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Chance and structure: an essay on the logical foundations of probability
New York: Oxford University Press (1988)
Abstract
Discussing the relations between logic and probability, this book compares classical 17th- and 18th-century theories of probability with contemporary theories, explores recent logical theories of probability, and offers a new account of probability as a part of logic.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Intuitive and reflective inferences.Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber - 2009 - In Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 149--170.
The supertask argument against countable additivity.Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):619-628.
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