produced just the same old world all over again." I am not, indeed, convinced that even a world which looked to everyone just as the actual one does would necessarily be the same world ; but even putting this doubt aside, since the world mentioned wouldn't look to everyone as the actual world does, it wouldn't be the same even by Wilson's own standards. (shrink)

Do emotions represent values? The dominant view in philosophy has it that they do. There is wide disagreement over the details, but this core commitment is common. But there is a new comer on scene: the attitude view. According to it, rather than representing value properties, there is a value-relevant way you represent the targets of emotion. For example, in feeling angry with someone you stand to them in the relation of representing-as-having-wronged-you. Although a recent view, it has quickly generated (...) discussion. But the central considerations in favour of each view are left wanting and it is hard to see how to choose amongst these alternatives. I argue that there is an empirical path to a decision. (shrink)

Cet article examine certains des éléments fondamentaux de la pensée de Bernard Lonergan sur l'éthique. Il y est proposé que le traitement des préceptes transcendentaux et des valeurs dans Method suggère une continuité avec sa position antérieure dans Insight. Cette continuité est exposée par l'examen de la manière dans laquelle Lonergan dérive les 'devoirs' des préceptes transcendentaux de 'l'être' de la structure de la connaissance. Cet approche, dessinée à grands traits, est appliquée à une analyse de l'éthique proportionnaliste. On suggère (...) en outre qu'une telle éthique se révèle incohérente. (shrink)

'Professor Vyse presents the historical, sociocultural, and psychological basis for superstition in a clear, interesting, and even entertaining way. What easily could have been a dry, over-intellectualized tome is, instead, a gem of a book that engaginly tells the story of what science has learned about superstition, of how pervasive and powerful superstition can be, and of why critical thinking skills are so important in everyday life.' -Douglas A. Bernstein, Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 'Many books deal with (...) irrational beliefs but have little to say about why people cling to superstitions...and what can be done to stem the rising tide of interest in pseudoscience and the paranormal. Professor Vyse has filled this vacuum with a book as entertaining as it is enlightening.' -Martin Gardner 'This book can be rewritten or updated every fifteen years, I believe, since new claptrap presents itself every day. And there are always victims out there ready to surrender their common sense for a talisman...or a ritual that puts them 'in' with their peers and gives them the warm glow of being avant-garde. Meanwhile, I urge the rationalists out there to snap up this book when they see it. It may be heading for the bonfires.' -James Randi, The James Randi Educational Foundation, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 'Employing scientific techniques and utilizing hard facts, Vyse shows how silly superstition really is.... This is a highly informative book, dealing with everything from chain letters to lucky charms to the lottery system.' -Amazon 'Vyse presents plenty of uncomfortable truths about the way most of us think, and plumbs a vast literary repetoire ranging from Chaucer and Melville through Leon Festinger to get us into his corner.' -Voice Literary Supplement 'An engaging introduction to psychology focused on a topic, superstition, of inherent interest to us all.' -Valerie M. Chase, The Boston Book Review. (shrink)