La péricope de Luc, intitulée dans certaines Bibles La femme qui était une pécheresse, a donné lieu à de nombreuses études de critique littéraire. L'A. a essayé d'expliquer les contradictions du texte en assignant un rôle différent aux sources distinctes. La présente analyse entend montrer que les tensions et les accentuations distinctes trouvent dans le texte seul leur raison intrinsèque. Elles focalisent l'attention sur la figure principale du récit, qui n'est pas la femme pécheresse mais Simon, et en dernière analyse, (...) le lecteur en tant qu'il s'identifie au pharisien. (shrink)

A close analysis of the composition of both versions of the Decalogue in Ex 20 and Dt 5 shows the central place of the two positive commandments: the consecration of the sabbath and the honour due to father and mother. The literary and semantic relation between these two commandments provides the key for understanding the entire text: addressing man, the first text as father and the other as son, they define him as subject of a freedom received from another and (...) recognised in the other. Freedom is also offered to the reader in so far as two texts are given to him, which are similar and different: Presence is revealed in the space left open between them. (shrink)

L'analyse rhétorique est souvent présentée comme une nouvelle méthode exégétique, parmi d'autres. Il serait sans doute plus juste de dire qu'elle est une nouvelle façon de mener l'une des multiples opérations nécessaires à l'étude des textes. Son premier fruit - son objet en réalité - est de fournir les instruments indispensables pour délimiter de manière raisonnée les unités littéraires, aux niveaux successifs de leur organisation : depuis celui du segment, bimembre ou trimembre , jusqu'à celui de l'ensemble du livre ; (...) il s'ensuit qu'elle fournit des critères véritablement scientifiques pour définir la notion de contexte que l'exégèse a toujours utilisée, mais de manière trop empirique. Son second fruit - qui est en réalité sa fin - est de frayer la voie à l'interprétation, dans la mesure où elle détermine quelles sont les unités qui doivent être lues ensemble parce qu'elles ont été ainsi composées par l'auteur. L'analyse rhétorique a aussi des retombées non négligeables pour d'autres opérations exégétiques : pour la traduction et même pour la critique textuelle. (shrink)

La parabole du vieux et du neuf selon Luc est pratiquement toujours considérée comme faisant partie de la controverse sur le jeûne ; ce qui limite fort son interprétation. En réalité c'estune péricope à part entière et son contexte est formé par l'ensemble des controverses avec les pharisiens : à propos du paralysé pardonné et guéri, puis chez Lévi à propos de la conduite de Jésus envers les pécheurs et le jeûne; puis, après la parabole, à propos des épis froissés, (...) puis de la guérison de l'homme à la main paralysée, toutes deux le sabbat. Centrale, la parabole est la clé de lecture de toute la séquence: la nouveauté est celle de la «nouvelle alliance» annoncée en particulier par Jérémie. Celle-ci repose sur le pardon des péchés, mis en acte dès le début. Sa figure est celle des épousailles; or Jésus se présente comme l'Époux. Ce qui est en question n'est autre que la Loi, représentée dès le début par ses Docteurs, cristallisée en finale dans le sabbat. (shrink)

O presente trabalho objetiva uma exegese da perícope de 2Pd 3,14-16, pertencente a uma das cartas católicas e deuterocanônicas do Novo Testamento. Para tal, utilizaremos as regras de Análise Retórica Bíblica Semítica, propostas pelo estudioso francês Roland Meynet, e, mediante esse método, podemos verificar a centralidade das Escrituras paulinas e do problema acerca de sua correta interpretação. Longe de supervalorizar esses escritos, o hagiógrafo reclama que não somente esses são distorcidos, mas igualmente também as outras Escrituras. Esta centralidade (...) coloca Paulo como exemplo a ser seguido pelos fiéis, os quais são opostos verazmente aos “falsos mestres”, que, desqualificando as Escrituras, colocam-se diametralmente opostos igualmente ao “amado Paulo”. (shrink)

BackgroundSexual boundary violations in healthcare are harmful and exploitative sexual transgressions in the professional–client relationship. Persons with mental health issues or intellectual disabilities, especially those living in residential settings, are especially vulnerable to SBV because they often receive long-term intimate care. Promoting good sexual health and preventing SBV in these care contexts is a moral and practical challenge for healthcare organizations.MethodsWe carried out a qualitative interview study with 16 Dutch policy advisors, regulators, healthcare professionals and other relevant experts to explore (...) their perspectives on preventing SBV in mental health and disability care organizations. We used inductive thematic analysis to interpret our data.ResultsWe found three main themes on how healthcare organizations can prevent SBV in mental health and disability care: setting rules and regulations, engaging in dialogue about sexuality, and addressing systemic and organizational dimensions.ConclusionOur findings suggest that preventing SBV in mental health and disability care organizations necessitates setting suitable rules and regulations and facilitating dialogue about positive aspects of sexuality and intimacy, as well as about boundaries, and inappropriate behaviors or feelings. Combining both further requires organizational policies and practices that promote transparency and reflection, and focus on creating a safe environment. Our findings will help prevent SBV and promote sexual health in mental health and disability care organizations. (shrink)

That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding (...) to this problem for safety, issuing from work by Williamson and Pritchard, are of dubious success. (shrink)

This essay describes the value and validity of public dialogue on science?related issues. We define what is meant by ?dialogue?, the context within which dialogue takes place in relation to science, and the purposes of dialogue. We introduce a model to describe and analyse the practice of dialogue, at different stages in the development of science, its applications and their consequences. Finally, we place the practice of dialogue on science?related issues in relation to the wider political process and draw out (...) implications for scientists in particular. (shrink)

Two distinct and apparently "dual" traditions of non-classical logic, three-valued logic and paraconsistent logic, are considered here and a unified presentation of "easy-to-handle" versions of these logics is given, in which full naive set theory, i.e. Frege's comprehension principle + extensionality, is not absurd.

In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e. that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.

In his recent book, National responsibility and global justice, David Miller conceptualizes and justifies a model of national responsibility. His conceptualization proceeds in two steps: he starts by developing two models of collective responsibility, the like?minded group model and the cooperative practice model. He then proceeds to discuss national responsibility, a species of collective responsibility, and argues that nations have features such that the two models of collective responsibility also apply to them. In this article I focus on the question (...) whether Miller?s like?minded group model and the cooperative practice model are plausible and convincing models of collective responsibility. I will argue that the like?minded model does not provide a plausible conceptualization of collective responsibility, while the collective practice model provides a good model for collective responsibility but is not particularly helpful in conceptualizing national responsibility. (shrink)

Nothing seems more possible to me than that people some day will come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in the… nervous system which corresponds to a particular thought, or a particular idea, or, memory.WittgensteinIn a recent essay it was emphasized that brain and mind appear to the mind as complementary and reciprocally recursive domains of a hermeneutic circle (Fischer, 1987). An outstanding and not yet recognized feature of this hermeneutic circle is that interpretation within this circle (...) is not rule-governed and hence appears self-organized: individual features of the world (or the brain) become intelligible in terms of the whole context (of the mind)… while the entire context becomes intelligible through individual features (or brain functions). How, or from where then is significance arising? (shrink)

Although neglected by psychology, self-respect has been an integral part of philosophical discussion since Aristotle and continues to be a central issue in contemporary moral philosophy. Within this tradition, self-respect is considered to be based on one's capacity for rationality and leads to behaviors that promote autonomy, such as independence, self-control and tenacity. Self-respect elicits behaviors that one should be treated with respect and requires the development and pursuit of personal standards and life plans that are guided by respect for (...) self and others. In contrast, the psychological concept of self-esteem is grounded in the theories of self-concept. As such, self-esteem is a self-evaluation of competency ratios and opinions of significant others that results in either a positive or negative evaluation of one's worthiness and inclusionary status. The major distinction between the two is that while competency ratios and others' opinions are central to self-esteem, autonomy is central to self-respect. We submit that not only is self-respect important in understanding self-esteem, but that it also uniquely contributes to individual functioning. Research is needed to establish the central properties of self-respect and their effects on individual functioning, developmental factors, and therapeutic approaches. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology”Roland Littlewood (bio)Keywordsreligion, innovation, psychosis, culture, diagnosisThis is an ambiguous though clinically valuable paper. Jackson and Fulford suggest that the distinction between their two categories, spiritual experience and mental illness, is conventional, yet their emphasis on issues of correct practice from the medical perspective threatens to return both into distinct ontological categories, albeit with a shared phenomenology. I do not understand why any (...) single instance must either be pathological or spiritual, except through clinical and clerical demands for clarity and order.Mental illness and spirituality are not two distinct natural phenomena “out there,” existing independently of human volition. They are both social—cultural if one prefers—ascriptions. Neither has some substantive core whose elucidation through psychophysiological, phenomenological or ultrahuman procedures could enable us to define its essence and thus differentiate it from the other. Neither experience is a self-evident datum. Both are easily susceptible to critiques, either that they do not exist as natural categories, or else that they should more properly be described as something else—as the workings out of social exclusion in the case of mental illness, as cosmological understanding or mass hysteria in the case of spirituality. Neither, I would suggest, can be specified by physiology or ultrahuman interventions respectively, but rather through shared cultural meanings which in turn are experientially validated by the biosocial phenomena themselves. It is not that we need to exclude the possibility of concurrences in brain states, but rather that these cannot specify the meaning and experience of the phenomena.Note that I emphasize “experienced through cultural meanings,” not “influenced by” culture: I do not accept that psychophysiology can have any existence independent of the social world through which it occurs. The psychiatrists’ form/content distinction, an optimistic proxy for nature/culture (Birnbaum 1923; Schneider 1928) may remain a convenient heuristic device, but it has a curious, perhaps doubtful, intellectual history (see the Endnote following).Cross-cultural comparisons argue that local idioms which we might approximate to current Western notions of mental illness and religion are quite varied. And the validity of particular instances of both “spiritual experience” and “psychopathology” may be contested in any society. While the social consequences of a pattern may determine the approbation accorded to a pattern such that patterns recalling chronic schizophrenia [End Page 67] are regarded as a deficit (and here I agree with James [1902] and the two authors), they are not necessarily aligned to categories of physical illness, but may be seen as a spiritual failure or obstruction. Unsuccessful or inappropriate shamanic practice among Amerindian and circumpolar societies is the classic instance (Eliade 1964). Within Western societies, demonic possession may be read by doctors as mental illness. (It is just as much a “spiritual experience”: why introduce the religionist’s distinctions between different types of ultrahuman agency? Compare Maslow on “peak” experiences. The terms “spiritual” and “religious world view” are naturalized idioms of late Christianity rather than cross-culturally valid terms [Tambiah 1990].) But also the converse (Koch 1972). And this depends on our professional interests. Clearly, psychiatrists prefer to perceive the world in a psychopathological idiom, while religious enthusiasts and clergy may favor divine intercession or demonic possession; and a Christian psychiatry not surprisingly may claim to act as arbiter (Sims 1991). Any specific instance may be perceived differently by individuals in accordance with their interests and affiliations.The paper’s terminology—“spiritual psychotic experience,” “genuine spiritual experience”—is confusing in that it does imply realist, not conventional claims (cf. Endnote 1, Jackson and Fulford). It is not necessary. A less laden idiom—such as “statistically or normatively unusual brain states and their experiential correlates” (Littlewood 1993, 257)—may be just too unwieldy for repetition, but I would propose that at this level of detail we need rather four categories depending or not on concordance with (i) something close to psychiatry’s recognition of a major mental illness, and (ii) something like an anthropological notion of religious or spiritual experience (cf. Littlewood 1991):[Table 1]PsychosisReligious ExperiencePresentAbsentPresentABAbsentCDSo Jackson and Fulford’s three cases fall into group “A” if the PSE was scored... (shrink)

C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist: realist in that what’s the case in arithmetic doesn’t rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with ‘a priori’. I’m here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins’s account beyond arithmetic—in (...) particular, to set theory. After setting out the central elements of Jenkins’s account and entertaining challenges to extending it to set theory, I conclude that a satisfactory such extension is unlikely. (shrink)

Brain functions are stochastic processes without intentionality whereas mind emerges from brain functions as a Hegelian “change from quantity”, that is, on the order of 1012 profusely interconnected neurons, “into a new quality”: the collective phenomenon of the brain's self-experience. This self-referential and self-observing quality we have in mind is capable of (recursively) observing its self-observations, i.e., interpreting change that is meaningful in relation to itself. The notion of self-interpretation embodies the idea of a “hermeneutic circle”, that is, (in interpretation (...) theory) the treatment of the whole in relation to its parts. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher's account of scientific progress incorporates a conception of explanatory unification that invites the so-called 'obsessive unifier' worry, to wit, that in our drive to unify the phenomena we might impose artificial structure on the world and consequently produce an incorrect view of how things, in fact, are. I argue that Kitcher's attempt to address this worry is unsatisfactory because it relies on an ability to choose between rival patterns of explanation which itself rests on the relevant choice having (...) already been made. I also suggest a way of answering the worry that Kitcher is not likely to endorse. (shrink)

Site‐specific recombination events are of fundamental importance in many biological systems. In vitro experiments using purified proteins and DNA sub‐strates are yielding insights into strand exchange mechanisms and synapsis of recombination sites. By examining results across a range of systems ‐ prokaryotic and eukaryotic ‐ two distinct classes of site‐specific recombinase enzymes can be defined.

We assess St. Paul's account of kenōsis in Philippians 2:5–8 from a neurophenomenological horizon. We argue that kenōsis is not primarily a unique event but belongs to a class of experiences that could be called kenotic and are, at least in principle, to some degree accessible to all human beings. These experiences can be well analyzed, making use of both a phenomenological approach and the cognitive neuroscience of altered states of consciousness. We argue that kenotic experiences are ecstatic, in that (...) they involve—both phenomenologically and neurologically—one's "stepping out of" his/her self and history. This seemingly impossible task of stepping out has led to the understanding of kenōsis as a unique event. We conclude that kenotic experiences are continuous with common, everyday experiences of the self's intimate communion with everything that exists. This means that kenotic Christology does not necessarily have to rest solely on the scriptures but can also be arrived at by way of the worldly experiences of actual, living persons. (shrink)

"Erst in diesem Jahr gestartet, ist bereits abzusehen, dass die Reihe der Sozialgeographischen Bibliothek im Franz Steiner Verlag fur die deutschsprachige Geographie Massstabe setzen wird [a] Lippuner, der mithin eine der besten ...

Cosmopolitanism is currently one of the most prominent topics in the social sciences and humanities, and a key concept for understanding globalization. This collection of essays, featuring a line-up of leading international scholars, argues that most work on cosmopolitanism uses a normative model, rather than fully interrogating the issue empirically, comparatively and globally. This ambitious and ground-breaking collection will push the boundaries of the debate on cosmopolitanism into new areas, opening up new lines of inquiry and analysis that will have (...) an impact on the study of globalization and global process for years to come."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

This paper argues that Philip Kitcher's epistemology of mathematics, codified in his Naturalistic Constructivism, is not naturalistic on Kitcher's own conception of naturalism. Kitcher's conception of naturalism is committed to (i) explaining the correctness of belief-regulating norms and (ii) a realist notion of truth. Naturalistic Constructivism is unable to simultaneously meet both of these commitments.