Cet article présente le dispositif de formation et ses objectifs ainsi que l’analyse d’écrits réflexifs produits dans le cadre des travaux certificatifs et dans lesquels les participantes décrivent quelques-uns des effets de la formation sur leurs pratiques professionnelles.

We propose that learning has a top-down component, but not in the propositional terms described by Mitchell et al. Specifically, we propose that a host of learning processes, including associative learning, serve to imbue the representation of the conditioned stimulus (CS) with affective meaning.

This essay argues that Plato’s Republic includes a widely overlooked meditation on the affective dimension of political judgment. This meditation occurs in the passages on music. In music, Plato identifies the possibility of an extra-rational aesthetic activity that prepares the soul for reasoned judgment: he makes musical mimesis the precondition to logos because of its ability to actualize in the soul the very ethos required of sound judgment. Music is able to do this because it is not imagistic; music does (...) not produce mediated representations but rather produces alterations in the condition of the soul itself. These alterations are made possible because the soul itself is structured musically. If music actualizes the conditions of the soul, so too does the soul instantiate the conditions of music. In his treatment of musical mimesis, Plato thereby makes disposition, or affect, the defining feature of sound judgment. (shrink)

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories (...) are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain–emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories. (shrink)

In our response, we clarify important theoretical differences between basic emotion and psychological construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires brain localization, whether localization can be observed with better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.

Il s'agit, dans ce second volume, intitulé Terrains et idéologies.Théorie et pratique, de montrer par des recensions d'ouvrages sur des objets de recherche divers qu'une théorisation élaborée en sciences sociales à partir de théorisations déjà faites, exige un retour au terrain pour être validée. Une nouvelle théorisation invalidera ou confirmera les premières théorisations. Des approches comportementalistes de la pénibilité du travail, un chercheur montre l'insuffisance par une analyse approfondie qui tient compte de la subjectivité.De la pratique à la théorie, de (...) la théorie à la pratique, les sciences sociales suivent un chemin qui s'interrompt, se reprend sans cesse et qui ne s'achève jamais -- Editor. (shrink)

Lindquist et al. convincingly argue that the brain implements psychological operations that are constitutive of emotion rather than modules subserving discrete emotions. However, thenatureof such psychological operations is open to debate. I argue that considering appraisal theories may provide alternative interpretations of the neuroimaging data with respect to the psychological operations involved.

Of the many ethical corporate marketing practices, many firms use corporate social responsibility (CSR) communication to enhance their corporate image. Yet, consumers, overwhelmed by these more or less well-founded CSR claims, often have trouble identifying truly responsible firms. This confusion encourages ‘greenwashing’ and may make CSR initiatives less effective. On the basis of attribution theory, this study investigates the role of independent sustainability ratings on consumers’ responses to companies’ CSR communication. Experimental results indicate the negative effect of a poor sustainability (...) rating for corporate brand evaluations in the case of CSR communication, because consumers infer less intrinsic motives by the brand. Sustainability ratings thus could act to deter ‘greenwashing’ and encourage virtuous firms to persevere in their CSR practices. (shrink)

We agree that conceptualisation is key in understanding the brain basis of emotion. We argue that by conflating facial emotion recognition with subjective emotion experience, Lindquist et al. understate the importance of biological predisposition in emotion. We use examples from the anxiety disorders to illustrate the distinction between these two phenomena, emphasising the importance of both emotional hardware and contextual learning.

Sophia Moreau’s Faces of Inequality is a terrific book and it is a great privilege to have this opportunity to comment on it.1 In this ambitious book, Moreau identifies and helpfully analyses a num...

At the heart of Sophia Moreau’s theory of wrongful discrimination is the moral duty to treat others as equals. This article raises some challenges regarding the contours of this duty and suggests some ways to make the theory stronger. In particular, it suggests that we incorporate a cosmopolitan view of the duty’s scope, that we illuminate the features at the basis of individuals’ equal moral status to determine its grounds, and that we identify some considerations about important interests to (...) articulate its contents. The relation between Moreau’s theory and human rights discourse is also briefly examined, and more engagement with the latter is recommended. (shrink)