En este trabajo intento ofrecer una visión de conjunto del programa ético filosófico diseñado por Ricardo Maliandi, y puede entenderse como una introducción básica a sus principales ideas y propuestas. Esta colaboración se enmarca en un proyecto mayor que estoy realizando, referido a la filosofía práctica de Maliandi, la cual incluye complementariamente una antropología filosófica y una ética. Trataré de cumplir con el objetivo apuntado al principio articulando mi exposición del siguiente modo: inicialmente, reconstruyendo panorámicamente las nociones fundamentales de la (...) reflexión teórica que lleva a cabo la ética convergente ; luego, resumiendo una reflexión de índole teórica que ilustra la originalidad y profundidad de su pensamiento, y algunas problemáticas prácticas de nuestro tiempo a las que la ética de Maliandi presta atención y responde ; y finalmente, compartiendo una valoración crítica de los aportes referidos. In this essay, I try to provide an overview of the program of philosophical ethics designed by Ricardo Maliandi, which can be understood as a basic introduction to his main ideas and proposals. This work is part of a larger project I am working on, based on the practical philosophy of Maliandi, which includes a philosophical anthropology and an ethics. I will try to fulfil the objective by organi-zing my presentation this way. First, I rebuild the fundamentals of the convergent ethics ; then, I summarize a reflection that illustrates the originality and depth of his thought as well as some practical problems of our time to which the ethics of Maliandi pays attention and answers ; and finally, I share a critical evaluation of the mentioned contributions. (shrink)

The problem of the applicability of moral principles is one of the most significant issues of practical reflection. With Kant's practical philosophy, the ethical demands of universality and individuality came to seem incompatible. After reviewing the outlooks of Apel and Simmel, who both offer paradigmatic answers to the “rigorism” of the categorical imperative, this article presents the issue from the perspective of Maliandi's “Convergent Ethics”. It suggests that Maliandi's recognition of an “a priori of conflictivity” and of the bi-dimensional character (...) of reason surmounts the shortages of both Apel's and Simmel's philosophies. (shrink)

Mi intención en este trabajo es doble, y se corresponde con las partes de la exposición que ofrezco. En principio, reconstruyo los argumentos que permiten afirmar, siguiendo a la Scienza Nuova, que el lenguaje y la política se hallan fuertemente interrelacionados. Posteriormente, de manera crítica, pondero algunas interpretaciones que aproximan el pensamiento de Vico sobre la cuestión referida a la filosofía del lenguaje contemporánea. La tesis que defiendo es la de que el lenguaje no expresa meramente una peculiar visión del (...) mundo, sino que es el medio indispensable para la creación y modificación de las instituciones del mundo civil.Palabras clave: institución, lenguaje, universal, política, acción.My intention in this work is double, and corresponds with the parts of the exposition that I offer. In principle, I reconstruct the arguments that they allow to affirm, following the Scienza Nuova, which the language and the politics are strongly interrelated. Later, in a critical way, I consider some interpretations that bring Vico’s thought near on the question referred to the contemporary philosophy of the language. The thesis that I defend is it of which the language does not express merely a peculiar vision of the world, but it is the indispensable way for the creation and modification of the institutions of the civil world.Keywords: Institution, Language, Universal, Politics, Action. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se articula en dos partes; en la primera reconstruyo el tema del mismo, a saber: la cuestión de la proletarización y la politización de los intelectuales, tal como fue planteada por W. Benjamin; en la segunda, estudio dicha problemática desde algunos conceptos centrales de dos marcos teóricos para los cuales aquélla no fue pensada, la filosofía de G. Simmel y la sociología del conocimiento de K. Mannheim. Pongo en relación con éstos además algunas referencias de la filosofía (...) del lenguaje contemporánea. El objetivo de todo ello no es el de obtener una nueva respuesta a la problemática, cuanto reconstruir las condiciones que la posibilitarían. (shrink)

This work emphasizes the influence in Apel of the named Critique of Meaning developed by Wittgenstein and Peirce. We reconstruct the foundations of the recognitionof a linguistic a priori, and of the semiotic-anthropological radicalization, that leads to the conception that man can be understood as thought-sign. It also shows the way Apel believes that such thought-sign is inscribed in the context of a supraindividualenviroment, where it develops its own individuality. From that approach, a transformation of the subject function in the (...) interpreter function of the signs has to be done in order to create a new answer to the problem of intersubjectivity. (shrink)

El trabajo destaca el influjo que ejerce en Apel la llamada crítica del sentido desarrollada por Wittgenstein y Peirce. Reconstruimos los fundamentos del reconocimiento de un a priori lingüístico y de la radicalización semiótico-antropológica que conduce a la concepción de que el hombre puede entend..

En el presente trabajo caracterizo operativamente el pensar temprano de Heidegger como una “filosofía de la intersubjetividad”. Esto me permite habilitar un contraste de su aporte frente a lo que define como “metafísica de la subjetividad”: se trata de un horizonte filosófico que Heidegger critica, y que en este trabajo reconstruyo prestando especial atención a la fenomenología de Husserl. Este cotejo puede llevarse a cabo circunscribiendo el programa ontológico-hermenéutico de _Ser y tiempo_ a los términos del estudio preparatorio que antecede (...) a la pregunta por el ser, y de comprenderlo como una analítica de la coexistencia. (shrink)

El trabajo muestra cómo algunos representantes de la ética filosófica contemporánea no han salvado las dificultades que inauguró el imperativo categórico kantiano, derivando en una unilateralización de los principios de individualización o de universalización. Que esto es así, y que puede ser corregido sin excluir o postergar ninguno de esas exigencias es un aporte relevante de la “ética convergente” desarrollada por el filósofo argentino Ricardo Maliandi. En este escrito reconstruyo aspectos fundamentales de aquellas dificultades y de este programa de investigación (...) desde la perspectiva de la consideración antagónica de lo individual y lo universal. Se verá que esta oposición es, para Maliandi, sólo un aspecto de la conflictividad del ethos, y de qué modo su esclarecimiento se alcanza mostrando, por medio de un recurso novedoso en el análisis ético, que los principios no sólo chocan entre ellos, sino que también se oponen a otros sentidos que le son inherentes en lo que ordenan. El trabajo finaliza con una valoración personal acerca del aporte realizado por la ética convergente. (shrink)

In “Reliabilism Leveled” Jonathan Vogel (2000) provides a strong case against epistemic theories that stress the importance of tracking/sensitivity conditions. A tracking/sensitivity condition is to be understood as some version of the following counterfactual: (T) ~p oÆ ~Bp (T) says that s would not believe p, if p were false. Among other things, tracking is supposed to express the external relation that explains why some justified true beliefs are not knowledge. Champions of the condition include Robert Nozick (1981) and, more (...) recently, Keith DeRose (1995). To my knowledge, the earliest formulation of the counterfactual condition is found in Fred Dretske’s conclusive reasons condition (1971), which says, s would not have had the reason that she does for believing p, if p were false. Vogel contends that any such counterfactual condition on knowledge will render the theory of knowledge too strong. He believes that there is at least some possible reflective knowledge that cannot satisfy the counterfactual--viz., the possible knowledge that one does not believe falsely that p. The alleged impossibility of such reflective knowledge is taken by Vogel to be a decisive objection to the tracking theories advocated by Dretske, Nozick, DeRose1 and others. The criticism finds its roots in Vogel’s earlier work (1987), and recurs in papers by Ernest Sosa (2002, 1996). Sosa suggests that the externalist idea behind tracking is on target, but that Nozick’s counterfactual is a misbegotten regimentation of the idea. In its place Sosa offers his own counterfactual “safety” condition, which he feels properly captures the externalist idea. Sosa’s counterfactual is not the topic of this paper. I mention it only to point out that the criticism that constitutes the subject of my investigation is meant to do a lot of work. In Sosa’s 1 case the criticism is meant to motivate his own counterfactual analysis, and in Vogel’s case the criticism promises to be a silver bullet against a theory that has recently found renewed life in the work of Keith DeRose.. (shrink)

Since the publication of David Lewis’ Counterfactuals, the standard line on subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) has been that they are vacuously true. That is, a conditional of the form ‘If p were the case, q would be the case’ is trivially true whenever the antecedent, p, is impossible. The primary justification is that Lewis’ semantics best approximates the English subjunctive conditional, and that a vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant theory. Another justification (...) derives from the classical lore than if an impossibility were true, then anything goes. In this paper we defend non-vacuism, the view that counterpossibles are sometimes non-vacuously true and sometimes non-vacuously false. We do so while retaining a Lewisian semantics, which is to say, the approach we favor does not require us to abandon classical logic or a similarity semantics. It does however require us to countenance impossible worlds. An impossible worlds treatment of counterpossibles is suggested (but not defended) by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Blackwell, Oxford, 1973), and developed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:325–527, 1997), Kment (Mind 115:261–310, 2006a: Philos Perspect 20:237–302, 2006b), and Vander Laan (In: Jackson F, Priest G (eds) Lewisian themes. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004). We follow this tradition, and develop an account of comparative similarity for impossible worlds. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals. The following putative counter-examples are frequently cited, respectively.

There are communities in which disadvantaged groups experience severe inequality. For instance, poor and indigent families face many difficulties accessing their social rights. Their condition is largely the consequence of the wrong choices of those in power, either historical or more recent choices. The lack of opportunities of these deprived citizens is due to state omissions. In such communities, it is not unusual for homeless members of these particular groups to occupy abandoned lands and build their shelters there. However, almost (...) everywhere, these actions constitute a crime. The typical response to this situation is prosecution and punishment. In this paper, I will defend the occupation of public places as a consequence of the failure of governments to solve the problem of housing, and I will argue that we must distinguish a social claim from a crime and avoid the use of criminal law in these “occupation cases”. I will also argue that our right—as a community—to blame and punish these “squatters” is eroded by the fact that we perpetrated their situation of injustice. (shrink)

The paradox of knowability is a logical result suggesting that, necessarily, if all truths are knowable in principle then all truths are in fact known. The contrapositive of the result says, necessarily, if in fact there is an unknown truth, then there is a truth that couldn't possibly be known. More specifically, if p is a truth that is never known then it is unknowable that p is a truth that is never known. The proof has been used to argue (...) against versions of anti-realism committed to the thesis that all truths are knowable. For clearly there are unknown truths; individually and collectively we are non-omniscient. So, by the main result, it is false that all truths are knowable. The result has also been used to draw more general lessons about the limits of human knowledge. Still others have taken the proof to be fallacious, since it collapses an apparently moderate brand of anti-realism into an obviously implausible and naive idealism. (shrink)

Propõe o ensino das duas linguagens fundamentais - de Língua Materna e de Matemática - através da argumentação para que se articule o ensino de todas as disciplinas. Ao final, faz uma proposta global de avaliação para a escola, centrada em textos argumentativos, transformando a "cola" consentida em consulta necessária.

Dung’s argumentation frameworks have been applied for over twenty years to the analysis of argument justification. This representation focuses on arguments and the attacks among them, abstracting away from other features like the internal structure of arguments, the nature of utterers, the specifics of the attack relation, etc. The model is highly attractive because it reduces most of the complexities involved in argumentation processes. It can be applied to different settings, like the argument evaluation of an individual agent or the (...) case of dialectic disputes between two agents (pro and con), or even in multi-agent collective argumentation. The latter case involves agents with possibly different arguments and/or opinions on how to evaluate them, leading to the possibility of considering multiple sets of arguments and attack relations. Two basic questions can be asked here, namely ‘what to aggregate’ and ‘how to aggregate’. The former concerns what kinds of entities do the agents intend to choose (arguments, attacks, assessments, etc.), while the second one focuses on which aggregation mechanisms yield rational choices (voting on arguments, merging procedures to obtain a common argumentation framework, deliberation processes, etc.). In particular, the question about the rationality of a collective argument choice relates this topic to Social Choice and Judgment Aggregation theories, while its associated strategic issues relate it to Game Theory. The research efforts on the disparate problems elicited by collective argumentation have generated a considerable corpus of literature that deserves an orderly evaluation. This survey is intended as a contribution to that end. (shrink)

ABSTRACTContrary to what some critics of epistemic democracy claim, the association between democracy and truth does not necessarily make the former inhospitable to conflict, contestation, and pluralism. With the help of John Stuart Mill and William James, truth can be interpreted so as to make it compatible with a democratic politics that appreciates conflict and dissent. In some circumstances, truth claims are politically relevant and should become the object of democratic deliberation.

The problems that arise from the presence of self-attacking ar- guments and odd-length cycles of attack within argumentation frameworks are widely recognized in the literature on defeasible argumentation. This paper introduces two simple semantics to capture different intuitions about what kinds of arguments should become justified in such scenarios. These semantics are modeled upon two extensions of argumentation frameworks, which we call sustainable and tolerant. Each one is constructed on the common ground of the powerful concept of admissibility introduced by (...) Dung in [10]. The novelty of this approach consists in viewing the admissibility of a subset of arguments as relative to potentially challenging subsets of arguments. Both sustainable and tolerant semantics are more credulous than preferred semantics (i.e. they justify at least the same arguments, and possibly more). Given certain sufficient conditions they coincide among them as well as with other semantics introduced by Dung. (shrink)

O artigo busca elaborar um conceito de liberdade democrática como desenvolvimento de si, resistência à opressão e à injustiça epistêmica mediante engajamento crítico com as obras de Paulo Freire, Amílcar Cabral e Augusto Boal. No pensamento dos três autores, democracia, liberdade e desenvolvimento de si constituem uma tríade de mútua influência, de sorte que o pleno exercício de quaisquer desses itens é impossível na ausência de qualquer um dos outros dois. Trata-se de mostrar, além disso, a maneira pela qual a (...) opressão é compreendida nos trabalhos dos três pensadores como o oposto da liberdade, e a injustiça epistêmica, como uma dimensão psíquica da opressão. (shrink)

This collection assembles Church's referee reports, Fitch's 1963 paper, and nineteen new papers on the knowability paradox.

In this paper we provide a compact presentation of the verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) and defend it against the sustained attack recently mounted by Alexander Bird (2007). Advocated by such authors as Ilkka Niiniluoto and Theo Kuipers, VS is the view that progress can be explained in terms of the increasing verisimilitude (or, equivalently, truthlikeness, or approximation to the truth) of scientific theories. According to Bird, VS overlooks the central issue of the appropriate grounding of scientific (...) beliefs in the evidence, and it is therefore unable (a) to reconstruct in a satisfactory way some hypothetical cases of scientific progress, and (b) to provide an explanation of the aversion to falsity that characterizes scientific practice. We rebut both of these criticisms and argue that they reveal a misunderstanding of some key concepts underlying VS. (shrink)

Lewis/Stalnaker semantics has it that all counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are vacuously true. Non-vacuism, by contrast, says the truth-values of counterpossibles are affected by the truth-values of the consequents. Some counterpossibles are true, some false. Williamson objects to non-vacuism. He asks us to consider someone who answered ‘11’ to ‘What is 5 + 7?’ but who mistakenly believes that he answered ‘13’. For the non-vacuist, (1) is false, (2) true: (1) If 5 + 7 were 13, x (...) would have got that sum right (2) If 5 + 7 were 13, x would have got that sum wrong Williamson is not persuaded by the initial intuitiveness of such examples: ... they tend to fall apart when thought through. For example, if 5 + 7 were 13 then 5 + 6 would be 12, and so (by another eleven steps) 0 would be 1, so if the number of right answers I gave were 0, the number of right answers I gave would be 1. (2006) That’s the whole argument—much of it implicit. Alan Baker’s critique (2007) of Brogaard and Salerno (2007) prompts us to say something less abbreviated about a less abbreviated form of Wiliamson’s argument. Then we further develop our (2007) counterfactual analysis of essense. (shrink)

Kit Fine (1994. “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1-16) argues that the standard modal account of essence as de re modality is ‘fundamentally misguided’ (p. 3). We agree with his critique and suggest an alternative counterfactual analysis of essence. As a corollary, our counterfactual account lends support to non-vacuism the thesis that counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are not always vacuously true.

I. Non-Trivial Counterpossibles On Lewis’ account, a subjunctive of the form ‘if it were the case that p, it would be the case that q’ (represented as ‘p → q’) is to be given the following rough meta-linguistic truth-conditions1.

Theory change is a central concern in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between two ongoing research programs providing formal treatments of theory change: the (post-Popperian) approach to verisimilitude and the AGM theory of belief change. We show that appropriately construed accounts emerging from those two lines of epistemological research do yield convergences relative to a specified kind of theories, here labeled “conjunctive”. In this domain, a set of plausible conditions are identified which (...) demonstrably capture the verisimilitudinarian effectiveness of AGM belief change, i.e., its effectiveness in tracking truth approximation. We conclude by indicating some further developments and open issues arising from our results. (shrink)

The body of Eva in Thomas Aquinas The constitution of the first female body or the body of Eva presents several physical and metaphysical problems, problems that have gone through the centuries and reach the present, generating social and cultural consequences for women. The non-existence of parents demands from Aquino answers that go beyond the anthropological and biological and lead to the search of philosophical answers intertwined with the theological ones. Thomas Aquinas provides rational answers although the background is of (...) faith, and even, with literal interpretations of the Sacred Scriptures now abandoned. The Aquinate makes an intellectual effort to find answers in a rational field because the matter of the body of the first woman brings difficulties for its elucidation and understanding. As in other parts of his extensive work, Thomas Aquinas, follows the biological and physical works of Aristotle. Although the Aristotelian background is in line with Christian thought, Aquinas shows his extraordinary capacity for synthesis between the faith received and reason argued, between revelation and the principles of reason. (shrink)

Micro Credit (MC) programs lend money to poor borrowers using innovative mechanisms such as group lending under joint liability while successfully accounting for the presence of asymmetric information in underdeveloped financial markets. MC programs have achieved what the conventional financial institutions and the government have not been able to: lend to the poor, impressive loan recuperation, and a positive impact in poverty reduction. This article analyzes the performance of ALSOL, an MC program in Chiapas, México, for 2151 participants in urban (...) and rural areas for the time period between July 2000 and July 2001. While loan recuperation is high (95%), administrative costs also remain high. Socially responsible lenders and donors play a key role in providing continuous funding to MC programs and assisting in reducing the level of poverty. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, el autor analiza la adecuada reinserción social del recluso como finalidad de la ejecución de la pena privativa de la libertad. Con ese propósito, el jurista identifica los diferentes modelos de readaptación social (“readaptación para la moralidad” y “readaptación para la legalidad”), con sus virtudes y críticas. Por último, Arocena examina los condicionamientos que impone un arquetipo de Estado social y democrático de Derecho, a la hora de adherir a uno u otro de esos modelos, y (...) finalmente expone sus razones a favor de un paradigma de readaptación social mínimo. (shrink)

This paper questions the notion that states may be justified in denying certain prisoners the right to vote as a means of distancing themselves from particularly grave wrongs. Christopher Bennett has recently defended prisoner disenfranchisement as a fair and deserved retributive punishment for crimes, and Mary Sigler and Andrew Altman have argued in favor of prisoner disenfranchisement as a civil restriction. All three proponents agree that disenfranchisement should be reserved for those guilty of the most serious offenses. I assert that (...) it is inappropriate to treat citizens in this manner and will advocate for the right to vote, whether disenfranchisement is perceived as a form of punishment or as a civil measure. I will present two arguments against disenfranchisement as it impacts both citizens and political community at large. First, it excludes citizens from the democratic arena and restricts the opportunity to reintegrate offenders into the political community. While a criminal sentence is intended to be burdensome, the burden associated with disenfranchisement extends beyond the appropriate penal scope. (shrink)

Dung’s argumentation frameworks are formalisms widely used to model interaction among arguments. Although their study has been profusely developed in the field of Artificial Intelligence, it is not common to see its treatment among those less connected to computer science within the logical-philosophical community. In this paper we propose to bring to that audience a proof-theory for argument justification based on tableaux, very similar to those the Logic students are familiar with. The tableaux enable to calculate whether an argument or (...) subset of arguments are accepted or rejected in accordance to Dung’s preferred and grounded extension-based semantics. Soundness and completeness results regarding those semantics are provided. (shrink)

In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on “nomic conjunctive theories”, i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and identify (...) suitable conditions concerning the (partial) correctness of acquired data, under which revising our theories by data leads us closer to “the nomic truth”, construed as the target of scientific inquiry. We conclude by indicating some further developments, generalizations, and open issues arising from our results. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is commonly characterized as the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. Little has been said, however, on how best to construe these representational devices—in other words, on what conceptual engineering should be all about. This paper tackles this problem with a basic strategy: First, by presenting a taxonomy of the different possible subject matters for conceptual engineering; then, by comparatively assessing them and selecting the most conducive one with a view to making conceptual engineering an actionable (...) method, that is, a method that can be applied effectively and consistently to specific case studies. The outcome is that conceptual engineering should be all about concepts on pain of pragmatic inconsistencies otherwise. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the 1960s, when Dr. Belding Scribner discovered how to accomplish the process of dialysis in a repeated way, he could not imagine that in solving such a problem others as or more difficult would appear. Given the technological progress and the impossibility of assisting all patients through the most modern methods, the medical doctor often finds himself faced with the moral dilemma of choosing which patient in the waiting list will receive the treatment. This same dilemma is amplified (...) in the case of organ transplants. Professionals, students, professors of the juridical and health fields, and the population in general, were interviewed as a means of documenting the moral concepts and opinions surrounding this problem. In the reality in which we find ourselves, it seems to us that deciding who lives, and the responsibility for all the events that culminate in such decisions, is still a subject left open to discussion. (shrink)

O acontecimento do compreender, enquanto questão-chave do pensamento de Gadamer, também pode ser compreendido como uma fusão de horizontes. Do ponto de vista da hermenêutica filosófica, tal aspecto abre a possibilidade de tematização do âmbito próprio da compreensão como uma experiência filosófica simultaneamente ontológica e prática. Por isso, a descrição do compreender enquanto fusão de horizontes indica o tratamento de traços fundamentais da vida humana que, para Gadamer, encontra afinidades com a retomada da filosofia prática de Aristóteles. Deste modo, pretendemos (...) discutir alguns aspectos da relação entre os conceitos de compreensão e fusão de horizonte a partir da conexão essencial entre hermenêutica filosófica e filosofia prática.: The happening of understanding, as key-issue of Gadamer’s thought, can be also understood like a fusion of horizons. From the point of view of philosophical hermeneutics, this aspect opens the possibility of discussing about the sphere of understanding simultaneously ontological and practice philosophical experience. Therefore, the description of understanding as fusion of horizons indicates the treatment of basic traces of human life that finds affinities with the rehabilitation of practical philosophy of Aristotle. Thus, we intend to discuss some aspects of the relation between the notions of understanding and fusion of horizons from the essential connection between philosophical hermeneutics and practical philosophy. Keywords: Gadamer; understanding; fusion of horizons; practical philosophy; Aristotle. (shrink)

Na abordagem hermenêutica das obras de arte, Gadamer discute a arquitetura como uma das expressões artísticas na qual se pode reconsiderar a relação ontológico-interpretativa com as coisas em geral. Repensando a estrutura representativa própria da experiência hermenêutica das obras de arte, Gadamer introduz a arquitetura como uma expressão artística peculiar, na qual as obras de arte resistem aos posicionamentos estéticos atuais, reinserindo-as na esfera prática da vida. Essa tematização encontra ecos importantes na teoria e prática arquitetônicas, à medida que possibilita (...) uma nova relação com as obras de arquitetura, para além das variáveis estéticas. O presente artigo, portanto, tem como objetivo discutir a experiência hermenêutica da arquitetura como um momento interpretativo decisivo da relação com as obras de arte, explicitando tanto o caráter ontológico-hermenêutico do pensamento de Gadamer quanto o traço hermenêutico das obras de arquitetura. Para isso, partimos de um diálogo estabelecido por Gadamer e dois arquitetos, Jacques Herzog e Pierre de Meuron sobre a essência da arquitetura. A resposta gadameriana indicou-nos o horizonte de tematização das obras arquitetônicas como extensão da experiência da obra de arte, tal como foi discutido em Verdade e Método, notadamente na discussão sobre a representação artística e a retomada das noções de ocasional e decorativo. A tematização hermenêutica encontra, por conseguinte, repercussões na teoria e prática arquitetônicas, indicando um horizonte alternativo de questionamento do sentido da arquitetura e urbanismo, situando-o e remetendo-o para o horizonte da vida em comum. (shrink)

A covid-19 tem gerado grande mobilização por parte das sociedades contemporâneas. Como forma de prevenção e controle da doença, o isolamento social tem sido uma medida eficaz, recomendada por diversos órgãos da saúde. Por isso, pensar o isolamento social como prática solidária tem sido fundamental. Nesta perspectiva, o presente artigo busca problematizar o isolamento social enquanto isolamento solidário. Para isso, partimos da tematização da enfermidade, até agora conhecida, seus modos de prevenção e controle e, por conseguinte, o diálogo entre a (...) Saúde Coletiva e a Hermenêutica Filosófica, na tentativa de repensar o isolamento criticamente, para além de uma questão biomédica. Assim, discutir o isolamento solidário como noção essencial ao enfrentamento da pandemia da COVID-19 significa contribuir para uma visão mais ampla de saúde, ao passo que se encontra em jogo o restabelecimento da vida comunitária para além de sua concepção biomédica. (shrink)

The paradox of knowability threatens to draw a logical equivalence between the believable claim that all truths are knowable and the obviously false claim that all truths are known. In this paper we evaluate prominent proposals for resolving the paradox of knowability. For instance, we argue that Neil Tennant’s restriction strategy, which aims principally to restrict the main quantifier in ‘all truths are knowable’, does not get to the heart of the problem since there are knowability paradoxes that the restriction (...) does nothing to thwart. We argue that Jon Kvanvig’s strategy, which aims to block the paradox by appealing to the special role of quantified epistemic expressions in modal contexts, has grave errors. We offer here a new proposal founded on Kvanvig’s insight that quantified expressions play a special role in modal contexts. On an articulation of this special role provided by Stanley and Szabo, we propose a solution to the knowability paradoxes. Introduction.. (shrink)

Michael Dummett’s realism debate is a semantic dispute about the kind of truth conditions had by a given class of sentences. According to his semantic realist, the truth conditions are potentially verification-transcendent in that they may obtain (or not) despite the fact that we may be forever unable to recognize whether they obtain. According to Dummett’s semantic anti-realist, the truth conditions are of a different sort. Essentially, for the anti-realist, that the truth conditions obtain (whenever they do) is a matter (...) that is always recognizable by us in principle. On this view, truth cannot outrun all possible human knowledge. Unsurprisingly, the outcome of the debate is sometimes said to hinge on whether all truths are knowable.1 More carefully the point of contention is the following.. (shrink)