With the conviction that "the gap between traditional morality and the avant-garde approach is widening," Erwin W. Lutzer offers this precise, easy-to-understand, and knowledgeable critique of situation ethics. This presentation adds new insights to the discussion of morality and the ethic of love. Lutzer pinpoints the fallacies of the situationist's philosophy and offers a biblical alternative that clearly recognizes and deals with moral conflicts.

God is whatever we want Him to be -- Many paths lead into God's presence -- God is more tolerant than He used to be -- God has never personally suffered -- God is obligated to save followers of other religions -- God takes no responsibility for natural disasters -- God does not know our decisions before we make them -- The fall ruined God's plan -- We must choose between God's pleasures and our own -- God helps those who (...) help themselves. (shrink)

Out of the shadows -- It's not all your fault -- The voice of God or the voice of the devil -- No condemnation: no need for suicide -- The truth that hurts and heals -- The healing power of light -- Conflicts of conscience -- Becoming an impossible person -- Forever forgiven -- When sorry isn't enough -- A clear conscience in a dark world.

The three essays reprinted in this book were first published in 1963 as individual chapters of a psychiatric treatise entitled Psychiatrie der Gegen wart (Psychiatry of the Present Day). The editors, W. H. GRUHLE (Bonn), R. JUNG (Freiburg/Br. ), W. MAYER-GROSS (Birmingham, England), M. MUL LER (Bern, Switzerland), had not planned an encyclopedic presentation; they did not intend to present a "handbook" which would be as complete as possible in details and bibliographic reference. Their intention was to "raze the walls" (...) separating Continental and Anglo-Saxon psychiatries and to offer a synopsis of developments in psychiatry during the last decades on an international basis. The editors requested, therefore, cooperation of scholars from many foreign countries, large and small, on both sides of the Atlantic. A section entitled "Borderlands of Psychiatry", in which MARGARET MEAD (New York) discusses the relation of "Psychiatry and Ethnology", HANS HEIMAN (Bern), the relation of "Religion und Psychiatrie", and ROBERT VOLMER (Paris), "Art et Psychiatrie", is a good illustration of the trilingual character of the whole work. Two of the editors, GRUHLE and MAYER-GROSS, died before the publi cation had been completed. In a kind of posthumous eulogy, Professor JUNG and Professor MULLER praised the initiative and accomplishments of MAYER-GROSS, "who during the last five years of his life had given a great deal of his time to this work. He had set his mind on a synthesis of German and Anglo-Saxon psychiatry. (shrink)

The three essays reprinted in this book were first published in 1963 as individual chapters of a psychiatric treatise entitled Psychiatrie der Gegen wart (Psychiatry of the Present Day). The editors, W. H. GRUHLE (Bonn), R. JUNG (Freiburg/Br. ), W. MAYER-GROSS (Birmingham, England), M. MUL LER (Bern, Switzerland), had not planned an encyclopedic presentation; they did not intend to present a "handbook" which would be as complete as possible in details and bibliographic reference. Their intention was to "raze the walls" (...) separating Continental and Anglo-Saxon psychiatries and to offer a synopsis of developments in psychiatry during the last decades on an international basis. The editors requested, therefore, cooperation of scholars from many foreign countries, large and small, on both sides of the Atlantic. A section entitled "Borderlands of Psychiatry", in which MARGARET MEAD (New York) discusses the relation of "Psychiatry and Ethnology", HANS HEIMAN (Bern), the relation of "Religion und Psychiatrie", and ROBERT VOLMER (Paris), "Art et Psychiatrie", is a good illustration of the trilingual character of the whole work. Two of the editors, GRUHLE and MAYER-GROSS, died before the publi cation had been completed. In a kind of posthumous eulogy, Professor JUNG and Professor MULLER praised the initiative and accomplishments of MAYER-GROSS, "who during the last five years of his life had given a great deal of his time to this work. He had set his mind on a synthesis of German and Anglo-Saxon psychiatry. (shrink)

Epigenetic research has brought several important technological achievements, including identifying epigenetic clocks and signatures, and developing epigenetic editing. The potential military applications of such technologies we discuss are stratifying soldiers’ health, exposure to trauma using epigenetic testing, information about biological clocks, confirming child soldiers’ minor status using epigenetic clocks, and inducing epigenetic modifications in soldiers. These uses could become a reality. This article presents a comprehensive literature review, and analysis by interdisciplinary experts of the scientific, legal, ethical, and societal issues (...) surrounding epigenetics and the military. Notwithstanding the potential benefit from these applications, our findings indicate that the current lack of scientific validation for epigenetic technologies suggests a careful scientific review and the establishment of a robust governance framework before consideration for use in the military. In this article, we highlight general concerns about the application of epigenetic technologies in the military context, especially discrimination and data privacy issues if soldiers are used as research subjects. We also highlight the potential of epigenetic clocks to support child soldiers’ rights and ethical questions about using epigenetic engineering for soldiers’ enhancement and conclude with considerations for an ethical framework for epigenetic applications in the military, defense, and security contexts. (shrink)

Early in 1926 Erwin Schrodinger presented his famous theory of wave mechanics to account for atomic phenomena. It is often assumed that Schrodinger’s work reflected a realist philosophy. In this article, I will argue that this assumption is incorrect.

A work in this genre inevitably invites comparison with the 1953 anthology of Vivas and Krieger. Though containing some duplication of the contents of the earlier volume, Weitz's collection makes many additional, fine selections available--e. g., three examples of Erwin Panofsky's techniques; Hospers' "The Concept of Artistic Expression"; Malraux on style; Chapter IX of Cassirer's Essay on Man; and a direct encounter in which Erich Kahler has prepared a traditional, humanistic rebuttal to Weitz's own contention that 'art' cannot be (...) defined. A good anthology.--D. W. S. (shrink)

Subtitled "Rejections of Cartesian Dualism" this collection of essays traces through western Philosophy the strong but often overlooked idea that the body and the mind are not two different kinds of entity somehow reconciled in man, but rather a unity that is man. The editor's introduction sets forth Aristotle's ideas, concentrating on the dictum that it is the same man that thinks and runs. Spicker also treats Descartes' view, and the view of the Cartesians, ably separating the two when necessary. (...) The rest of the book is basically arranged chronologically, starting with extracts from Spinoza's Ethics, an essay on these extracts by Hans Jonas, and then moving through Julien de la Mettrie and two short essays by Kant. The second part of the book contains interesting essays on the human body by John Dewey, Douglas Long, and B. A. O. Williams, all defending the essential unity of body and soul. The third and last section of the book is itself divided into two parts, the first of which, entitled "Philosophy of Embodiment" contains four extracts from the works of prominent phenomenologists, Max Scheler, Gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. These essays all center around the necessity of a concept of the "lived body" to the understanding of man's being-in-the-world. In the last section, the quality of the essays drops, although it is delightfully leavened by a witty essay by Richard Griffith on the foot. This section contains essays on particular parts of the human body, such as sight and the upright posture, by Herbert Plügge, Hans Jonas, and Erwin W. Straus. There is a selected bibliography for those who are captured by this basic thread of western thought.--W. A. de V. (shrink)

The introduction and six essays in this book originally appeared as a continuing series in the Southern Journal of Philosophy, and are gathered together here for the first time in one volume. In the introduction, E. M. Adams briefly touches upon the major questions of the philosophy of mind and how they have been dealt with in the past; his suggestion for the future is that philosophers give themselves a little more "categorial room" in which to handle these problems. In (...) the first essay Douglas Browning argues for the essential privacy of the verbal and adverbial functionings of feeling. This is followed by an essay by Charles Hartshorne in which he argues that feelings are by no means essentially private, and that in fact God shares all of our feelings in their full totality. The essay by Donald F. Gustafson continues the non-privacy argument in a different mode. He argues that there is an essential connection between feeling and the expression of that feeling, and that keeping feelings to oneself is something that is learned and by no means necessary. I am not sure his rather narrow notion of privacy keeps the argument philosophically interesting, however. In contrast, the fourth essay, by Erwin W. Straus, is basically phenomenological, and, unfortunately, sounds more like a polemic than a clear description of the incommensurability between the lived world and the "scientific world." In the fifth essay Edward H. Madden gives a synoptic view of the recent work in the philosophy of mind by C. J. Ducasse. Madden sees in his work an extremely promising analysis of the problems in this field, and attempts to show why this is so. The most interesting essay in this book is, I found, the last, by the editor, in which he adds another discussion of Strawson's concept of a person. Van de Vate argues that the analogy upon which Strawson launches his account is misleading. Rather than seeing the concept of a person allied with a tool of the sort Wittgenstein described, Van de Vate would have us understand it in the light of public tools like parliaments. From here, Van de Vate argues that persons are not natural facts, but social facts. I should like to see a more complete handling of this idea and its problems at some future date.--W. de V. (shrink)

The article covers Erwin W. Straus’ views on the problem of time and temporal experience in the context of psychopathology. Beside Straus’ published scholarship, including his papers dealing exclusively with the subject of time, the sources utilized in this essay comprise several of Straus’ unpublished manuscripts on temporality, with the primary focus on the 1952 manuscript Temporal Horizons, which is discussed in greater detail and subsequently published for the first time in this journal. In the first part of the (...) article, the author introduces what he considers to be the central tension of the whole of Straus’ work on the issue of time, namely, the tension stemming from a dualistic account of time with its personal and impersonal dimensions. Interpretative developments of this tension are followed covering Straus’ early German works and his late American scholarship. The author presents Straus’ way of overcoming the dualistic account of time and his arguments in favour of what is termed here the “unified view of time”. Of critical importance for the unified view is Straus’ concept of “today”, which is extensively commented upon. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on the psychopathological consequences of the unified view as seen by Straus. A clear-cut boundary between a normal and a psychotic experience of time is supposed to lie in breaking the bond between the personal and the impersonal orders of time, leading to a fundamental estrangement. This view, it is claimed, is already present in a nutshell in Straus’ earliest work, and is elaborated upon later. In conclusion, both the merits and the weaknesses of Straus’ account of temporality are presented. A major advantage is that Straus abstains from a dualistic conception of time and reappraises the often-devalued clock time. A fundamental drawback is that Straus does not venture to explore the pathological varieties of temporal experience and fails to specify the acknowledged differences between, on the one hand, psychotic elements in depressive disorders, and, on the other hand, such elements in schizophrenic disturbances. (shrink)