The comprehension of norms in complex social systems is one of the most active fields of research in agent-based modelling. This is faced with the challenge to comprehend the recursive interaction between inter- and intra-agent processes. In this article, a comparative analysis of selected cases of normative agent architectures will be given based on a review of theories of norms in the social sciences. This allows to identify the prerequisites for a representation of the cognitive processes of norm recognition. As (...) yet, there is no unequivocal concept for the design of normative agents. Different approaches are compared along the line of different theoretical accounts. (shrink)

The detection and categorization of animate motions is a crucial task underlying social interaction and perceptual decision making. Neural representations of perceived animate objects are partially located in the primate cortical region STS, which is a region that receives convergent input from intermediate-level form and motion representations. Populations of STS cells exist which are selectively responsive to specific animated motion sequences, such as walkers. It is still unclear how and to what extent form and motion information contribute to the generation (...) of such representations and what kind of mechanisms are involved in the learning processes. The article develops a cortical model architecture for the unsupervised learning of animated motion sequence representations. We demonstrate how the model automatically selects significant motion patterns as well as meaningful static form prototypes characterized by a high degree of articulation. Such key poses are selectively reinforced during learning through a cross talk between the motion and form processing streams. Furthermore, we show how sequence-selective representations are learned in STS by fusing static form and motion input from the segregated bottom-up driving input streams. Cells in STS, in turn, feed their activities recurrently to their input sites along top-down signal pathways. We show how such learned feedback connections enable predictions about future input as anticipation generated by sequence-selective STS cells. Network simulations demonstrate the computational capacity of the proposed model by reproducing several experimental findings from neurosciences and by accounting for recent behavioral data. (shrink)

The child was 2 years, 8 months old and weighed 25 pounds, one-fifth the weight of her mother, for whom she was to be the bone marrow donor. The mother had suffered a relapse of acute myelogenous leukemia; her physicians recommended a bone marrow transplant. The child was the closest human leukocyte antigen match and thus the best donor candidate for her mother's transplant.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:On Inception by Martin HeideggerDaniel NeumannHEIDEGGER, Martin. On Inception. Translated by Peter Hanley. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2023. xi + 171 pp. Cloth, $40.00This translation [End Page 548] of Heidegger's On Inception (written in 1941 and published in German in 2005 as Über den Anfang) is an important addition to the translated corpus of texts on the themes of Ereignis (event) and the history of beyng (...) (Seynsgeschichte) that occupied Heidegger's thinking from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s, and that resulted in a series of writings that remained unpublished during his lifetime. Similar to those other volumes, On Inception does not follow a linear train of thought but offers short and often fragmentary notes and musings that, nonetheless, build on one another. There is a considerable thematic overlap with the other writings on the event. Many of the themes found here, such as the role of technology in exposing contemporary understanding of being, Hölderlin as the poet of the saying of beyng, or the notion of another beginning of the unconcealment of beyng, can be found in Contributions to Philosophy, Mindfulness, and The Event as well.What sets On Inception apart from these other volumes is the focus on the inceptual aspect of the thinking of beyng. In this regard, the first and longest of the six sections comprising the book (entitled "The Incipience of Inception") offers the most extended original contribution Heidegger makes here. It concerns the question of how one can think from out of the unconcealment of beyng. Exploring this topic throws more light on many of the questions that the reading of the other volumes raises, such as whether the event should be thought of as a one-time historical occurrence; how one can think from out of the event, that is, how it constitutes the possibility of thinking it; and the relationship between beings, being (referring to the truth of the presence of beings), and beyng (referring to the truth of the presencing of being). All of these issues concern the inceptual character of the event, whose understanding affords a better sense of paradigmatic change in thinking and dwelling associated with it. To understand the inceptual character of the event gives the reader a clue as to where to begin thinking (about) it. This does not remove the considerable and intentional obscurity surrounding these ideas, but it shows Heidegger as constantly altering and refining how to think of the history of the concealment and unconcealment of beyng. One of the biggest disagreements among interpreters has been whether to read this in transcendental or realist terms, that is, whether we should take the unconcealment of beyng as the proffering of a real, mind-independent totality or as a cipher for our transcendental ability to understand and make sense of the appearance of being. In this regard, the question of incipience goes toward elucidating who or what is thought to begin this unconcealment.What, then, does an inceptive thinking of beyng amount to? Put negatively, it can concern neither beyng as some sort of cause of beings, nor beings themselves as what appear as a consequence of beyng's unconcealment: "[I]nception is not the inception of something other than what it itself is; equally, inception is not the inception of itself, as if what were being thought of were a producing and causing." To think beyng as inception puts emphasis on the emergent nature of the opening of the clearing in which beings can come to presence for someone. That is, the [End Page 549] word "inception" names the very opening up of the possibility to consider the truth of beyng, that is, to think the event. What is at stake is therefore the incipient nature of inception—the fact that grasping what the term means cannot be based on any one incipient thing, but on incipience (Anfängnis). There is a processual (or, to use Daniela Vallega-Neu's more Heideggerian term, poietic) aspect to the way Heidegger thinks the event, and incipience in many ways expresses this poietic nature because it both suggests that there is something that begins and unfolds, but also conceals what... (shrink)

"Das Ziel dieser Untersuchung ist es, die Frage nach dem Wesen und dem Begriff der menschlichen Freiheit als ein philosophisches Grundproblem vor den phänomenologischen Blick zu bringen und nicht nur im Rahmen einer bereits vorausgesetzten philosophischen Teildisziplin - wie etwa in der Ethik oder als Gegenstand einer praktischen Philosophie - abzuhandeln. Diese Aufgabe führt uns in das Zentrum von Heideggers Philosophie. Heidegger gewinnt seinen eigenen Freiheitsbegriff jedoch in der grundlegenden Auseinandersetzung mit den großen Denkern des Abendlandes. Auch und gerade bei (...) Leibniz wird der Freiheitsbegriff in einer weit ausgreifenden Auseinandersetzung mit der philosophischen und theologischen Überlieferung eingeführt und auf dem Boden seines eigenen Denkens, der Monadenlehre, neu positioniert. Durch die Entgegensetzung der beiden Denker kann der jeweilige Standpunkt zum Freiheitsproblem noch schärfer in den Blick gebracht und im Rahmen der abendländisch-europäischen Geistesgeschichte erörtert werden. Zudem ermöglicht es gerade die Auseinandersetzung mit Leibniz, die Frage nach dem Wesen und dem Begriff der menschlichen Freiheit und andere wesentliche Fragen, die sich daraus ergeben, auf unsere Gegenwartsprobleme, insbesondere die Deutung oder gar Leugnung der Freiheit durch die Neurowissenschaften, zu beziehen und anzuwenden."--. (shrink)

Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer, Franz Neumann, Theodor Adorno, Leo Lowenthal—the impact of the Frankfurt School on the sociological, political, and cultural thought of the twentieth century has been profound. _The Dialectical Imagination_ is a major history of this monumental cultural and intellectual enterprise during its early years in Germany and in the United States. Martin Jay has provided a substantial new preface for this edition, in which he reflects on the continuing relevance of the work of (...) the Frankfurt School. (shrink)

This up-to-date introduction to decision theory offers comprehensive and accessible discussions of decision-making under ignorance and risk, the foundations of utility theory, the debate over subjective and objective probability, Bayesianism, causal decision theory, game theory, and social choice theory. No mathematical skills are assumed, and all concepts and results are explained in non-technical and intuitive as well as more formal ways. There are over 100 exercises with solutions, and a glossary of key terms and concepts. An emphasis on foundational aspects (...) of normative decision theory (rather than descriptive decision theory) makes the book particularly useful for philosophy students, but it will appeal to readers in a range of disciplines including economics, psychology, political science and computer science. • Has over 100 end of chapter review questions and exercises with solutions • Includes a chapter on how to draw a decision matrix • Explains the link between individual decision making, game theory and social choice theory Contents Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. The decision matrix; 3. Decisions under ignorance; 4. Decisions under risk; 5. Utility; 6. The mathematics of probability; 7. The philosophy of probability; 8. Why should we accept the preference axioms; 9. Causal vs. evidential decision theory; 10. Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian decision theory; 11. Game theory I: basic concepts and zero sum games; 12. Game theory II: nonzero sum and co-operative games; 13. Social choice theory; 14. Overview of descriptive decision theory; Appendix A. Glossary; Appendix B. Proof of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem; Further reading; Index. (shrink)

El artículo trata sobre el 'reavivamiento hermeneútico' de Agustín, es decir, acerca de la significación filosófica que tiene el influjo histórico y metodológico de san Agustín sobre la obra de Martin Heidegger "Sein und Zeit", y cómo esto se ha vuelto más evidente con las aportaciones de fenomenólogos y patrólogos, especialmente a partir de 1993.

Open peer commentary on the target article “How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self” by Martin V. Butz. Excerpt: In this commentary to Martin V. Butz’s target article I am especially concerned with his remarks about language (§33, §§71–79, §91) and modularity (§32, §41, §48, §81, §§94–98). In that context, I would like to bring into discussion my own work on computational models of self-monitoring (cf. Neumann 1998, 2004). In this work I (...) explore the idea of an anticipatory drive as a substantial control device for modelling high-level complex language processes such as selfmonitoring and adaptive language use. My work is grounded in computational linguistics and, as such, uses a mathematical and computational methodology. Nevertheless, it might provide some interesting aspects and perspectives for constructivism in general, and the model proposed in Butz’s article, in particular. (shrink)

Gustav Radbruch war Deutschlands beruhmtester Rechtsphilosoph im 20. Jahrhundert. Seine gehaltvollen, aber auch spannungsreichen Schriften pragen die deutschsprachige Rechtsphilosophie bis heute. Im Zentrum von Radbruchs Lehre steht sein neukantianisch gepragter Rechtsbegriff, der im Laufe der Zeit eine Reihe von Veranderungen erfahren hat. Die Beitrage in diesem Band sind Radbruchs Rechtsbegriff im Allgemeinen und den Wandlungen dieses Rechtsbregriffs im Besonderen gewidmet. Nach der orthodoxen Lesart vertrat Radbruch vor dem Kriege eine rechtspositivistische Lehre, wurde unter dem Eindruck der nationalsozialistischen Grauel jedoch zum (...) Naturrecht bekehrt. Zunehmend wird gesehen, dass diese 'Bekehrungsthese' zu Ungereimtheiten fuhrt. Verschiedene Beitrage dieses Bandes betonen demgegenuber die Kontinuitat nichtpositivistischer Elemente in der Entwicklung von Radbruchs Rechtsbegriff. Mit Beitragen von: Hidehiko Adachi, Martin Borowski, Horst Dreier, Ralf Dreier, An dreas Funke, Ulfrid Neumann, Stanley L. Paulson, Joachim Renzikowski, Hubert Rottleuthner, Marc Andre Wiegand. (shrink)

The First International Congress for Analytical Psychology was held in Zurich from 7 to 12 August 1958. On this occasion a small group of Israeli psychologists, represented by Erich Neumann, was accepted as a charter group member of the International Association for Analytical Psychology, which marked the foundation of the Israel Association of Analytical Psychology. The history leading up to this official birth date is mainly associated with the efforts of Erich Neumann – and rightly so; however, a (...) number of other therapists, scholars and patients have been forgotten or deleted from this historical narrative, to their detriment. While I was working on the edition of the correspondence between C. G. Jung and Erich Neumann I came across their names, which were often only casually mentioned re some episode, and I have since tried to find out their stories and what happened to them. In this article I discuss the contributions to the development of analytical psychology in British Mandate Palestine, later Israel, of two such figures, Max M. Stern and Margarete Braband-Isaac. Both had been in personal contact with C. G. Jung and built a bridge between the isolated Jewish therapists in British Mandate Palestine and the Zurich circles. In Tel Aviv they collaborated for a while with Neumann, with whom for different reasons both fell out. The article shows the cause of these controversies with Neumann and tries to find out why those two characters were historically marginalized. (shrink)

The main result of this paper is a formal argument for the principle of maximizing expected utility that does not rely on the law of large numbers. Unlike the well-known arguments by Savage and von Neumann & Morgenstern, this argument does not presuppose the sure-thing principle or the independence axiom. The principal idea is to use the concept of transformative decision rules for decomposing the principle of maximizing expected utility into a sequence of normatively reasonable subrules. It is shown (...) that this procedure provides a resolution of Allais's paradox that cannot be obtained by Savage-style or von Neumann & Morgenstern-style arguments. (shrink)

Das wachsende wissenschaftliche Interesse an Tieren, ihren Fähigkeiten und Interaktionen mit den Menschen sowie verhaltensbiologische Erkenntnisse und tierphilosophische Einsichten führen zu einer Neubewertung der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung. Dies bleibt nicht ohne Konsequenzen für die Theologie. Sie muss nach den philosophischen und theologischen Ursachen für ihre weitgehende „Tiervergessenheit“ fragen sowie die Potenziale entfalten, die zum Beispiel die Heilige Schrift und die Schöpfungsspiritualität für die Gestaltung der Beziehung zu den Tieren bieten. Dabei balanciert sie auf dem schmalen Grat, den Mensch-Tier-Differentialismus zu überwinden, ohne das (...) je Eigene von Menschen und Tieren zu verwischen. Dieser Band leistet eine interdisziplinäre Annäherung an eine christliche Tierethik, die sich nicht als isolierte binnenphilosophische oder -theologische Bereichsethik versteht, sondern Antworten sucht auf gesamtgesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzungen mit Fragen der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung. Mit Beiträgen von Andreas Aigner, Heike Baranzke, Martina Besler, Julia Blanc, Katharina Ebner, Matthias Eggel, Julia Enxing, Matthias Gauly, Herwig Grimm, Anita Idel, Kurt Kotrschal, Peter Kunzmann, Martin M. Lintner, Susana Monsó, Ute Neumann-Gorsolke, Jakob Ohm, Christina Potschka, Kurt Remele, Michael Rosenberger, Markus Vogt und Markus Wild. (shrink)

After World War II, quite a few mathematicians, including Mark Kac, John von Neumann, and Nobert Wiener, worked on the physical problem of phase transitions, i.e. changes in the state of matter caused by gradual changes of physical parameters such as the condensation of a gas to a liquid and the loss of magnetization of a ferromagnet above a certain temperature. The significance of these mathematicians was not so much that they brought mathematical rigor to the theoretical description of (...) the phenomena,1 but that they applied their mathematical skills and tools to solve concrete mathematical problems encountered in the microscopic modeling of phase transitions. The present paper deals... (shrink)

The two concepts of probability used in physics are analyzed from the formal and the material points of view. The standard theory corresponds toprob 1 (probability of the coexistence of two properties). A general logicomathematical theory ofprob 2 (probability of transition between states) is presented in axiomatic form. The underlying state algebra is neither Boolean nor Birkhoff-von Neumann but partial Boolean. In the Boolean subalgebras,prob 1 theory holds. The theory presented contains the logicomathematical foundations of quantum mechanics and, as (...) degenerate cases, the theories of stochastic games and of Markov chains. (shrink)

The paradigm for modelling decision-making under uncertainty has undoubtedly been the theory of Expected Utility, which was first developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and later extended by Savage (1954) to the case of subjective uncertainty. The inadequacy of the theory of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) as a descriptive theory was soon pointed out in experiments, most famously by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961). The observed departures from SEU noticed by Allais and Ellsberg became known as “paradoxes”. The (...) Ellsberg paradox gave rise, several years later, to a new literature on decision-making under ambiguity. The theoretical side of this literature was pioneered by Schmeidler (1989). This literature views the departures from SEU in situations similar to those discussed by Ellsberg as rational responses to ambiguity. The rationality is “recovered” by relaxing Savage's Sure-Thing principle and adding an ambiguity-aversion postulate. Thus the ambiguity-aversion literature takes a normative point of view and does consider Ellsberg-type choices as behavioural “anomalies”. (shrink)

A pesar de que Max Horkheimer en Eclipse de la razón había analizado los límites de la razón subjetiva, atendien- do a las posibilidades de retornar a la razón objetiva y a su función después del eclipse, a Jay le parecían aún insuficientes estas respuestas. Por ello, regresó al estudio de las conceptualizaciones filosóficas de los fundadores de la teoría crítica y de quienes se quedaron a cargo del Instituto de Investigación Social en Frankfurt. En este sentido, este texto podría (...) verse en continuidad y a distancia respecto a su primer li- bro: Dialectical Imagination. A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (1973); producto de su trabajo de doctorado, enfocado en la formación del Instituto de Investigación Social; en sus principales integrantes: Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Leo Löwenthal, Walter Benjamin,Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Henryk Grossmann, Erich Fromm, Karl August Wittfogel; en la integra- ción del psicoanálisis; en su exilio a América; en los estudios empíricos sobre el autoritarismo, la estética y la industria cultural. (shrink)

Every year since 1933 many of the world's leading intellectuals have met on Lake Maggiore to discuss the latest developments in philosophy, history, art and science and, in particular, to explore the mystical and symbolic in religion. The Eranos Meetings - named after the Greek word for a banquet where the guests bring the food - constitute one of the most important gatherings of scholars in the twentieth century. The book presents a set of portraits of some of the century's (...) most influential thinkers, all participants at Eranos: Carl Jung, Erich Neumann, Mircea Eliade, Martin Buber, Walter Otto, Paul Tillich, Gershom Scholem, Herbert Read, Joseph Campbell, Erwin Schrodinger, Karl Kereyni, D.T. Suzuki, and Adolph Portmann. The volume presents a critical appraisal of the views of these men, how the exchange of ideas encouraged by Eranos influenced each, and examines the attraction of these esotericists towards authoritarian politics. (shrink)

Every year since 1933 many of the world's leading intellectuals have met on Lake Maggiore to discuss the latest developments in philosophy, history, art and science and, in particular, to explore the mystical and symbolic in religion. The Eranos Meetings - named after the Greek word for a banquet where the guests bring the food - constitute one of the most important gatherings of scholars in the twentieth century. The book presents a set of portraits of some of the century's (...) most influential thinkers, all participants at Eranos: Carl Jung, Erich Neumann, Mircea Eliade, Martin Buber, Walter Otto, Paul Tillich, Gershom Scholem, Herbert Read, Joseph Campbell, Erwin Schrodinger, Karl Kereyni, D.T. Suzuki, and Adolph Portmann. The volume presents a critical appraisal of the views of these men, how the exchange of ideas encouraged by Eranos influenced each, and examines the attraction of these esotericists towards authoritarian politics. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This article develops an ecological framework for understanding collective action. This is contrasted with approaches familiar from the collective intentionality debate, which treat individuals as fundamental units of collective action. Instead, we turn to social ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory and argue that they provide a promising framework for understanding collectives as the central unit in collective action. However, we submit that these approaches do not yet appreciate enough the relevance of social identities for collective action. To analyze this (...) aspect, we build on key insights from social identity theory and synthesize it with embodied and ecological accounts of perception and action. This results in the proposal of two new types of affordances. For an individual who enacts her "embodied social identity" of being a member of a particular collective, there can be what we call embodied social identity affordances. Moreover, when several individuals dynamically interact with each other against the background of their embodied social identities, this might lead to the emergence of a collective, which we understand as a dynamically constituted and ecologically situated perception-action system consisting of several individuals enacting relevant embodied social identity affordances. Building on previous work in social ecological psychology, we suggest that there can be genuine collective affordances, that is, affordances whose subject is not an individual, but a collective. (shrink)

Recent empirical findings from social psychology, ecological psychology, and embodied cognitive science indicate that situational factors crucially shape the course of human behavior. For instance, it has been shown that finding a dime, being under the influence of an authority figure, or just being presented with food in easy reach often influences behavior tremendously. These findings raise important new questions for the philosophy of action: Are these findings a threat to classical conceptions of human agency? Are humans passively pushed around (...) by situational factors, or are there agential aspects in the way we spontaneously experience and react to situations? How can one conceptualize the pervasive influence of situational factors on human action? What are situations in the first place, and how should the influence of these situations on action be thought of? This paper sets out to develop a new conceptual repertoire for thinking about the influence of situations on action, drawing on research from ecological psychology as well as from embodied and enactive cognitive science. The key proposal is the development of a philosophical sensorimotor account of agency: Action, it is proposed, should be conceived of as constant dynamical interaction of agential and environmental factors – factors which should all be conceptualized in new ways. (shrink)

Two more or less standard methods exist for the systematic, logical construction of classical mathematics, the so-called theory of types, due in the main to Russell, and the Zermelo axiomatic set theory. In systems based upon either of these, the connective of membership, “ε”, plays a fundamental role. Usually although not always it figures as a primitive or undefined symbol.Following the familiar simplification of Russell's theory, let us mean by alogical typein the strict sense any one of the following: (i) (...) the totality consisting exclusively of individuals, (ii) the totality consisting exclusively of classes whose members are exclusively individuals, (iii) the totality consisting exclusively of classes whose members are exclusively classes whose members in turn are exclusively individuals, and so on. Any entity from (ii) is said to beone type higherthan any entity from (i), any entity from (iii), one type higher than any entity from (ii), and so on. In systems based upon this simplified theory of types, the only significant atomic formulae involving “ε” are those asserting the membership of an entity in an entity one type higher. Thus any expression of the form “(x∈y)” is meaningless except where “y” denotes an entity of just one type higher than the type of the entity denoted by “x” It is by means of general type restrictions of this kind that the Russell and other paradoxes are avoided. (shrink)

Ethical mysticism, by S. Coit.--The ethical import of history, by D. S. Muzzey.--The tragic and heroic in life, by W. M. Salter.--Distinctive features of the ethical movement, by A. W. Martin.--Ethical experience as the basis of religious education, by H. Neumann.--"All men are created equal," by G. E. O'Dell.--How far is art an aid to religion? by P. Chubb.--Evolution and the uniqueness of man, by H. J. Bridges.--The spiritual outlook on life, by H. J. Golding.--The ethics of Abu'l (...) Ala al Ma'arri, by N. Schmidt.--Life's unused moral force, by H. Snell.--Is the ideal real? by G. A. Smith.--Some ethical tendencies in the professions, by R. D. Kohn.--On the art of living, by W. Boerner.--The relation of the ethical ideal to social reform, by J. L. Elliott.--Concerning tolerance, by R. F. Dewey.--Ethical culture in Germany after the war, by R. Penzig.--A confession of faith, by S. B. Weston.--"Hearing the witnesses," by J. Gutmann. (shrink)

Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.

Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.

The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical terms within his second formulation of the categorical imperative, “[A]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”. When we realize that “humanity” means rational nature and “person” means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), (...) but rational selves in all their sameness, in their unvarying conformity to the universal principles of pure practical reason. Contemporary individualism gets no support from Kant. (shrink)

En el escrito Vorläufige Thesen zur Refomation der Philosophie, Ludwig Feuerbach atribuye a Spinoza la autoría de la filosofía especulativa. A la zaga queda Schelling, considerado por Feuerbach únicamente como el restaurador de la misma. En la secuencia establecida por éste, Hegel sería, por su parte, solo un elemento más en la constitución de la filosofía especulativa, aunque tiene el mérito de completar tal sistema de pensamiento. En el presente artículo pretendo determinar en qué medida el autor de esta filosofía (...) se halla presente en el que la consuma. Esbozaré la forma y grado de esa presencia poniendo el foco en un aspecto nuclear, que, al mismo tiempo, servirá de guía del trabajo aquí propuesto: la negación. (shrink)