Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 1, Page 25-41, January 2022.

Really statistical explanation is a hitherto neglected form of noncausal scientific explanation. Explanations in population biology that appeal to drift are RS explanations. An RS explanation supplies a kind of understanding that a causal explanation of the same result cannot supply. Roughly speaking, an RS explanation shows the result to be mere statistical fallout.

Discussing the relations between logic and probability, this book compares classical 17th- and 18th-century theories of probability with contemporary theories, explores recent logical theories of probability, and offers a new account of probability as a part of logic.

Ramsey's “Facts and Propositions” is terse, allusive, and dense. The paper is far from easy to understand. The present essay is an effort, largely following Brian Loar's account,1 to say what Ramsey's goal is, to spell out what he took to be the means to accomplish it, and to show how those means, at least in the terms of F&P, cannot accomplish that end. I also contrast Loar's own account of judgment, explicitly modeled on Ramsey's view, with the latter. The (...) exercise is not at all academic. Loar makes clear the striking depth and originality of Ramsey's insights. (shrink)

How does deductive logic constrain probability? This question is difficult for subjectivistic approaches, according to which probability is just strength of (prudent) partial belief, for this presumes logical omniscience. This paper proposes that the way in which probability lies always between possibility and necessity can be made precise by exploiting a minor theorem of de Finetti: In any finite set of propositions the expected number of truths is the sum of the probabilities over the set. This is generalized to apply (...) to denumerable languages. It entails that the sum of probabilities can neither exceed nor be exceeded by the cardinalities of all consistent and closed (within the set) subsets. In general any numerical function on sentences is said to be logically coherent if it satisfies this condition. Logical coherence allows the relativization of necessity: A function p on a language is coherent with respect to the concept T of necessity iff there is no set of sentences on which the sum of p exceeds or is exceeded by the cardinality of every T-consistent and T-closed (within the set) subset of the set. Coherence is easily applied as well to sets on which the sum of p does not converge. Probability should also be relativized by necessity: A T-probability assigns one to every T-necessary sentence and is additive over disjunctions of pairwise T-incompatible sentences. Logical T-coherence is then equivalent to T-probability: All and only T-coherent functions are T-probabilities. (shrink)

The main sources here are Hume, Husserl, and De Finetti. The problem is how phenomenological investigation has to do with partial or probabilistic judgment. Behavioristic, frequentist and subjectivistic views are briefly surveyed. A variant of Hume's account of the probability of chances is developed with the help of De Finetti's concept of exchangeability. The question of transcendental elements in or behind partial judgment is considered in the light of understanding disagreement and error in partial judgment.

In this paper I consider the question of the reality of chance. This is not what divides contemporary probabilists into the objective and subjective schools. That division is accomplished by the question whether there are objective grounds for the correctness of probability judgments. The subjectivists say that there need not be such grounds, and that probability judgments thus need not be empirically meaningful in the verificationist sense, or perhaps that they are not judgments at all, but rather expressions of attitude. (...) (See [11], pp. 156-198). The objectivists say that the truth conditions for probability judgments are such as the frequencies of traits in populations or the existence of propensities. Objectivists and subjectivists are, however, agreed that there are no objective chances. (See [2], pp. 141, 142; and [12], §16).There is a Humean argument against the reality of chance which depends mainly upon the premise that we have no experience of it. (shrink)

Ramsey's “Facts and Propositions” is terse, allusive, and dense. The paper is far from easy to understand. The present essay is an effort, largely following Brian Loar's account,1 to say what Ramsey's goal is, to spell out what he took to be the means to accomplish it, and to show how those means, at least in the terms of F&P, cannot accomplish that end. I also contrast Loar's own account of judgment, explicitly modeled on Ramsey's view, with the latter. The (...) exercise is not at all academic. Loar makes clear the striking depth and originality of Ramsey's insights. (shrink)

The interpretation of the calculus of probability as a logic of partial belief has at least two advantages: it makes the assignment of probabilities plausible in cases where classical frequentist interpretations must find such assignments meaningless, and it gives a clear meaning to partial belief and to consistency of partial belief.

behaviour from the rival manufacturer. We consider the case where franchise fees can be used to extract retailers' surplus. We show that vertical separation is in the collective, as well as individual, interest of manufacturers, and hence facilitates some collusion in the simple setting..

This fine book is a comprehensive and careful survey of the current situation in the methodology of economics. It is directed primarily at economists and students of economics. Indeed, the economist who reads it with the care it deserves will have a better grip on matters of methodology in economics than most philosophers of science, but philosophers and historians of science will also find the work rewarding and interesting. Though a few examples may be beyond the economically untutored reader, they (...) are not essential to the exposition, and other examples are accessible and enlightening: the brief discussions of Paul Samuelson's revealed preference approach and Julie Nelson's criticism of Gary Becker's work on economics of the family are good instances. Chapter 2, “The Methodological Tradition in Economics,” is a calm and brief introduction to its subject.Until quite recently practicing scientists, economists among them, and philosophers of science presupposed several strong theses about science and knowledge: that all genuine knowledge is scientific; that the objects of this knowledge are eternal and free of context; that all knowledge and all science is one, unified at least by a common scientific method; that, though not infallible, this method is progressive—it approaches truth as a limit—and operates in independence of the nonscientific beliefs and values of its practitioners. These principles cannot be presupposed today. Those who would accept any of them must be ready to meet serious criticisms. The import of this contemporary Methodenstreit as it affects economics is the dominant theme of Reflection without Rules. The reader is left with the conviction that the science of economics and the study of its methodology are inseparable and that it was only dedicated and myopic attachment to The Legend that kept this messy business at bay. Nor can there be any return to the age of innocent division of labor—economists to economics, philosophers to methodology.There are too many topics treated in the book even to list in a brief review. There are calm and clear accounts of Thomas Kuhn's work; of logical positivism ; of the deep effects of the collapse of The Legend on Walrasian equilibrium models; of Daniel Hausman's work on the nature of economics; of the strong program, which strives to reduce scientific activity to the effects of the social interests of scientists; of Alvin Goldman's reliabilism and social epistemology ; and of the important differences between pre‐ and post‐Legend views of science and knowledge.The question of values in science arises for economics in a special and pointed way, for economics studies many sorts of values. It also, at least since Adam Smith, deals in the unintended collective consequences of individual intentional actions. Economics evidently consists in the largely unintended consequences of the intentional actions of individual economists, and, once The Legend is discredited, economics is seen to navigate the very currents that it studies. This opens the door to the virtuous possibility of self‐criticism in tune with the strong naturalism of contemporary epistemology.It is not the least virtue of Reflection without Rules that its author wears his impressive erudition gracefully and well. The book is sophisticated and at the same time naive in the best sense. It will fortunately be the standard reference for work in the methodology of economics for some time to come. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.3 (2001) 225-244 [Access article in PDF] Sophistic Travel: Inheriting the Simulacrum Through Plato's "The Sophist" John Muckelbauer Was it not Plato himself who pointed out the direction for the reversal of Platonism? ------Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense 1. Developing an itinerary: guides and lineages A single question marks our departure, a question that, while apparently straightforward, has assumed so many shapes and disguises (...) that it would not be unjust to claim it has infected all of Western history. In its current manifestation, however, we will take our cue from Plato in phrasing it thus: What is a Sophist? When Plato first formulated the question in these terms, he well understood that its self-evident simplicity could be deceptive and that its effects might proliferate uncontrollably. As Jacques Derrida comments, "The question of what the Sophists really were is an enormous question" (Olson 17). In Plato's case, attempting to "hunt down" the Sophist led from a disturbing journey through the world of images to an unsettling encounter with the existence of nonbeing.Of course, the issue of Plato's distaste for sophistry is well-covered ground, so well-covered, in fact, that nearly all contemporary rhetorical scholarship that attempts to assert the value of sophistic rhetoric does so by reproducing an antagonism between sophistry and Platonism (see, e.g., Poulokos, Jarratt, Vickers). 1 A particularly interesting example, simply because it is so persistently skeptical of most conventional assumptions about sophistry, is G. B. Kerford's The Sophistic Movement. It is an excellent and careful treatment of sophistry in which he insists on the importance of approaching the Sophists without prior assumptions as to their relationship to the history of thought or politics--something that he shows has been far too prevalent in previous appropriations. Nevertheless, in his treatment of Plato's dialogue the Sophist, he writes, "It is clear that [Plato's] characterizations [End Page 225] in the Sophist constitute an outright condemnation" (5). Given the wealth of readings of different dialogues that express sentiments similar to Kerford's, the antagonistic structure of Platonic-Sophistic relations is apparently quite certain; it is something we know.It is also true that as a result of the many forays across the terrain of this antagonism, we know a great many other things about the relationship between Plato and sophistry. We know, for instance, that Plato was an idealist who abhorred the Sophist's interest in practical discursive wisdom. We know, as well, that Plato was a reactionary aristocrat who resented the Sophists for selling speeches and encouraging democracy. Without question, the many trips across this oppositional territory have been important expeditions for both Philosophy and Rhetoric, providing each discourse with a sense of its own distinct identity. 2 At very least, the mutual suspicion that often characterizes contemporary relations between these two disciplines is symptomatic of our inheritance of this Platonic mantra.It is, of course, quite difficult to avoid repeating this mantra of opposition between Philosophy and Rhetoric. Any attempt to champion one of the terms--even the supposedly underprivileged one, Rhetoric--overtly reproduces this opposition. But so too do most efforts to reduce one term to the other (i.e., claims stating that Philosophy is inevitably rhetorical) insofar as they must begin with the assumption that they know what rhetoric is; in other words, they must begin with what may schematically be characterized as a philosophical relation to rhetoric and to philosophy. Said differently, the two common disciplinary strategies that generate the opposition between rhetoric and philosophy, (1) championing the Sophists over Plato and (2) claiming that Plato is rhetorical, both effectively privilege the very notion of philosophy that they are attempting to discredit, i.e., one that is based on the notion of a preexistent, recognizable, and knowable identity, a fundamental truth.Given the renewed scholarly interest in the Sophists as early rhetoricians, it is curious that very few and very brief rhetorical engagements exist with the Platonic dialogue the Sophist--largely, one suspects, either because everyone already "knows" that it contains yet another... (shrink)