Heidegger, M. Andenken an Max Scheler.--Gadamer, H.-G. Max Scheler, der Verschwender.--Plessner, H. Erinnerungen an Max Scheler.--Kuhn, H. Max Scheler als Faust.--Dempf, A. Schelers System christlicher Geistphilosophie als Grundlage einer religiösen Erneuerung.--Scheler, M. Neun Briefe an Karl Muth.--Rombach, H. Die Erfahrung der Freiheit.--Landgrebe, L. Geschichtsphilosophische Perspektiven bei Scheler und Husserl.--Theunissen, M. Wettersturm und Stille.--Good, P. Anschauung und Sprache.--Welsch, W. Mit Scheler.--Avé-Lallement, E. Die phänomenologische Reduktion in der Philosophie Max Schelers.--Gehlen, A. Rückblick auf die Anthropologie (...) Max Schelers.--Schoeps, H. J. Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos.--Ströker, E. Der Tod im Denken Max Schelers.--Wyss, D. und Huppmann, G. Die Bedeutung Max Schelers für die Medizinische Anthropologie.--Lieber, H.-J. Bemerkungen zur Wissenssoziologie Max Schelers.--Fetscher, I. Max Schelers Auffassung von Krieg und Frieden.--Bochenski, J. M. Ist die Sprache Schelers in eine analytische übersetzbar? (shrink)

Peter Spader has written a magisterial study on Max Scheler, one of phenomenology’s earliest and greatest figures, whose theory of ethical personalism has become a major voice in the formulation of phenomenological ethics today. Spader follows Scheler’s use of the classic phenomenological approach, by means of which he presented a fresh view of values, feelings, and the person, and thereby staked out a new approach in ethics. Spader recreates the logic of Scheler’s quest, revealing the basis of (...) his thought and the reasons for his dramatic changes of direction. This remarkable study provides a framework that allows us to understand Scheler’s insights in the context of their dynamic evolution of his thought. It corrects imbalances in the presentation of his ideas and defends Scheler against key misunderstandings and criticisms. In short, Spader’s work continues the process of developing Scheler’s pioneering theory of ethical personalism. (shrink)

Is 'n transendentale kritiek religieus bepaald? deur V. Brümmer. -- Constitution and creativity in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, by A. L. Conradie. -- Studium Generale, deur H. J. De Vleeschauwer. -- Sociology of law and its philosophical foundtions, by H. Dooyeweerd. -- Beginvrae en antwoorde in der Wysbegeerte, deur P. G. W. Du Plesis. -- Max Scheler's concern with the highest perfection, by S. I. M. Du Plessis. -- Christelike wetenskap, highest perfection, by S. I. M. Deu Plessis. (...) -- Christelike wetenskap, deur B. Duvenage. -- Malan's critical study, by H. Hart. -- Raakpunte vir 'n dialoog met 'n Christelike Wysbegeerte, deur A. M. T. Meyer. -- Nuwe gedagtes oor die begrip Natuurwet, deur A. H. Murray. -- Die voorwaardes vir die uitbou van 'n wysgerige antropologie, deur C. K. Oberholzer. -- De structuur van feit-en-betekenis, deur K. J. Popma. -- The relation of the arts to the presentation of the truth, by C. G. Seerveld. -- Gezag en vrijheid in het licht van Gods Woord, deur J. Stellingwerff. -- Voorveronderstellings vir 'n filosogie van die opvoeding, deur J. A. L. Taljaard. -- Objektiwiteit, sekularisasie en geskiedenis, deur N. T. Van der Merwe. -- Etiek: wetenskap van relasies, deur S. P. Van der Walt. -- Wetten en feiten, deur C. A. Van Peursen. -- Enige opmerkingen over entiteiten, deur H. Van Riessen. -- Richard Kroner on Herman Dooyeweerd, by C. Van Til. -- De mens in de taalkunde, deur P. A. Verburg, -- Enkele motieven van het anti-militair pacifisme, deur S, U. Zuidema. -- Publications of prof. dr. H. G. Stoker. Publikasies van prof. dr. H. G. Stoker (p. 303-311). (shrink)

Two distinct attitudes have been adopted by investigators in the field of the sociology of knowledge. One of them may be called speculative; the other, empirical. The central interest of an investigator having the speculative attitude lies in developing a theory of the sociology of knowledge. The central interest of investigators having the empirical attitude lies in finding out or explaining concrete phenomena; the theory is employed, implicitly or explicity, for this purpose. The existence of the two attitudes may be (...) in part explained, as far as the German sociology of knowledge is concerned, by reference to the history of this school, which has grown out of and has been determined by a Marxist and materialistic philosophy, and especially by the use of this philosophy as a political instrument in the struggle of the emerging proletariat against the bourgeoisie. This statement, however, must be supplemented by a short location of the four most important contributors to the theory of the German sociology of knowledge. Max Scheler approaches the problem phenomenologically; he was the first and only one to ask the fundamental question, “What is knowledge?” Karl Mannheim, though markedly influenced by the Marxist viewpoint, particularly by Lukács, seems to me more adequately characterized by stressing his development from a more exclusively speculative to a more decidedly empirical attitude, which latter is especially evident in his most recent book, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. Alexander von Schelting's main contribution is his thorough logical analysis of Mannheim's theory in the light of Max Weber's methodology. Ernst Grünwald has given the most complete survey of the forerunners, the history, and the various contributions of the sociology of knowledge. These four thinkers are indirectly dependent on the historically determined emphasis of the movement on ideology in that they remain on the level of a theoretical discussion without arriving at factual research. (shrink)

Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) is most often remembered for his role as a teacher of phenomenology or as a philosopher of law, yet the range of subjects covered in his surviving published and unpublished works is diverse. As scholars such as Kimberley Baltzer-Jaray have argued, Reinach's contributions to philosophy, and in particular his influence on the early phenomena logical movement, have been underestimated in the past. It is of both historical and philosophical importance, therefore, to identify and recognise the contributions that (...) Reinach made across the many fields his works touch upon, including that of ethics. This thesis argues that Reinach made a number of significant contributions towards the development of early phenomenological ethics, and although his works contain neither a complete nor a comprehensive systematic theory of ethics, this is no reason to overlook or dismiss the importance of his work in this field . The thesis demonstrates that Reinach's works on ethics were original; that they influenced other early phenomenologists in the development of their ethical theories; and, ultimately, that they were and remain valuable additions to the field, discussing value-theory, the problem ofnormativity, motivation, freedom and responsibility, and more. This thesis comprises two parts. Part one examines and assesses Reinach's contribution against his immediate philosophical background incorporating a discussion of how Reinach's works on ethics fit into his body of work as well in relation to other contemporary philosophers (e.g., Brentano, Husserl, Scheler, Stein) who advanced the development of early phenomenological ethics. To support the interpretation, part two of the thesis contains appendices of three relevant extracts from Reinach 's published and unpublished works, translated for the first time into English (with original German text supplied). These translations are also intended to be ofvalue in making Reinach's works on ethics more accessible to English-speaking scholarship in the future. (shrink)

This book is a primer of contemporary philosophy of religion. It introduces in non-technical simplicity the four basic philosophical options which can inform a modern religious posture. The options are: process philosophy, phenomenology, language analysis, and existentialism. There is an introductory essay by the editor which describes the attitudes of Barth, Brunner, Bultmann, and Tillich toward philosophy and its relation to theology. Hartshorne's essay on process philosophy sets forth the bare bones of his bipolar theism and presents his case that (...) it is necessary for the creatures to contribute to the enrichment of God. The phenomenology article is written by Quentin Lauer, S.J. He deals briefly with Husserl's methodology and its applicability to the investigation of "religious consciousness." He describes four styles of phenomenology of religion represented by James, Van der Leeuw, Otto, and Scheler. He also discusses briefly Teilhard de Chardin. In the next essay, Frederick Ferré uses Socrates as his point of departure for showing the relevance of language analysis for policing religious discourse, both theistic and christological. He is skeptical, however, as to whether language analysis can be considered a resource for Christian thought. He points out that because it is in the Socratic tradition it can better serve as a midwife. John Macquarrie contributes the chapter on existentialism, showing its anthropocentrism and its reluctance to develop a doctrine of God. All the essays, originally the Alden-Tuthill lectures at Chicago Theological Seminary, raise provocative, important, and basic questions. They would serve well as an introductory text or as a catalyst for class discussion.—S. O. H. (shrink)

This is Volume Six of Scheler's Gesammelte Werke. The contents of this volume were published in 1922 in four small volumes, corresponding to the four groupings of the present edition: Moralia, Nation und Weltanschauung, Christentum und Gesellschaft, Zusätze. Corrigenda and comprehensive indices have been added.—H. C.

The author intends this book to be a theoretical contribution to the sociology of knowledge. Her main effort is to isolate and describe what she takes to be four irreducible systems of knowledge which dictate, for those who share in them, "thinking and action concerned with the nature of the world." The four systems of knowledge, which she calls magical, religious, mystical and scientific, are connected to specific types of thought. There are three basic types of thought connection: empirical, rational, (...) and abstractive. Empirical thought establishes connections at the purely observational level, whereas rational thought, of which mathematical and metaphysical systems are examples, makes connections only at the theoretic level. By contrast, abstractive thinking connects the observational and theoretic levels. Magical thought is purely empirical. Mystical thought accepts the evidence of empirical observation, but seeks to abstract the individual's thought to a theoretic end state which is not rational. Religious knowledge combines rational connections among concepts with abstractive connection of concepts to observables, but the religious concepts are not identified with any empirical objects. Finally, scientific thought combines rational, empirical and abstractive thought. Each of these four systems of knowledge has a characteristic conception of power. In a magical system, power consists of the ability to gain observable ends. For mystical knowledge systems, power is the individual's achievement of escape from empiricism and rationalism. In religious systems individuals may have authority, but power belongs exclusively to "god." In scientific systems of knowledge, power "consists of ability to theoretically anticipate or explain empirical transformations." Likewise, each of the four systems of knowledge is related in some way to certain social situations. In the light of these theoretical distinctions, the author examines a number of theories and developments in social science and the history of thought. She finds Malinowski's distinctions between magic, religion and science quite inadequate. Weber's sociology of religion fares better. She invokes the development of planetary astronomy, of mechanics, and of evolutionary biology to illustrate her definition of science. Finally, the problem of knowledge in the modern world is seen to be due not to an overemphasis on science as she defines it, but to the persistence of magical thought in the political, economic and social spheres. Though the author's efforts at definition are interesting, this is in many ways a difficult and unsatisfying book. Written in a lapidary style, which is lacking both in grace and connectives, the book utilizes historical and sociological data very selectively. No reference is made to what has been done in the sociology of knowledge by Scheler, Mannheim, Berger and Luckmann. Finally, the book bristles with questionable epistemological assumptions and with statements which seem quite incompatible with the findings of recent work in the study of religion.--H. F. (shrink)

Fifty-eight years ago Max Scheler, one of the founders of modern philosophical anthropology, wrote: “Man is more of a problem to himself at the present time than ever before in all recorded history. ... the increasing multiplicity of the special sciences that deal with man, valuable as they are, tend to hide his nature more than they reveal it.”1 In 1944, some sixteen years later, Ernst Cassirer comments that even though “no former age was ever in such a favorable (...) position with regard to the sources of our knowledge of human nature,” we are still looking for a clue which will provide “real insight into the general character of human culture.”2 In his famous 1958 book, Irrational Man,3 William Barrett looked to existentialism to recover the whole and integral, suffering and dying human being from the abstract image of humankind as logical operators dominant in modern philosophy. However, in a new book William Barrett concludes that the concrete human self was not in fact recovered in existentialism and laments its disappearance in modern thought. He talks of the Death of the Soul.4 I would add: and Elimination of the Body. (shrink)

This survey first deals with The Downfall of Values, a collection of essays by Max Scheler, late Professor of Philosophy at Cologne. It then summarizes a small book on The Controversy Concerning Causation in Recent Physics, by Hugo Bergmann, for which Einstein has written a preface. Next it considers Georg Stieler's inquiry into The Individual and the Mob. Finally, it deals with Wilhelm Worringer's contribution to æsthetics in hision and Empathy.

This little volume is a critical introduction to the phenomenological scene through discussion of the ideas of some of its more prominent exponents and an extensive analysis of the thought of its founder. About two thirds of the book is devoted to Husserl. It traces the evolution of Husserl's philosophy from an early interest in the psychological presuppositions of number, to the phenomenological analysis of acts of meaning, and finally to his unsuccessful attempt to construct a comprehensive system embracing the (...) presuppositions of knowledge in general. Previous acquaintance with Husserl's work is not necessary as Pivcevic gives critical expositions of the main theses of Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic, Logical Investigations, Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Phenomenological Philosophy. He is careful to establish particular philosophic problems through reference to the views of other philosophers, and on different issues the position of Husserl is compared and contrasted to those of Frege, Brentano, Russell, Descartes, the positivists, the classical Empiricists and Kant. The presentation of Sartre's views includes brief discussions of European romanticism, Hegel, and Marx. Besides Sartre, Scheler and Heidegger are discussed to illustrate differing applications of the phenomenological method. The final chapter is a brief critique of the limitations of this method: the problem of "other egos," the marked tendency to anti-rationalism, and the failure to achieve its aim of a presupposition-less philosophy. Pivcevic is not totally sympathetic with the phenomenologists, which is perhaps what makes possible this critical exposition of their views. But at times one wishes his clear prose would follow a philosopher's thought further into its more obscure dimensions. His criticisms are often the standard, uninspired objections to what are generally accepted as unjustified excesses of existentialist thought. Nevertheless, this is an excellent introduction to phenomenology and especially valuable for its exposition of the thought of Edmund Husserl.--M. S. H. (shrink)

Der Band besteht aus Aufsätzen und Essays, die dem Thema «Begegnung zwischen der deutschen und polnischen Philosophie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert» gewidmet sind. Viele polnische Philosophen haben an das Ideengut der deutschen Philosophie angeknüpft. In der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts genossen Kant, Hegel und seine Schule in Polen einen großen Ruf. In der zweiten Hälfte des 19.Jhs stand das Thema der Werte und der Philosophie der Kultur im Vordergrund. Mit der durch F. Nietzsche aufgeworfenen Problematik der Notwendigkeit einer (...) radikalen Umwertung aller Werte haben sich in dieser Zeit viele Philosophen in Polen auseinandergesetzt. Im 20. Jahrhundert ist die deutsche Philosophie nicht nur in Ingardens Phänomenologie, sondern auch in der analytischen Philosophie der weltberühmten «Lemberg-Warschauer Schule» und sogar in der katholischen Philosophie von K. Wojtyła und J. Tischner präsent, die an die Philosophie von Kant, Scheler und Heidegger anknüpfen. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

This paper discusses Max Scheler’s early works, written between 1899 and 1906 in a neo-Kantian context. The very little attention the literature paid to them was almost always guided by the only aim to single the themes out which can be used as signs of Scheler’s future „conversion“ to phenomenology. In consequence of this predominant approach, the neo- Kantianism that characterizes Scheler’s early works has been treated as a vague notion and never examined as such. The paper (...) specifies this notion through an examination of Scheler’s early works which shows their most significant theoretical debts (to R. Eucken, W. Windelband and particularly to H. Cohen) and the questions they deal with, i.e. the relation between knowledge and morality as different kinds of objective forms of experience; the methodological problem in philosophy; the development of a transcendental logic as general science of objectivity. (shrink)

RESUMENEl artículo estudia primero el paradigma religioso de Scheler, el ético de Jankélévitch y el ontológico de Rombach de la alegría, intentando en cada caso despejar los rasgos formales esenciales que definen el fenómeno en todos ellos. Redefine luego estos rasgos valiéndose de las nociones de sincronía y sintonía y muestra el trasfondo estético propio de los diferentes paradigmas de la alegría. Finalmente se refiere al enamoramiento como un modo abierto a todo hombre de experimentar la alegría en su (...) esencia.PALABRAS CLAVEALEGRÍA, SENTIDO, SINCRONÍA, ABSTRACTThe article first deals with Scheler’s religious, Jankélévitch’s ethical, and Rombach’s ontological paradigm on happiness, and describes the essential formal traits that define the phenomenon in the three patterns. Second, it articulates these traits by resorting to the notions of synchrony and syntony, and shows the aesthetic backgound proper to the different paradigms of happiness. Finally, the article refers to the act of falling in love as a mood open to every human being in order to experience happiness in its essential nature.KEYWORDSHAPPINESS, MEANING, SYNCHRONY, GRACE. (shrink)

Phenomenological reduction as a philosophical conversion (periagoge) -/- Während Husserl in den Ideen I die Reduktion als eine neue „Methode“ des Denkens, d. h. als eine „epistemologische“ Reduktion versteht, schlägt Scheler eine Reduktion als eine „Tèchne“ der Umbildung vor, durch die der Mensch seiner exzentrischen Stellung in der Welt Gestalt zu geben sucht. Mich interessiert an diesem Zitat vor allem der Gebrauch des griechischen Terminus „Tèchne“. Was Scheler damit bezeichnet, hat offensichtlich nichts mit dem zu tun, was wir (...) heute unter dem Begriff der Technik verstehen. Er spricht eben von einer Kunst „des inneren Handelns“. Meines Erachtens verweist Scheler durch diesen griechischen Begriff auf Platons Gedanken. Für diese These kann man sich bereits auf eine Stelle aus der mittleren Phase im Denken Schelers stützen, in der er nämlich die phänomenologische Reduktion als den moralischen Akt darstellt, dem der „platonische Aufschwung“ (Vom Wesen der Philosophie, GW V, 67) zugrunde liegt. Es ist nun geradezu dieser „platonische Aufschwung“, der im Nachlass ausdrücklich als eine „Tèchne“ (Nachlass, GW XI, 118) beschrieben wird. Was heißt nun in diesem Kontext tèchne bei Platon? Schelers Gebrauch des griechischen Terminus tèchne für die Bezeichnung der phänomenologischen Reduktion erinnert sehr an die tèchne tês periagogês im Höhlengleichnis Platons, durch die die Gefangenen aus der Höhle hinausgehen können. Diese tèchne versteht Platon als einen Bildungsprozess des Menschen; er lernt dadurch, seinen Blick auf das Gute hin zu lenken, damit seine Seinsweise in der Welt zurechtgerückt werden könne. Es geht also um eine conversio oder Umkehrung der eigenen Positionalität in der Welt, die den Übergang vom Leben zum guten Leben zustande bringen kann. Diese tèchne ist grundlegend für das Verständnis der paideía bei Platon, die sich nicht mit einer bloßen Übertragung von Informationen begnügt, sondern vielmehr nach einer periagogé (Umkehrung) der ganzen Seele strebt. Es muss also – wie Sokrates sagt – eine besondere „Kunst der Umkehrung [tèchne tês periagogês]“ geben, die lehrt, auf welche Weise am leichtesten und wirksamsten die Seele umgewendet werden kann, und zwar unter Berücksichtigung dessen, dass sie bereits sehen kann, aber es alleine nicht schafft, das Gesicht zu wenden, „wohin es solle“ (Politeia, VII, 518 d). (shrink)

Spader identifies and addresses in this work three enigmas that continue to overshadow the merits of Scheler's ethical personalism (9-10): (a) the lack of phenomenological evidences, (b) the sudden change of path from ethics to religion and metaphysics, and (c) the movement from theism to panentheism. Spader's book is thus an attempt to rid Scheler's ethical theory of its illusive reputation by making explicit the rationale behind the obscurities that Scheler seems to have intentionally embraced.

Of the nature and origin of the mind, by B. de Spinoza.--Spinoza and the theory of organism, by H. Jonas.--Man a machine, and The natural history of the soul, by J. O. de la Mettrie.--On the first ground of the distinction of regions in space, and What is orientation in thinking? by I. Kant.--Soul and body, by J. Dewey.--The philosophical concept of a human body, by D. C. Long.--Are persons bodies? By B. A. O. Williams.--Lived body, environment, and ego, by (...) M. Scheler.--Metaphysical journal, and A metaphysical diary, by G. Marcel.--The body, by J.-P. Sartre.--The spatiality of the lived body and motility, by M. Merleau-Ponty.--Anthropodology: man a-foot, by R. M. Griffith.--Man and his body, by H. Plügge.--The nobility of sight: a study in the phenomenology of the senses, by H. Jonas.--Born to see, bound to behold: reflections on the function of upright posture in the esthetic attitude, by E. W. Straus.--Selected reading (p. [363]-367). (shrink)

This paper examines a general political problem of how to balance the need for concentrated power in the hands of the state—which is needed for effective governance—against the egalitarian desire to equalize power. It distinguishes between ‘positive’ political power appropriately wielded by the state, and ‘negative’ power that individuals may use to protect their own activities and interests from excessive or illegitimate state action and argue for institutions and practices designed to equalize power by ‘leveling up’ the powerless to match (...) the strong. (shrink)

The article proposes to defend the basic income as a pillar of a socio-cultural revolution. This is done exclusively from a literature review and articulation of different works. The introduction section presents the characteristics of a basic income. Section 2 brings how it would mitigate current capitalism problems, which are: increasing inequality, lack of equality of opportunity, means tested social security and its bureaucracy, narrow definition of paid work and future of labor. On Section 3, the author does a literature (...) review to address two common objections against basic income: the cost, and potential labor decrease. Section 4 presents the author argument on three pillars of the socio-cultural revolution: austerity, active citizenship, and solidarity. The article ends with a general conclusion. (shrink)

Conventionality and aptness are two dimensions of metaphorical sentences thought to play an important role in determining how quick and easy it is to process a metaphor. Conventionality reflects the familiarity of a metaphor whereas aptness reflects the degree to which a metaphor vehicle captures important features of a metaphor topic. In recent years it has become clear that operationalizing these two constructs is not as simple as asking naïve raters for subjective judgments. It has been found that ratings of (...) aptness and conventionality are highly correlated, which has led some researchers to pursue alternative methods for measuring the constructs. Here, in four experiments, we explore the underlying reasons for the high correlation in ratings of aptness and conventionality, and question the construct validity of various methods for measuring the two dimensions. We find that manipulating the processing fluency of a metaphorical sentence by means of familiarization to similar senses of the metaphor (“in vivo conventionalization”) influences ratings of the sentence's aptness. This misattribution may help explain why subjective ratings of aptness and conventionality are highly correlated. In addition, we find other reasons to question the construct validity of conventionality and aptness measures: for instance, we find that conventionality is context dependent and thus not attributable to a metaphor vehicle alone, and we find that ratings of aptness take more into account than they should. (shrink)