This article is a critique of Thaddeus Metz’s modal relational approach to moral status in African ethics. According to moral relationalism, a being has moral status if it exhibits the capacity for communal relationship as either a subject or an object. While Metz defends a prima facie plausibility of MR as an African account of moral status, this article provides a fresh perspective to the debate on moral status in environmental and ethical discourse. It raises two objections against MR: (...) the capability criterion inherent in MR is not only exogenous to African thought but also undermines the viability of MR; and MR cannot account for the standing of species populations. Both objections have severe implications for biodiversity conservation efforts in Africa and beyond. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Thaddeus Metz is probably the leading expert on the meaning of life. His latest book admirably displays his intellectual agility and fairness: arguments, counter-arguments, examples and counter-examples come in wave after wave that may compel most of us to slow down the pace of reading. If you have ever had the delight of interacting with Professor Metz at a conference, you know his irrepressible energy and love for debate. In this brief essay, I challenge some of Metz’s terminology, (...) raise a worry about the role of metaphysics in the meaning of life literature, suggest a reply to the religious relational account of meaning, and firm up the intuition that meaning is enhanced in a theistic cosmos. (shrink)

In a Guest Lecture delivered by Professor Thaddeus Metz at a Colloquium organized in honour of my 50th birthday, he critically interrogated various aspects of my African philosophical scholarship with a particular focus on what I consider as the task of an African philosopher in the twenty-first century. Drawing on the existential and social problems in contemporary Africa, I have argued that African philosophy should be tailored towards ameliorating these problems as a way of making life meaningful. Metz’s striking (...) criticism is that doing philosophy that does not necessary address existential and socio-political problems in Africa is worth taking seriously in African philosophy. He adds that the very idea of “meaningfulness constitutes a strong, competing reason,” to do philosophy for its own sake. In this article, I reply Metz, contending that his critique only differs in degree from the position I earlier defended but not in kind regarding the connection between theory and praxis. While we both agree on the imperativeness of theorizing in African philosophy, I argue further that African philosophy should go beyond this to solve the practical issues relevant to the advancement of humanity and the society. Keywords: African Philosophy, theory, Praxis, Thaddeus Metz. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Thaddeus Metz’s new book ‘God, Soul and the Meaning of Life’ presents a brief analysis of supernaturalist views about the meaning of life – my specific concern being the Divine purpose theory. While the view locates meaning in the fulfilment of some divine mandate, I show that this theory is, at best, unattractive. In this essay, I challenge the view that a belief in God is not necessary for the Divine purpose theory to be viable. I show that (...) if we were to agree that a belief in God is inconceivable, then a theory built on such a belief is, at best, wishful thinking. Arguing from a subjectivist perspective, I make clear the fact that any recourse to a godly mandate as what makes life meaningful inadvertently assumes an extrinsic and instrumental character, which makes such a pursuit an unattractive form of meaningfulness. Finally, I show that the God purpose theory is much too narrow as it fails to capture other paths to meaningfulness that do not involve a recourse to God, and also that any assigned purpose is unnecessary (and, therefore, unattractive), if God is all-knowing, all-powerful, etc. (shrink)

An e-book devoted to 13 critical discussions of Thaddeus Metz's book "Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study", with a lengthy reply from the author. -/- Preface Masahiro Morioka i -/- Précis of Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study Thaddeus Metz ii-vi -/- Source and Bearer: Metz on the Pure Part-Life View of Meaning Hasko von Kriegstein 1-18 -/- Fundamentality and Extradimensional Final Value David Matheson 19-32 -/- Meaningful and More Meaningful: A Modest Measure Peter Baumann 33-49 -/- Is (...) Meaning in Life Comparable?: From the Viewpoint of ‘The Heart of Meaning in Life’ Masahiro Morioka 50-65 -/- Agreement and Sympathy: On Metz’s Meaning in Life Sho Yamaguchi 66-89 -/- Metz’s Quest for the Holy Grail James Tartaglia 90-111 -/- Meaning without Ego Christopher Ketcham 112-133 -/- Death and the Meaning of Life: A Critical Study of Metz’s Meaning in Life Fumitake Yoshizawa 134-149 -/- Metz’ Incoherence Objection: Some Epistemological Considerations Nicholas Waghorn 150-168 -/- Meaning in Consequences Mark Wells 169-179 -/- Defending the Purpose Theory of Meaning in Life Jason Poettcker 180-207 -/- Review of Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life Minao Kukita 208-214 -/- A Psychological Model to Determine Meaning in Life and Meaning of Life Yu Urata 215-227 -/- Assessing Lives, Giving Supernaturalism Its Due, and Capturing Naturalism: Reply to 13 Critics of Meaning in Life Thaddeus Metz 228-278 . (shrink)

Neglected monotheism is how Thaddeus Metz and Motsamai Molefe designate the common denominator among the various religious cultures found across sub-Saharan Africa. This is a product of their engagement with such traditional African religious themes as God’s nature, God’s will, life beyond death, and the duration of existence beyond or without a body consequent on death. This article uses traditional Yoruba theology and its ritual archive, the Ifa corpus, to argue that Metz and Molefe’s monotheistic proposal is a hasty (...) generalization. In fact, on close inspection, the Ifa corpus turns out that traditional Yoruba theology is grounded in panentheism. (shrink)

My remarks on Metz's project will focus on another angle than the one Metz uses. I am more interested in thinking about whether and how far ethical standards from different cultures really differ, how to understand those differences, and how to relate them to what is objectively good, independently of people's opinions on the matter. Of course one widely circulating opinion on the topic is that cross-cultural differences somehow demonstrate that there is no such thing as objective good at all (...) – that each culture has its own conception of what is good, right, permitted, forbidden, and so on, and the differences are so wide that anyone at all familiar with this, can no longer take seriously the idea that there could be any “objective” values underlying such varied systems. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 2007: pp. 336-346. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article questions Metz’s purification of the evaluative subject, and wishes to pose the theological question concerning the meaning of life from a normative and social conception of subjectivity. Before asking whether or not God is indispensable to the meaning of life, it is first necessary to identify the ways in which God is hidden in the fundamental evaluations that the contemporary subject makes in the globalized capitalist world.

I argue that Metz's undertaking, in seeking a ‘comprehensive basic norm' to underpin African ethics, is similar to Hans Kelsen's postulation of the Grundnorm in his Pure Theory of Law. But African ethics does not need to be underpinned by an approach such as Kelsen's. In my view, Metz's preference for seeking to develop a Grundnorm rests upon a failure to attend carefully to the distinctness of African ethical thinking from Western ethical thinking. This failure is manifest in a spurious (...) distinction between ‘moral anthropology' / ‘cultural studies' and ‘normative theory'. It is also manifest in Metz's failure to attend carefully to the work of Wiredu and Bujo, both of whom present systematic, critical analyses of African ethical thinking while implicitly rejecting the quest for a Grund norm as being unAfrican. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 2007: pp. 347-355. (shrink)

A collection of several previously published articles by Thaddeus Metz translated into Igbo, with an introduction by Prof L. O. Ugwuanyi of the University of Abuja.

This paper is a critique of the new paradigm in analytic philosophy for investigating the meaning of life, focusing on Meaning in Life as the definitive example. Metz relies upon intuition, and reflection upon recent analytic literature, to guide him to his ‘fundamentality theory’. He calls this a theory of ‘the meaning of life’, saying it may be ‘the holy grail’. I argue that Metz’s project is not addressed to the meaning of life, but a distinct issue about social meaning; (...) and that by neglecting and sidelining alternative approaches, his results are rendered provisional. I then argue that there are a number of equally legitimate senses of a ‘socially meaningful life’; that Metz’s exclusive and unjustified focus on only one radically diminishes the scope of his project; and that what remains is undermined by cultural specificity. Finally, I argue that the Kripkean semantics Metz adopts runs counter to his interests. (shrink)

In his Meaning in Life, Thaddeus Metz puts a certain argument – the ‘incoherence objection’ – to a number of different uses. The incoherence objection states that attempts to establish knowledge of the truth of certain conditionals will, in conjunction with some uncontroversial knowledge claims, commit us to decidedly controversial ones. Given that we do not wish to be so committed, it follows that we cannot claim to know the truth of those conditionals. This article seeks to examine some (...) of the underlying epistemological assumptions of such an argument, raising potential problems to work on and locating areas where the argument might be refined or clarified. Although the considerations raised are for the most part general, specific issues concerning epistemic transmission principles are canvassed as regards the argument’s application to a particular view of life’s meaning associated with John Cottingham. (shrink)

“Western” moral thought is often stereotyped as being (too) individualistic, Thatcher-like; communities are treated as mere assemblages of individuals, each of whom must look after their own welfar...

Thaddeus Metz’s groundbreaking book A Relational Moral Theory provides a sophisticated moral theory hailing from the Global South. In this book, one of the theses he defends is that biotechnological enhancement is generally morally impermissible. This article, written for a book symposium on A Relational Moral Theory, primarily demonstrates how Metz’s criticisms presented in his book fail to convince. Furthermore, we explore some possible objections from Metzian deontology against enhancement and also show that these do not imply that enhancement (...) is intrinsically wrong. Finally, we showed how Metzian ethics offers good reasons to support rather than oppose enhancement. (shrink)

According to the pure part-life view the meaning in our lives is always borne by particular parts of our lives. The aim of this paper is to show that Thaddeus Metz’s rejection of this view is too quick. Given that meaning is a value that often depends on relational rather than intrinsic properties a pure part-life view can accommodate many of the intuitions that move Metz towards a mixed view. According to this mixed view some meaning is borne by (...) parts of our lives and some by our lives as a whole. The arguments in this paper suggest, however, that even if a pure part-life view is to be rejected, a mixed view that incorporates a whole-life aspect is not going to be any more plausible. (shrink)

In Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study, Thaddeus Metz advocates a kind of naturalistic objective theory of meaning in life, through a rejection of supernaturalism. In this paper, I examine Metz’s argument on supernaturalism, in particular, soul-centered theory and immortality. I will argue that his objection to supernaturalism is inadequate because he does not treat properly a familiar idea about the relationship between death and meaning, namely, the idea that a person’s death itself makes her life meaningless. Metz interprets (...) immortality as a condition for obtaining meaning, but in view of the idea that I present, immortality means the negation of the death of a person whose life already has meaning. As I see it, this idea about death and meaning is also one of the motivations to accept a soul-centered theory and therefore key to a fuller rejection of supernaturalism. (shrink)

In the first two sections of this reply article, I provide a brief introduction to the topic of ineffability and a summary of Ineffability and Religious Experience. This is followed, in section 3, by some reflections in reply to the response articles by Professors Metz and Cooper. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks on the future of philosophy of religion in the light of the most recent philosophical work on ineffability.

One of the practical ethical areas that Thaddeus Metz applied his Relational Moral Theory (RMT) to is business ethics. In this important area of applied ethics, Metz examines the question of how business owners, and related agents ought to deal with others, especially workers and consumers. He argues that the relational account of obligations recommends a stakeholder model of business and provides a plausible alternative (if not better to) familiar kinds of utilitarianism and Kantianism. In this article, I discuss (...) and engage with this claim by raising a number of issues for RMT. For although I believe that Metz’s moral account could, in general and under certain description, be positioned as a viable competitor to utilitarianism and Kantianism, it is not clear that in certain theoretical aspects of the stakeholder account of business, it fares better than, for example, utilitarianism. Furthermore, I argue, on the one hand, that RMT should be understood as a _heterochthonous account_ of African ethics and, on the other hand, that an _autochthonous account_ of African ethics captures better or comes closer to the moral sensibilities of indigenous Africans. An _autochthonous account_ of African ethics has a different take on the issue of the stakeholder model of business and does conceptualize the business relationship in terms of needs and welfare whereby a “distant” individual may be owed more duties than a “local” individual. (shrink)

David Benatar argues that one important consideration in favour of anti-natalism is based on the fact that all humans lack cosmic meaning; we will never transcend space and time such that we will have an impact on the entire universe, forever. Instead of denying Benatar’s claim that we lack cosmic meaning, Thaddeus Metz recently argues that our lack of cosmic meaning is not that significant because we ought not to regret lacking a good that we could not have in (...) the first place. He explains the principle behind this idea in modal terms: “the closer the world in which one could access a benefit, the more reasonable are attitudes such as sadness, disappointment, regret when does not acquire it.” I argue that this principle faces a serious counterexample in the form of death. The possible worlds in which one doesn’t die are incredibly distant. Yet, it is appropriate to express deep sadness, disappointment, and regret at the fact that one must inevitably face death. Metz is wrong that we shouldn’t regret lacking a good unavailable to us in the first place. His criticism of Benatar therefore fails. While it might be objected that immortality is not good, my basic point still stands when considering the fact that our lives are not significantly longer. Benatar’s claims about the significance of our lack of cosmic meaning might not be true, but not for the reasons suggested by Metz. (shrink)

This article is a reply to Thaddeus Metz's (2011). I suggest that Metz's theory is too broad since it entails that merely understanding Einstein's or Darwin's views can make a life highly meaningful. Furthermore, it is unclear whether , toward which highly meaningful lives are oriented, may or may not be necessary conditions to , how completely the former should explain the latter, and whether Metz's account is indeed non-consequentialist. While acknowledging the importance of Metz's contribution, I consider alternative (...) directions that future research might take. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTransitional justice encompasses a global body of scholarship and practice that concentrates on responses to large-scale wrongdoing in the context of an attempted shift from conflict and/or repression. In my book, The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice I argue that transitional justice is a distinctive type of justice. Transitional justice requires the just pursuit of societal transformation. I define transformation relationally, as the terms defining interaction among citizens and between citizens and officials. Transformation is necessary because of the presence of (...) pervasive structural inequality and wrongdoing. Transformation is a practical possibility because of the uncertainty characteristic of transitions. Processes of transitional justice pursue transformation by dealing with past wrongs. The just pursuit of societal transformation requires heeding the moral claims of victims and moral demands on perpetrators. In this paper, I address four issues raised by Sirkku Hellsten, George Hull, Thaddeus Metz, and Margaret Urban Walker. I first discuss the methodological questions pressed. I then consider challenges to the substantive view of transitional justice I propose. I next turn to queries about the distinctiveness of transitional justice. Finally, I respond to skepticism about the necessity and value of a substantive normative theory of transitional justice. (shrink)

In _A Relational Moral Theory: African ethics in and beyond the continent_ ( 2022 ), Thaddeus Metz proposes an African moral theory according to which we ought to respect and honour the capacity of individuals to be party to harmonious relationship. He aims to present a moral theory that should ‘be weighed up against at least contemporary Western moral theories’ (p. 2). As Metz intends his theory to be a serious contender with other moral theories, I assess how his (...) moral theory can be applied and contribute to contemporary moral discussions _‘beyond the continent’_, as the subtitle of the book puts it. In particular, as Metz’s relational moral theory is grounded on the value of harmony, an important question is how well his theory handles _disharmony_ especially if his theory is to have application in our non-ideal world in which disharmony is rife. And here, I hold up Metz’s account to one area of disharmony, disruptive emotions and affective injustice. By first establishing how disruptive emotions and affective injustice pose a challenge to similar relational moral theories grounded in harmony, I argue that Metz’s theory has distinct advantages in the way in which it can indeed engage with such phenomena. I close the paper by considering the objection that Metz’s account is limited in making sense of a common form of disruptive emotion in response to structural injustices where affective injustice can arise, but ultimately conclude that such a limitation is superficial. (shrink)

A pioneer in the field, Christian Metz applies insights of structural linguistics to the language of film. "The semiology of film . . . can be held to date from the publication in 1964 of the famous essay by Christian Metz, 'Le cinema: langue ou langage?'"--Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Times Literary Supplement "Modern film theory begins with Metz."--Constance Penley, coeditor of Camera Obscura "Any consideration of semiology in relation to the particular field signifying practice of film passes inevitably through a reference to (...) the work of Christian Metz. . . . The first book to be written in this field, [ Film Language ] is important not merely because of this primacy but also because of the issues it raises . . . issues that have become crucial to the contemporary argument."--Stephen Heath, Screen. (shrink)

The current informal practice of pharmacometrics as a combination art and science makes it hard to appreciate the role that informatics can and should play in the future of the discipline and to comprehend the gaps that exist because of its absence. The development of pharmacometric informatics has important implications for expediting decision making and for improving the reliability of decisions made in model-based development. We argue that well-defined informatics for pharmacometrics can lead to much needed improvements in the efficiency, (...) effectiveness, and reliability of the pharmacometrics process. The purpose of this paper is to provide a description of the pervasive yet often poorly appreciated role of informatics in improving the process of data assembly, a critical task in the delivery of pharmacometric analysis results. First, we provide a brief description of the pharmacometric analysis process. Second, we describe the business processes required to create analysis-ready data sets for the pharmacometrician. Third, we describe selected informatic elements required to support the pharmacometrics and data assembly processes. Finally, we offer specific suggestions for performing a systematic analysis of existing challenges as an approach to defi ning the next generation of pharmacometric informatics. (shrink)

This narrative provides insight into medical education for Black physicians in South Carolina in the 1960s, during the civil rights movement. It also discusses the many rewards and challenges of being a physician of color, describes what has been done to develop programs that benefit minority communities, and argues that more such programs are needed.

One of the central issues in comparative law and political economy is whether the forces of globalization will result in the convergence of public policies across countries. Noting in particular that taxes collected still cover a considerable range across industrialized countries — from a low of 20% of GDP to a high of 50% — some have argued that globalization has not resulted in a loss of tax sovereignty. However, following a review of the evidence, in this Article we conclude (...) that globalization has had significant but subtle effects on tax levels and structures. Moreover, these pressures will make it increasingly difficult for countries to raise revenue to finance new public needs and to structure their tax systems in order to achieve a more socially acceptable distribution of income than what market forces dictate. Tax levels in most countries have remained essentially flat over the past twenty years, but there is a host of reasons for thinking they would have continued to rise were it not for the pressures of globalization. Statutory corporate tax rates have declined dramatically and, although corporate tax revenues have remained robust, this has been due to factors unrelated to deliberate tax policy choices. Personal marginal tax rates have also declined sharply and tax revenues have been increasingly raised by regressive consumption taxes. These trends stem from tax competition brought on by the forces of globalization, not from changing ideas or other political variables. In this Article we conclude that in order to prevent tax competition from completely eroding the ability of countries to fashion their own tax systems, there will have to be considerable cooperation among the major countries and some harmonization of aspects of their tax systems, particularly as they apply to footloose factors of production. (shrink)

The most remarkable characteristic of Pope Benedict XVI’s encyclical Caritas in Veritate is its theologically robust mode of discourse: a pervasive and unapologetically Trinitarian and Christological, substantive argument, based in a robust theological anthropology of person and society as gift, and a peculiarly Platonic and Augustinian rhetorical mode of discourse. Caritas reveals the implicit, hidden, and faulty theological and philosophical commitments of secular reason—which, when used as a medium for the Gospel, can too easily taint the true doctrine the Church (...) attempts to convey with it—proclaiming instead a radically orthodox diagnosis of and prescription for a disenchanted, love-and-truth starved—yet Enlightenment-weary—postmodern world. (shrink)

Originally published in German in 1935, this monograph anticipated solutions to problems of scientific progress, the truth of scientific fact and the role of error in science now associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn and others. Arguing that every scientific concept and theory—including his own—is culturally conditioned, Fleck was appreciably ahead of his time. And as Kuhn observes in his foreword, "Though much has occurred since its publication, it remains a brilliant and largely unexploited resource." "To many scientists just (...) as to many historians and philosophers of science facts are things that simply are the case: they are discovered through properly passive observation of natural reality. To such views Fleck replies that facts are invented, not discovered. Moreover, the appearance of scientific facts as discovered things is itself a social construction, a _made_ thing. A work of transparent brilliance, one of the most significant contributions toward a thoroughly sociological account of scientific knowledge."—Steven Shapin, _Science_. (shrink)

Ideally, the government of any nation is in a contract with the citizens for protection of life, property and freedom while the citizens are obliged to obey government laws. Moreso, the government is to discharge her duties without discriminating against any person or group. In Nigeria there are economic and administrative policies that discriminate against the Igbo nation resulting in dire consequences. Since economic policies make or mar the wellbeing of citizens especially in business, the need for fairness, equity, and (...) justice in the formulation and execution of policies is unquestionable. The Igbo of South East Nigeria, who are very active in business and entrepreneurship, suffer untold disadvantages and massive economic losses due to the lopsided and discriminatory economic policies churned out by successive Nigerian governments. Here we examine and argue against such policies based on their ethical implications and effects on individual and national development. (shrink)

Ariane Lewis offers a comprehensive and expert review of ethical issues raised by brain death in the United Kingdom and how they compare to management of those issues in the United States (Lewis 20...

In this issue of JCE, Douglas Diekema argues that the best interest standard (BIS) has been misemployed to serve two materially different functions. On the one hand, clinicians and parents use the BIS to recommend and to make treatment decisions on behalf of children. On the other hand, clinicians and state authorities use the BIS to determine when the government should interfere with parental decision-making authority. Diekema concedes that the BIS is appropriately used to “guide” parents in making medical treatment (...) decisions for their children. But he argues that the BIS is inappropriately used as a “limiting” standard to determine when to override those decisions. Specifically, Diekema contends that the BIS “does not represent the best means for determining when one must turn to the state to limit parental action.” He argues that this limiting function should be served by the harm principle instead of by the BIS.I contend that we should not reassign the BIS’s limiting function to the harm principle. In this article I make two arguments to support my position. First, the BIS has effectively served, and can serve, both guiding and limiting functions. Second, the harm principle would be an inadequate substitute. It cannot serve the limiting function as well as the more robust BIS. (shrink)

In the first part of the article I show how Descartes employs the sceptical theist strategy as part of his response to the problem of evil in Meditation Four. However, Descartes's use of this strategy seems to raise a serious challenge to his whole project: if Descartes is ignorant of God's purposes, then how can he be sure that God doesn't have some morally sufficient reason for creating him with unreliable clear and distinct perceptions? Drawing on related objections from Mersenne (...) and Hobbes, I show in the second half of the article how Descartes can sidestep this objection. (shrink)

Pullman argues that when it comes to medical aid in dying (MAID), “Canada … has much to learn from California” (Pullman 2023). Canada and California have similar populations: each about 40 million...

Bester offers powerful arguments for why the harm principle cannot replace the best interest standard (BIS) as a guide for, and limit on, surrogate healthcare decision making (Bester 2018). Since B...