Who Can Blame Whom? Moral Standing to Blame and Punish Deprived Citizens

Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):271-281 (2019)
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Abstract

There are communities in which disadvantaged groups experience severe inequality. For instance, poor and indigent families face many difficulties accessing their social rights. Their condition is largely the consequence of the wrong choices of those in power, either historical or more recent choices. The lack of opportunities of these deprived citizens is due to state omissions. In such communities, it is not unusual for homeless members of these particular groups to occupy abandoned lands and build their shelters there. However, almost everywhere, these actions constitute a crime. The typical response to this situation is prosecution and punishment. In this paper, I will defend the occupation of public places as a consequence of the failure of governments to solve the problem of housing, and I will argue that we must distinguish a social claim from a crime and avoid the use of criminal law in these “occupation cases”. I will also argue that our right—as a community—to blame and punish these “squatters” is eroded by the fact that we perpetrated their situation of injustice.

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Gustavo Beade
Universidad Austral de Chile

Citations of this work

Let's See You Do Better.Patrick Todd - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
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Standing to Punish the Disadvantaged.Benjamin S. Yost - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy (3):1-23.
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References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Blame.D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2014 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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